The Impact of Europeanization on New Democracies Such as Hungarian One - Case Study Example

The Impact of Europeanization on new democracies: The case of Hungary Your name University name 1) Overview of the term Europeanization Europeanization as a concept does not have a single agreeable definition. Various authors have defined the term differently; I will look at the various definitions. Europeanization can be the change of policies within a nation and beyond as a result of integration (Maria, Thomas & Caporaso, 2001, p.1). This policy changes have the aim of creating uniformity in the structures that govern member countries so as to allow them to share a common ground on issues. According to Olsen, (2002, pp.923-924) Europeanization means exporting forms of political organization. The term also describes changes occurring out of Europe aimed at unifying countries politically. Schmidt (2002, p.896) defines Europeanization as the result of influence from the European Union member states, their politics and national policies. Radaelli (2003, p.30) defines Europeanization as a process that involves construction, diffusion and institutionalization of rules; both formal and informal, procedures, policies and ways of doing things as first outlined and consolidated in the European Union Process of policy making and then transferred to the domestic level, identities, political structures and public policies. This paper will discuss Europeanization as a change in domestic policies and institutions due to direct influence by the European Union. 2) Introduction Hungary’s interaction with the European Union can be traced back to 1988 when they signed a trade and cooperation agreement. Hungary was at this time heading towards the end of the communist era, which ended in 1989 (Buller, Jim & Andrew, 2002). In 1990, Hungary got into diplomatic relations with the EU through the Dublin European Council Initiative. The initiative paved way for association agreements between the two countries. Hungary and two other countries; the Czechoslovakia republic and Poland first signed three Europe agreements in December, 1991. The Europe agreement was effected in 1994 (Balcerowicz, 1994, p.102). After the agreement, there was a need for western type political structures. The Hungarian government pursued a lot of changes in its national policies especially because it had a communist background. The changes were aimed at getting Hungary accepted into the European Union (Pridham, 2005, pp.32-33). Transitions were made in politics where multiparty systems were reintroduced. Legal provisions were also made so as to facilitate the establishment of a functional market economy. After 15 years of negotiations which involved political, economic and environmental policy changes, the accession process was concluded in December, 2002. Hungary joined the European Union in 1st May 2004 (Grabbe, 2002, p.13). Hungary’s acceptance to the European Union marked the beginning of conformity to all rules set by the Union for their member countries. Hungary together with other new members of the EU formed the Central and East Europe members (Haughton, 2007). The EU required these CEE countries to implement policy changes in their political, Justice and Home affairs. The countries had to uphold democracy and human rights through reforms in state administration. Hungary had to make post accession reforms in their economic, social and environmental policies as required by the EU (Boerzel, Tanja & Risse, 2003, p.34). Their post accession journey has been slowed by a number of challenges. First, Hungary’s economy is not very big. One of the reasons for their long quest to join the EU was to expand and strengthen their economy (Fink-Hafner, 2007, p.82). Secondly, Hungary’s civil servants lacked the necessary skills needed in implementing proposed changes in various policies. Thirdly, the country lacked mechanisms; both formal and informal that was needed for policy making. The elites lacked the necessary language skills which were needed for adequate communication. Fourthly, the Hungarian government has faced stability problems due to frequently changing governments, therefore, causing electoral volatility and unsettled political systems (Tavits, 2008, p.27). The ruling party Fidesz under the leadership of President Pal Schmitt has been accused of corruption and mismanagement of funds. Such issues have slowed the progress of the country because of low investor confidence (European Parliament, 2012). Fifthly, the distance between the capital Budapest and Brussels, has proved to be an accessibility challenge to the government. It is expensive for the government to keep in touch with all EU meetings and conventions. Finally, Hungary being one of the Central and Eastern Europe countries has an even harder task. This is because it is joining a Union that has old member countries who had previously negotiated their interests and reached an agreement. New members have to bend more and negotiate for longer so as to have their interests addressed (Kassim, 2003, p.56). However, it is worth noting that of all the CEE member countries, Hungary and Poland have been on the forefront of implementing reforms. 