Oppression Lies in the Invalidation of Experience - Essay Example

Running Head: OPPRESSION LIES IN THE INVALIDATION OF EXPERIENCE Oppression Lies In The Invalidation Of Experience of the of the Institution] Oppression Lies In The Invalidation Of Experience Introduction: Oppression The type of oppression that is imposed by nature is well known. It consists of the pains of sickness, the weaknesses of old age, the various liabilities of the body (its limited capabilities, infirmities, or degenerations), and all such stress-causing factors. "Oppres'd with two weak evils, age and hunger" was Shakespeare's formulation of the more hostile effects of nature on humans (As You Like It, act 2, scene 7, line 132). Studies in the area of natural sciences successfully analyze the whole kaleidoscope of these effects. Similarly, the social sciences have developed a "sociology of disasters," which describes and analyzes behaviour caused by natural factors. Man-made oppression, however, is of a different character. Whereas "natural" oppressions are overt and easily recognizable, man-made-or socially induced--oppression has, as a rule, to be unmasked, even though in social life, oppression, like power, is ubiquitous. Moreover, unlike naturally induced oppression, the concept of man-made oppression accepts as its basic assumption the concept of free will. The existential idea that an individual can be the "master of his fate," or even that he/ she is "sentenced to freedom," radically alters the perception of human made oppression from the traditional notion that the human condition is one of pain and the creation of pain. Literature Review Some attempts to formulate a definition of oppression read like the outline of a novel: Oppression is, above everything else, a condition of being, a particular stance one is forced to assume with respect to oneself, the world, and the exigencies of change. It is a pattern of hopelessness and helplessness. People only become oppressed when they have been forced (either subtly or with obvious malice) to finally succumb to the insidious process that continually undermines hope and subverts the desire to "become." The process, which often is self-perpetuating and self-reinforcing, leaves in its wake the kinds of human beings who have learned to view themselves and their world as chronically, almost genetically, estranged. The end product is an individual who is, in fact, alienated, isolated, and insulated from the society of which he nominally remains a member. He and society are spatially joined but psychologically separate: they inhabit parallel but nonreciprocal worlds (Goldberg 1978: 2-3). The recent work of Young is an interesting exception, for she uses the concept of oppression in a more elaborate and precise way, heavily influenced by a "soft" type of Marxism that is quite normative: "In its new usage, oppression designates the disadvantage and injustice some people suffer not because a tyrannical power coerces them, but because of the everyday practices of a well-intentioned liberal society" (Young 1990: 41). She suggests that there are five "faces" of oppression. The first, exploitation, is "a steady process of the transfer of the results of the labour of one social group to benefit another." For example, exploitation could be based on the oppression of women, or on manipulation of conditions related to race or menial labor. The second, marginalization, is "the most dangerous form of oppression." It has mainly a material form and is, according to Young, a situation in which "a whole category of people is expelled from useful participation in social life." The third, powerlessness, is described negatively; Young argues that "the powerless lack the authority, status, and the sense of self that professionals tend to have." The fourth, cultural imperialism, "involves the universalisation of a dominant group's experience and culture, and its establishment as the norm." The fifth and final face of oppression is systematic violence (Young 1990: 48-65). Young believes that these criteria are objective. Her approach is based on an understanding that the main duty of the social scientist is to articulate the actual meanings of the basic concepts of the current social movements; hence she is not especially worried by semantical errors like idem per idem (tautology--"the same by the same"), the lack of precise definitions, or the usage of value-loaded concepts. This approach assumes some type of critical metalanguage and is not especially troubled by empirical evidence. In contrast, I suggest the following understanding of oppression: it is an external or internal man-made limitation of the available options of human behaviour of an individual or a group (if individuals belonging to this group identify themselves with it). This definition stresses that oppression may come from outside or inside. Oppression not only affects cognitive options of available types of conduct (these limitations may be especially visible when in contrast to a "revolution of expectations") and not only widens the options of human behaviour (since it deals with legal and illegal attachments) but also restricts, sometimes in a literal sense, physical possibilities of behaviour. Oppression is understood here not so much as a clear denial of expected options (which generates relative deprivation), or as a burden that seems to be obnoxious when compared with the light hardships of others (noticed due to relationship with other reference groups), but as a constant, invisible, almost unconsciously binding restriction of existing possibilities. By this perception, oppression may be treated as natural, given, or unquestionable. Since it is not always easily visible, it may appear for the individual as a