The Military Coercion - Essay Example

The Challenges Involved in Military Coercion, Using Vietnam and Kosovo as Examples Nura Al-Shibli (z3236173) Abstract This essay provides an explanation on the challenges involved in military coercion, using Vietnam and Kosovo as examples. The use of military coercion has been controversial in the last two decades given the pre-emptive military strategy being followed by the United States of America in quelling potential risk to American and international security particularly in possession of weapons of mass destruction. It has been a popular choice of military strategy among leaders of industrialized nations due to its ability to maximize target destruction at the same time control civilian casualties. However, its use poses multi-faceted challenges particularly in the face of multinational alliance, increase in democratic states and the demand for humanitarian concerns. It is an effective military strategy if used solely without the aid of non-military strategy since it can create hatred among population of target states. On the other hand, it is a strategy that is seen to be crucial in protecting international security. Keywords: military coercion, military strategy, air strike, air power, insurgency, counterinsurgency “The defensive form in war is…..not a mere shield, but a shield formed of skillfully delivered blows” - Clausewitz, On War (Edward Haley, 2004) Introduction Issue under discussion Military Coercion presents many challenges hence it is not useful on its own as a single strategy. Thus, non-military measures such as economic sanctions, political isolation, and inducements to operate in the form of aid, for example, must be implemented simultaneously with military coercion. In fact, empirical study of Horowitz and Reiter showed that implementing sanctions in aid of military coercion is a significant variable in making the attempt of coercion successful1. Grand strategy should be the norm in international relations diplomacy than military strategy alone. According to Posen2 the former focuses on providing security using both military coercion and non-military strategies. Whereas, the latter uses military force to punish dissenters by infringing into the opponents’ political stance through “counter civilian bombing or guerrilla strategy”3. The former’s goal is to make the opponent surrender else be faced with continuous destruction of its social and economic infrastructures and eventual targeting of its population. It uses air strike, atomic bombs and ballistic missile, among others. The latter involves limited number of coercive military operations mostly involving ground combat forces towards key political areas of a territory to ensure surrender of leadership of the opposing party. Empirical evidence showed that military coercion bridge international conflict wherein countries with highest military capability can either start or coercively address it4. Benjamin Fordham 5 pointed out results of non empirical studies implying that decisions of states to attack dissenters are highly influenced by its higher capabilities to enforce military coercion. However, Horowitz and Reiter’s studies showed that military coercion is ineffective as a punishment strategy. It can lead to strengthened social support to the dissenters particularly if it targets civilians6. Such contrasting arguments are challenge in itself in using military coercion for international relations policy. Significance of the issue The facilities of military coercion have improved across time resulting to higher military capability of industrialized regions. President Bush’s declaration in 2003 of a pre-emptive security policy against opposing entities that post risk in international security particularly in acquiring weapons of mass destructions created a new direction in the convention of international security.7 “Weinberger-Powell Rumsfeld Doctrines”8 followed with a caveat that such strategy will be used as a last resort with the support of the majority. International activists and even among allied partners of USA showed concerns on the veracity of intelligence conducted to prove the necessity for such action. Multinational coalition requires collective decision to use military coercion to alienate adversaries.9 In fact, USA mostly vows to pressure from its allies in implementing pre-emptive measures.10 Nevertheless, there is a growing concern on the massive destruction inflicted by advance military technology. Dissenting arguments surfaced on the use of military coercion alone without humanitarian concern to quell political maneuvering of leaders. Thus, it is timely to discuss the challenges in applying military coercion. On the other hand, military capability should be recognized as necessary in protecting international democracy11. Essay structure The essay structure proceeds to discuss air power as a form of military coercion and the general challenges in using it. It is then going to be applied in the subsequent discussions of two case studies namely, the Rolling Thunder Campaign in the Vietnam War and the Allied Forces Operation in Kosovo. Air power was heavily used in these areas against its respective leaders and military. Air Power as a Form of Military Coercion Air power is usually employed in large scale coercive strategy such as during the Rolling Thunder Campaign in the Vietnam War and during the Operation Allied Force in Kosovo by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Michael Horowitz and Dan Reiter consider it as an important device to carry out international relations policy12. They validated that air strike coercion has a higher probability of success when the military capability of its opponent is highly susceptible to aerial attacks according to a quantitative empirical test they conducted covering years 1917 to 1999. Susceptibility of civilians to such attacks and demanding for change in political leadership does not ensure success in the use of air power for effective international relations policy. However, Robert Pape cautioned the need to deeply understand the use of air power strategy. Experts must be pooled to understand its effect in the “political system, national economies, and armed forces functions”13. Advance knowledge of such enemy’s asset vulnerabilities and the air strike’s effect on it can lead to concession. Military intelligence must gather this information and employ experts in ascertaining the strategic impact to enemy lines. Air power is expected for a shorter period of military coercion preventing potential attack escalation which means inflicting more pain if the target opponent does not act in accordance with the terms of the attacker. The ability to limit human casualties is another challenge of air power14 which is a sensitive issue