The Thought Experiment of Clark and Chalmers - Essay Example

Does your mind extend beyond your skin and skull? Discuss in relation to Clark and Chalmers’ “The Extended Mind Name Institution Course Tutor Date It is known to all that the body, time and the environment are essential for cognition. What people do with their bodies and environments is extremely important for their mental life (Walmsley 2008). In their analysis, Clark and Chalmers (1998) challenge the idea that the separation of skin and skull determines cognition boundaries. They object the idea that whatever that exits outside the body is indeed outside the mind. To them, it is an assumption to separate mind, body and environment (Aydin 2013). The extended mind hypothesis (EMH) argues that our minds extend beyond our skin and skull. The hypothesis focuses primarily on beliefs and neglects other propositional attitudes which make the EMH problematic. Using a range of thought experiments, this essay demonstrates that even if EMH was true, it is simply a claim that concerns extended beliefs and not extended cognition. The most popular thought experiment which Clark and Chalmers (1998) used to support their position on the extended mind is the case of Otto. Due to effects of Alzheimer, Otto moves with a notebook, writes in it all his beliefs and refers often to help him in cognition. However, unlike Otto, Inga has normal cognitive functioning and both of them want to go the Modern Art Museum. Before going to the Museum, Inga thinks for some times and she is able to recall that it is located on the 53rd street (Clark & Chalmers 1998). This clearly shows that Inga believed that museum was located where it is. Alternatively, Otto first checked in his notebook, saw the location of the museum and made his way there, that is, the 53rd street. According to Clark (2009) the information in the notebook should be considered as a belief since it played similar role it would, if the information was in the head of Otto. Ideally, before checking the notebook, Otto believed that the location of the museum was on 53rd street (Nirshberg 2009). Although Otto had a belief about the museum, the EMH in not entirely structured as a claim concerning extended beliefs, so to say, but it concerns mental states (Nirshberg 2009). Thus, it was necessary that EMH handled the combination of extended beliefs with other states of mind. As Weiskopf (2008) argued it is impossible to integrate an internal desire with an external belief appropriately to influence the behaviour of the cognitive agent. Let us consider a scenario of Martha who is in a similar situation to Otto but documents her desires in a notebook. Because of being unhappy with her weight, she likes to lose 15 pounds and therefore she goes ahead and notes this desire in her notebook. Additionally, to achieve her desires, Martha decides to change her eating habits, walk to work, work out at a gym, and more. Imagine after some days, after Martha wakes up, she forgets her gym clothes and drives to work (Nirshberg 2009). While at work, she is given a brownie by a colleague and without hesitation, she takes it. Still, during that night she eats on potato chips as she watches a movie and before bed admires her figure upon looking at herself in the mirror (Nirshberg 2009). The fact the desire was stored in the notebook, it did not play a proper role in affecting the behaviour of Martha and it appears astonishing to attribute to her this desire. The point is that we do not access long standing desires when they are required to guide our action. Such attitudes often play an important role in influencing personal behaviour and mental life (Aydin 2013). Ideally, it is not practical for Martha to constantly check her notebook the whole time to see her extended desires that would help direct her behaviour at the time. However, this appears to be the only way to make Martha behave in respect to her desire. Therefore, unlike beliefs, individuals often do not introspect to see whether or not they need something before they act. It is natural that people need reminders of what they want to achieve from time to time. They need things to keep them on track (Walmsley 2008). For instance, the information in the notebook of Martha is similar to a post-in note positioned on a fridge that reminds a person not to indulge in treats. While the rejoinder may be insightful appealing, it fails as well (Rupert 2004). Important thought, the use of a note is only sensible if an internal desire exists, which allows a person to interact with it in the proper way. Consider a situation with Martha when she reads the note that informs her not to eat any brownie. It is not clear why she need to behave in respect to that information. Neither is she aware of any desire to desist from eating a brownies and therefore she may not consider disregarding the information in the note (Nirshberg 2009). This is explained by the fact that the note is not the desire in itself, but need to integrate with a desire that exists in an appropriate way. In fact, the note may not be viewed to externalize the attitude itself, but the content of the desire. Going back to Otto’s case, the fact that he believed the museum was on 53rd street, the proposition sounds implicit in the information storage, which appears not to convey in an appropriate way to additional propositional attitudes (Clark 2010). Generally, the plausibility of extended attitudes is more short of when individuals act beyond normal propositional attitudes of desire and belief to think about states like fear. There is need to try and shift focus to beliefs and the manner in which these beliefs assimilate broadly with the cognitive processes of individuals to understand how our minds work. For example, when working through a logic puzzle and other activities related to reasoning, the entire process involves interacting with the external belief and this is how the importance