result of a time of reflection. Oppression can assume many forms: legal, economic, political, ideological, cultural, or existential. Kafka described, in an obsessive way, the oppressive entanglements of all forms that can enmesh an average citizen in his/her everyday life. Cultural pressures inside the bourgeoisie, and especially the lower-middle bourgeoisie, can be devastating, as Balzac and others have convincingly shown. Violations of human rights, as recorded by Amnesty International, indicate how vivid the problem of political oppression remains. Marxist doctrine was so obsessed with the liberation of the economically disadvantaged that it began to oppress even more severely those whom it was supposed to defend; however, ideological oppression, understood as a monopoly of accepted beliefs and the practices connected with them, is the essence of all totalitarian regimes and it is also the most comprehensive type of oppression. Social Oppression Oppression usually descends in the wake of social struggle. If the struggle takes the form of a legal battle, its results are quite easily recognizable since they are reified into formal frameworks. If it takes the shape of a duel of opposite social or physical forces, then its consequences are, as a rule, multivariate, obscure, and laden with unexpected consequences. But oppression always manifests ongoing conflict. It appears when there are at least two adversaries enforcing opposite interests. In such a situation, the given level of oppression shows how far the oppressor can push and how much the oppressed can endure, indicating the relative strength of the oppressor and oppressed. In extreme situations, those who are oppressed may, in fact, be stronger; being aware of their potential, they may purposely restrain themselves from attacking until such time as they can demolish their opponents. As a rule, however, those who are more powerful suppress those who are weaker to keep under control latent or dormant conflicts. Therefore, human rights as generally proclaimed are not derived from "natural" or "divine" sources, but they are engendered by the type of oppression that is targeted against those who had aspired to these rights. In the history of humankind, individuals and small groups move from the first stage of natural, concrete, face-to-face types of oppression and enter into the subsequent stage of abstract pressures applied through formalised social structures. In this stage, traditional means of social control such as the family, tribe, and community governance change their targets radically. Also, instruments for control of institutions, organisations, and various formal structures based on rational patterns of behaviour replace traditional measures of social control. These new, rational measures of social control sequentially overwhelm human beings in a new and unprecedented way. Additionally, huge social superstructures, or macroexperiments imposed by the modern totalitarian systems, provide collective human experience with new instruments that are more suitable to the constantly shifting meanings of the globalization process. In these even more rationalised settings, the law starts to play a decisive role in shaping the image and reality of the "new world" and "new civilization." Thus, law and its pathology appear as the main instrument of social oppression. I shall return to this central point shortly. Vulnerability can be treated as a good indicator of oppression. As Stanko (1987: 131-32) puts it: If we read the use of precautionary strategies as one indication of universal vulnerability, most of the research indicates that women feel more universally vulnerable than men. While, on the whole, individuals who have experienced some form of victimization have a greater tendency to change their behaviour to avoid future victimization, many victimised men do not seem automatically to alter their behaviour to protect their physical safety. Preliminary evidence from this ongoing research indicates that men are more likely than women to take additional measures to protect their material possessions--their cars or their belongings--rather than their persons, even if they themselves had been physically threatened or assaulted. And, Stanko adds, also in a case of sexual assault, physical assault, or sexual harassment, "women adopt precautionary strategies as a way of living in a male-dominated world" (Stanko 1987: 133). Once oppression becomes a matter of formal, abstract, and rationalised means of exerting pressure, social control enters into the psyche of an individual with an impact much increased by the creative ballast of technical and organisational social constructions. Human beings are more or less forcibly socialised to treat and absorb new technical and organisational surroundings as a natural type of environment. The essential feature of this environment is a transformation from external control of a body and its social habitat (attitudes, roles, status, etc.) into a new, internal, unprecedented reality of control. This control (or its pathological equivalent, ubiquitous totalitarian control) is implanted directly into the psyche of the individual, since it is the individual who is treated as the target of modern civilization. This advanced type of control tends to include in its pool of available measures the individual "I's," the selves of each given human being. In other words, it tends to incorporate as its strategic control measures those categories of self that are treated as the most treasured elements of human life. Thus, in effect, the individual is controlled not only from outside but from the very centre of his/her existence--from within. Social control seems to be reified; it takes on a life of its own. To elucidate