Mixed Methods Research - Assignment Example

Mixed Methods Research A. 1. Explain what the researchers wanted to find out. What research methods did they employ? What criticisms may be made of the research design? The researchers highlight the lack of recent research into the access of those detained in police stations to legal advice. While older studies exist, the researchers claim that ‘this is unfortunate because there have been major changes in both the management of the police stations and the provision of legal aid to suspects’.1 Due to such modernization factors, the researchers claim that the procedural aspects of supplying suspects with legal advice has also changed, as have the available resources. The study to be conducted aims to clarify the effects of these changes, which uses both qualitative and quantitative data2 collected through observation and interviews. The researchers wanted to discover whether the current situation providing legal advice to those detained in police stations is legal, and to what extent the elements of ‘denial and choice and lack of privacy’3 affect the access of suspects to legal advice. The main form of legal advice researched is that of telephone conversation, where it expressed that some police stations do not provide the facility for private phone calls of suspects obtaining legal advice. Thus, the study researches the legality and the fairness of denying suspects the choice of how and from whom they obtain the legal advice. The research method is interestingly hybrid in nature, two detention sites were chosen, and one week of observational data was collected followed by some 56 interviews conducted with persons from the chosen sites. Data was collected from custody records, thus providing both qualitative and quantitative data, the latter of which was analysed using SPSS. The mixed method choice of research is, however, the recipient of criticism: it is argued that such researchers overestimate ‘its ability to reveal the truth and occasionally imprison their thought in one system’.4 Such critics, ascribing to the incompatibility thesis state that qualitative and quantitative data is inherently distinct and thus should not be combined in a single study.5 Rather than compliment one another and thus increase the ambit of the data found, the components of qualitative and quantitative research could conflict one another and cause incorrect or irregular data to be collected. It is claimed that such mixed-methodology allows the use of multiple approaches during the research stages6, and if the researchers are able to combine the two research types in a complementary manner, then effective results can be achieved. Although this approach is hailed for being able to provide detailed procedures of research method, it appears that the incompatibility theory criticism is rather strong. Whether qualitative and quantitative data combined in the same realm will render an effective form of methodology also depends on the extent to which the researchers conduct their research, and how aware they will remain as to the potential conflicts. In the current context it may prove advantageous, because it can provide two separate stances in data form, and bring them together; it is highly suggestible that the current study would not render such comprehensive results if just a qualitative or quantitative method was used. 2. What conclusions do the authors draw from their empirical research? Explain whether these conclusions are justified. The authors conclude that the lack of privacy given to those seeking legal advice is present, as is the lack of choice of who provides the suspect with the legal advice. It is, however, also concluded that this is not illegal per se, rather that it is considered unfair by those being detained. The researchers further conclude that in the two sites chosen, legal advice given by telephone potentially undermines the right to privacy of the detainee, due to the location and public positioning of telephones in the sites. It is worth noting that the two sites were distinct from one another in that one is privately run, and the other publicly run. The researchers found that the three forms of legal advice provided at police stations is by telephone, meetings in person and by telephone, and solely meetings in person. Those suspects who are unable to pay for legal advice may receive advice from legal aid solicitors, duty solicitors or the Criminal Defence Service Direct. It was also found that advice given solely by telephone is an unusual practice, and that suspects are often also seen in person. One of the main concerns of the researchers is the fact that suspects receiving advice from CDS Direct are not given the choice of advisor; rather they are connected with any available advisor. Suspects in such situations are not always guaranteed a meeting in person and may have to settle for a phone call only. Based on observations made in the two chosen sites, the finding that 18.7% of legal advice is given by phone, and 28.6% is given by phone and in person, an observation was made as to the telephone areas in the sites. Observations showed that both sites provide little privacy for telephone calls, and that suspects were aware of this, but did not object to it. The main conclusion of the researchers is that there is an inherent lack of privacy for suspects who obtain legal advice while detained in police stations – in site 1 both persons involved in the telephone conversation could be overheard and in site 2 the words of the suspect could be heard. It is also suggested by the researchers that this lack of privacy inhibits legal consultations and the advice that suspects receive, which is confirmed by interviews obtained with suspects – advisors may often use the telephone as a way of informing the suspect that he/she will come to meet them face to face.7 However, the research seems to have been limited in its addressing of how suspects feel about the situation – it appears that interview