Ethnic Conflict and Multiculturalism - Essay Example

The rationality and irrationality of ethnic violence: Aggressive nationalisms always claim that they are regrettable but rational defensive reactions against perceived external threats; but this claim that aggression is defence, and that aggression is rational, is always (or often?) itself an irrational claim.  Explain and comment upon this statement Every ethnic group in the world had faced or initiated aggression against another throughout the human history. In the hundred years before the end of Cold War there have been radical transformations from monarchy to communism to democracy, from liberal capitalism to stringent economic protectionism, and vice versa across the globe. Not only have there been numerous instances of such changes but have also oscillated from one extreme to another. Amid all this churning, the one strong conception with which peoples in different parts of the world could identify with is their ‘nation’. The prevailing geo-political circumstances of the recent centuries have made these conflicts all the more fiercer and frequent. Irrespective of the arena and time of these conflicts, its initiators have always claimed some rationale and legitimacy for their purported ‘defensive’ actions. But there is obvious contradiction in the terms ‘defence’ and ‘aggression’. Moreover, an attrition warfare emerging from ethno-nationalistic feelings, inevitably leads to injustices in the form of war profiteering, mass rapes and other atrocities. In this context, it becomes difficult to justify the claim that aggression is defence, and that it is rational. This essay will elaborate on this assessment by perusing appropriate scholarly resources. Ronald Suny article ‘Why We Hate You: The Passions of National Identity and Ethnic Violence’ attempts to sort through theories of ethnic conflict. It peruses the case of Soviet Union, before and after its collapse, to identify underlying motives of ethnic conflict. The author disagrees with the view forwarded by certain academics that Primordialism, which springs from an innate, natural identity, is at the root of most ethnic conflicts. But, since the notion of Primordialism is itself loosely and vaguely defined, this argument does not hold merit. Secondly, there are deficiencies in a Constructivist approach to studying ethnic conflicts, as this approach does not provide a satisfactory explanation for most conflicts in the past. Moving away from these simplistic assessments of ethic conflict, Suny suggests that a combination of both emotion and reason are at work in any given instance of conflict. The emotions that instigate conflict include fear, resentment, hate and anger. But it is debatable whether there is sufficient justification for these emotions and whether they are backed by historical fact (Suny, 2004). The Balkan region had seen some of the turbulent episodes of war and strife dating back to ancient history. Twentieth century Germany is another relevant case study, as the nation had gone through three distinct phases in this period. Similarly, a few South East Asian nations have composite ethnic, religious and cultural identities. By carefully studying the internal dynamics of conflicts in these examples, key insights into the nature of ethnic conflict could be gained. The collapse of Yugoslavia into smaller states is a significant event following the collapse of the Soviet Union. To understand the complexities involved in this outcome, we have to grasp the history of the region going back a millennium. The middle centuries of first millennia AD was a period of continuous change in Europe. There were widespread animosities between various tribes in their quest for geographic locations rich in natural resources. At this period of time, around 6th and 7th century AD, no one tribe could claim nativity over a piece of land as there were constant displacement from and conquering of new lands. It was then that “the Slavonic tribes, mixed with the Avars, made their appearance in the Balkans, which was sparsely inhabited by many different tribes of the Illyrians, the Dardanians, the Thracians and probably others whose names have fallen into oblivion” (Almond, 1998). The present day hostility between Albanians and Serbians could be traced back to this period. Contemporary Albanians, who descended from the aforementioned tribal groups, were defeated in warfare by migrating Slavonic tribes. While some of the conquered were assimilated into Slavonic tribes, the rest took refuge in inaccessible geographic locations like mountain tops. The victorious Slavs on the other hand took control of the most fertile and irrigable lands in the region. Hence, the geography of the Balkans is an important aspect of ethnic rivalries there. “There is little doubt that the process of appropriating the possessions of the pre-existing population created a deeply felt resentment between those who lost their homes and their land and those who profited from the conquest. This hatred was transmitted from father to son over many generations and it became a constant factor in the relationship between the Serbs and the Albanians. Inherent to this feeling remained a strong desire to retake the lost areas if an