Pity: An Ethical Dilemma - Essay Example

Pity: An Ethical Dilemma I. Introduction Commonplace individuals habitually discern pity from cruelty through the governance of the sentiments and the partial absence of cognitive ascendancy. Pity has been generally defined as an outward sign of humaneness or an immediate reaction to negative encounters with actual or imagined adverse, inopportune or ill-fated human being. An individual experiencing pity will undergo complex sentiments of distress and mercy directed to the person whom is under the pretext of bad fortune thus prompting the pitying agent to provide physical and/or monetary assistance to the pitied. Several cultures loathe the nonexistence of compassion, empathy and sympathy because of its connotation of harshness and cruelty (Fraser, 2002). Many people unconsciously interchange the concept of pity to positive emotions such as love and kindness but there were a few brilliant individuals who attempted to enlighten humanity on the real motives and inner functioning of pity. These philosophers such as Spinoza, Kant, Seneca and the most renowned existentialist Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche boldly countered the prevailing belief on pity. The widespread acceptance of pity as a positive human characteristic is promoted by the powerful institution of religion, particularly Christianity as maintained by Nietzsche (ibid). Nietzsche belligerently criticized the foundations of Christianity which lay on the principle that basic human instincts such as self-preservation and individualism are wicked and malevolent in nature. For Nietzsche, these basic human natures are in reality the fundamental element of inner strength promotion. Christianity, as he succinctly stated it, is a firmly established societal institution which in actuality operates to motivate individuals to be weak physically, emotionally and mentally through the exercise of pity. Nietzsche’s despise of Christianity is strongly reflected in this passage which he wrote in his book The Antichrist (1954): “Christianity is called the religion of pity. Pity stands opposed to the tonic emotions which heighten our vitality: it has a depressing effect. We are deprived of strength when we feel pity. That loss of strength which suffering as such inflicts on life is still further increased and multiplied by pity; pity makes suffering contagious” (574). Nietzsche apparently interpreted the Christian psychology as a doctrine that seeks to diminish humanity’s “will to power”. Human nature can only be affirmed and strengthened through willpower or the tangible attempt to discard the stronghold of church-fabricated identity on individuals which negatively influence one’s disposition and personal improvement. Nietzsche defended humanity against mysticism by asserting that human beings are naturally free and autonomous. This gift of independence guarantees individuals skills and aptitudes to wrestle against enervating emotions such as pity. In order to overcome this insurmountable external force, one should completely grasp the essence of acknowledging one’s inborn motives and feelings. Moreover, Nietzsche advocated that egoism or individualism is not at all immoral but a strategy in which individuals could attain the highest realization of self-worth (Figgis, 1917). Moreover, Nietzsche regarded pity as a producer of more sufferings than the alleviation of pain that routinely pounces on humanity. Pity is like a vacuum to both the pitying agent and the pitied in a sense that it powerfully germinates depression which can exhaust human strength and willpower. It is perplexing that even the German term for pity which is Mitleid literally indicates “suffering with pain” hence encouraging Nietzsche to probe into the origin and implications of the value and morality of pity. Nietzsche decried the detrimental consequences of pity which are the preservation of those who were selected by nature to perish because of their weakness and the decline of those high in aptitude or the “superhuman” because of pity (Berkowitz, 1996). II. The Value of Pity Nietzsche fervently argued that the sentiment of pity does only harm to both the philanthropist and the recipient of any form of aid and support. Generally, pity is the blatant manifestation of nihilism or the belief that human existence is devoid of objective meaning, goal and inherent value. Nihilism is advanced through pity because life simply becomes disheartening and corrupt. This is the negation of pity accomplished by Nietzsche in his morality of pity. Yet, it is quite indefinite if the concept of pity put forth by Nietzsche reflects compassion and sympathy. Numerous people use the terms pity, compassion and sympathy interchangeably. Sympathy in the German language is Mitgefühl which means “feeling with” whereas Mitleid or pity denotes a negative sense of “suffering with” (Nietzsche, 1967, 34). Following this variance in the German terms for sympathy and pity, it is safe to assume that pity in Nietzsche’s view is a direct contradiction of the sentiments compassion and sympathy. Pity in Nietzsche’s contemplation is an extremely negative idea since aside from suffering with the one who committed mistake or chosen by nature to suffer, it doesn’t achieve any end. Pity, aside from being devoid of internal meaning and purpose is also a squandering of emotional vigor to those who are impossibly dejected and aggravated by off-putting circumstances of life (ibid). To further delineate between compassion and pity, it is important to consider the focus of the two sentiments. Compassion centers its attention on the suffering subject whereas pity tends to put much notice on the endured situation such as desolation or disease. Logically, the emphasis on the suffered condition of pity will tolerate a leeway for disparity, disconnection