questions were mainly based on what the situation is currently like. Indeed, the researchers even state that ‘there has been no empirical research into what suspects think of being restricted to telephone advice…or lack of privacy during legal consultations.’8 Although the interviews conducted gather much ground in depicting the current conditions in respect of telephone calls for suspects, any presumption of suspect’s opinions about the lack of privacy is lacking in empirical evidence. Although the researchers refer to case law in this respect, the concept that suspects may find the lack of privacy ‘chilling’ is merely presumed, and not actually empirically found in the research.9 Whether this can be used as a presumption for how suspects feel about the lack of privacy is highly doubtful, and it is evident that more research would be needed to conclude such a finding. The researchers also found through empirical evidence that the situation in which legal advice is given in person is not much better than the situation on the telephone. While consultation rooms are allocated for such meetings, they were observed to be limited in number and it was suggestible that the custody area would often be used during busy periods for consultations. It was observed that conversations held in the custody area had as much risk of being overheard as telephone consultations, although there is no restriction on advisors waiting for a consultation room to become vacant. It was further observed that CCTV cameras existed in both sites, with audio feed – though not in cells and in the consultation rooms. Interviews with suspects did however conclude that this was not a main issue for suspects in respect of their invasion of privacy during consultations. The conclusions backed directly by the empirical research appear to be justified, if only from the fact that the data was collected from first hand experience. The presumptions of the effect those findings have on suspects is less justifiable, mainly by lack of evidence and empirical data to support it. There does not appear to be any favorable interpretation of the data, and the fact that suspects were not overly objecting to the conditions under which they receive legal advice was duly noted. 3. With reference to Hammersley’s argument on the ‘political’ nature of social research, explain any political dimensions of this article. Hammersley questions whether social research is political, and if so, whether it should be political. He claims that value neutrality is an increasingly desired approach to research, and that researchers too often approach conducted research with a pre-conceived basis of ideals in mind of what they wish to convey or find with the results of their research. He stringently claims that ‘researchers should strive to be value neutral or objective’10 and states that although critical research has the potential to provide these criteria for successful findings, value conclusions are often connected to value assumptions, which affects the outcome or the analysis of research. He claims of these assumptions that, ‘unless judged from a perspective that already assumes their validity, there is no reason to accept them at face value’.11 So how can value conclusions be drawn from factual evidence, and is this evident in the current study conducted by the researchers? There is some evidence that the current study does not evident unwarranted value assumptions. The researchers support the interpretation of their empirical findings with socially contextual elements. For example, when it is ascertained from the empirical evidence that the privacy of suspects is hindered by the conditions under which they receive advice via telephone, reference is made to the European Convention on Human Rights. This provides strong evidence for the findings in that it the right to privacy is a social institution protected by actual legislation on both a European and national level. This appears to be in line with Hammersley’s theory, for he claims that if beliefs based on fact are to be considered as critically applicable, they should be ‘systematically generated by a particular social institution’.12 The researchers constantly refer to case law and legislation when asserting their findings, suggesting that the interpretation of the empirical findings is not localized to their expectations and their value considerations, but to that of the wider society. Hammersley questions why we should believe what scientists claim to have established as fact. Indeed, he states that we ‘should distinguish between a factual knowledge claim being true and our belief that it is true’.13 How does this apply to the current study? What elements of the study can cause us to accept it as factual? Firstly, the research is based on both qualitative and quantitative data, and as applied correctly, each can operate to validate the other. The interviews convey true emotions of those subjected to the concept at issue; they convey some degree of consensus as to what is expressed. However, the researchers do not base their findings solely on these interviews and observations, they base them also on the legislation and case law. By basing their research findings on established elements of social authority, they have increased the possibility that the facts will be perceived as correct in their social context. Does there appear to be any degree of bias within the study findings? Indeed, the study does not state any suspect who has no problem with, or even agrees with the lack of privacy. The results of interviews provided in the paper are not overly in favour of implementing the point they are trying to establish as fact. This severely reduces the possibility of bias within the findings shown. It is thus apparent that while there was a potentially high risk of bias entering into the research and the interpretation of the results, there appears to be no high degree. Indeed, the political stance of the researchers is that the measures are not sufficient to provide suspects with adequate privacy when receiving legal advice, but they do not succumb to premising aspects or elements of the study. 