these problems better a task was undertaken to split the self, as an atom had once been split. False Consciousness Man-made or social oppressions do not necessarily manifest themselves (or become unmasked) through extraordinary or spectacular events. They can operate in the same way as the weather or air, perpetuating themselves in a "natural" way; they just exist. They have been generated by social structures that are established and reified by history and by the long-lived socio-political domination that has been supported by the well-organised and consistent apparatus of social control and repression. Even more, these oppressions maintain their existence with the continuous support of well-elaborated illusions that have been spread around by the phenomenon of false consciousness. South African apartheid is a suggestive example of such an internalised Weltanschauung that was able, in the past, to transform itself into ubiquitous, unquestionable "obviousness." Only recently has apartheid become the target of vigorous attack by more ethically sensitive whites. What used to be called the black problem has now become the white problem. It is not easy to accept that even in relation to the demise of apartheid, whites and their anxieties dominate. Justice would require that the central issue be how to guarantee that the oppressed majority's rights are restored and the effects of centuries of colonial and racial domination removed. Negotiations should be exclusively about how to dismantle the structures of apartheid, establish democracy, and correct the injustices of the past. Yet what is being projected as a central issue is the constitutional future of whites (Sachs 1990: 149). Racial domination points to a significant ingredient of oppression, the very phenomenon of false consciousness: the inadequate and biased perception of the existing situation by an individual or collectively by a social group. Sometimes this perception can run contrary to the "objective" interests of those who generated it. Recent events in Eastern Europe unmasked several suggestive examples. A worker in a socialist country who lives everyday with socialism as it is and not as it is supposed to be, and yet who votes for the "socialistic" government that claims to represent his/her interests; or a social scientist specializing in problems of social stratification who provides his/her expertise for such a government--each is displaying a striking degree of hypocrisy. There are many reasons for this hypocrisy. Factors like greed, the desire for career advancement, the search for monetary rewards; or intellectual retardation, aggravated personal insecurity, authoritarian types of personalities: these, alone or in part, may play a decisive role here. Economic and male-oriented types of oppression present further examples of successfully inculcated false consciousness. Women not only face the stress of physiological oppressions. They are not only placed in a stressful, disadvantageous position vis--vis men in domestic, social, economic, and political life; they are also deeply conditioned by ideology to do everything possible to make themselves pleasant to men. This man-made captive Weltanschauung, this semi-ideological orientation can be even more oppressive than many types of accumulated, hard-natured physiological and economic disadvantages. The idea of being a man's "pet," implanted into the psyche of women by the long-standing processes of acculturation acquired in some socio-religious circles, is, in effect, almost a natural existential status. An inquiry into the interrelations of a pseudo family composed of a pimp and the women who work for him linked the structure of economic and paternalistic dominance thus: A putative and potential refuge to women responding to a dearth of licit employment opportunities and the glitter and economic potential of the street, the pseudo family actually emerges as a heteropatriarchal mechanism whose character, organisation, and context serve to depress further, rather than enhance, the life chances of its female members. Once a woman is "turned out" by the "man" and listed in the pseudo family, she is enmeshed in a tangled skein of conflicting emotions and motives; "wives-in-law" vie for the coveted position of "bottom woman" and for the attention and regard of their "man" and the "man" schemes (in concert with other "men") to maintain his/her dominance and, above all, the profitability of the union. As female hustlers age, and as their criminal records lengthen, they become marginal even to this world of last resort. Traded as chattel, often stripped entirely of property in the process of exchanging "men," and finally disowned when competition from other more naive, more attractive, and more obedient women becomes too strong, street women find themselves doubly jeopardised by capitalistic patriarchal structures that are pervasive in "straight" society and profound upon the street (Romenesko and Miller 1989: 1090). Women are here the targets of a triple, mutually reinforcing oppression: economic, social (as executed by the family, a social body especially treasured by them), and male (perpetuated both by individual males and by males as a collective category). Women are not only financially exploited, physically used, suppressed by an official and intuitive law (as "wives-in-law"); they are also dominated by the ideology imposed on them. While various types of oppression may reinforce each other, however, they may also contradict themselves. To take an example from South Africa, as one specialist explains: When certain males are extremely disadvantaged, it becomes more difficult for women to recognize their relative disadvantage as women. The fact that white women enjoy the