Moral Skepticism of Mental Disorders - Essay Example

and (Word count: 1372) Moral Skepticism of Mental Disorders Introduction There is a persistent debate about medicalization of mental illness, an element that has drawn skepticism from the society, with critics hailing from such fields as philosophy, psychiatry, and law. There is concern whether the society should attribute mental disorders to individuals. We shall evaluate and address the concerns raised by moral skeptics. People should not be classified as having mental disorders, as the illness lacks a scientific basis and can’t be diagnosed through an autopsy, and can’t follow a defined biological pathology. Exposition Critics have put across arguments as why people should not be classified as suffering from mental disorders. Thomas Szasz charges that psychiatrists should not label people as mentally ill as mental illness happens to be a metaphorical disease (Szasz, The myth of mental illness 1-6). He asserts that “disease’ is a biological process that tends to affect the normal functioning of the body of living organisms. It can be identified through performed autopsy and ascribed to a well-defined pathology (Szasz, The myth of mental illness 3-6). On the other hand, mental illness depicts undesirable thoughts and feelings associated with abnormal behaviors. He argues against classifying such thoughts, feelings and behavioral elements as diseases as it would present an open door for logical and semantic misappropriations. He shares a clear-cut insight of diseases as a malfunction the body of living organisms and would feature identifiable organs like the heart, kidney and the brain, while he describes behavior as what people do. He feels that tendency to address behaviors as illnesses grants the state powers to exercise control over treatment of such patients. Szasz puts an argument regarding respect for persons in ascription of somatic and mental disorders (Szasz, The myth of mental illness 4). A somatic ascription tends to categorize the ability of the individual based on the body functioning while mental disorders signify person’s condition of mental powers and faculties. Szasz believes that the two elements dictate special attention as a mental ascription presents some contestable value judgments that can be moral and socio-political in character (Szasz, The myth of mental illness 5). He stresses the need to see the difference between problematic disturbances and sickness. The likes of depression and anxiety are more of disturbing difficulties. Addressing such feelings as sicknesses yields confusion between sickness and difficulty, and between medicine and morals. Szasz asserts that classifying people as mental patients subjects them to disrespect and indignity. Their power to reason and make decisions is not respected. They are manipulated to fit into arrangement and plans of other individuals. Their personal preferences are ignored as they are deemed incapable of making right decisions. Their choices regarding treatment have no place, and the society subjects them to what they deem appropriate. Otherwise, a somatic diagnosis leaves no room for disrespect. Szasz argues that a physical illness happens to be comparatively value free. It is not open to essentially contestable values. Ascribing a physical illness upon a person doesn’t pose an affront for them as when they are said to be mentally ill. Szasz believes that psychiatry is disrespectful as it upsets the principles of independence and liberty (Peter 415). Its approach has harmful consequences as it does not address the need for a person classified as mentally ill to learn personal responsibility as reflected by his behavior, but rather tends to treat or cure the deviants. Szasz feels subjecting patients to psychotherapy does not cure their illnesses and thus should be just meant to raise their self-awareness about themselves, others and life, in general (Zilbergeld 77-79). Psychiatry should not deny them to act as moral agents so as to gain their entire control. The presumption of their incompetence is disrespectful. Mental competence should be up for assessment like any other aspect of the society. The accused has a right to be represented and pose an appeal legally and judiciary. Thomas Szasz feels there would be more respect for the patients if there would be separation of psychiatry from the state (Szasz, Thomas Szaszs Summary Statement and Manifesto). He argues that the government should not hinder with the medicalization of consenting adults. Government’s involvement has a tendency to create a therapeutic state where once individual behavior has them termed as insane, which is offensive to the patients. Szasz is keen to suggest the abolition of involuntary mental hospitalization (Szasz, Thomas Szaszs Summary Statement and Manifesto 1). Patients are secluded without their will and ‘imprisoned’ in established buildings