The Impossibility of Religious Reforms by Sullivan - Book Report/Review Example

The Impossibility of a Religious Freedom What argument(s) does Sullivan make, and what evidence does she provide for them? In the book, The Impossibility of Religious Reforms, Winnifred Fallers Sullivan makes a number of arguments concerning religious freedom and practice, especially in the workplace. According to the author, even though the U.S Constitution exclusively guarantees religious freedom, the freedom is utterly impossible in America. Sullivan had been an expert witness in a case regarding the unrestricted practice of religion in Florida. Therefore, she relies on her experience as the fundamental evidence for her ultimate assertion that it is impossible to achieve religious freedom (Sullivan 14). She intensively outlines the order of events in the Florida trial to justify the challenge that surrounds the provision of the religious freedom. Sullivan (32) argues that for the courts to determine whether the First Amendment fully protects a religiously motivated activity, an examination of the relationship between the action and the religion is necessary. The author holds that whenever a court decides to interrogate the authenticity of religious behavior, it is undeniably going against the idea of religious freedom (Sullivan 34). When the court requires authentication for a “religious motivation,” it is fundamentally extending the clause on free religious exercise to a behavior that only an external “proof” can legitimize. Sullivan (34) clarifies that the typical trustable sources of evidence that courts often use sacred texts, widespread adherence, clerical pronouncements, and historical texts. In accordance with her contention, the courts ought not to broaden the scope of religious freedom to all the claims of religious alignment, which are often unsubstantiated and subjective. In addition, the author asserts that proving the religious beliefs of a claimant is not only impossible, but also unethical. Su (124) also claims that extending the free exercise clause to substantiated subjective beliefs implies that the legal system is agreeing to take on many exemptions from the ordinary laws. Therefore, the most appropriate way that the courts can address the issue of free religious exercise is to award only the claims that an external evidence can prove. A typical and reliable external evidence would be a “legitimate” religious institution, and not the manifestation of an individual. In the fifth section of the book, Sullivan argues that the free religious exercise is necessarily unworkable when the courts have not clearly defined its boundaries since it is often specific to “religion.” According to Sullivan (142), the impossibility of defining the boundaries of free exercise implies that unsubstantiated faith does not qualify as a reliable source of evidence to the freedom of religion. In line with Sullivan (143), the possible solution to such a scenario is the protection of an equality that is seemingly more general. The author continues to explain that the present assurances of the freedom of association, speech, and press can adequately protect a majority of the existing religious clauses. Accordingly, the book suggests that people can consider petitioning the courts of they feel a particular situation is utterly violating their freedom to a religious practice. They can proceed to request the court to include an exemption clause that specifically protects the neutral rule on overall applicability. Do you agree or disagree with her? Why? I staunchly agree with Sullivan’s point of view concerning the exercise of religious freedom. Just as she has explained, the only way that the US courts can allow people to practice religious freedom is to confirm the legitimacy of the religious exercise. Interrogating a religious behavior is, in itself, a violation of the freedom that the First Amendment of the US Constitution delegates. In keeping with Flake (216), a universal and coherent definition of the term, “religion,” is nonexistent, thus making the free practice clause an internal impossibility in the US legal system. Similarly, if the legal system were to include a provision that requires the definition of religion, it would utterly result in the ultimate loss of the religious freedom. Su (124) contributes to this controversial but vital debate by asserting that that the US legal law indirectly undermines the realization of the freedom of religion. In other words, the author holds that since the constitutional protection of a “religious” practice requires an intensive examination of the acclaimed spiritual exercise, the religious freedom is virtually invalid. Therefore, it is worth reiterating that the religious freedom, as the First Amendment articulates, is possible; though, the need for the definition of “religion” hinders the protection of the same freedom. The other significant argument that Sullivan raises is the concept of the boundary in a religious behavior. As has been mentioned, Sullivan (142) holds that it is impossible to define the boundary of religion given the multitudinous concomitant faiths to religion. Sullivan’s assertion is especially justifiable since a behavior that a particular religious group considers “religious” may be “unreligious” in the perspective of another religious organization. In the same school of thought, Flake (218) clarifies that an “unreligious” activity is one that falls outside the precincts of the larger classical and hierarchical structure of a religion. Hence, the courts cannot use the religion to legitimize the action of the particular follower. For that reason, filing a petition