4. Why are research ethics important? What ethical issues might have arisen in the conduct of this research, and how should any ethical dilemmas have been addressed? Research ethics are inherently important when conducting research studies to ensure that the rights of others are not violated, and to ensure that the purpose of the study is not outweighed by the negative effects it has on the subjects being studied. It is also connected to the requirement of honesty when reporting data and findings and procedures conducted. It could be suggestible that the researchers may have altered the way in which they communicate their findings in order to support the principle they were trying to establish. They could also have chosen two sites known for being less than satisfactory in terms of privacy given to suspects. However, the study seems to portray a broad range of empirical evidence, not simply that which unconditionally confirms their suggestions. Whether the two sites chosen were deliberate is not evident in the study, although reference was made to other sites, which ensured that the two sites chosen was a realistic depiction of such prisons in general. To overcome this potential problem, the researchers could have conducted the study over four or more sites to gain a more generalized idea. Another important area of ethics is the requirement of objectivity when conducting research. Was the design of the experiment conducted to ensure their thesis, or was it a realistic portrayal of a typical study method? The interviews are an effective method of ensuring objectivity, so long as this objectivity remains throughout the recording and interpreting of answers. Whether the main aim of the study was divulged to interviewees was not disclosed, although the answers appear to be unbiased and seem to be free of alteration, for they are not entirely in favour of the thesis proposal. When conducting interviews with subjects such as suspects, issues of confidentiality come into play. The study did not disclose any personal information of the interviewees, and was neutral in its portrayal of the subjects interviewed. There was also no apparent discrimination against any of the subjects – similarly, the conditions described in the sites was not entirely critical and good points were recorded as well as bad points. For example, the researchers noted that while the custody areas would subject suspects to a lack of privacy due to crowding, they were not forced to receive legal advice in this area and were free to wait for an interview room to become free. Furthermore, a high degree of competence was evident throughout the study, coupled with a strong understanding of the topic and of the legislation and conditions involved. The researchers did not include any personal criticisms, and focused mainly on the responses of the interviewees, as well as the relevant provisions of law to support their findings of the importance of privacy. Integrity was also shown in respect of the police, and no references or suggestions were made to portray that they intentionally eavesdrop on conversations with suspects by telephone or during consultations. The importance of research ethics appears to have been followed by the researchers – they appear to have appreciated its relevance and have strived to conduct their research in line with its principles. Of course, the concept of ethics has been criticised as being highly subjective, and thus no specific code can be formulated. However, there are some common sense concepts that can be effectively applied. When conducting research, it is important to understand not only what research ethics consist of, but also to grasp the reason as to why they are required. Research that conflicts with or goes against research ethics often suffers in its validity. Similarly, it raises questions as to what the point is of unethical research that does not comply to the established principles of fairness. Unethical research indeed weakens the very basis of the results obtained by such practices. B. 1. What is the purpose of comparative legal research? Why does the author undertake such research in this article? The purpose of comparative legal research is often in response to a problem area found within the law of a particular legal system. The assessment as to whether the legal provision in question is appropriate or not, or right or wrong is often the cause of much debate. How do we define when a problematic area of the law is sufficient or whether it requires change? It is only be the reference to other legal systems that an idea can be gained to allow us to arrive at ways of altering the law. By using other legal systems as examples, one can assess whether they function more effectively, or whether they resolve the problems found in the initial legal system. If this Is found to be the case, then a more effective and systematic critical analysis can be made of the law. Put simply, how can something be criticised in its own right unless it is compared to another better (or worse) example? For example, to claim that fried potatoes are unhealthy is not to claim much. How are they unhealthy? Why are they unhealthy? The contention gains little ground in claiming the extent of their unhealthiness. However, when compared to an apple, we are provided with the comparative criteria, under which we can assess the differences in fat, calories and other aspects that we claim make the fried potatoes unhealthy. This is the same with legal comparison; to compare it to another legal system allows us to analyse the extent of its shortcomings, and to proceed to suggest alterations based on the system it is compared with. The above points are displayed perfectly in the context of the paper analysed; Hogg claims that there are problems inherent in the law of unilateral promises, mainly that they