The Sway of Assurance in CRM Performance - Research Paper Example

Influence of Overconfidence in CRM effectiveness Name Institution Date Influence of Overconfidence in CRM effectiveness Crew resource management was initially known as the cockpit resource management. It was founded in the early 1980s. Crew resource management is geared towards teaching pilots how to improve communication, delegate authority, monitor automated equipment and prioritize tasks. CRM began in the United Airlines in the year 1980 when a final training program was constituted to purely concentrate of the human factor present in the cockpit. According to Cooper et al. (2000), the term ‘cockpit’ was changed to ‘crew’ owing to the fact that the training was expanded to include mechanics, flight attendants, management personnel, dispatchers and anyone else who was involved in the safe accomplishment of the flight journey. All the airline pilots are needed to training in crew resource management that knit together ground training and technical flight with subjects of human factor. The training has also escalated when it comes to flight attendants. According to Birnbach and Longridge (1993), the training is efficacious for both groups in separate terms. In flight real operations that are physical and cognitive factors that make these groups which are disparate to work less efficiently among the groups, especially when an environment that is cohesive is crucial, this could be such thing like an emergency. Crew Resource Management came to board as a response to new insights into the of aircraft accidents which resulted from the introduction of cockpit voice recorders and flight recorders in to jet aircraft which are modern. Information collected from these devices indicated that numerous accidents is occasioned not from technical malfunction of the aircraft or its systems, nor from a failure of skills of aircraft handling or absence of technical knowledge on the part of the crew, apparently that they are instead caused by the inability of the crew to appropriately respond to situation in which they are caught up into. For instance, communication inadequacy between crew members and the rest of the parties resulted into situational awareness loss, teamwork breakdown in the aircraft, and finally to a bad decision or series of decisions that resulted in a fatal accident or a serious incident (Cooper et al. 2000). The commencement of widespread dynamic flight simulator as a training aid permitted a variety of new theories concerning the causes of aircraft accidents to be analyzed under experimental situations. Basing on these results and an effort to give solution to the seemingly deficiency in the skills of the crew , more training in flight deck management techniques has been embarked on by various airlines. Preceding duration of experimenting and development, the techniques used by the new training came to be known as Crew Resource Management. The essence of CRM concept was promotion of more efficient and safer aircraft operations which have come to be acknowledged in the whole world. There has been less momentum as focus has been shifted from human factor of flight safety towards systematic error prevention and management (Byrnes & Black, 2003). There is need for fresh impetus to be injected in the field. According to Helmreich, et al. (1999), CRM is relating not so much with the technical skills and knowledge needed to operate and fly an aircraft but rather with the interpersonal and cognitive skills required to manage the flight in an organized aviation system. In this perspective cognitive skills are explained as the mental processes utilized for maintaining and gaining situational awareness for taking decisions and for problem solving. Interpersonal skills are regarded as communications and a variety of behavioral activities related with teamwork. In aviation as in other fields these skills areas more often overlap with each other, and more so overlap with technical skills needed in context of aviation. Overconfidence in CRM effectiveness A legitimate cause of overconfidence is an individual’s to believe in his abilities. Decision making that is good requires great knowledge of facts, relationships and concepts. It needs meta-knowledge which is the understanding of the limits an individual knowledge. Overconfidence is deeply embedded in an individual’s judgments and beliefs. Owing to the fact that is not instilled during formal education or rewarded in practice nor recognized, overconfidence has remained a flaw that is hidden in decision making in management level. Although overconfidence is responsible for distortion of decision making, it can play the main role during making decision at implementation. Many scholars have a long period tried to bring to attention the tricky issue of balancing confidence with realism, yet the effects of confidence which is unsupported continue to impact negatively on crew resource management (Helmreich. et al., 1999). Experience dictates that crew management suspects the level of certainty which the statement of this belief is made. Management understands that some of the opinions that that they get from subordinates and colleagues will be accurate while others will be inaccurate, even if they are persuasively argued and sincerely held. Besides, in the case of an opinion which is strongly held, one hardly has to look very far to point out an opposing view which is held no less firmly. An individual does not have to side with a position now to secure the right to hold a position in future. Overconfidence can distort crew resource management. Sometimes individuals are more often than not unjustifiably certain of their beliefs. Individuals are often distorted by overconfidence which is deep-seated. The aircraft captain was for a long time regarded as ‘God’ and the decisions that he made were always ‘perfect’. There was very little, if any at all, input from