and apartness to build up between the pitying individual and the pitied. This gap that will develop between the two agents of pity will consequently produce moods of superiority and disdain on the giver of pity and estrangement, humiliation and inferiority on the recipient of pity. On the contrary, compassion gives importance to the communality of humanity hence bridging the gap between the pitying agent and the pitied (Leiter, 2002). Nietzsche took off from this premise that pity and not compassion generates negative feelings of superiority, anger, disgrace and inferiority thus encouraging him to deliver his most lethal objections against the sentiment of pity. However, before examining Nietzsche’s morality of pity in an in-depth manner, it is relevant to first discuss briefly the influences that stimulated his antagonism towards this basic moral sentiment. Nietzsche is commonly misinterpreted as the pioneer of antipathy and aversion. Nonetheless, it is imperative to note that Nietzsche simply continued and enhanced the anti-pity tradition set off by Socrates and the Stoics (ibid). a.1. The Socratic Tradition of Pity The long tradition of ancient opposition to the sentiment of pity was instigated by Socrates who maintained that virtue and self-sufficiency are the only plausible factors that could enhance a human life. By proclaiming that pity is insignificant to both the pitying agent and the pitied, Socrates put forth a rigid idea that only self-autonomy is needed by individuals to conquer a successful life. The virtue or eudaimonia that Socrates was championing is self-sustaining or beyond the influence of external forces that could sway the fate of people (Roberts, 1998). This virtue is independently powerful because it strappingly fuses itself on the realm of internal manipulation or simply “it masters its own destiny”. If this virtue is transgressed it logically follows that the individual committed a blunder through erratic decisions and choices hence harming one’s own virtue. In this case, pity is inapplicable since bad fortune to the agonizing party was caused by internal erroneousness and not by unforeseen and remote circumstances. Only blame should be granted to the erring individual and not the sentiment of pity. On the other hand, the occurrences that many regard as major catastrophes to one’s life such as demise of a loved one, dire health condition, failure to seize critical opportunities for personal growth and others are considered insignificant by the Socratic tradition (Fraser, 2002). Eudaimonia is a solitary and field independent identity. It is absolute and self-contained. Possessing such a virtue, according to Socrates is sufficient to thwart all the external strains that could destroy one’s disposition in life. Individuals who upheld similar view will certainly perceive pity as a repulsive human sentiment. Antagonists of pity such as Nietzsche believe that it merely gratifies trivial or inconsequential things and events in life. For them, misfortune only happens because of bad choices and wicked actions thus bestowing pity upon the tormented party is quite appalling. Moreover, pity just aggravate the already ill-fated condition of the sufferer through alluding that the person is in dire need of material things that the world offer and that the person is lacking eudaimonia and autonomy because of these superficial needs. Likewise, this denigration accompanied by pity is extended to the pitying agent since it implies that only feeble and brittle individuals can be affected by pity (Nietzsche, 1967). The inverse relationship between virtue and pity is substantially exemplified by Nietzsche in his plethora of writings on the possibility of greatness through self-actualization and ethos of self-command. Socrates, even though unconfirmed, could have motivated Nietzsche to abominate pity as a fundamental human sentiment. Nonetheless, the continuing anti-pity tradition was then reinforced and prolonged by the Greek and Roman stoics who resultantly generated the fiery convention of attack on pity (ibid). a.4. Beyond Good and Evil For Nietzsche, the fundamental driving force that propels truth, thought and morality is the will to power. The truth that we are ardently sought for is actually a mere expression of humanity’s will to power. Assertive individuals usually parade their perspective on reality as bias-free and omnipresent while people of shaky disposition commonly resort to self-denial instead of challenging the willpower of the confident. Reality is constructed by the constant clashing of contradicting wills. Nietzsche absolutely admires individuals who do their utmost effort to free themselves from the fetters of prejudices of others and to evaluate their own assumptions. These individuals who possess a remarkable strength of character will not allow themselves to be averted by the morality that undermines the genuine potentialities of humanity but instead on the unconsciously ignored meta-morality that put emphasis on unconscious drives that decide on humanity’s concrete choices and manifest activities (Berkowitz, 1996). This principle on morality exemplified by Nietzsche strengthens his resolve against the subsistence of the sentiment of pity. Pity will successfully override any attempt of individuals to achieve a higher morality or that is beyond the incarceration of the conventional morality that Christianity propagates if the willpower is not securely anchored on the core of one’s self. At first, this argument on willpower will sound rather conceited, egotistical and insensitive. Yet, Nietzsche possibly suggests that the bracing of one’s determination will grant individuals a steady conviction that would help them in their everyday engagement with their fellowmen. The dogmatic morality, for Nietzsche is harmful at all levels