Judaism as a Religion for Adults - Essay Example

Judaism as a Religion for Adults Introduction In a world where many question the very existence of God and the need for religion, Levinas challenges these atheistic notions by showing that the God of the Torah is not a simplistic one. If an all-powerful God existed that only rewarded good behaviour and punished man for committing wrongs, then he may be perceived as a God for children. However, Levinas claims that the Judaic God is one that gives man responsibility over his own behaviour as well as his association to others. This philosopher is able to prove his case by examining the notion of theodicy (or why a moral God allows immoral actions to exist), responsibility and choice when relating to the other. The religion for adults Theodicy implies a vindication of the divine in spite of the manifestation and existence of wickedness; this concept of suffering has troubled many because they believe that it is a contradiction to be a good God and still let one’s creation suffer. Levinas explains that atheism would be the most obvious reaction to such a phenomenon, but this would be taking a simplistic path in understanding the matter (145). Persons who hold such a view may come to this resolution because they had a perception of God that is also simplistic; that is, of a creator who treats men like children. This God gives prizes to those who have been good and then punishes them for failing to play by the rules; in other words, he regards the human race as one with an infantile state of mind (Katz and Trout 144). However, if one were to conceive of God as a being that is more complex than the above assumption, then it is likely that one will be better able to understand the notion of suffering. Levinas adds that the God who is found in the Torah is one who hides his face in order to allow man to rely on his conscience in order to find him (145). He requires a responsible subject who would not need to depend on certain physical aids or manifestations in order to get to this level; this means, he would have to be mature. Levinas goes on to affirm that theodicy is actually not a fact but is really a product of mythic thinking that has been perpetuated over the years. When understanding such a monstrous act like the Holocaust, where 6 million Jews were killed, this scholar believes that people have to take responsibility for human behaviour. Trying to rely on theodicy to explain away these atrocious acts it to deflect human responsibility to a divine being, and this is what children would do (Katz and Trout 145). The God of the Torah is a God of adults because he requires man to become responsible for other human beings experiencing God means relating with other men. Therefore, the concept of social justice is only possible when one thinks of others, as it requires one to shoulder God’s responsibility. Throughout Levinas’ texts, he echoes the fact that human beings are autonomous in matters of religion, especially in a monotheistic faith. This is especially true even when reading narratives in the Torah that demonstrated divine providence as was the case when the Israelites created the golden calf. At first glance, one might presume that this was a scenario in which God intervened and thus acted as though man was incapable of shouldering his own responsibility. However, such a perspective could not be further from the truth; the case of the golden calf was one that dealt with divine matters, so it necessitated the intervention of a divine being (Levinas 20). On the other hand, when man commits a sin against another man, then he cannot expect to get pardoned by God; full responsibility rests on man himself. According to Levinas, evil is not a mystical thing that can be deflected onto other mystical creatures that may correct it; it is a concept performed by man upon another man. Therefore, man has a great duty, which involves granting pardon to those who commit evil; no ritual can right any wrongs as this implies assuming child-like roles. In Judaism, adults must behave as adults by embracing their autonomy and seeing that there is no substitute for becoming victims. They are the only ones who have the power to pardon a crime committed against them since the God who created the whole universe gave them that duty and power (Katz and Trout 148). One way in which the author has explained this concept of adult responsibility in faith is through the story of Abraham and Isaac, where God asked Abraham to sacrifice his son in order to show that he trusted God. God had promised to fulfil his covenant through this one son, who took so long to come, yet here he was asking Abraham to sacrifice him in Mt. Moriah. However, Abraham remembered the initial promise that God had made to him concerning the fulfilment of Canaan and predicates his actions on this promise before preparing to sacrifice his son. He believes that his son will somehow return; no one knows exactly how this may occur but it could be through either resurrection or some other form of divine intervention (Sanders 18). Several Judaic scholars like Kierkegaard and Levinas have debated over the significance of this event with some of them claiming that it a test of Abraham’s faith while others believe that it is an ethical one. Levinas ascribes to the latter school of thought because he affirms that Abraham saw the victim’s face – Isaac – before he heard the Angel who told him to stop (Koskey 26). According to the scholar, this focus on the victim rather than the need to obey God can better explain why the latter individual passed the test. Levinas explains that the most important aspect of the story occurred when Abraham stopped sacrificing his own child right at the time when the Angel spoke to him. He believes that this point is interesting to students of faith because it shifts focus from the perpetrator of violence even in God’s name to the victim. If human beings focus on the people receiving an act of evil, then they are capable of refraining even from those things that cause harm to other people (Katz 15). The theme of taking adult responsibility in the commissioning of sin is echoed in this narrative as it indicates that when man is relating with others, he must really see them. Indeed Levinas affirms that Abraham was a man of faith not because he obeyed the voice of God when he was told to sacrifice his son but because he chose to see the ethical in that scenario. Other scholars like Bergman have also supported Levinas by stating that Abraham was a faith-led man owing to the discovery that Mt. Moriah was a holy site in which such a human sacrifice was out of place. In this regard, Levinas emphasises that Abraham needed to envision his responsibility to God as a responsibility to the other man; therefore, real Judaism is a faith in which the duty to God is also the duty to other men (Simmons 38). Many lack the capacity to see this fact, and that is why they struggle to experience God; however, people like Abraham did because they were conscience of this responsibility. Others like his servants did not have that level of consciousness, so their spirituality was also wanting; maturity is the mark of making the