privileges associated with being white in a white supremacist society, means that many are unlikely to feel more oppressed than black men. Similarly, due to the extreme deprivation suffered by black people under the system of apartheid, black women are not necessarily likely to feel more oppressed than black men (Hansson 1991: 4). This view is not always so, however. One of the most intriguing controversies arising in the 1991 Senate confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominee Judge Clarence Thomas was the question of why Anita Hill waited ten years to reveal her version of events. K. Morton in Newsweek (October 21, 1991) presents this explanation: There is more than personal catharsis at stake in owning up to this long suppressed incident. I am writing this not only because the memory would not go. I am writing because Professor Hill's voice moved me to do so. I wanted to say to the Senate panel, "Look, I know why she stayed on with a man who insulted her. So many of us have been there, not liked ourselves for it, but we have stayed." And there is another impulse to my speaking out now. If men and women alike pronounce such degrading episodes unacceptable, perhaps our daughters might be spared similar choices in their professional lives. No one should have to purchase job security at so high a price. The Law As An Instrument Of Social Oppression As noted earlier, once concrete types of oppression are replaced in human society by abstract pressures applied through formalised social structures, the law becomes central in shaping the new order. Inside structures that are built on the basis of face-to-face interpersonal relations, this is done through the intuitive law potential (compare, Podgrecki , 1991: 37-67); inside institutional and organisational social bodies, this is mainly done by the services of official law. On the macro level, or the level that combines the impersonal relations and requirements of institutional and organisational frames, this is done through the use of professional and cognitive measures. But all norms utilised by impersonal officials or rituals and etiquette have their roots in oppression that is socially established; is usually invisible and taken for granted; is sometimes despised, but is treated as natural; and usually is treated as legitimised. Oppression is an independent factor of social life. As such, it cannot be reduced to economic exploitation, sexual harassment, racism, political intolerance, legal persecution, or other well-elaborated concepts. It is a social pressure that functions as an additional component generated by various natural and man-made factors. The experience of Native women, which was incorporated into the report on federally sentenced women in Canada, may exemplify these man-made factors: Our understandings of law, of courts, of police, of the judicial system, and of prisoners are set by a lifetime's defined racism. Racism is not simply set by the overt experiences of racism, though most of us have known this direct hatred, have been called "dirty Indians" in school, or in foster homes, or by police or guards, or have seen differences in the way we were treated and have known that this was no accident. Racism is much more extensive than this. Culturally, economically, and as People we have been oppressed and pushed aside by the Whites. We were sent to live on reserves that denied us a livelihood; controlled with rules that we did not set and that made us dependent on services we could not provide ourselves. Approach And Overview The normative content of the law and oppression makes it imperative to find a special method of inquiry that combines an evaluative perspective with the requirements of the empirical approach. In this study, I have used what may be called a multidimensional approach to the problem of social oppression. Such an approach develops a complex methodological and conceptual framework that permits analysis of social issues from different perspectives, so that the various faces of social reality can be grasped more comprehensively. The essence of this idea was presented in the book Multidimensional Sociology (Podgrecki and o 1979): It is not possible to see in the darkness a complicated structure unless it is illuminated from different angles at the same time. But when the light comes from one angle only, then the emerging vision would lack entirely the intriguing complexity of the whole. As a result this vision impoverishes the picture of the reality. One of the central tools of the multidimensional approach is social empathy, a learned understanding of other human beings surrounded by the social world, an understanding of what belongs to the social world that is alien to a given individual. In other words, social empathy is an entrance into a world of social existence other than one's own; this entrance is accomplished by experiencing, whether directly or indirectly, other people's existential specificity. By this means, one can absorb different types of socio-personal experiences that are different from one's own internal world. Bergsonian intuition, Diltheyan procedure that furnishes the thinker with data pertaining to the external reality; Znaniecki's "humanistic coefficient," which supposedly allows one to grasp the specificity of others' comprehension of the world existing outside; Petraycki's enlarged comprehension of introspection; and even Giddens's "double hermeneutics" (lay actors' meanings of social life and the reconstruction of frames of these meanings) should be treated as gradual approximations of the notion of social empathy. If they are to be used in social practice, data obtained by the exercise of social empathy must, as a rule, be transformed into dependent or independent