are often disguised as contracts in some legal systems. The desirability of this, he claims, is questionable. By comparing several legal systems in this aspect, he is able to analyse their approach to and regulation of the unilateral promise, and thus claim whether his contention is correct in respect of other legal systems. By assessing how each system approaches the principle of the unilateral contract, he can form a more complete idea of whether the problems he claims are inherent in all such legislation, or whether they are remote to the system in question. By finding potentially more effective ways of dealing with the unilateral contract in other systems, he can then suggest how the current system he criticises can be altered or improved. Such comparative analysis in the legal field also allows one to predict the results of suggested alterations with some clarity. By utilizing one (better) system to highlight the problems of another legal system, the alterations required can be made using the better system as a model and the effects it brings can be predicted. This enables a much stronger set of contentions to be made when criticizing – or hailing – legal concepts; one can state that the current system is bad because system A is better, or that system B is lacking in areas which system C seems to have settled sufficiently. The other systems to which a current system can be compared will provide the researcher with a set of principles and standards by which his chosen system can be tested. 2. Explain the ‘presumption of similarity’ and the ‘presumption of difference’. Where do you think the author might stand in this methodological debate? The presumption of similarity is based on the contention of how two systems or problems are similar. Thus the researcher comparing two different legal systems or concepts will have the presumption in mind of the different needs of different societies and the result that they require institutions to solve these problems and meet these needs.14 Whether a presumption of similarity or difference will be assumed depends on the extent to which the researcher compares systems due to their similarities or due to their differences. But what are these similarities and differences based on? The comparison of two systems based on the similarity of their solution of a certain problem will not qualify as the presumption of similarity; indeed the concept delves much deeper than this. This praesumptio similitudinis states that a presumption of similarity of practical legal results amongst different legal systems.15 But while these results are similar, the methods and approaches will vary between legal systems. Those acting on the presumption of similarity will acknowledge that while some systems differ on one level, they may also function in a similar manner on another level. It is suggested that a complete comparative exercise requires any components of similarity to be uncovered before the comparison takes place.16 In contrast, a presumption of difference is the way in which a comparative researcher will gain a better understand of the jurisdiction from which he hails by the comparison method. This is because the legal system he compares his own to is different, and he is thus able to delve into the new system, and return to his own system with a new approach. It is contested that he is likely to find elements in his law that he was not able to see before the comparison. Such resumptions of difference allow one to use the comparative process to gain a deeper understanding of his own legal system.17 It seems that the author’s approach is somewhat presumptive of similarities. He appears to recognise that some systems do not identify unilateral promises as valid aspects enforceable by law, but that they nonetheless implement some form of legal process in connection with such promises. In order to understand more fully how the law of his jurisdiction is lacking or in need of some clarification, he chooses to compare it to other jurisdictions. This practice is not based on the presumption of difference; he indeed states the different forms of unilateral promise in the chosen legal systems, and highlights how they differ. He therefore recognizes that the systems he has chosen are similar in that they recognise some form of unilateral promise, although he highlights their application, definition and difference in validity of these unilateral promises and forms these differences as a basis of his comparison. 3. Evaluate the author’s choice of jurisdictions to be compared. The author is comparing the three main systems of law; civil, common and mixed law. His aim is to analyse how each of the three systems acknowledge the unilateral promise and to what extent they give effect to its validity in law. The countries he chooses are Germany, England, and Scotland. On an evolutional level, the author’s choice of jurisdictions is extremely appropriate. By choosing two systems, and a third which is a mix of the initial two, he is thus able to make a very comprehensive comparison, not only of the two extremes but also of the compromises that may be found in the middle mixed jurisdiction system. When comparing different systems, comparators are often tempted to choose extremes, without considering a middle ground. However, this middle ground can serve to bring greater clarity to the findings of the two extreme systems. The fact that the dual jurisdiction system is a combination of the two extremes will allow the author to analyse whether, in a mixed system, principles of one or the other extreme are preferred, or whether aspects of both are equally employed. This has the potential to gather much ground in the study he proposes, because, although the three jurisdictions are differentiated, they are also close enough to not bring sparse results that may be difficult to compare. For example, if he had compared English law to Arabic law, he may have encountered many problems in light of any major differences found. 