because of its shortcoming in enhancing individual characters through guiding them in understanding both their visible and latent motives first before assuming a personal and civic space in a society of heterogeneous people (Friggis, 1917). Pity has the power the successfully plague a society that is comprised of people who are highly reliant on the external merchandises of human life. Revisiting Socrates premise on virtue, individual who had achieved a morality beyond what is shallowly accepted by the material world will more likely be victorious in defying the prevailing human sentiment, pity (ibid). a.5. On the Genealogy of Morals As a continuation of the discourse on the significance of acknowledging “extra morality” in the attainment of self-command or willpower, Nietzsche claims that the suffering individuals experiences is caused by humanity’s constant struggle to gratify a form of morality that is distantly remote from one’s own true convictions and ethical system. Human beings strive hard to achieve an inner life that is largely distinct from lower forms of animals through painful self-denial and wrestling against one’s own nature; yet, the true accomplishment of individuals who give their all-out for the success in achieving a productive inner life is a wretched and unstable replica of morality. Nietzsche defended that the greatest triumph is to take pleasure on one’s self-torture and struggle in order for the self to perceive the entire endeavor as a determined act of creation in which one can liberate the self from the chains of destructive instincts and unconstructive evolutionary past to recreate the self in one’s own molder. However, Nietzsche observed that individuals ordinarily distinguish these struggles as hardships and punishments. Plausibly, if people view life as a continuous cycle of suffering, then life becomes an object of pity and physical, mental and emotional sickness (Nietzsche, 1967). Those who are easily infected by this sickness of humanity are deficient in self-discipline hence weaklings and disgrace to the humankind in the eyes of Nietzsche. The term “sickness” was appropriately used by Nietzsche to refer to a moral disorder that is contagious. This generates a slave morality that convinces the determined and the strong that they are malevolent in nature because of their steady belittling of the power of self-denial. If the strong bends to the influence of the slave morality they will began conceding their self-reliance to hatred and eventually to sickness. The solitary way that these resolute individuals can do to avoid the manipulation of the sick masses is to discard and ignore any attempt of the slave class to moralize them (ibid). The ascetic model of the slave morality bestows an increased power to the sentiment of pity because the willpower is consciously restrained from manifesting itself. The sick individuals will consequently regard life as an overarching system of suffering and misfortune. This negative perception of life then will yield pity among them and to other people who they assess are suffering similar conditions. According to Nietzsche, slave morality wills only nothingness thus giving primacy to the sentiment of pity. These sick individuals do not have the capability or the initiative to will on positive acts such as good health, happiness, strength, contentment, etc hence keeping them on the command of pity (ibid). III. Conclusion Contemporary mankind is highly materialistic because of its desire to acquire more and more goods. This preoccupation on the material worth of life is oftentimes self-centered and considered by many as morally wrong. On the contrary, a life that is firmly grounded on simplicity and contentment is regarded with righteousness (Haney, 1936). Yet, the concepts of right and wrong are equally elusive. Multitudes of individuals are largely influenced by the doctrines of religion. Yet, many philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche contradicted the all-embracing teachings of religion. For the existentialist, the moral codes of right and wrong instructed by religion are in reality invalid. They have explained that people differ in their perception toward morality because an absolute meaning of good and bad is non-existent. People normally follow their individual notions of morality which substantially depend on their sentiments and cognitive capacity (Strong, 1965). Organizations in post industrial societies cannot function outside the value system. The value system largely influences if not completely forms the behavior of individuals who as a group comprise the organization. Pattern of general attitudes and principles are seen in the value system. Ideas of undesirable and desirable, right and wrong differ from organization to organization (Sabath, 1993). An unemployed sawmill worker in Northern California feel differently about cutting old growth forests than a young lawyer working in San Francisco who enjoys hiking in the Sierras mainly because their economic and social condition are incomparable. The unemployed sawmill worker has a different set of moral code from the lawyer because of their organizational affiliation. The former, because of incidences of unemployment, perceives cutting old growth forests for subsistence whereas the latter takes pleasure in nature-tripping because of affluence. Post industrialism bestowed diverse moral codes to individual economic capacities (Hosmer 2008). Works Cited Berkowitz, P. (1996). Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Figgis, J. N. (1917). Will to Freedom: Or, the Gospel of Nietzsche and the Gospel of Christ. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Fraser, G. (2002). Redeeming Nietzsche: On the Piety of Unbelief. London: Routledge. Haney, L. (1936). 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