other pilots owing to the fact that there was an assumption that the captain entirely knew and understood what he was doing. Moreover it was regarded as disrespectful to explicitly question the decision of the superior. Part of this kind of thinking generated from the military realm. Previously the military was the greatest provider of pilots, and accordingly to military training came with a lot of ego, autocratic and machismo decision-making process. Military fighters were often single pilot aircraft and consequently there was absence of redundancy of, and input decisions from any other crewmember. The attitude did not go well in the cockpit of the civilians (Sherman, 2001). The problem commenced manifesting in the pilot connected airline accidents that resulted in hundred of lives being lost. Many of the accidents resulted from the human error that came as a result of breakdown in communication. The respect that has been given to the pilots made them to be overconfidence in the decisions making and not consult other crew members on what should be done incase of an incident that can culminate into an accident. Although the pilots are ever technically very competent, they were very deficient in interpersonal skills. The captain would fly a perfect Instrument Landing System approach, and in the opposite they were not able to operate in environment with synergy to accomplish tasks effectively. This creates a potentially dangerous and antagonistic circumstance. Overconfidence in Crew Resource Management is the major cause of disjointed communication and relationship among the crew members. One pilot trusts his decisions so much that there is virtually no communication of him with the co-pilot. Every crew member will feel like he is doing the right thing and there is no need to consult colleagues and other members of the flight team. In one plane crash that occurred, some reasons were identified as being the causal factors of the accident: The captain did not discuss the procedure of instrument approach, the procedure of missed approach, and other crucial elements on his approach briefing owing to the fact that he anticipated to use a visual approach to the airport. Secondly, the first officer and the pilot did not execute the needed callout of instrument approach, and the first officer did not call out the needed course, fix and altimeter information. Thirdly, the flight crew was not able to deliberate on a missed approach after receiving a third report of a missed approach to the airport and another report of visibility that was deteriorating in the face of the approach course (Cooper et al., 2000). The Safety Board recommended to the Federal Aviation Administration to revise the code of regulation requiring training of the aircraft crew. Safety has become number one priority for many airlines. Presently stewardesses are referred to as flight attendants and the role during the flight has changed tremendously. Passenger service is no longer the priority. Center of safety is the core function of the flight attendants. The problem with overconfidence it harms the interpersonal skills and also harms synergy among the members of the flight crew. The flight attendants believe in themselves and see no need of consulting the rest of the crew in case of an incident. The majority of the civilian airplanes and almost all of them have two pilots. In many cases the individual pilot has a lot of belief in his own ability and training to the degree that he sees no need of consulting his co-pilot in case he feels there is a hitch somewhere. As in the example that was mentioned previously, the pilot decided to use visibility approach rather calling out to other measures that could have been helpful in the situation. The pilot’s self belief in their competency in technical know-how makes them reluctant to use the available options that involve them communicating to the other parties who could have averted the event of an accident happening. The problem with flight attendant and pilot teamwork, especially in the communication perspective, has its source in the disparate job functions of the groups. Pilots are mostly men while flight attendants are majorly women. From theory of innate gender characteristics, female and male processes of thought are divergent from these groups. The pilot considered the cockpit their territory while the flight attendants considered the cabin their own territory. Consequently the flight attendants will be overconfident in their territory while the pilots will be overconfident in the in the cockpit. This brings about breakdown of information in physical and psychological terms. The pilot and flight attendants only communicate through an intercom and the divisions are made more prominent with the subsequent division of job responsibilities and functions. Research indicates that the divisions are attributed to organizational, historical, regulatory, and, psychological factor. Some factors that have been outlined as the cause of the accident in the example were beyond the pilots and the cockpit and therefore it calls for the pilots to communicate with other parties. For a successfully flight to be accomplished no should be regarded as inferior in the crew team (Sherman, 2001). According to Sherman (2001), the pilot has to communicate to controllers of flights at the airport stations and to effectively relay messages to the flight attendants to ensure that there is maximum safety measures in case of an incident during the flight. There should be effective communication in all persons responsible for a safe flight journey. Various cockpit voice recordings until now still show a considerable absence of non-essential chatter by the pilots, especially in the taxi phase. Flight attendants are part of the sterile cockpit rule. In many cases the cabin crew will not want to bother the pilots in the critical portion of the flight even the matter is crucial. Flight