The Situation Involving Somali Piracy - Research Paper Example

Section/# Somali Piracy: An Examination and Discussion of Current Trends Within the of the past few years, each and every well informed citizen has been made fully aware of the situation involving Somali “piracy” which exists in and around the immediate coast and far-flung international waters that make up the horn of Africa’s coast. However, as with many issues within our current time, the true definition of “piracy” is not entirely accurate with regards to the actions that small bands of thugs/fisherman/Islamists turned brigands of the high seas engage in. As a function of discussing and defining the term, this brief analysis will consider the traditional definition and means of operation that piracy has historically entailed and compare this to the actions and mechanisms whereby these individuals engaged in this supposed “piracy” (Spearin 2010). Furthermore, the unique dynamics of Islamization, poverty, and the effects that 20 years of incessant civil war on the only truly failed state in the world has had on the way in which Somalia and the issue of “piracy” has developed will be discussed within the lens of media representation of the issue. Merriam Webster’s dictionary broadly defines piracy as “an act of violence or robbery at sea”. Such a broad definition leaves little room for prevarication concerning whether or not the actions taken by groups of Somalis over the past decade or so can be understood as piracy or not. However, a more important test of determination is of course the question of how tactics, objectives, and operational mechanisms differ when one compares current Somali piracy with that of the earlier more traditional understandings of the word. What is unique with regards to Somali piracy is the fact that the actual material goods that the ships which are arrested by them are often of secondary or tertiary importance. Of primal importance is the money which can be extracted from shipping companies, governments, or interested loved-ones of the crew members of the ships which have been captured. This serves as a fundamental deviation from traditional piracy in that this is the ultimate goal which the Somali pirates pursue as opposed to a secondary or tertiary goal that traditional piracy was engaged with. For the traditional definition of piracy on the high seas, the requisition of the goods was of primary importance with the lives and health of the crew being much lower on the list of interests that the pirates dealt with. Ultimately, in the traditional understanding of piracy, the lives of those which were captured were worth little unless it was believed that an added amount of money could be extracted by ransoming them off to interested governments, families, or trade representatives (Murphy, 2011). This shift in the dynamic that piracy has taken within the modern world is a unique hallmark of the Somali understanding of the term. Instead of seeking to acquire and sell tens of millions of dollars worth of ships and goods, the Somali pirates are almost exclusively disinterested in such an operation; instead concerned with seeking to ransom the ship, its contents, and the crew itself to interested parties the world over. The media’s interpretation of piracy in Somalia has been one that has traditionally missed the point. Although the actual day to day occurrences of piracy and associated deaths are recounted within world media, little to no attention is paid to the preceding determinants with regards to the underlying reason why piracy is currently taking place to such a high degree within Somalia. There are a number of reasons for this media misrepresentation; however, it is the belief of this author that a large degree for the hesitancy with which Western media has sought to discuss and analyze the underlying reasons for Somali piracy is the level of culpability that the West continues to feel with regards to the situation that exists within the county. As a function of the failed UN intervention in Somalia in 1993 as well as other factors, the media seeks to downplay the role that poverty, lack of education, and lack of overall economic development/opportunity has on the affected populace. In such a way, it is much easier to cast all of the individuals who engage in piracy as “criminals” and “Islamic radicals” than it is to truly seek to understand the motivating and underlying factors which continue to see generations of young Somalis seek to better their lives within one of the only “industries” that currently exists within the nation. In the case of the Barbary Coast in the early 1800s, the United States and others were faced with a state sponsor of piracy that protected a highly lucrative industry that profiteered from the illegal acquisition, distribution, and sale of seized shipping and its components, as well as a booming slave trade that sold Anglo-Americans and white Europeans into slavery throughout the Arab world (Oliveira, 2013). As a function of this, even though Somalia is what can be defined as a failed state, what little representation there is of government is very much the same way analogous to the instance which has been detailed above. Almost each and every layer of Somali society realizes and cooperates with groups responsible for piracy. A type of secondary economy has developed in which Somali pirates front groups fund local and regional government, provide funding for education and social programs, and funnel money to terrorist organizations within and without of the nation itself. As such, one can understanding Somali piracy as something much more than a few bands of isolated brigands acting on their own self interested motives as a way to generate income for a few individuals at the top of the organization. Rather, it is a multi-million dollar per year extortion industry which combines elements of gang warfare, radical Islamic extremism, piracy, and pseudo-governmental behavior. As has previously been discussed, the level to which Somalia typifies the failed state cannot be under-emphasized as a function of understanding the root cause of piracy. As many scholars have sought to show the direct linkages between terrorism and poverty, much the same can be said for the way in which piracy has grown and developed within. Due to the fact that the nation has not had any true lasting semblance of government for the past two decades, the level to which social programs, education, cultural development, and national identity have been able to be developed within the nation have been all but non-existent. As a function of this, what has developed in its place is a highly regionalized, tribal, and group centric approach which has seen the rise of warlords, radical Islamic groups such as al Shabaab, as well as a litany of gangs. Such a dynamic has been fertile ground for piracy to rise within the region (GUILFOYLE, 2010). As a function of the analysis which has herein been performed, the reader can understand that although piracy and its definition has grown when one considers the events that have occurred, and continue to occur, in and around Somalia, the fact of the matter is that the definition of piracy is still adequate to define what has taken place. Although the methods and the ultimate goals that these individuals are pursuing may stand in contrast to the ways in which piracy has been practiced historically, the fact of the matter is that according to the traditional definition, these individuals are seeking to develop an amount of personal gain via the practice of robbery on the high seas; the very definition of piracy. References GUILFOYLE, D. (2010). THE LAWS OF WAR AND THE FIGHT AGAINST SOMALI PIRACY: COMBATANTS OR CRIMINALS?. Melbourne Journal Of International Law, 11(1), 141-153. Murphy, M. N. (2011). Somali Piracy: Political Lessons for the Navy. American Foreign Policy Interests, 33(1), 17-25. doi:10.1080/10803920.2011.550238 Oliveira, G. (2013). ‘New wars’ at sea: A critical transformative approach to the political economy of Somali piracy. Security Dialogue, 44(1), 3-18. doi:10.1177/0967010612470294 Spearin, C. (2010). A PRIVATE SECURITY SOLUTION TO SOMALI PIRACY?. Naval War College Review, 63(4), 56-71. Read More