Shiism in Pakistan - Case Study Example

Shiism in Pakistan Shiites have lived in the region of what is today Pakistan for hundreds of years although the exact date of their settlement has yet to be known with certainty. These individuals have made some very significant contributions to the cultural heritage of this country. Shiites in Pakistan form between 15% and 25% of the population, and this is the largest Shiite presence in any country other than neighbouring Iran, which is a majority Shiite State. The significance of this number cannot be underestimated because it shows that despite their doctrinal differences with other Muslims in the country, the Shiites managed to live within it for generations without any conflict taking place (Richards, 1996; Schimmel, 1980). While this has been the case, in recent years, Shiism in Pakistan has been under siege as this community has increasingly come under attack from radical Sunni groups. The result has been the possibility of radicalisation, especially among Shiite youth in order to defend themselves becoming a reality. Shiism has been a part of Pakistan for centuries and has existed side by side with other Muslim sects, but this has changed in recent years, especially after the 9/11 attacks, with the radicalisation of Sunnis in the country. Since the founding of Pakistan, Shiite Muslims have played a prominent role in the emergence of the State as well as in the political sphere (Ahmad, 2003). The influence that Shiites have exercised has been instrumental in ensuring that there is harmony between them and the Sunnis in the country. After Pakistan gained independence in 1947, there was a significant level of collaboration between Sunnis and Shiites to appoint whereby it was not rare for them to marry one another; each viewing the other as fellow Muslims. Furthermore, it was common for Sunnis to take part in Shiite ceremonies such as the Mourning of Muharram, which commemorated the massacre of the Imam Hussein and his family and friends in Karbala (Martín, 2004). The sectarian cohesion that was seen in Pakistan between the Shiites and the Sunnis was brought to a sudden end by the rise of Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq to the presidency of the country. He was a devout Sunni, and chose to Sunnisize the country through bringing in more Sunni preachers in the country and separating the school curriculum of the State to such an extent that there developed sectarian divisions within the population that had not existed before. The policy adopted by Zia-ul-Haq proved to be the beginning of the sectarian problems that have become ever more prevalent in Pakistan today, because instead of acting as a unifying factor as previous presidents had done, he chose to side with one against the other. The result was that Shiites in the country began being more marginalised and instead of pursuing an independent course, many opted to look towards revolutionary Iran for supports; essentially coming under the influence of the Shiite clerical establishment that ruled Iran. The increasing radicalisation among the Sunnis as a result of Pakistan’s involvement in the Afghan-Soviet War as well as the 9/11 attacks that led to American involvement in Afghanistan. These two events led to a situation whereby Shiites in Pakistan became even more marginalised and at risk of being victims of terrorist attacks (Arkedis, 2009). When the jihadist Taliban was pushed out of Afghanistan, it found refuge in the northern federally administered tribal regions of north Pakistan and this ensured that they were free to radicalise the local Sunni population so that it could join its cause. While this may be the case, it should be noted that for a while, the Shiite population in these areas were left well alone with the main focus being the conflict across the border in Afghanistan. Routing of the Taliban in Afghanistan led to a situation where it had to focus its energy elsewhere and the Shiites increasingly became targets of these radical Sunni militants (Felbab-Brown, 2012). The Shiite population in the tribal areas of Pakistan has essentially remained peaceful despite the repeated attacks against them and it is probably this peaceful nature has ensured that this situation does not descend into an all out sectarian conflict like has been the case in Iraq and Syria in recent years. The inability of Pakistan government to protect the Shiite population has also served to undermine its authority in the tribal areas because it has ended up showing the vulnerability of the Pakistani state not only towards the militant groups operating within its territory, but also its lack of commitment to its own people irrespective of sect. The end of political unity that had been prevalent in Pakistan meant that there developed sectarian violence in various parts of the country, as individuals came to focus more on their religious differences rather than on the need to stay united so that they could deal with their problems together. As a result of the constant attacks against the Shiite minority by more radical elements within the Sunni community, there developed a situation where some Shiites, this being a minority in the population, became radicalised and took up arms to protect themselves. The result of the rise of Shiite militia in Pakistan is that there were constant fights between them and the Sunni militia; further widening the rift between members of these communities (Robinson, 2007). The violence against each other that has been practiced by radical Sunni and Shiite militia has led to a lot of conflict in Pakistan. The fact that both of these sects have lived peacefully side by side for many generations is no longer considered to be important, and the main source of conflict between them being petty religious and political differences. Among the radical Sunni population, there have developed doctrines which are increasingly being preached, that reject Shiites as being truly Muslims, but rather being infidels (Mazari, 2008). This message has increasingly been spread within Pakistan and it has led to the further alienation of the Shiite community because their rejection by the Sunnis in the country leaves them open to attack. The level of Shiite alienation in Pakistan