3) Effects of Europeanization A) National Development Supporters of Hungary’s move to join the EU have described it as a ticket to further development of the country’s economy and their democracy. They feel that Hungary’s economy has expanded ever since it joined the EU. Its further association and integration will ensure that their economic situation only gets better. Hungary has developed various sectors of its economy since it joined the European Union. The agricultural sector, which is the main contributor to the national GDP, has grown immensely. This is as a result of high demand for their products across the big market in Europe (Endrix, 2010). The increase in the amount of goods exported has created more jobs for the Hungarian citizens. The EU has been a source of funding for the Hungarian government, and this has opened up business opportunities in the technological and service sectors. The government’s national budget has grown to € 495 per annum which means that the government has developed. Joining the EU has influenced Hungarian policies on a lot of issues such as migration; into and out of the country, ethnicity; people are now more ethnic tolerant because integration has paved way for diversity in ethnic interactions, and in national relations since countries belonging to the EU relate more among themselves (Denca, 2009, p.4). The Hungarian government now enjoys border protection because of its accession to the EU. This has improved the security of the country. EU membership has influenced national court systems and territorial politics, society based networks, public discourse and the identity of the Hungarian people (Pridham, 1991). Minority groups’ interests have the same strength as majority interests especially among religious and sexual groups. The European Union has spearheaded the establishment of quality democratic units among its new EU members. B) Regionalisation Hungary experienced a lot of pressure to establish intra-regional, interregional and trans-regional networks so as to improve and decentralise its administrative capacity. There was a need for proper management and distribution of resources across the country so as to ensure uniform growth. Regionalisation is proposed by the EU as a model for multi-level governance. The regional development act of 1996 (Sepos, 2005) proposed the formation of seven regional bodies called the County Development Councils that worked under self government. The bodies did not address the regional deficits as well as expected. Therefore, a three tier system of regional development was established in 2004. The system was aimed at increasing government involvement in regional administration by replacing social characters in the councils with government representatives. It was proposed that the new micro, regional development council would have 19 county and 7 regional representatives (Fink- Hafner, 2007). The county receives 8-10% of the resources allocated to development for the advancement of county projects. The county also gives public services to citizens and institutions like schools, health centres and homes for the old. The EU requires that some of the tasks allocated to the county council be handled by the regional bodies. The purpose for this is to allow the EU to monitor administrative activities from an international platform while allowing for smooth national administration. C) Hungary’s new constitution Hungary’s new constitution came into effect in January 1, 2012 (Keil, 2012). A constitution is considered as the guideline to a country’s operation. It spells out the rules, regulations and policies defining organizational and individual behaviour in all circumstances. A constitution can promote or limit behaviour depending on the interests spelled out. The new constitution signifies a change in regime for the country under the leadership of Pal Schmitt and Prime Minister Viktor Orban. The ruling party is the Fidesz party. The Hungarian government considers the new constitution as a formal end to the post socialist transition. However, this is not what most stakeholders think of the document (Dupre, 2012). Analysts have termed it as an attempt to control people’s democratic rights and the independence of some bodies. The EU treaties require that all member countries promote democracy in their operations. In addition, the Central bank, the data protection agency and the judiciary must be independent of any government forces at all times in all the member countries (Zwagemakers, 2012). The European Union has tried to reach out to the Hungarian government over their concerns on the new constitution. The EU plans to force the Hungarian government to conform to the policies they agreed to on democracy and human rights through sanctions. The EU has threatened to open infringement proceedings against the Hungarian government, and stop funding them because of the budget deficit caused by a stagnating economy and reduced investor confidence. 