opportunity appeared”. (Velebit, 1999) Primoridalist theory of ethnic conflict is one way of looking at Balkan history. But, it does not hold true for in all instances of conflict. For example, the primodialist approach to ethnic conflict states that ethno-national bond is much stronger than patriotic bond. The basis for the formation of ethno-national bonds are never fully based on fact and evidence, but rather on some vague but convincing feeling of kinship within a group of people. In other words, the concept of ethno-nationality appeals to the notion of common genetic inheritance alongside other tangible aspects such as language, culture, religion, etc. But, it is evident from the aforementioned case that factors such as geography and material wealth are as powerful in instigating aggression as are ethno-national bonds. For a major period of human history material wealth was synonymous with fertile lands abundant with various food sources (Velebit, 1999). On a biological basis, there are no major differences in the genetic makeup of Serbs and Albanians, or for that matter among other groups in the Balkans. Yet, the ancestors of present day Balkans were engaged in much attrition warfare. The notion of nationalism, which gained currency relatively recently in human history, fails to account for the intra-Balkan hostilities. This suggests that reason, in this particular case the possession of fertile lands, proved to be a strong motivation for initiating aggression, the legacy of which is still witnessed in the psyche of the people in this region. But, it would be too simplistic to presume that reason had always prevailed over emotion in the history of Balkans. For as long as recorded history exists, dating back to pre-Christian times, religious belief of some sort existed among the primitive communities across the world. The Balkan region was no exception. Religion and irrationality go hand in hand. A classic example of its exhibition happened with the arrival of Ottoman Turks toward the end of the century. Unlike other contenders, the Ottoman Turks were more powerful, militarily better organized and renowned for shrewd tactics. This is a turning point in the history of the Balkans. The subsequent Ottoman rule was marked by religious tension between the Mohammedan rulers and their Christian subjects. “This is particularly true in the first two hundred years of Turkish rule over south-eastern Europe, when the natural economy prevailed and the central power of the sultans was still respected. After the gradual introduction of the money economy and the appearance of greedy and rapacious local pashas, the fate of the Christians deteriorated considerably and became almost unbearable. It led to religious conversions and numerous uprisings, which in the 17th and 18th centuries became a regular feature in the Ottoman Empire”. (Almond, 1998) Similarly, constructivist and instrumentalist approaches to studying ethnic conflict do not provide a consistent picture. The case of twentieth century Germany provides a suitable illustration of such theoretical inadequacies. Since the end of the Cold War and the subsequent unification of Germany, there has been persistent discussion, analysis and debate in the academic and media circles over the perceived differences, between the structural aspects of Germany’s political and economic institutions before and after the unification. In this context, the term Bonn Republic is applied to represent “the old Federal Republic of Germanys (FRG) political system, with its emphasis on political stability, consensus politics, high welfare expenditure and a multilateral foreign and defence policy”. In sharp contrast, what is termed the new Berlin Republic, post October 1990, “is seen to refer to a more fluid polity, in which traditional patterns of domestic politics and policy are called into question, and whose foreign policy is normalising in terms of pursuing clearly-defined national interests” (Tewes, 1998). Though Germany is the leading endorser of the EU’s enlargement eastwards, it has found this concept incompatible with its objective to promote stronger European integration. By employing the “role theory”, an explanation could be found for this state of conflicting interests. More precisely, “West Germanys post-war role in European politics was that of a promoter of deeper integration; the deepening of West European integration thus became part of the self-conception of West German foreign policy-making elites. The changed situation after 1990 placed new demands on German foreign policy makers. West Germanys traditional self-conception as an integration deepener conflicted with the desire on behalf of unified Germany to press for EU enlargement. However, although German policy makers employed a variety of strategies in order to pursue their incongruous foreign-policy aims, their principal concern remained with the deepening of western integration”. (Jeffery, 2003) In addition to the issue of western integration, there is widespread debate within Germany about the changing nature of the country’s identity in light of its new policy framework. An area of concern for many German intellectuals is the implication of this new identity to the country’s decision making