4. To what extent does this article embody prescriptive legal scholarship? What legal measures or reforms does the author recommend? How far would you agree with the author’s conclusions? The area of law chosen by the lawyer to compare is an area which has been the cause of debate in the UK. Therefore, from the outset, the author has chosen a topic which has relevance and is in need for some degree of further clarity in light of its uncertainty and problems. The author then proceeds to specify how each of the three jurisdictions treats unilateral promises His approach is structured and clear, and his objectives are apparent. He describes clearly, but with enough detail, the legal system of each jurisdiction, and explains the main concepts of how each treats unilateral promises and the main principles behind the treatment. The author shows an educated understanding of legal systems and the main components, which it consists of and concentrates on these elements so that the comparison does not become cluttered with irrelevant information or points. He highlights the main components of unilateral promises in each system in evident preparation for a concise and final comparison of these elements. The author then proceeds to compare the main elements from each system and supply them to actual examples. He essentially applies the law of each jurisdiction to discover how each would deal with the circumstances. In order to avoid any misunderstandings in the interpretation of the law, he devises six instances, so that a comprehensive application and thus understanding can be achieved. This is extremely effective, and avoids the potential problems caused by applying the law to just one or two instances – the author shows an understanding of the law’s application to different situations and that its effectiveness depends greatly on this principle of application. In doing so, he refers to case law and legislation alike (where appropriate) to gain a realistic application of the jurisdictions chosen. In his conclusion, it is clear that the author has comprised an effective and comprehensive comparison. He is able to claim that the tendency to force unilateral promises into contractual models18 is undesirable because it undermines their effectiveness and fails to provide the reality under which they should be applied and enforced. The author recommends that unilateral promises be recognised and categorised in their own right, because the law of contract is not sufficient to deal with them appropriately. He highlights that the changes required to achieve this would involve considerable alteration of the common law of obligations, but maintains that the changes in practice would be less revolutionary than they appear to be in theory. He brings attention to the similarities between the three jurisdictions and claims that these similarities suggest the recognition of English law to adopt a different approach in its legislation. Overall, he claims that it is highly suggestible that the English courts have already recognised the need for a different set of legislation in the field of unilateral promises, and raises questions as to how difficult this would be to rectify through legislation. I would agree with the author’s conclusion, as he seems to have an extremely educated approach to the subject, and recognises quite correctly some concepts that I myself recognise. Primarily, it is often the case that the English courts are faced with the task of making up for legislative shortcomings, and that this is acceptable only insofar as the courts are able to without jeopardising the initial meaning of the legislation they are dealing with. The author has highlighted the fact that in this case, the courts have adapted the law too often for unilateral promises to not be given their own legislative basis. The author not only suggests changes to English law, but also progressed to suggest how changes could be made to German law, so that an even ground can be maintained throughout civil and common law jurisdictions. This conveys that his understanding of the topic and of the effects of the law is profound, and that he has carefully considered the importance and relevance of classifying unilateral promises in their own right. Word Count: 4,622. Bibliography Freshwater, D. 2007. Reading Mixed Methods Research: Contexts for Criticism. Journal of Mixed Methods Research vol. 1 no. 2 134-146. Hammersley, M. 2009. Why Critical Realism Fails to Justify Critical Social Research. Methodological Innovations Online vol. 4 no. 2 1-11. Hogg, M.A. 2010. Promise: The Neglected Obligation in European Private Law. International and Comparative Law Quarterly vol. 59, 461-479. Hyland, R. 1999. Comparative Law in Patterson, D. (ed.) A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Langbein, J.H. 1995. The Influence of Comparative Procedure in The United States, 43 AJCL 545. Onwuegbuzie, A., Leech, N. 2005. Taking the “Q” Out of Research: Teaching Research Methodology Courses Without the Divide Between Quantitative and Qualitative Paradigms. Quality and Quantity vol. 39, no. 3 267-296. Pattenden, R., Skinns, L. 2010. Choice, Privacy and Publicly Funded Legal Advice at Police Stations. Modern Law Review vol. 73, no. 3 349-370. Platsas, A.E. 2008. The Functional and the Dysfunctional in the Comparative Method of Law: Some Critical Remarks. Electronic Journal of Comparative Law vol. 12 no. 3 (http://www.ejcl.org) Shamoo, A., Resnik, D. 2009. Responsible Conduct of Research, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press. Teddlie, C. & Tashakkori, A. (2003). Major Issues and Controversies in the use of Mixed Methods in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. In Tashakkori, A., Teddlie, C. (eds.) Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research (pp. 3-50). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Zweigert, K., Kötz, H. 1998. An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3nd ed. Trans: Weir, T.( Oxford: Clarendon Press. Read More