can be seen through a significant minority of Pakistani Sunnis, about 41% that believe that Shiites belong to a different religion altogether and are not Muslims. The divisions in the country based on sect are likely to overwhelm the Shiite population which despite the numerous attacks and rejection it is beginning to face, has chosen to remain at peace with its neighbours. When Pakistan gained independence from Britain colonists in 1947, its politics were dominated by Shiites, with the founder of the State, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, being a Shiite. While this may have been the case, Jinnah proved to be above sectarianism and he instituted a state that ensured that its Muslim character was enhanced while its sectarian background was largely put aside (Cole, 2002). Furthermore, as a secular leader, he believed that the best way to ensure that the state remained stable was through reaching out to all Muslims within it irrespective of sect and it is under his guidance that Pakistan truly became not only a secular, but also a non-sectarian state. The charismatic leadership of Jinnah allowed Pakistanis to live side by side peacefully and the secular nature of the state further encouraged greater interaction between members of different sects within the population (Wolpert, 1984). This is the reason why, as seen above, there were marriages between Shiites and Sunnis as well as the latter participating in the religious ceremonies of the former without any consciousness of sectarian differences between them. Therefore, under Jinnah’s guidance, Pakistan became a model for other Muslim majority states across the globe that members of the two major sects of Islam, namely Shiites and Sunnis, could be able to live together in peace without the negativity brought about by sectarian conflict (Rieck, 2001). The example set by Jinnah for Sunni-Shiite cooperation, however, did not last for long and with the coming to power of Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, as has been seen above, the balance in Pakistan began to change in favour of Sunnis at the expense of the Shiite population. Shiism in Pakistan has come to be affected by the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran for dominance over the Middle Eastern region as well as for the leadership of the Muslim world. This rivalry developed after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which is a Shiite majority country and this brought it head to head with Sunni dominated Saudi Arabia (Beehner, 2006). The fight for political dominance between these two countries led to a situation where each has chosen to support their respective sects at the expense of others. The rivalry between these two countries has spread across the Middle Eastern and South Asian regions as they have turned their rivalry into proxy wars. In those countries which are dominated by Sunni Muslims, it is the latter that are dominant politically while Shiite Muslims tend to be oppressed and treated as second class citizens in their own countries, as has become the case in Pakistan. A further example of a Sunni dominated country which oppresses its Shiite population is Saudi Arabia, where the Shiite population is barely tolerated by the ruling Sunni elite (Meyer, 2011). The same also applies in Shiite dominated countries such as Iran, which after the 1979 revolution has become a theocratic state that is based on the Shiite doctrine of Islam. The proxy conflicts between Saudi Arabia and Iran have contributed to the increasing marginalisation of the Shiite community in Pakistan because they have each sought to support the sect that they relate to. The rise of Sunni radicalism came about as a result of the massive funding as well as radical Sunni clerics being allowed into Pakistan from the presidency of Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq onwards. The radicalisation of Sunnis led to a situation where Shiites have increasingly been marginalised (Nasr, 2000). This marginalisation of Shiites in Pakistan for the most part encouraged a significant portion of this community to turn to Iran for guidance and this change in allegiance has become a trend to this day. The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has created a potential for a proxy war between Shiites and Sunnis taking place in Pakistan and such an event would be devastating for the Shiite community, which was one of the most liberal and moderate Muslim communities in Asia. The wars that have taken place in Afghanistan have led to a situation where the Shiites have ended up being the losers because most sponsorship from Pakistan has tended to go to radical Sunni elements within its society (Maley, 2009). Sponsoring such groups has resulted in the demise of political unity between the Shiites and Sunnis and there has been some speculation that if the Pakistani government does not change its policies, it might end up facing a possible end of the states as it is today. The Pakistani Shiite minority, while it has shown incredible restraint in the face of numerous terrorist attacks against it as well as the disruption of its most important ceremonies as a result of open hostility from jihadist groups, might end up choosing to take up arms against its oppressors (Jalal, 2008). As the death toll increases almost on a daily basis, the Shiite population, especially the younger generation, might not take the same view of restraint as that of their parents and grandparents. This is because these individuals, unlike their parents or grandparents, have not lived in an area where the Sunni and Shiites of Pakistan were incredibly united; with many of them mixing freely despite their sectarian affiliations (Rizvi, 1988). The spirit that was prevalent during the formation of the Pakistani state was one of Shiite and Sunni cooperation and this is what led to Pakistan becoming one of the preeminent powers within its region. The younger generations of Shiites in Pakistan did not live through that period and have instead been raised in an environment where they are under constant threat from Sunni jihadists. Such an environment of fear as well as a need to protect themselves as a result of state failure to do so might lead to their turning increasingly