of EMH becomes evidence. Nevertheless, despite appreciating the importance of beliefs, it is also essential to recognize the importance of other propositional attitudes because they influence our interaction with the external environment (Nirshberg 2009). According to Rupert (2004) to individuate a cognitive system extends beyond understanding beliefs of an agent and the role played by these beliefs in different cognitive functioning. There is need to also understand how these beliefs combine with each other and integrate with fears, desires, hopes and intentions. We can hypothesize two people who have a lot of overlap in their cognitive skills and beliefs; however, what might be relevant about them is how they act given the manner in which their beliefs work together with their other mental states (Menary 2010). Clerk (2009) clearly stated the importance of extended beliefs in guiding behaviour, but did not consider the essential role of extra propositional attitudes inherent in individuals which determine their behaviour. The way people respond to situations, say for example, becoming frustrated after working on a problem for ten minutes, communicates a lot about their minds compared to what beliefs they hold (Nirshberg 2009). Imagine two people who come to belief that there is no God. Although one of them hoped that this proposition was true, its truth frightened the other person in stead. Consequently, although the person who accepted it to be true developed a new sense of freedom, the one who feared the truth of the proposition experienced a serious existential crisis that even made him not to sleep for a whole week. The interesting thing about the minds of these two individuals is that not the belief that God does not exist, but how this belief integrated with other mental processes, which possibly explains the existence of the skin/skull boundary. According to Menary (2010) as external stores are increasingly utilized, the strategies of memory change and agents begin to depend more on external stores. Consequently, in the process of remembering, states of external stores perform the role of bearing indispensable information. When this takes place, the appropriate states of external stores play an important role in the cognitive process which involves remembering (Rupert 2004). We may not deny the fact that developing the ability to write down, for example, and later on read the contents is accompanied by a shift in the composition of the applicable internal memory that helps to process information. Nevertheless, increased use of external resources is likely to change the way internal processing occurs and how the agent interacts with the environment (Weiskopf 2008). All in all, the ability of people to converse depends heavily on working memory, which can not be effectively substituted by an external store. In fact, when experiencing a malfunctioning extended cognitive system, it may be necessary to differentiate between the environment and the organism as disconnected components of that very system (Rupert 2004). Thus, in regard to effects of interference, we may be surprised by the relevance of the distinction between the internal and external because this is all about breakdown. Consider a very distinct but similarly central element of cognitive science, also known as developmental psychology. It has been thought that the developing system has to be envisaged as being integrated within its environment (Rupert 2004). However, this appears to have less plausibility when a wider view of the reasons of developmental theorizing is considered. In a practical developmental process, Nirshberg (2009) argued that the objects of the environment interacted with this process are not essential and inconsistent and therefore they may not be considered to be part of the combined system that endures over time. Truly, a constitution of a system may change over time at the same remaining the same system. By locating the cognition’s functionalist characteristics in a supposed independent and irreducible world of the brain, Aydin (2013) argued that this makes it possible to understand mind as being exclusive in regards to enhancing information processing and instrumental problem solving functions. In conclusion, the above discussion makes it clear that even if the attitude’s content is externalized, the attitude itself is not externalized. Clark and Chalmers assumes that the Modern Art Museum which is on 53rd street, which is Otto wrote in his notebook is a belief. However, it is also likely that Otto fears of hopes that the museum in located where it said to be. This implies that the information in the notebook would only play a proper role when it connects up to Otto’s internal attitude or belief. Otherwise it appears that the mind remains confined within the boundaries of the skin and skull. Reference List Aydin, C., 2013. The artifactual mind: overcoming the ‘inside–outside’dualism in the extended mind thesis and recognizing the technological dimension of cognition. Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, 14(1), pp.73-94. Clark, A. and Chalmers, D., 1998. The extended mind. analysis, 58(1), pp.7-19. Clark, A., 2009. Spreading the joy? Why the machinery of consciousness is (probably) still in the head. Mind 118(472), pp. 963-993. Clark, A., 2010. Memento’s revenge: The extended mind, extended. The extended mind, pp.43-66. Menary, R., 2010. The extended mind. Mit Press. Nirshberg, G., 2009. It’s Not All About Beliefs: The Extended Mind and Why Propositional Attitudes are Still in the Head. University of Texas. Rupert, R.D., 2004. Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition. The Journal of philosophy, 101(8), pp.389-428. Walmsley, J., 2008. Methodological situatedness; or, DEEDS worth doing and pursuing. Cognitive Systems Research, 9(1), pp.150-159. Weiskopf, D.A., 2008. Patrolling the mind's boundaries. Erkenntnis 68(2), pp. 265-276. Read More