process and vice versa. This issue is very significant, as Germans are always cautious in matters affecting their identity and perception from outside. This goes back a long way, the most notable example of which is the so-called “Primat der Aussenpolitik, the doctrine of the primacy of foreign policy, that was adopted during the nineteenth century” (Lansbury and Pain, 1997). Germany’s relationship with its western neighbours since the fall of the Berlin wall has been more or less on expected lines. But even here, there is an inherent contradiction, due to the fact that while Germany was expected to approve of the Maastricht Treaty and integrate into the EMU, there is also anticipation from western democracies as to “the strategy Germany would pursue towards CEE, and German support for enlargement towards the East was seen with rather more wariness” (Dyson, 2003). Due to long-standing economic connections, cultural similarity, and other strategic advantages in foreign and domestic policy, it was expected that Germany would be the prominent member of a hypothetical northern bloc in the EU that was meant to counter a southern bloc led by France. But, this concept serves only as the epitome of a general prevalence of incertitude about Germanys motivation within the EU. Nevertheless, during the early 1990’s, the other members of the European Union were preoccupied with their own domestic problems that Eastern enlargement was not on top of their agendas. In this scenario it is understandable how significant it was that German political leaders addressed the issue at all (Dyson, 2003). Hence, the fluid and impermanent nature of twentieth century German policy serves expose the inadequacies of constructivism and instrumentalist ethnic conflict theories. The fact that the Nazi war machinery of the 1930s started off in the name of ‘aggressive nationalism’ is a stark reminder of the irrationality of such notions. The Nazi propaganda during the period was full ‘nationalistic’ fervour, with cries for ‘defending’ the sovereignty of the Aryan race. It is difficult to reconcile such seemingly respectable feelings with the mass slaughter of six million Jews by the end of the Second World War. It then becomes impossible to equate any measure of rationality, reason or genuine emotion with ‘aggressive nationalisms’. The other argument against ‘aggressive nationalism’ derives from the theoretical aspects of the term nationalism. It is well documented how the rise of nationalism was facilitated by the simultaneous decline of key cultural conceptions of great antiquity, which had erstwhile had a profound effect on humankind. The first of these changes had to do with the role of language in the evolution of human civilization. For much of history, written language was interlinked with power and privilege. The religious elite especially had employed the medium of written language to control the thoughts and actions of the masses. This was true across various religions. Second was the dismantling of the belief that the ruling elite earned their right by divine decree. The liberalization of language use had encouraged rational discourse among the common people and the movement toward democratic governance owes its advance to this. The third development which made it conducive for nationalism to flourish is the conceptual separation of humans and their physical world. For much of pre-modern history, the view held by scholars and intellectuals were essentially anthropocentric, meaning that they interpreted natural phenomenon from the stand point of its significance to human existence. But this approach to studying the world around them changed not only the course of scientific progress, but had also ushered in changes of political organization - one such advance being ‘nationalism’. What we learn from the growth of nationalism is the triumph of reason over superstition and blind faith. Seen in the backdrop of these facts, the irrationality associated with so called ‘aggressive nationalism’ is obvious. In other words, the claim that ‘aggression is defence’ is incongruent in the context of the historical development of nationalism. Relevant to the discussion of nationalism is Samuel Huntington’s hypothesis termed ‘The Clash of Civilizations’. The theory springs from the framework of ‘aggressive nationalism’, with its attendant justifications in the form of ‘aggression is defence’, ‘aggression is rational’, etc. But this theory found endorsers and critics in equal measure. The primary criticism is levelled against the fact that he cannot back up his assertions with comprehensive statistical proof. Further, the idea of a newly emergent era in human history that would be dominated by ‘The Clash of Civilizations’ might be convincing at the level of theory, but since the theory pertains to events in the future, one cannot ascertain its validity at this point in time. Also, social science and other related fields of scholarly inquiry are not conducive to theorizing. This is borne out by the fact that the last great idea in this field of inquiry was Francis Fukuyama’s concept termed the ‘End of History’, which is not proven to be true but can only considered a proposition. Huntington’s thesis too is subject to the same