The Impossibility of Religious Freedom - Essay Example

The Impossibility of Religious Freedom Sullivan’s arguments on “The Impossibility of Religious Freedom”are valid and true. There are some court cases in which the perspectives given by Sullivan have come to bear, or at least receive some degree of credence. One such case is that of Holt v Hobbs. Being an inmate, the grooming policy for Arkansas Department of Correction had prevented Holt, a Salafi practicing Muslim, from rearing his mustache beyond a quarter inch long, citing a diagnosed dermatological problem. Holt’s religion, on the other hand, required that he grows mustache and for that reason, he argued that the policy burdened his ability to practice his religion. The very first amendment to the United States’ constitution as observed by Sullivan, is a testimony to the argument freedom of religion is unachievable in the United States of America (42). That Congress will in no way make laws that respect the establishment of religion (Sullivan 40) is supportive of the argument by Sullivan. To claim to establish no law that prohibits a practice the law itself does not respect the establishment of is in essence to disregard place of religion. In fact, the situation seemed to have played out in the Holt versus Hobbs case. Holt must have found himself in a difficult situation when he argued that the grooming policy burdened his ability to live by the dictates of his religion. Such must be the condition because the law did not recognize any rule that establishes a religion and, in essence, does not recognize the place of religion. Indeed, the first amendment in the American constitution causes several conflicting arguments with regard to religion, which some quarters of legal minds hold that “America has never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the state is free to regulate” (Sullivan 68). Such legal arguments and positions, being highly likely to be validated by the courts denies the individuals the religious freedom. Besides, as much as Holt won his final appeal case and the Arkansas Department of Correction faltered, The arguments leading to the determination of the case are in themselves suggestive of the position taken by Sullivan. The court’s determination argument, the free religious practice of rights must be “based on a sincerely held religious belief…Moreover, that Holt proved it, by being neither slight nor idiosyncratic with tenets of Islam is arbitrary” (Sullivan 48). The argument as explained by Sullivan essentially means that it rests with the courts to debate and establish whether or not the religiously-motivated practices are enjoying protection under the first amendment of the constitution (49). Additionally, the court had to determine the growing of mustache was sincerely and genuinely motivated by the Islam religion. The condition in itself amounts to a violation of the religious freedom in the sense that the interrogation of legitimacy. Sullivan ably supports his position that “through interrogating the “legitimacy” of religious behavior in this first instance, the court fundamentally destroys the very idea of religious freedom (60). He continues, “By requiring authentication of the religious motivation, the courts extend free exercise clause on to the behavior that is legitimized by virtue of external “proofs” like sacred texts, clerical pronouncements, widespread adherence or historical tradition” (Sullivan 63). The argument implies that by the courts attempting to widen the scope of free practice, to accommodate all the subjective and unsubstantiated claims of motivating religion, they risk subjecting all the laws to exceptions. Again, it is impossible to substantiate legally a sincere religious belief for the purposes of the law; hence only “awarding the claims that can be ‘legitimized’ by external evidence” (Sullivan 61). The unrealistic nature of the law only allows the courts and law enforcement agents to whimsically and arbitrarily award the claims. The religious freedom is hence at risk under the circumstances. Moreover, Holt had presented the grooming policy of the Arkansas Correction Center as burdening his ability to exercise his personal commitments to the Islamic religion. Legally, the free exercise of personal religion does not have any definition in the law of America. Defining religion so as to enable legal protection of the same, including that of Holt, is not possible in the American law. As observed by Sullivan, “it is impossible to distinguish, by definition, between that which is religious from that which is not, and that which is a manifestation of faith from that which is purely cultural” (Sullivan 60). The implication of the situation is that should the jury have decided that keeping mustache to half an inch length is “not religious enough” to qualify for the sweep of free practice, and then Holt would have had to do without a mustache. Since it is upon the courts to decide that the degree of practice that is consistent with a particular religion, it was highly possible for the same court to agree with the grooming policy of the Arkansas and allow at most quarter an inch length of the mustache. As a result, religious freedom violation would have been easily violated using law. From the argument, I understand that Holt’s case got to prevail as a matter of chance and arbitrary determination of individual whims. Still on definition religion to enable its legal protection, the American law seems to recognize only the elaborate, classical religious structure that is highly hierarchical as the religion. The courts only validate the actions of followers of such outfits. Indeed, the appellate court held that opinion, through which it widely and accepted Holt’s Islam as a religion. The law in effect only protects the structures of traditional religion while rendering insignificant the beliefs of modern upcoming associations and individuals. Because the law does not define what religion is, its application adversely affects the smaller associations and individuals with a unifying unique belief about the supreme beings (Sullivan 58). The condition might have resulted to Holt losing the case if he claimed to subscribe to a less publicized union, or worse still, individual perception of creation and belief. Consequently, the situation has resulted in curtailing the individual religious freedom. Again, the government bureaucrats in the United States seem to be always willing to trample on religious liberty in such places of incarceration as the prison. According to Sullivan, ”Religion being a modern invention has simply been used to separate ‘good’ religion from ‘bad’ religion, orthodoxy from heresy… it is an invention whose legal and political use has reached the end of its useful life” (52). Religion has become a liberal political theory being applied by those in positions of influence and authority to subdue those whose life positions, for unknown reasons, they ‘don’t like’ in society. Sullivan explains that religious freedom is never religious freedom if people celebrate one religious freedom and deny freedom to those whose religion they do not share. In fact, by agreeing to trim his mustache to half-an-inch was a compromise on the side of Holt but the Arkansas Correction Center would listen to none of it. In conclusion, the court ruled if favor of Holt and held that the Arkansas Correction Centers grooming policy was a violation of the Religious Land use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLOIPA). As ably observed by Sullivan, I strongly hold the ruling does not draw a set of strong law aimed at protecting the freedom of religion but comes as an arbitrary ruling that goes in favor of Holt. The reason is that it is not based on substantial legislations that several other cases of near similar nature can be decided. Works Cited Sullivan, Winnifred. The Impossibility of Religious Freedom. Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University Press. 2005. Print. Read More