In fact, the note may not be viewed to externalize the attitude itself, but the content of the desire. Going back to Otto’s case, the fact that he believed the museum was on 53rd street, the proposition sounds implicit in the information storage, which appears not to convey in an appropriate way to additional propositional attitudes (Clark 2010). Generally, the plausibility of extended attitudes is more short of when individuals act beyond normal propositional attitudes of desire and belief to think about states like fear.

There is need to try and shift focus to beliefs and the manner in which these beliefs assimilate broadly with the cognitive processes of individuals to understand how our minds work. For example, when working through a logic puzzle and other activities related to reasoning, the entire process involves interacting with the external belief and this is how the importance of EMH becomes evidence. Nevertheless, despite appreciating the importance of beliefs, it is also essential to recognize the importance of other propositional attitudes because they influence our interaction with the external environment (Nirshberg 2009).

According to Rupert (2004) to individuate a cognitive system extends beyond understanding beliefs of an agent and the role played by these beliefs in different cognitive functioning. There is need to also understand how these beliefs combine with each other and integrate with fears, desires, hopes and intentions. We can hypothesize two people who have a lot of overlap in their cognitive skills and beliefs; however, what might be relevant about them is how they act given the manner in which their beliefs work together with their other mental states (Menary 2010).

Clerk (2009) clearly stated the importance of extended beliefs in guiding behaviour, but did not consider the essential role of extra propositional attitudes inherent in individuals which determine their behaviour. The way people respond to situations, say for example, becoming frustrated after working on a problem for ten minutes, communicates a lot about their minds compared to what beliefs they hold (Nirshberg 2009). Imagine two people who come to belief that there is no God. Although one of them hoped that this proposition was true, its truth frightened the other person in stead.

Consequently, although the person who accepted it to be true developed a new sense of freedom, the one who feared the truth of the proposition experienced a serious existential crisis that even made him not to sleep for a whole week. The interesting thing about the minds of these two individuals is that not the belief that God does not exist, but how this belief integrated with other mental processes, which possibly explains the existence of the skin/skull boundary. According to Menary (2010) as external stores are increasingly utilized, the strategies of memory change and agents begin to depend more on external stores.

Consequently, in the process of remembering, states of external stores perform the role of bearing indispensable information. When this takes place, the appropriate states of external stores play an important role in the cognitive process which involves remembering (Rupert 2004). We may not deny the fact that developing the ability to write down, for example, and later on read the contents is accompanied by a shift in the composition of the applicable internal memory that helps to process information.

Nevertheless, increased use of external resources is likely to change the way internal processing occurs and how the agent interacts with the environment (Weiskopf 2008). All in all, the ability of people to converse depends heavily on working memory, which can not be effectively substituted by an external store. In fact, when experiencing a malfunctioning extended cognitive system, it may be necessary to differentiate between the environment and the organism as disconnected components of that very system (Rupert 2004).

Thus, in regard to effects of interference, we may be surprised by the relevance of the distinction between the internal and external because this is all about breakdown.

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