variables. To do this, they have to be husked from the mixture of existing matter and the flow of current events, and operationalised into constructs and notions suitable for empirical inquiry. Since in the process the data are deprived of their particular authenticity and uniqueness, it is advisable to flavour them with elements of everyday life, even anecdotes, to make their genuine character more visible. When discussing the problem of social control and oppression, one thinks, as a rule, about such supervisory agencies as the police (including secret police), courts, the bureaucratic apparatus, and power elites, as well as about education, religion, and political ideology. Institutions of this sort play various and important roles in performing supervisory tasks and are, as a whole, complementary in their concerted effort to bring people's activities up to the expected standards. Some of these agencies use techniques that are quite visible and obviously repulsive, whereas others use techniques that are subtle, attractive, and unobtrusive. Tortures and governmental promotions, the psychological poisons of vicious gossip and intrigue, flatteries and compliments: all belong to this kaleidoscope of strategies. Due to their visibility, pressures of this kind have been described in more or less detail by specialists analyzing the interrelations of humans in different social settings. It is easy, however, to overlook the particular type of control that lies, hidden and unseen, deep within the human psyche. This kind of control relies on devices that are inculcated upon the human soul and that operate automatically within it; they can be more powerful than all the spectacularly oppressive or covert and seductive institutions that constantly impose social conformity. It was Marx who highlighted the possibility of transforming oppression into self-oppression. It is necessary to make the actual pressure even more pressing by adding to it the consciousness of pressure; the shame even more shameful by making it public. . . . We have to make the ossified conditions dance by singing them their own melody! We have to cause the people to be frightened by their own image, in order to give them courage (quoted in Meyer 1957:19). What, then, are these inherent, hidden, invisible, unspecified, yet crucial forces of social control In order to identify these forces more clearly, one has to analyze the different types of techniques that ensure that social behaviour conforms with the basic values of social order. Thus, eight types of social selves are proposed here for consideration: the Instrumental, the Facade, the Looking-glass, the Principled, the Ideal, the Real, the Subsidiary, and the Private selves. Camus novel The Plague (1977, first published in 1947) describes an imaginary society in a large city that is attacked by a deadly epidemic. In the course of the story, one may distinguish fifteen stages in the advancement and withdrawal of oppression. The first is the stage of everyday normalcy. The second is characterised by the emergence of various types of new and unrecognised symptoms (strange circumstances, calling for an alarm, inducing a tendency to ignore them, etc.). The third stage heralds the social recognition that the newly emerged symptoms constitute a common danger. The fourth consists of attempts to fight against the puzzling but deadly danger with measures that traditionally were regarded as useful in battling various calamities. The fifth stage is marked by a growing social presentiment of an approaching general crisis, and the sixth, by a socially shared feeling of despair: Why did it happen to me Why did it happen to us The seventh stage of oppression consists of various types of social reactions toward the catastrophe, whether withdrawal, animated religious activity, real or spurious indifference, overt or hidden anger, irrational behaviour, engagement with a second ("shadow") economy, open refusal to adapt, excessive optimism, or various sorts of social pathology. The eighth stage is typified by its clear image of collective identity: "We oppressed." This stage constitutes the peak of the crisis. In the ninth stage comes the first hope of relief; to some extent, those hopes are justified by new technical and organisational inventions in the war with the plague. The tenth stage sees a far-reaching cry for a "new social order," at which point the plague turns itself into its own opposition. The eleventh stage is an acute, painful feeling that rescue is still not close enough. The twelfth is the first massive withdrawal of the calamity; the thirteenth, a recurrent wave of pain. A general return to "normalcy" comes with stage fourteen, which marks the closing of the circle. In the fifteenth and the final stage comes the awareness that the evil that was defeated has merely returned to its dormant form. Translated thus into sociological language, The Plague presents abundant and suggestive material for the development of a synthetic model of macro social oppression (imaginative and insightful penetration of social reality is often much more illuminating than laborious and dull sociological inquiries). This chapter outlines at the microlevel descriptions of human behaviours that arise in situations of man-made oppression. It does so through a series of hypotheses about features of behaviour under oppression that are specific to various types of social situations. These hypotheses provide general frameworks for human behaviour; different types of selves modify this behaviour, but they do it inside of those already predesigned skeletons. Conclusion According to Merton, the dominant mode of behaviour in nonoppressive situations is conformist. Conformity, he says, Is the most common and