in the courts to address such religious externalities is a probable solution to the issue of the religious boundary (Larbode and Sullivan 8). How does your chosen case relate to what Sullivan discusses in The Impossibility of Religious Freedom? My selected case for this paper is the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie and Fitch Stores, Inc. The central focus of the case is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII discourages discrimination against employees based on national origin, sex, religion, color, or race (“Title VII” n.p.). The primary issue of the aforementioned case is whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act makes an employer liable for discharging a worker or refusing to employ an applicant because of a “religious practice and observance.” The case refers to a situation where the employee or applicant has notified the employer, directly and explicitly, of his or her religious practice. Therefore, the employer, in this case, has an open knowledge of the need for a religious accommodation. More specifically, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is suing Abercrombie & Fitch Stores for declining to hire a Muslim teenager – Samantha Elauf – merely because she reported for an interview while wearing a headscarf (“SCOTUS Blog” n.p.). Elauf’s situation is a typical case of religious practice in the workplace that closely relate to Sullivan’s arguments in the book, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom. In wearing the headscarf while reporting for the interview, Elauf was merely observing her religious beliefs and practices that require women to cover almost all their body parts as a show of decency and respect. Nonetheless, Abercrombie & Flitch Stores, which understands her religious practices, considered her dress code inappropriate and ultimately refused to hire her. Just as Sullivan argues in her text, informing a potential employer about a person’s religious practices does not necessarily justify the practice of those activities in the workplace (Sullivan 43). A constitutional scrutiny of wearing a headscarf while going to the interview would be necessary to justify the extent to which the action is “religious.” One of the judges handling the case had actually expressed the same sentiments that Sullivan features in her book. Justice Anthony Kennedy suggested that it is necessary to interrogate Elauf’s “religious behavior” since understanding and knowing a given religious rule are entirely different ideas. The Judge holds that the First Amendment only protects a legitimate religious practice (“SCOTUS Blog” n.p.). Similarly, Sullivan’s position on the need for a definite definition of the boundary of a religious activity directly relate to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie and Fitch Stores, Inc. case. In line with Sullivan (142), the courts can only legitimize a religious practice as an expression of religious freedom after determining whether the activity is “religious” or “not religious enough.” In this case, the Supreme Court has to interrogate the consistency of Elauf’s “religious” practice with the Muslim faith. Nevertheless, in questioning Elauf’s religious practice, the court would be apparently violating the free exercise clause, which the US Constitution protects (“SCOTUS Blog” n.p.). Moreover, Sullivan’s position regarding the impossibility of a providing a religious freedom would be evident if the Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. had opted to interrogate Elauf’s religious practices. Instead of refusing to hire the applicant, the employer could have involved her in a dialogue to reach a decision that focuses on the accommodation of her religious practices. However, as Sullivan notes in her book, such an interrogation would constitute a plain violation of the freedom of religion. Simply put, the employer could have readily discriminated against the applicant even with a wider knowledge of her religious beliefs. Likewise, Sullivan (139) identifies the fact that most religious beliefs and values are contradictory to typical workplace practices. Predictably, there could have been a conflict between Elauf’s religious practices and Abercrombie’s workplace rules. In sum, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie and Fitch Stores, Inc. case is a typical situation that closely relates to Sullivan’s arguments concerning the freedom of religion. Just like the Abercrombie, most employers have adopted rules that, in one way or the other, may be inconsistent with particular “religious” practices of employees or job applicants, just like the case of Elauf. The employer may then resort to questioning the employees about their religious practices, which is a practice that directly hinders the freedom of religion. Likewise, when the courts question the legitimacy of a religious practice, they are directly acting against the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. Works Cited "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc." SCOTUSblog RSS. Web. 23 Apr. 2015. < http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/equal-employment-opportunity-commission-v-abercrombie-fitch-stores-inc/> "Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Web. 24 Apr. 2015. Flake, Kathleen. "The Impossibility of Religious Freedom." Church History 1 (2007): 215-224. Print. Su, Anna. "The Rise and Decline of American Religious Freedom." Constitutional Commentary 2015: 120-132. Print. Sullivan, Winnifred Fallers. The Impossibility of Religious Freedom. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007. 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