among democratic nations. Thus, it is becoming the choice among powerful countries since attackers can control target areas and attack escalation.15 The length and cohesiveness of multinational coalitions is another challenge in implementing air power. It helps facilitate efficient implementation of air strikes through priority of flight routes and airports to base its aircrafts.16 It also provides an in depth shared intelligence and logistic supports to maintain military operations thereby daunting the opponent. Vietnam: Rolling Thunder Bombing Campaign The Rolling Thunder Bombing Campaign against North Vietnam was launched in 1961 on the basis of the international relations policy of the USA to squash communism. Its creation was galvanized by the creation of the National Liberation Front (NLF) by the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) to overthrow South Vietnam’s political leadership identified with USA. DRV considered USA as an imperialist and was perceived to block the national unification of Vietnam.17 The campaign’s aim to capitulate North Vietnam from military coercion did not happen. Below are the discussion of the challenges faced by the implementation of Rolling Thunder Campaign resulting to the defeat of South Vietnam and USA. Public protest against Vietnam War Public protest both from domestic USA and international population paved the way for then President Johnson to order and extend the “37 day hiatus in the American bombing campaign against North Vietnam”18 amid protest from US military commanders which was seen as a sign of weakness towards DRV’s military force. In fact, some analysts perceived that public protests against the war encouraged DRV military to continue its fights against USA troops.19 Intensive news coverage heavily influences public opinions against the war. Allied opinions USA was also concerned with the opinions of its allies; hence the indecisiveness to implement a full force military coercion against North Vietnam. Full force military coercion against North Vietnam might possibly involve the intervention of communist oriented territories such as Soviet Union and China which will not sit well with allies of USA. Lack of public support to South Vietnam government The political leader of South Vietnam was unpopular to the constituents. Instead, they supported the causes of DRV military forces. Fraudulent, weak, and obstinate that even USA cannot control was the image of South Vietnam government. It prompted US military commanders to constantly emphasized effective political steps to combat DRV’s threat of insurgency20 by recognizing importance of effective governance to influence citizens’ support. Thus, reforms in governance, socio-economic and political policies21 were advised. USA employed development programs to help out South Vietnam in the hope of changing citizens’ negative perception about USA and South Vietnam government. However, these actions failed to win their support. Flawed and miscalculated military strategies USA miscalculated the resilience of DRV’s political and military force. They expected to diminish the capability of North Vietnam government22 using gradual escalation of coercion which did not happen. US President Johnson were indecisive to use full force in coercing North Vietnam due to fear of public backlash and concerns of interventions from allies of North Vietnam particularly China and Soviet Union. Economic and military supplies of North Vietnam that were bombed were effectively replenished by its allies and protected profusely by DRV’s troops23. US strategists miscalculated the non-logistic and non-technological aspects of DRV’s military force. Thus, in the end, military strategy failed due to its inability ascertains the capabilities of its enemy. Limited experience of USA troops in Vietnam’s terrain US troops were not used to threading the geographical terrain of Vietnam, mostly agricultural and forest areas, in its ground combat strategy. It resulted to tactical superiority of DRV’s military over US troops adding to the failure of the USA to coerced DRV effectively. Also, US troops at that time do not have revolutionary war experience that DRV was doing. Steadfast political will of DRV DRV symbolized a “revolutionary class struggle”24 which drew support from local population. It has the methodical and tactical machinery of the Communist Party as well as the determination to defeat USA in the Vietnam War, which it did in 1975. It did not show any interest in talking peace with the country even with the diplomacy intervention of Hungry and Poland, with the perceived agreement of Moscow25. In the end, USA’s bombing of Vietnam increased its foreign aid which increased from millions to billions of money from 1965 to 1968.26 Kosovo: Operation Allied Force The Operation Allied Force in Kosovo was launched by NATO to protect Kosovars from ethnic cleansing by Serbian military forces with the sole use of air power as a method of military coercion27. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia President Slobodan Milosevic led the Serbian troops occupation of Kosovo. The interracial war was fueled by the resistance of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) reintegration to Yugoslavia demanding self-determination of Kosovo in 199828. Milosevic’s Yugoslav military troops quelled such resistance by escalating ethnic cleansing resulting to 6,000 murdered Kosovars. It became the basis of NATO’s intervention using air power to protect Kosovars from further harm and the recognition of agreement among NATO members to end cases of ethnic cleansing. The number of Kosovar and Serbian armies was highly disproportionate wherein the former was only composed of smaller number of guerilla armies while the latter was able to recruit higher number of Serbs to join the Serbian arm forces.29 Air strikes were targeted at the political seat of Milosevic in Belgrade attacking military infrastructure and eventually economic and social infrastructures over the approximately four months of bombing. These aerial attacks were carried out limiting civilian casualties. The four fold challenge in the military coercion of NATO towards the withdrawal of Yugoslav military troops from Kosovo is discussed below. Sole use of air power as military coercion strategy Air power showed a higher percentage of destruction of targets, limit number of casualties due to high technological innovation and help show clear political commitment without endangering allied troops.30 The ability of air power to limit casualties but magnify destruction to military targets is made possible by modern technology for instance “stealth, laser guide bombs, and global positioning”31. It helped political allies to show credible political support to international relations