attendants are required to remain seated in the jump seats until when the pilot indicate to them that the sterile part of the flight is complete. They are not permitted to perform non-essential duties. Worrying statics show that a majority of the accidents, up to eighty percent happened when the sterile cockpit rule was in operation. There should be more communication during take off and landing. For a pilot of an aircraft, a large portion of the information from which situational awareness is obtained from emanates from the navigation equipment and flight instrument on board, therefore the process of conjuring up a mental code which is accurate of the position of the aircraft in space, its condition, and the crew condition, is exposed to a variety of degrading influences such as inattention, under-arousal, distraction, boredom, fatigue and stress. In such circumstances confirmation of the accuracy of mental models with the rest of crew members by means of sharing information and perceptions about situation, and being categorical about intentions, is of uttermost importance in the effective and safe management of the flight. Besides, sharing of information and knowledge apart from helping the incidents that are more obvious and accidents coming from loss of awareness of the situation, like controlled flight into terrain, it also puts a firm foundation for decisions that are of high quality concerning the overall flight management (Sherman, 2001). As it has been outlined, overconfidence causes much of the communication breakdown among the cabin crew and impact negatively in the accomplishment of the safe and successful flight. Byrnes and Black (2003) argue that the major aim of CRM is to make sure that decisions of high quality are taken the whole spectrum of flight operations. By means of pre-flight planning which is thorough will not only provide a yardstick against which in-flight decisions can be made but on the other hand will permit all crew members to contribute in the most effective manner to decisions made in the flight. Consequently it is crucial as the flight progresses that the captain keeps the crew posted at intervals that are regular on any changes to the original plan, so that individual crew members are able to maintain situational awareness that is good. This is paramount in case of abnormal operations or in operations that are emergency, where conditions influencing the flight progress and the aircraft safety are likely to change expediently. In incidents like these, regular updates on the status of the flight give the opportunity to individual crew members to be adequately aware of the situation of the circumstance and needs of the moment to contribute in the effective way to the process of decision making. Overconfidence among the crew members creates or enacts unseen barriers that hinder efficient and timely flow of information. The cabin crew is cut off from the cockpit while the pilots do not get back to the cabin crew to give them latest feedback of the situation of the flight (Byrnes& Black, 2003). Permitting subordinate crew members to take part in the process of decision making does not translate to all the decisions having to be made by committee. The level of participation or otherwise from subordinate crew members to some extent depends on the behavior which controls the decision. Behavior skilled-based depend to a large extent on the prior learning and any other associated decisions are mainly made subconsciously. In this context, the rest of the crew members provide a monitoring role that is passive. On the other hand this may necessitate need for assertive intervention if the level of skill on display by the person making the decision falls below a safe standard. Behaviors that are rule-based arte based on previously considered courses of action. Behaviors that are knowledge-based are used in circumstances which have not been encountered previously. In these situations the crew is required to make decision basing on a rational appraisal of the facts; therefore there must be scope that is considerable for the participation of the rest of the crew members and-if circumstances and time permit-even outside agencies can be incorporated. It is important that there should a good rapport among the crew members to make it easy for them to communicate among themselves (Helmreich et al. 1999). For maximization of CRM effectiveness in the aircraft, crew members apart from possessing a good grasp of the technical skills and knowledge, they also need to develop and understand interpersonal and cognitive skills which are a requirement for efficient Crew Resource Management. To play down the effects of overconfidence every member of the crew should regard the other as an important part of a successful flight and there should be enhanced communication among the crew members. Feeling of being superior and the only one to give orders should not be entertained. Some decisions that have resulted into fatal accidents have come from pilots or crew members who ignore consultation or raising alarm to create situation awareness. References Helmreich, R. L. et al. (1999). How Effective is Cockpit Resource Management Training? Issues in evaluating the Impact of Pragrams to Enhance Crew Coordination. Flight Safety Digest, 9(5), 1-17 Byrnes, R. E., & Black, R. (2003). Developing and Implementing CRM programs. Cockpit Resource Management (pp. 421-446). Cooper, G. E. et al. (2000). Resource Management on the Flightdeck: Proceedings of a NASA/Industry Workshop. (NASA CP-2120). Moffett Field, CA: NASA-Ames Research Center. Sherman, P.J. (2001). Research Project Evaluating the Effect of National culture on Flight crew behaviour. International Civil Aviation (ICAO) Journal, 51(8), 14-16. Birnbach, R., & Longridge,T. (1993). The regulatory perspective. Cockpit Resource Management. (pp 263-282). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Read More