3) Discussion Hungary's new constitution is criticized because it transfers power from the judiciary to the government and enshrines conservative social beliefs into law (Olsen, 2002, p.75). The new constitution dismantled the judicial independence by court packing and by barring judicial review of new laws. The number of recognized churches has reduced to 14 from 384. This amounts to religious oppression of minor religious groups (Keil, 2012). Every citizen should have an equal freedom to worship in whichever domination they choose. The constitution also stunted press freedom by allowing heavy fine for independent or critical media, which fails to provide balanced coverage, a move that has led some TV journalists to go on hunger striker in response. There are also laws that allow gerrymandering in ways that favour the current president, Fidesz and some, which even allow the dismantling of the opposition socialist party on grounds of the party legal affiliation with the former Soviet Party (Keil, 2012). In any democratic state, people protest and replace the government with a different one that can alter the policies that do not have public support. The Hungarian new constitution will not allow this because it has transformed the legal landscape to remove checks on the power held by the government. Furthermore, it has put almost all power into the hands of the reigning governing party for the near future (European Parliament, 2012). Such concerns have led the European Commission to monitor developments related to the new constitution closely. The EC raised various concerns regarding the new laws compatibility with EU laws. Earlier, the commission intervened to change various parts of the Media law, as they did act in accordance with the EU laws (Krauthaner, Loana & Natasha, 2012). The Commission already sent Hungary authorities 3 Letters of Formal Notice; this is the initial step in the violation course of action by the EU. The letter raised interrelated matters with authorities in Hungary. They were asked to respond to whether under EU laws; there was a warrant for more action, especially when it comes to the judiciary independence. The commission gave the authorities 30 days to reply to the EC concerns. The EU seeks to take action against Hungary on three main legal grounds (Keil, 2012): the autonomy of the country central bank, that of the data protection supervisory authority, as well as that of the judiciary. The new Hungarian legislation allowed compulsory retirement of 274 judges. The constitution also gives the government power over all the data protection authority, and this contradicts EU treaties (Wyatt, 2004, p.23). The treaty requires the autonomy of the member states data protection authority and independence of the state central bank under Articles 16 of the TFEU ‘Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’ and Articles 130 and 127 TFEU, Article 14 respectively. All member states central banks are part of the European System of Central Bank, and the country’s Central Bank Governor sits in the European central Bank General Council. (i) Infringement of Autonomy of the Country Central Bank Hungary’s constitution has led to the breach of the EU rule, which stipulates full autonomy of member states central bank. According to Article 130 TFEU, the national central bodies from the bank and the Central Bank of Europe (CBE) do not take or seek any instructions from member state government, the community institutions, as well as any other body (Wyatt, 2004). The article instructs that member states should confer with ECB on any drafted lawmaking in its competent area (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003, p. 65). The Hungarian government has introduced laws which compel the Central bank to inform them of all meetings being held. The government wants a cabinet minister to be present at all meeting held by the Central Bank Monetary Council. This is considered unlawful because the government will be monitoring and debating activities of the Central Bank, therefore, tampering with their independence (Krauthaner, Loana & Natasha, 2012). In addition, granting politicians the power to attend Central Bank meetings is viewed as an attempt by the ruling class to get the loyalty of the Central Bank governor and the members of the council. Hungary did thus not respect the statutes of the European Central Bank. The EU commission asked the authorities in Hungary to offer clarifications. (ii) Infringement of Autonomy of the Judiciary The constitution has also led to the infringement of the judiciary’s independence. The contravention concern by the commission regarded the new stipulated care for prosecutors and judges’ retirement and relate to Hungary resolution to reduce the compulsory retirement age for public notaries, prosecutors and judges to 62 years from 70 years commencing 1 January 2012 (Krugman, 2012). This stipulation was an infringement of EU laws because the union laws on the same treatment in employment disallows workplace discrimination because of age. The EU court of justice demands an objective as well as a proportionate reason for a government decision to cut the retirement age of a group of workers and not another. According to the EU commission, Hungary had no objective reason for treating the prosecutors and judges in a different way compared to other workers (European Commission, 2007). This is especially so when the retirement age across Europe is progressively being increased. The Hungarian government had already communicated its intention to increase the retirement age to 65. Thus, lowering the prosecutors and judges’ retirement age to 62 is legally questionable. According to Krugman (2012), the number of current sitting judges who