policy without sacrificing too much casualties among military forces of NATO members. It also prevents public outcry from domestic population. However, such advantage of air power is challenged by concerns on the possibility of its abuse particularly for leaders of nations who do not have military experience.32 Why there was no immediate concession from Milosevic? The bombings lasting 79 days were considered too long given that air power were expected to coerce Milosevic to immediately concede. However, absence of ground troop threat, lower civilian casualties and hesitance of military to bomb the seat of Milosevic’s government further strengthened his resistance to surrender. It gave him the domestic political advantage among Serbs during the earlier stage of bombings which was what he needed from the domestic criticisms he garnered prior to NATO’s bombing. Civilians became supportive of him who showed vehemence towards NATO and political opponents were silenced.33 Economic and psychological effect of NATO air bombings to Serbian populace Civilians eventually became fearful, weary and demoralization34 over the extended period of the bombing particularly when NATO elevated the attack to bombing “bridges, refinery and electric power grids”35. Serbs were limited access to running water and electricity. NATO, in fact, acknowledged that such attacks were planned to partially destroy the means of the populace to enjoy “quality of life”36 thereby influencing them to pressure the leadership Milosevic to concede to NATO’s demands. As a result basic necessities became too expensive. Other social and economic disparages caused by the bombing to Serbian populace were (1) the reduction of pension payments, (2) closure of schools, and (3) loss of jobs.37 These consequences as well as future threats of escalated bombing in Belgrade and its people38 prompted Milosevic to concede to NATO’s demands and order Yugoslav troops out of Kosovo in June 1999. Not doing so would cost him political reelection and international repercussions. Did NATO achieve its goals in Operation Allied Forces Campaign? Yugoslav military forces continue its ethnic cleansing mission even after the bombings killing more Kosovars totaling to 10,000 deaths compared to the 6,000 deaths posted before the enforcement of Operation Allied Force.39 This ran in contrast to the objective of the campaign. Further, the military option it used was limited to meet its objective raising the concern that NATIO should have dispatch ground troop to complement the bombings. In the end, NATO drove Yugoslav forces out of Kosovo but the time frame was too long which further escalates casualties among Kosovars by Yugoslav troops. Milosevic was not politically punished and NATO’s integrity as an alliance to further security of populace was put into question.40 Conclusion: The challenges involved in military coercion are multi-faceted limiting or exacerbating its use. Vietnam’s Rolling Thunder Campaign and Kosovo’s Allied Force Operation used air power in different intensity to implement military coercion as a response to a similar military coercion employed by target opponents against a weaker political faction. However, it produced different outcomes. North Vietnam won South Vietnam and USA while NATO military troops have won over Yugoslav’s military coercion against Kosovo. These cases showed that the support of a multinational alliance was crucial to make military coercion successful such as in the case of NATO’s alliance against Yugoslavia. Whereas, the USA faced international obstacles in furthering its military coercion against North Vietnam since the latter is solidly allied with Soviet Union and China; thus massive coercion against North Vietnam would risk involvement of the two allied forces to fight against the USA. Other challenges involved in military coercion are the amount of public outrage or support against or for it, the intensive knowledge on the tactical vulnerabilities of opponents to ensure concessions as early as possible and the right strategies employed to achieve it. However, military coercion will not go well with the populace if it not implemented with humanitarian support to win over its understanding of military coercion. Bibliography Martin Aguera, ‘Air Power Paradox: NATO’s ‘Misuse’ of Military Force in Kosovo and its Consequences’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 12:3 Fall 2001, pp.115-135 Susan Hannah Allen, “Time Bombs: Estimating the Duration of Coercive Bombing Campaigns”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1, February 2007, pp. 112-133 Andrew Birtle, “Persuasion and Coercion in Counterinsurgency Warfare”, Military Review, Vol. 88, No. 4, July/August 2008 J. Boyer Bell & Stephen J. Cimbala, “ Review of Dragonwars: Armed Struggle and the Conventions of Modrn War” & “Coercive Military Strategy”, Reviewed by Harold Scott, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2001, pp. 187-190 Stephen Bouwhuis, “Kosovo: The legality of intervention?”, Australian Journal of Human Rights, accessed at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AJHR/2000/20.html on 14 November 2008 Daniel Byman & Matthew Waxman, Chapter 6, ‘Coercion and Coalitions’ The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp.152-174. Benjamin O. Fordham, “A Very Sharp Sword: The influence of military capabilities on American decisions to use force”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol, 48, No. 5, October 2004, pp. 632-656 P. Edward Haley, “A Defensive Grand Strategy for the United States”, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 30, No. 3, Spring 2004, pp. 461-481 Michael Horowitz & Dan Reiter, “When Does Aerial Bombing Work?: Quantitative Empirical Tests, 1917-1999”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45, No. 2, April 2001, pp. 147-173 Stephen T. Hosmer, Chapte 5 & Chapter 8, Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did, RAND, Santa Monica, 2001 Jeffrey P. Kimball, “The Stab-in-the-Back Legend and the Vietnam War”, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 14, No. 3, Spring 1998, pp. 433-458 David Milne, “Our equivalent of guerilla warfare: Walt Rostow and the Bombings of North Vietnam, 1961-1968”, Journal of Military History, Vol. 71, No. 1, pp. 169-204 Karl Mueller, ‘Strategies of Coercion: Denial, Punishment, and the Future of Air Power’, Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3, Spring 1998, pp. 182-228 Dan Reiter, “Military Strategy and the Outbreak of International Conflict: Quantitative Empirical Tests”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 3, June 1999, pp. 366-387 John Steinbruner, “Confusing ends and means: The doctrine of coercive pre-emption”, Arms of Control Today, Vol. 33, No. 1, January/February 2003 Read More

