Impact of the Buncefield Oil Depot Fire - Case Study Example

BUNCEFIELD INCIDENT Introduction This is an explosion that occurred on the morning of 11th December, 2005 in Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire which resulted to a large fire that has never been seen anywhere in Europe since the end of Second World War. It took four days to bring the fire under control in which kerosene, aviation fuel and twenty two tanks of diesel that were stored in the depot had been completely destroyed. There was a huge black Plume that was as a result of the fire which was also visible in satellite images and could even be seen in some parts of London and South East of England. This incidence forced hundreds of nearby residents to leave their dwellings. Due to the magnitude of the explosions, the noise could be heard in as far as some parts of Belgium, Netherlands and France and it is even believed to have woken up some people who were in places such as South London and Wokingham which are approximately 28 Kilometers away from the scene of the incidence. This forced the UK’s government to declare it a major incidence and a “Strategic Co-coordinating Group” was formed in order to evacuate those with damaged homes and business premises (Pat Troop). The police and the fire service led the response team and during the peak of the operations there were up to 180 firefighters being aided with 26 fire pumps with over 700,000 liters of foam being used in the operation (C.DRP, 2007) The widespread damage caused by the explosion stretched to as far as 2 kilometers from the site and it ended up affecting 20 businesses which employed 500 people and destroyed premises belonging to businesses which had employed approximately 3500 people and over 2000 people were evacuated by the deployed government rescue workers. During the time of the incident, the present inventory in the depot was more than 35 million liters of petrol, diesel and aviation fuel in which a third of it lost due to the fire (CDRP, 2007) Prior to the explosion, the depot was one of the largest and most strategically placed fuel storage sites that was owned by a number of petroleum companies such as the Total and British petroleum (B.P) that operates in the UK. The oil depot used to receive aviation fuel, diesel, petrol and other different types of petroleum products through its network of pipeline, it used to store these products and eventually re-distributing them either through the pipeline network or by road tankers to places such as London & South East England or to important facilities such as the Luton, Heathrow or Gatwick airports. Buncefield Impact on the Society Environmental Impact In any large chemical or environmental incident, it is proper for the environmental agency concerned to asses any potential impact. This could be done on a variety of approaches based on previous incident and whenever the information on the dangers posed becomes available a decision needs to be taken up on the need to carry out and follow out investigations. When the air pollution data was collected and analyzed by various organizations, there was an analysis of how they could identify any potential health risk resulting from exposure to the plume which was as a result to the huge flames, it was concluded that there was no significant public health risk as a result of the exposure to the plume and the fire outbreak (Pat Troop) When an environmental impact assessment was performed it was confirmed beyond reasonable doubts that the public health advice issued during the incidence was correct and that there was no hazardous exposure to the members of the public either through the plume or the hazardous chemicals. The air quality data at the time also confirmed that there would be no significant pollution at ground level arising from the plume and in a confirmation of this 72 samples from 33 different locations were obtained from soil and grass downwind of the fire and compared with control locations and background information on level of pollutants, also collected and analyzed were samples of dust & soot. These samples were collected before any substantial amount of rainfall falling in the area so as to avoid any possibility of rain washing away any pollution attached to the vegetation, property or soil (Pat Troop). These samples were later on analyzed in two different laboratories by using a combination of chemicals such as dioxins, furans, fluorides, heavy metals such as the nickel and the vanadium which are considered to be appropriate markers for oil combustion. When the results arising from the analysis were compared with the control site and available background data of these pollutants from UK soils, majority of the samples that were analyzed were found to be exceptional and had insignificant evidence on contamination arising from the fire (Pat Troop). There is a lot of concern on the 26 million liters of contaminated water that were used in fighting off the blaze as well as some of the ground water that were contaminated by diesel that entered a borehole. The environmental agency are also aware of the presence of the perfluoroctane sulphonate a toxic substance that is mainly used in firefighting foams that does not break down easily in the environment. According to the department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs the incidence did not result in substantial pollution of the soil and an initial report on the results of air quality also indicated that it is unlikely that there has been widespread impact at the ground level (BBC, 2006). Health Impact There was no single case of casualty but two people on the site suffered serious injuries and the health and protection agency issued out a statement concluding that there was no significant health risk posed by the plume either as a deposit or on the air quality. Amongst the people who attended the accident & emergency departments of hospitals in relation to the incidence, 90% of them were sent home without some necessary sorts of follow up since there were only few cases of minor injuries, the Health Protection Agency (HPA) also found the anxiety among the public to have dropped from 50% during the incidence to 13% around February (BBC, 