There is need for fresh impetus to be injected in the field. According to Helmreich, et al. (1999), CRM is relating not so much with the technical skills and knowledge needed to operate and fly an aircraft but rather with the interpersonal and cognitive skills required to manage the flight in an organized aviation system. In this perspective cognitive skills are explained as the mental processes utilized for maintaining and gaining situational awareness for taking decisions and for problem solving.

Interpersonal skills are regarded as communications and a variety of behavioral activities related with teamwork. In aviation as in other fields these skills areas more often overlap with each other, and more so overlap with technical skills needed in context of aviation. Overconfidence in CRM effectiveness A legitimate cause of overconfidence is an individual’s to believe in his abilities. Decision making that is good requires great knowledge of facts, relationships and concepts. It needs meta-knowledge which is the understanding of the limits an individual knowledge.

Overconfidence is deeply embedded in an individual’s judgments and beliefs. Owing to the fact that is not instilled during formal education or rewarded in practice nor recognized, overconfidence has remained a flaw that is hidden in decision making in management level. Although overconfidence is responsible for distortion of decision making, it can play the main role during making decision at implementation. Many scholars have a long period tried to bring to attention the tricky issue of balancing confidence with realism, yet the effects of confidence which is unsupported continue to impact negatively on crew resource management (Helmreich. et al., 1999).

Experience dictates that crew management suspects the level of certainty which the statement of this belief is made. Management understands that some of the opinions that that they get from subordinates and colleagues will be accurate while others will be inaccurate, even if they are persuasively argued and sincerely held. Besides, in the case of an opinion which is strongly held, one hardly has to look very far to point out an opposing view which is held no less firmly. An individual does not have to side with a position now to secure the right to hold a position in future.

Overconfidence can distort crew resource management. Sometimes individuals are more often than not unjustifiably certain of their beliefs. Individuals are often distorted by overconfidence which is deep-seated. The aircraft captain was for a long time regarded as ‘God’ and the decisions that he made were always ‘perfect’. There was very little, if any at all, input from other pilots owing to the fact that there was an assumption that the captain entirely knew and understood what he was doing.

Moreover it was regarded as disrespectful to explicitly question the decision of the superior. Part of this kind of thinking generated from the military realm. Previously the military was the greatest provider of pilots, and accordingly to military training came with a lot of ego, autocratic and machismo decision-making process. Military fighters were often single pilot aircraft and consequently there was absence of redundancy of, and input decisions from any other crewmember. The attitude did not go well in the cockpit of the civilians (Sherman, 2001).

The problem commenced manifesting in the pilot connected airline accidents that resulted in hundred of lives being lost. Many of the accidents resulted from the human error that came as a result of breakdown in communication. The respect that has been given to the pilots made them to be overconfidence in the decisions making and not consult other crew members on what should be done incase of an incident that can culminate into an accident. Although the pilots are ever technically very competent, they were very deficient in interpersonal skills.

The captain would fly a perfect Instrument Landing System approach, and in the opposite they were not able to operate in environment with synergy to accomplish tasks effectively.

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