“Weinberger-Powell Rumsfeld Doctrines”8 followed with a caveat that such strategy will be used as a last resort with the support of the majority. International activists and even among allied partners of USA showed concerns on the veracity of intelligence conducted to prove the necessity for such action. Multinational coalition requires collective decision to use military coercion to alienate adversaries.9 In fact, USA mostly vows to pressure from its allies in implementing pre-emptive measures.

10 Nevertheless, there is a growing concern on the massive destruction inflicted by advance military technology. Dissenting arguments surfaced on the use of military coercion alone without humanitarian concern to quell political maneuvering of leaders. Thus, it is timely to discuss the challenges in applying military coercion. On the other hand, military capability should be recognized as necessary in protecting international democracy11. Essay structure The essay structure proceeds to discuss air power as a form of military coercion and the general challenges in using it.

It is then going to be applied in the subsequent discussions of two case studies namely, the Rolling Thunder Campaign in the Vietnam War and the Allied Forces Operation in Kosovo. Air power was heavily used in these areas against its respective leaders and military. Air Power as a Form of Military Coercion Air power is usually employed in large scale coercive strategy such as during the Rolling Thunder Campaign in the Vietnam War and during the Operation Allied Force in Kosovo by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Michael Horowitz and Dan Reiter consider it as an important device to carry out international relations policy12. They validated that air strike coercion has a higher probability of success when the military capability of its opponent is highly susceptible to aerial attacks according to a quantitative empirical test they conducted covering years 1917 to 1999. Susceptibility of civilians to such attacks and demanding for change in political leadership does not ensure success in the use of air power for effective international relations policy.

However, Robert Pape cautioned the need to deeply understand the use of air power strategy. Experts must be pooled to understand its effect in the “political system, national economies, and armed forces functions”13. Advance knowledge of such enemy’s asset vulnerabilities and the air strike’s effect on it can lead to concession. Military intelligence must gather this information and employ experts in ascertaining the strategic impact to enemy lines. Air power is expected for a shorter period of military coercion preventing potential attack escalation which means inflicting more pain if the target opponent does not act in accordance with the terms of the attacker.

The ability to limit human casualties is another challenge of air power14 which is a sensitive issue among democratic nations. Thus, it is becoming the choice among powerful countries since attackers can control target areas and attack escalation.15 The length and cohesiveness of multinational coalitions is another challenge in implementing air power. It helps facilitate efficient implementation of air strikes through priority of flight routes and airports to base its aircrafts.16 It also provides an in depth shared intelligence and logistic supports to maintain military operations thereby daunting the opponent.

Vietnam: Rolling Thunder Bombing Campaign The Rolling Thunder Bombing Campaign against North Vietnam was launched in 1961 on the basis of the international relations policy of the USA to squash communism. Its creation was galvanized by the creation of the National Liberation Front (NLF) by the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) to overthrow South Vietnam’s political leadership identified with USA. DRV considered USA as an imperialist and was perceived to block the national unification of Vietnam.

17 The campaign’s aim to capitulate North Vietnam from military coercion did not happen.

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