2006). Local Residents According to the Dacorum County Council, 2000 homes were evacuated and after one year since the incidence occurred, still two families were spending temporarily in a local authority accommodation and in the Christmas of 2006 three families were likely to have spent their second Christmas in a hotel. In a survey involving some 761 households within the area, 67% of them had experienced some sorts of damages related to broken glasses, damaged window and door frames and cracks in ceilings e.t.c. Most of the residents displaced from their homes were allowed back and in some instances the damages have recurred, the cracks are so large that water pours in whenever there is rainfall and some of the biggest stress came as a result of dealing with the insurance companies which took up to four weeks to send their loss adjustors to view the damage experienced, and the companies have even delayed payments pending investigations, this scenario has a significant psychological impact on the residents (Cabinet Office, 2007). Compensation claims against the site owners are to be settled by use of negotiations or mediation without admission of liability and there are approximately 3300 claims worth an estimated seven hundred million pounds that have already been filed by individuals, assessors and businesses. Among the claims, 250 are from individuals estimated at 20 million pounds, and the remaining 2754 are for less than 10,000 pounds (BBC, 2006). Economic Cost The Mayland employment area was one of the largest parks in the East England Business area, which was home to some 630 businesses that employed an estimated 16,000 people. Despite affecting businesses from micro enterprises to large scale corporate organizations it also notably increased the operation cost and most of the companies were affected by the inability to meet most of the incoming orders and total losses were estimated to be in the region of 100 million pounds (Cabinet Office, 2007). This incidence is being believed to have affected some 92 local businesses employing over 9000 people who were directly affected. After the first year since the incidence occurred, 14 businesses employing over 200 people directly have relocated and several are operating under temporary premises. A total of two businesses that employed over 25 people have since gone into liquidation all being attributed to the incidence but the majority of the 630 companies that operated within the vicinity remain committed to Maylands. According to East of England Development Agency (EEDA), businesses were affected to the tune of 70 million pounds (BBC, 2006). The EEDA, commissioned an economic impact study in order to asses the impact created by the incidence on a wider economic scale and its main objective was in exploring the role Maylands played before the incidence, investigating the negative effects of the incidence and coming up with the necessary recommendations & conclusions for the regeneration of the area. EEDA provided 3 million pounds to aid in regenerating the area together with some additional funds that were to be used in developing a new business centre and accommodating small enterprises (Continuity Central, 2006). Social Impact Hertfordshire County Council decided to close two hundred schools after the advice of the Health Protection Agency, this led to disruption of the regular classes and brought about confusion onto when the institutions would resume their normal operations, However, this did not last and by December 14th most of them had re-opened only leaving out those that were severely damaged by the blast (Cabinet Office, 2007). Psychological impacts were many and varied and even professional counselors did not anticipate the magnitude of the incidence, they were overwhelmed by the number of parents who contacted them and teachers likewise were faced with issues that they were totally unused or not trained to handle and most of the common thoughts among younger people was that it was the end of the world with symptoms such as sleepless nights, fearing the dark, anxiety and general insecurity (Cabinet Office, 2007). Steps required to re-build Buncefield. Large parts of the depot have largely been destroyed by the inferno and cannot be used at their present state, re-building the site requires relevant consent from the Dacorum Borough Council, it also requires a pre-construction safety report to be submitted to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the Environmental Agency (EA) for consideration (MIIB, 2006). There are also new measures that are going to apply to new establishments that will help in mitigating and preventing the consequences of major accidents and it will set a clear benchmark for the safety of the people and the surrounding environment. Some of the proposals are (SEPA): Above ground storage tanks together with the underground storage tanks have to adhere to a certain standard in order to ensure their proper compatibility with the chemical and physical properties of the liquid to be contained in them, they should avoid excessive vapor generation, they should be protected against over & under pressurization, they should be designed to prevent failure due to corrosion or some chemical reaction, inspected, tested and maintained on a regular basis. All the pipe work within the establishment should adhere to a certain mechanical standard to ensure compatibility with the mechanical and physical properties of the fluid, they should withstand impact on thermal expansion and other foreseeable events such as fire and they should be designed in a way that they prevent failure due to corrosion or chemical reaction. All the valves should have the capability of being isolated by some strategically located fire safes shut off valves on outlet pipes, they should have a capability to be closed on an emergency and they should remain operable on an event of failure. The entire tank gauging system shall be automated and high level alarms will have to be installed, on substances which have a capability of creating vapor cloud an integrity high level alarming system will be provided. The above ground storage tanks shall be bunded in order to provide secondary containment and the