have served as judges before only amount to 23; this means that 106 judges are new in the judiciary. Since they were selected by the judiciary's superior, who has the coupled responsibility and authority to hire and sack, their allegiance is likely to be to the head of the judiciary and not the citizens of Hungary. This is non- democratic. The EU commission is also demanding that Hungary provides further information about the new rules on courts organization. Under the new law, the head of the new Judicial power holds power regarding human resources, budget, and operational management of courts and allocation of cases. This constitutes a shift from the longer mutually respectful management of the courts operational management as well as other right safeguards (Endrix, 2010, p.161). The law places all-important decisions on judiciary, even the appointment of judges, on only one person. The appointed head of the judiciary has been found to be an old time friend to the Prime Minister Viktor Orban. This raises a lot of questions on whether her appointment is a move to protect a few from the arm of the law. The fact that she has unquestionable power over other judges is threatening. The EU commission called the Venice Commission is investigating the move taken by the Hungarian moment and is due to report back to the EU parliament. The power vested on the head of the judiciary gives them authority to relocate cases to different courts other than those earlier allocated, seems very suspicious. Tunde Hando has already withdrawn three prominent cases and reallocated them different courts mostly in the rural courts. It is not clear why a high profile case would be withdrawn from an urban court to a rural one. This seems like an attempt to reduce its monitoring. Furthermore, the government stopped the authorization of the previous Supreme Court president prematurely at the end of 2011; the president was supposed to serve six years from June 2009 (Keil, 2012). This is in contrast with the other Supreme Court Judges who the constitution allows to continue with their job as the new Curia judges; the new Curia was the replacement for the Supreme Court. EU commission demanded meticulous responses from the authorities on whether they should pursue further infringement proceedings. (iii) Infringement of Autonomy of the Data Protection Supervisory Authority Hungary infringed the data protection supervisory authority's autonomy by replacing the former Data Protection Commissioner’s office, with a new National Agency for protecting data, which was effected on January 1 2012. Consequently, the government prematurely ended a six-year period of the Commissioner appointed in 2008. Until the tenure of the appointed Commissioner ends in 2014, there are no interim measures and the new rules form the likelihood that the president or prime minister can sack the new supervisor under subjective reasons. ‘Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ and ‘Article 16 of the Treaty on the EU Functioning’ guarantee the independence of data protection supervisors (Wyatt, 2004). Moreover, the European Union rule on protecting data in directive 95/46/EC oblige EU members to set up a supervisory organization, for monitoring the application of the Directive functioning in total autonomy (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). The data protection supervisory authority should not engage in both direct and indirect influence of the state. The independence performance of the supervisory authorities’ tasks is hindered by the sheer risk of political influence through state scrutiny. 5) Importance of EU Conditionality on Member States The EU conditionality for membership includes both a democratic, constitutional structure and numerous, detailed rules and regulations (Fink- Hafner, 2007). For instance, rules applied in the Hungarian case by the European Union claiming infringement reflect on conditionality on membership. There are obvious tensions between the EU’s procedural strictures and the large body of substantive law that its member states have to accept and implement (Denca, 2009, p.17). If these legal rules were not a condition of EU membership, a well-functioning member state democracy would not necessarily want to approve all the EU’s substantive policy directives. The European Union acts normatively, making use of its economic and diplomatic tools to promote the adoption of norms on human rights and democracy (Rischelt, 2001). For instance in Hungary’s case, some of the laws under the new constitution are not compatible with fundamental human rights and EU claims of infringement protects the rights of the majority. The EU conditionalities give it the power to request that appropriate changes be made to the laws that infringe the set conditions. The European Union is an external form of influence: it has developed the ability to pursue policies concerning human rights and democracy towards the applicant states. The EU extensive portfolio of conditionality (Fink-Hafner, 2007) demands seeks to promote democracy in Hungary. Conditionality is largely dependent on accession processes and dynamics. If there were no accession processes, compliance with EU conditionality would be more difficulty. The drive behind conditionality is predominantly extrinsic. The