widely diffused [type of adaptation]. Were this not so, the stability and continuity of the society could not be maintained. The mesh of expectancies constituting every social order is sustained by the modal behaviour of its members representing conformity to be established, though perhaps secularly changing, culture patterns (Merton 1968: 195). The thrust of the hypotheses that follow is that in oppressive situations, conformity as such ceases to be the dominant mode of adaptive behaviour. Although the hypotheses are formulated in a typically positivist manner, it must be noted that they are not exclusively concerned with objective data taken from outside; that is, with the data that are given, that can be measured, standardised, and translated into testable statements. Instead, the hypotheses are concerned with subjective constructions, developed by the agents of human interaction. These constructions can have objective counterparts, but they may also represent only pure products of human minds, emotions, and myths. Human interactions can, by visible activities, change social reality or communications and involve people in task-oriented activities, but they may also capture and oppress individuals by meanings that individuals themselves attribute to them, all because human beings can be seized by their own imaginations. Thus, under oppression the most common modes of behaviour are the instrumental, withdrawal, and rebellious modes. Thirdly, there are different areas where oppression manifests itself. Oppression takes place in the army, in the school, in the hospital, in prisons, and in many other social institutions. Although the forms of oppression that appear in various social settings have different characteristics, they can be divided according to the criteria of positive and negative and intended and unintended contexts. Intended negative oppression takes place in a concentration camp. The policy of a depersonalised, institutionalised unit could serve as an example of a personally unintended negative oppression. Here one may also formulate a general hypothesis concerning the relation of oppression caused by individuals and organisations in the modern world. The further the phenomenon and process of oppression are located from the interactions of small groups, in particular face-to-face encounters, then (a) the fewer the incidents of direct oppression and the lower the intensity of oppression triggered by individual feelings, and (b) the greater the oppression initiated by impersonal bodies (institutions, organisations, parties, etc.). The intended--or appearing as a by-product--oppression of the army, school, or hospital has its visible rationale: its discipline aims at predesigned effects. It is not easy to find an example of an unintended positive oppression; Grygier's previously discussed determination to transform his existential position as one of the oppressed into an inquiry based on participatory observation could serve as an example. But from a theoretical point of view, the largely unexamined instances of unbound negative effects flowing from a supposedly positive oppression are theoretically especially interesting. Religious life sometimes demands a sharp sort of discipline. In the Roman Catholic Church, the constant preoccupation with sex clearly diverts the hierarchy of priorities, and the attention of its believers, from the demands of civil decency and honesty in political matters to moral sex sins. This diversion seems to be articulated and executed by the righteous indignation of those who are administratively deprived of sex and who envy those who can enjoy it. One final point should be stressed. Independent of the volume and acuteness of an existing oppression, the human will, if it is persistent enough, can smash even the most overwhelming Moloch. But shouldn't I, at least, be experiencing a sense of joy The joy of victory No matter which way you looked at it, we had conducted a desperate war against this regime of utter scum. We were a handful of unarmed men facing a mighty State in possession of the most monstrous machinery of oppression in the entire world. And we had won. The State had been obliged to retreat. Even in jail we had proven too dangerous for it (Bukowski 1978: 342). References Bukowski V. To Build a Castle. London: Andre Deutsch, 1978. Camus A. The Plague. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1977. Goldberg I. Oppression and Social Intervention. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1978. Grygier T. Oppression: A Study in Social and Criminal Psychology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1943; New York: Grove Press, 1973. Hansson D. "The Patchwork Quilt of Power Relations: A Challenge to South African Feminism." Paper presented during The International Feminist Conference on Women, Law and Social Control, Montreal, Canada, 1991. Merton R. Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1968. Meyer A. G. Leninism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. Morton K. "Comments." Newsweek, Oct. 21, 1991. Podgrecki A. A Sociological Theory of Law, Milano, Giuffre, 1991. Podgrecki A. and M. o. Multidimensional Sociology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979. Romenesko K. and E. Miller. "The Second Step in Double Jeopardy" Crime and Delinquency 35 (1): 1989. Sachs A. Protecting Human Rights in a New South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1990. Stanko E. "Typical Violence, Normal Reaction: Men, Women and Interpersonal Violence in England, Wales, Scotland, and the USA." In Women, Violence and Social Control, edited by T. Hanmer and M. Maynard. London: Macmillan Press, 1987. Young Iris M. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990. Read More