bunds shall be impermeable, corrosion resistance, durable, they should have the capacity to allow for tank failure and firewater management, have no pipe water that penetrates through the bund wall and they should be regularly inspected and certified by a competent authority. The underground storage tanks will comply with all the specifications of the above ground storage tanks and in addition they will have to be double skinned, and have a failure monitoring system such as an alarm. The underground pipework will have a failure alarm monitoring system, they should also be double skinned and have the routes of the trenches clearly marked. The installation should also have the capacity to absorb the anticipated volume of hazardous fluids including fire water. Fire load risks have to be periodically undertaken in order to determine the optimum methods and equipments suitable for the rapid restoration and control of the foam application, there must be a prepared fire fighting plan, and all the movable fire fighting equipment have to be available on demand. All the maintenance have to be managed and operated according to maintenance, inspection and the testing authority which will ensure a sufficient level of operability for both the system and equipment present. The establishment will have to be managed and operated by sufficient personnel whom will also be expected to be competent in respect to the responsibilities undertaken by them in connection to the establishment they operate from (SEPA). Buncefield Recommendations There should be a common methodology developed for overfill protection which needs to be inline with the IEC61511 safety standard. Safety integrity should always be guaranteed by a proper proof testing and careful management of change should properly be applied. All the known operators of Buncefield type site should protect containment of petrol against loss and some similar flammable fluids by fitting a high integrity automatic overfill protection system that could be electrically separated and is independent from the tank gauging system. The location receiving the fluid should be in control of all the transfers without necessarily being dependant on third parties, all the tank gauging system should come with modern sensors that diagnoses logs automatically and control all the override actions. There should be appropriate measures to detect leaking vapors and the system should have a certain relationship with the overfill protection system that can aid it through the detection system in order to initiate action in limiting the extent of the loss. However, as an alternative action the application of a CCTV may be considered. Conclusion The explosion which resulted to huge fires and damages involving 23 large oil tanks had one very important aspect, the severity of the explosion, an inquiry was formed by the MIIB to investigate into the origin of the incidence and establish any further work that may be necessary based on the findings presented. In the first report the findings were disseminated and five speakers from the technical group gave their presentation on the basic of the forensic evidence, detonation hypothesis, assessment of structural damage, alternative mechanism and proposals for further work. However, unlike other incidents, most of the evidence available were in form of statement witnesses and CCTV footage which aided in establishing facts. There are allegations that a pancake shaped vapor formed covering an area of approximately 120,000m2 and a height of 2m was formed and there is also evidence alleging that the ignition source was present in the emergency pump house and high pressure could be witnessed in all the area within the cloud irrespective of the terrain and with time the overpressure diminished rapidly. There are also suggestions supporting the proposition that the trees and the undergrowth nearby, aided in the acceleration of the flame to the tune of several hundreds m/s, and according to the original work undertaken, the most likely scenario may be summarized as follows: There was dense water dispersion within low wind speed conditions that led to a cloud build up of over 120,000m2. The likely ignition that occurred at the emergency pump house, due to the pump house failure structure followed by a deflagration outside the pump house. Detonation of some parts of the remaining gas cloud. Flame acceleration around the three cherry tree lanes on velocities of several hundreds m/s followed by a detonation near the junction. The phase within the project has helped in identifying experimental work which is to be completed by a second joint industry funded project. It is widely believed that the trees along the three cherry lanes and bushes played a significant role in the acceleration of the flames and that the focus should also be in preventing loss of containment. References 1. Professor Pat Troop. The Public Health Impact of the Buncefield Oil Depot Fire. Retrieved January 2010. From http://74.125.93.132/search?q=cache%3AW739WmkiMycJ%3Awww.hpa.org.uk%2Fweb%2FHPAwebFile%2FHPAweb_C%2F1194947321467+buncefield+environment+impact&hl=en&gl=ke 2. Crime and Disorder Review Panel (CDRC) Retrieved January 2010. From http://www.newforest.gov.uk/committeedocs/cdrp/CDR03240.pdf 3. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Buncefield Effects. Retrieved January 2010. From. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6181626.stm 4. Cabinet Office. 2007. Buncefield Social Impact Assessment Final Report. Retrieved January 2010. From http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/131519/buncefield_%20_social_impact_assessment_%20_final_report.pdf 5. Continuity Central. 2006. Buncefield Explosion Cost Local Businesses. Retrieved January 2010, From. http://www.sro.hse.gov.uk/PublicPages/ShowArticle.aspx?id=42 6. Major Incidence Investigation Board (MIIB). 2006. Rebuilding Buncefield. Retrieved January 2010. From http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/faqs.htm 7. Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA). Rebuilding Buncefield. Retrieved January 2010. From http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/static/documents/Research/ca_containment_1797226.pdf Read More