emphasis on the relation between necessity and membership for every EU member state originated with “The Birkelbach Report” published by the political committee of the European Parliament (Wright, 1996). It specified the conditions for eventual membership: only states that warrant their territory true democratic actions as well as respect for essential freedom and rights can become EU members (cited in Pridham 1991, p.215). The EU also warned that states whose government do not take part in government decisions through full nominated representative or directly, cannot seek part of the countries which form the European Community (cited in Pridham 2005, p.30). Prior to becoming a member of the EU, Hungary agreed to comply with the conditions just like any member state. Hence, the EU has authority to carry out any actions that go against respect for fundamental rights and democratic practices. 6) Conclusion The EU has relied on the Copenhagen criteria to select joining members, and resolve arising conflicts. The EU conditionality mechanism functions well, and through it, the EU can exert great influence on the transformation of Hungary. The conditionality can ensure that the recent laws passed by the Hungarian government do not erode the independence of the key government institutions and important non-governmental aspects of society (Sissenith, 2007, p. 141). The conditionality also ensures the constitution does not get rid of checks and balances that are important to a democracy and the protection of civil liberties. Over time, the EU has succeeded in improving and tightening its bureaucratic structures that deal with the norms and enlargements and the rules and practices that applicant states have to comply with before they become full members (Kelley, 2004). These tighter structures will ensure that Hungary complies with the EU conditionality, failure to which it will put at risk its permanence in the EU and weaken its economy. The European Union has achieved its objective of encouraging democracy and human rights, and this is evidence in Hungary’s case. It has integrated human rights and democratization throughout its policies (Maria, Thomas & Caporaso, 2001). The unresolved Hungary issue is a significant factor of instability in the EU since it is not only an issue in Hungary, but it also undermines regional understanding of the conditionality. The European Union is interested in the region’s stability and, in the recent past, it has undertaken various initiatives to ensure that countries observe the set conditionalities. It is interested in resolving the Hungarian issue using the outlined rules and regulations. The accession agreements have certain distinctive features and this makes them an interesting case study. The EU external governance approach states that there has to be clear and direct conditions in order to be effective. Clear and direct conditionalities can produce certain compliance (Pridham, 1991, p. 196). The number of EU member countries has grown to 27 up from 15. While the number is anticipated to go up, there is an increasing conflict between countries and the EU. The EU has not had a smooth ride in its integration venture. There have been personal and collective concerns between the EU and member countries in their pursuit for a common ground for all its stakeholders. Many countries are breaching their accession agreements in their pursuit for national interests. The double standards of maintaining national status within an international platform are giving rise to conflicts which are further impacting on the strength of the EU. The economic strength of the Euro zone has weakened due to the global recession that reduced the GDP of the member countries, especially the new members who had smaller economies. Most of the CEE countries is still grappling with economic stagnation, therefore, leading to economic pressure on the Central Bank of Europe. Tension has erupted between member countries who are not contributing equally to the development of the EU because of low resource contribution. Countries still having deficits are sending the EU into more debt, and this is going to affect the stability of the euro. The EU has given ultimatums to these countries to reduce their deficits or face action from the union. Hungary had experienced a budget deficit that is rated at 4.6% in 2010 and 6% in 2011. Their government has pledged to reduce the deficit to below 3% by this year (Dupre, 2012), but with their stagnant economy and political tension, they are not likely to beat their target. If the Euro does not stabilise soon, it risks losing its position as a world currency, and this will destroy individual countries. References Balcerowicz, L. (1994). Understanding Postcommunist Transitions. Journal of Democracy, 5(1), 75-90. Boerzel, T. & Thomas, R. (2003). Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe. In H. Featherstone & B. Radaelli (Eds), The Politics of Europeanization. London: Oxford University Press. Buller, J. & Andrew, G. (2002). Conceptualizing Europeanization. Public Policy and Administration, 17(2), 4-24. Denca, S. (2009). Europeanization of Foreign Policy: Empirical Findings from Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 5 (3), 389-404. Dupre, C. 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