to Iran for support and guidance and might create a rift within Iranian-Pakistani relations. One of the biggest differences between Sunni and Shiite Islam that has impacted on the perception of Shiites by the Sunni in Pakistan is based on their religious tenets. Among the fundamental Shiite beliefs that is normally disputed by Sunnis and has been used by radicals from the latter is that authority within the Muslim community was vested by the Prophet Muhammad on his cousin Ali and by extension on his descendants (Pinault, 1993). The leadership of Ali and his descendants, who are the Imams of the Shiites, has often been vehemently disputed by Sunni Muslims, especially those who are inclined towards extreme forms of the sect. For Sunnis, authority over Muslims is vested on the Ummah rather than being dependent on the leader’s relationship with the Prophet. Among radical Sunnis, who do not accept any Shiite teachings, the belief that Ali was the chosen successor of the prophet is blasphemous and is considered heretical since it is not compatible with Islam. Furthermore, Sunni Muslims do not recognize the authority of Imams and consider the caliphs to have been the rightful successors of the Prophet; citing that since Shiites went against the caliphs, who were the lawful successors of the Prophet Muhammad, they also went against his teachings. Under such circumstances, in the most extreme cases in Sunni majority countries such as Saudi Arabia, Shiites tend to be excluded from the rest of the Muslim community (Nasr, 2007). These divisions in doctrine have begun becoming prominent in Pakistan and this to such an extent that some Shiites have ended up being fearful for their future in the country. The influence of Iran cannot be underestimated at this point because it might lead to the radicalisation of Shiites in Pakistan in order to further the proxy war with Saudi Arabia. While a majority of the Shiites in Pakistan live outside the tribal areas and tend to be away from most of the sectarian violence, this is not the case with those living in tribally administered areas (Mousavi, 1998). Such Shiite groups as the Hazara, who consist of about half a million people, have in recent years been the target of sectarian attacks from radical Sunni elements such as al Qaeda affiliated groups as well as the Pakistani Taliban. The result of these attacks has been that several thousand Hazaras have lost their lives while about two hundred thousand have been forced to flee their ancestral homes and resettle in other parts of Pakistan or abroad. The impact of such attacks is that even in cities where there were significant numbers of Hazara, such as Quetta, these individuals have ended up living in fear and under a state of siege because of their religious beliefs (Yousufzai 2013). The plight of the Hazara and other Shiite groups that are facing persecution in Pakistan has for the most part been ignored by Shiite dominated parties at the national level and these attacks have been on the increase because there is no political will to help these people. Furthermore, the inability of the state to take decisive action to protect the Shiite minorities has led to a situation where some members of this community have lost faith in the ability of the government to protect them. As a consequence, some communities have opted to form local militia to not only protect themselves from such groups as the Taliban, but also to undertake revenge attacks if their own are killed (Mughal 2011). The lack of political will to end the sectarian divisions within Pakistan has left many Shiites with very few options on how to determine their own futures. Many of these individuals have the option of either fleeing the increasing violence against them, or stay and fight. The latter is increasingly being considered to be a viable option and it is likely that many of those who choose to remain will turn towards Iran for logistical and military assistance. The ability of these individuals continuing to live in peace will depends on the manner through which the government of Pakistan handles the sectarian situation in the country (Jones 2003). Without state guidance, the possibility of an escalation of violence against the Shiite community in Pakistan will be very high and this might lead to a situation similar to those that are taking place in Syria and Iraq today. The active participation of Shiite politicians and political parties in defending the rights of Shiites in the country is essential in ensuring that a peaceful resolution to the conflict is achieved and this will only be possible through the establishment of national dialogue to find ways of dealing with sectarianism once and for all. The discussion has attempted to show that Shiism has been a part of Pakistan for centuries and has existed side by side with other Muslim sects, but this has changed in recent years, especially after the 9/11 attacks, with the radicalisation of Sunnis in the country. It has shown that Shiites have played a prominent role in the emergence of the state as well as in the political sphere since the Pakistani state was formed in 1947. When Pakistan gained independence from Britain in 1947, its politics were dominated by Shiites, with the founder of the state, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, being a Shiite. In addition, it has been found that the end of the political unity that had been prevalent in Pakistan meant that there developed sectarian violence in various parts of the country. Shiism in Pakistan has come to be affected by the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran for the leadership of the Muslim world. Moreover, the wars that have taken place in Afghanistan have been detrimental for Shiites because most sponsorship from Pakistan has tended to go to radical Sunni elements within its society. The major religious differences between Shiism and Sunni have come to affect the manner through which the Sunnis of Pakistan view the Shiites. Furthermore, despite a majority of Pakistani Shiites living outside the tribal areas and away from most of the sectarian violence, this is not the case with those living in tribally administered areas such as the Hazara. 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