association between the divine and the moral. Christians and other Jews have thus misread Abraham as a man of faith because his kind of faith only depends on hearing the word of God; it is linked with the ethical aspect of his relationship with others. Violence in this incident is possible when Abraham goes beyond the ethical and looks to the religious, so Levinas speaks against this occurrence when he states that humanity should love the Torah more than God. Man should be willing to act on the ethical even when this implies ignoring a voice that one believes to be that of God; this means putting one’s responsibility before one’s actions (Katz 16). Levinas made a daring assertion because he challenged popular thinking on the narrative; he stated that Abraham should have questioned what he heard. This does not simply that people should always doubt what they see, but it proves that followers should always contemplate on the meaning of the things they hear. Once again, Levinas shows that it is possible for one to be truly faithful if they are spiritually mature; they cannot be children in such matters. Abraham said “Here I am” when the angel called his name thus showing that he was already in a position to respond; this was someone that was already quite sensitive, aware and ready to react to whatever was to come (Katz 18). The quick response that Abraham gave after hearing from the angel was already a sign that he had marinated over the issues and come up with a similar resolution. This man of faith no longer thought of God as an absolute because another man now mediated his association with him; that is Isaac. One may even assert that his receptivity to the second command was possible because he had already seen the ethical, and that it why it is the turning point of the story. In this regard, the voice may now be perceived not as a command but the man of faith had already decided more of a response or nudge to what. Abraham had already started coming to the final resolution when he raised his hand with a knife and let it stay in the air for some time; when he looked into Isaac’s eyes, he knew that this would almost be an impossible thing for him to do. At this point, the ethical is all that matters to him and even supersedes a command from God; committing murder would be an even more monstrous act than disobeying God as it violates moral laws or the Torah (Perpich 49). Levinas echoes that the God of the Torah is one that gives man the absolute freedom to choose for himself the actions he will commit even if this implies disobeying him. Genuine freedom only comes about when people have the ability to reject even divine commands as this is a religion of adults (Barrett 51). God can deceive, test and command as was the case with Abraham, and a spiritually mature person should be able to select the right choice. In deciphering the concept of moral responsibility, one can better be able to understand why Judaism is indeed a religion for adults as affirmed by Levinas. Morality is a concept that is predicated on the universality of truth, but to a certain extent, it can also include concepts of election. Levinas stresses that when a person receives a revelation about morality, then they have discovered truth by election since this stems from responsibility rather than privilege (22). He adds that the election does not occur to those who are royal or those who posses certain birthrights; instead, it is conferred only to those who take up their responsibility. The above process can only arise when one thinks of himself in terms of the position he or she possesses with regard to the other. One must see oneself as separate from others that may also possess moral duties, and this association eventually leads to moral awareness. When one’s position is not equal to that of the other, then this causes one to demand more from himself or herself; this applies to persons who seek to be more just, they also tend to be judged more harshly (Levinas 22). Moral awareness only arises when a person accepts that they have been chosen and possess an exceptional position; usually, this may necessitate some degree of inequality. For reciprocity to occur, it needs to start from this place of inequality as one cannot aspire for equality if everything is already the same. People need to demand more from themselves than the individuals that they relate with in order embrace their place in the world fully. Taking responsibility for humanity and the fate that befalls them because of one’s own actions is the height of moral awareness. Israel, as a chosen nation, may also be understood from this light because it has a moral obligation to take responsibility over the rest of humanity owing to its moral duty. Levinas argues that Israel should not just be perceived as a historical entity but a moral category that requires the nation to demand more from itself morally. Israel can be separated from geographical, national or racial concepts because its identity depends on the decision to accept their responsibility towards humanity. Overall, it may be stated that morality for man comes about when the concerned entities have been elected, not based on their position but their revelation for the same. Responsibilities are adult matters; they require deep insight and awareness of one’s place in human society; these are definitely not things that children can act upon let alone fathom. Conclusion Levinas affirmed that Judaism was a religion for adults because it required deep awareness of the responsibility for sin; man was in charge of his relationship with other men, so he knew when to pardon others’ sins or when to commit certain acts. Children require constant commands, punishments and rewards but adults have the maturity to discern what is right, and this is the foundation of Judaism. The case of Abraham and his son Isaac at Mt. Moriah illustrates that the religion tells man what to do but still lets followers be adults even if this implies disobedience to the divine. Moral awareness comes about when man realises the truth by assuming his position in relation to the other; once again, this is predicated on free will and self-awareness. Works Cited Barrett, Justin. Why Would Anyone Believe in God? Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press: 2004. Katz, Claire and Trout, Lara. Emmanuel Levinas: Levinas and the question of religion. NY: Routledge, 2005. Print. Katz, Claire. “The voice of God and the face of the other: Levinas, Kierkergaard and Abraham.” The Journal of the Society for Textual Reasoning 10(2001): 15-18. Print. Koskey, Jeffrey. Levinas and the Philosophy of Religion. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001. Print. Levinas, Emmanuel. “A religion for adults.” Difficult freedom. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press), p. 15-120 and 130-150. Print. Perpich, Diane. The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008. Print. Sanders, John. The God Who Risks: A Theology of Divine Providence. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2007. Print. Simmons, Aaron. “In Whom, Then, Do We Put Our Trust?” Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 11.3(2011): 37-45. Print. Read More