medically termed as hospitals under the guise of medication and nurse care. These people are disrespected as they are detained without their consent. They are deprived of their liberty as they are handled as criminals in the hands of a justice system (Szasz, Thomas Szaszs Summary Statement and Manifesto 1). Erving Goffman and Deleuze felt the use of total institutions for those classified as mentally ill as stigmatizing (Summerfield 148). They are put away from the public and regarded incompetent to make sound decisions. They suffer discrimination even in the hospital as treatment is entirely based on decisions made by others. George Graham stand on mental disorders is different and feels such disorders cannot be regarded merely as neurological disorders, yet again their understanding would call for reference to the neurological (Graham 1-16). He looks at a mental disorder as impairment in psychological abilities with harmful effects for the patient. This can be caused by mental activities as well as irrational neural mechanisms. Graham admits difficulty in categorizing mental disorders as diseases. He is keen to clarify that not all somatic sicknesses are biologically clear leaving a thin line between diseases and disorders. He feels that mental disorders are unlikely to be categorized as diseases, but the issue should not pose a challenge to anyone with a deep and sophisticated knowledge about diseases (Graham 6-19). Graham argues that mental disorders are real as long as they are discoverable, their theory is independent, and the patient is identified as not okay with an irreducible mental diagnosis. He addresses the concerns raised by Szasz about essentially contestable values presupposed by the idea of mental illness. He addresses the idea of somatic illnesses being value free as proposed by Szasz. He feels that both diseases and mental disorders are not value free (Graham 91-108). Somatic illnesses pose contestable agendas, and as earlier mentioned, not all diseases are distinct and biologically clear. They raise a lot of questions before treatment. Grahams draws inspiration from the idea of his neighbor being allergic to cats. He can avoid cats at all or can seek medication to suppress the condition. But again, he imagines a situation where the treatment of the allergy is associated with another complication in the form of blindness. A proportion of those allergic to cats and are not subjected to treatment, with the treatment having a well-defined biological pathology, may turn out to be less susceptible to blindness than those treated. This is a clear indication that both mental disorders and diseases are subject to essentially contestable values (Graham 93). Argument Thomas Szasz is keen to put his arguments across based on his knowledge in psychiatry and as an academic. He is more informed on the foundations of psychiatry thus justified to level legit accusations against psychiatry. The society has stigmatized mental illness and the tendency to classify people as mentally ill is degrading. Their treatment does not conform to that of regular patients and is subjected to seclusion in hospitals. Their consent is violated, and their condition is regarded as so based on mere thoughts, feelings, and observable behavior. Such disorders cannot be confirmed by an autopsy and lack a defined pathology. Graham might contend that all diseases and disorders have contestable values, but somatic sicknesses are open to autopsy that can serve to clear any doubt. He doesn’t attend to stigmatization that comes with mental disorders. Assessment George Graham could respond to the argument just raised here by his persistent reference to neurological in understanding mental disorders. His tendency to pose both somatic and mental illnesses as subject to essentially contestable values using practical models might provide the basis for his arguments. Conclusion Moral skepticism of mental disorders addresses the issues that the society might be tempted to ignore. Critics raise valuable concerns that serve to justify why people should not be classified as mentally ill. The disorders have many areas to contend about though it’s clear they can’t be identified through autopsy and lack a defined pathology. Work Cited Graham, George. The Disordered Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Mental Illness. London: Routledge, 2010. Peter, Breggin. Toxic Psychiatry. New York: St. Martins Press, Why Therapy, Empathy, and Love Must Replace the Drugs, Electroshock, and Biochemical Theories of the "New Psychiatry". Summerfield, D. "Does Psychiatry stigmatize?" J R Soc Med (2001): 148-149. Szasz, Thomas. The myth of mental illness. Ney York: Harper and Row, 1961. —. Thomas Szaszs Summary Statement and Manifesto. May 23rd 2007. 28 Feb 2015. . Zilbergeld, bernie. The shrinking America: Myths of Psychological change. Boston: Little, Brown & company, 1983. Read More