criticism. Admittedly, there are enough instances in history that substantiate Huntington’s theory. But as many instances, if not more, can be presented that contradict the thesis. For example, there is undue stress on the apparent incompatibility of Islamic and Western civilizations and the resultant conflict between the two entities. But a brief look at twentieth century political history would suggest several instances where these two seemingly incompatible entities do successfully cooperate. In other words, the seemingly strong ethno-nationalistic bond within the Islam dominated countries of the Middle East would overwhelm opportunistic commercial alliances between the two ethno-national groups. (Said, 2001) The falsity of this supposition is illustrated by the classic example of collaboration between the Saudi Royal family and American political leadership. The elites of Saudi Arabia have strong business ties with American corporations – a relationship that goes back many decades. Even when the perpetrators of the September 11, 2001 attacks were identified to be predominantly of Saudi origin, the political leadership of both nations continued their business as usual. The authoritarian regime in Saudi Arabia is considered the most backward looking within the Islamic world. Yet, the leaders of so-called progressive West continue to maintain strong business and political relations with it. This is despite the fact that a large majority of Saudi citizens condemn American diplomatic and military intervention in the Middle East region. The theory of ‘Clash of Civilizations’ falls flat on its face when one recognizes how reactionary the Saudi regime is. Similarly, there are numerous instances of opportunistic commercial alliances in twentieth century history, especially in Latin America and South East Asia that significantly weaken conceptions such as ‘aggressive nationalism’. Contradictions such as these significantly weaken Huntington’s theory. Even the Al Qaeda and its leader Osama Bin Laden were in the payrolls of CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) as recently as the 1980s. In fact, a large share of the credit for the successful growth of Al Qaeda is to be attributed to the American government, which nurtured the fledgling terror outfit with funding and supplies of ammunition in order to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. To cite a more recent example, Saddam Hussein was Washington’s blue-eyed boy when it was in confrontation with Iran in the 1980s. Both Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein have proved at various times in their lives that they are willing to subjugate the well-being of their native ethnic community for personal interests and prospects (Said, 2001). Examples such as these further weaken theories of ethnic conflict, including constructivist and instrumentalist approaches to studying ethnic conflict. In a similar vein, they also mitigate the claims of ‘rationality’, ‘self-defence’, etc, that are usually associated with acts of aggression. In conclusion, in the prevailing world order, the fight for supremacy in the realms of ideology, material wealth and territorial conquest have superseded conflicts on the basis of differing ethnicity and its attendant attributes such as religion, culture, language, etc. Of all the constituent elements that comprise a particular nationalism, its identification with religion, ethnicity and culture form the core. A nation’s affiliation with these elements is constantly being challenged by forces of change in the economic and ideological domains. In this scenario, justifications for aggression in the name of nationalism seldom holds true. Claims such as ‘aggression is defence’ are not only irrational, but also devoid of merit. References: Almond, Mark. "Balkanized: The Wonder Is Not That Serbia Attacked Kosovo, but That It Waited So Long." National Review 20 Apr. 1998: 32+. Brown D and Wilson I “Ethnicized Violence in Indonesia: where criminals and fanatics meet” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 13, 3, 2007. Dandeker C, Nationalism and Violence, Transaction, New Brunswick, 1998, Ch.1 “Nationalism, Nation-States and Violence at the end of the Twentieth Century” Kenneth Dyson (2003), ‘The Europeanization of German Governance’, in S. Padgett, Edward Said, The Clash of Ignorance, retrieved from on 12th May, 2009 Huntington, Samuel P, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Published by Simon & Schuster, 1997. Jeffery, C., & Paterson, W E (Oct 2003). Germany and European integration: a shifting of tectonic plates. West European Politics, 26, 4. p.59(21 Pain, N., & Lansbury, M. (April 1997). Regional economic integration and foreign direct investment: the case of German investment in Europe. National Institute Economic Review, 160. p.87(1). Suny R.G., “Why We Hate You: The Passions of National Identity and Ethnic Violence”, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post Soviet Studies. Paper, 2004, : 22-32 H. Tewes (1998) ‘Between deepening and widening: role conflict in Germany’s enlargement policy’ West European Politics 21(2): 117—133. Velebit, Vladimir. "Kosovo: A Case of Ethnic Change of Population." East European Quarterly 33.2 (1999): 177.. Read More