Does Japan Need Any Other Parties Than the Liberal Democratic Party - Term Paper Example

Student: Instructor: January 2007 Japanese democracy has stagnated even as the economy has recorded astounding progress during the Post World War II 20th century era (Curtis, 1988). Japan’s past has a military background, and the monarchy, though it does not have an executive role any longer, is also a feature of how the country has been governed for centuries. Japan has experienced major changes in both its economy as well as in its politics. The country began the 20th century as an emerging industrial power, but closed the millennium in a stage of stagnation, leading to an economic crisis. Similarly, the ancient monarchy gave way to a democratic system of power, though the Japanese version of democracy has evolved differently from the pattern followed by western countries. Most western observers would like to believe that Japan’s dramatic economic growth in the decades following its World War II surrender, must have some relationship with the transition of power from the monarchy to the people. There can be no doubt that Japan’s progress from the abject days following the war has no parallels, but the truth is that real transfer of power to ordinary people has not been as effective as the industrial achievements. It is strange but true that Japan, for all its progress in material terms, and in terms of raising the standards of living of common people, is not matched by their true liberation and political freedom. The gaps between economic prosperity and political freedom in Japan worry all people who believe in democracy. However, all political observers have interests in understanding why people who have achieved such prosperity do not demand more say in the running of their country’s affairs. Japan has such a dominant position on the world stage that the progress of this nation on various fronts concerns the whole world. Some people might think that the Japanese do not care about their political rights because they are content with their economic well-being. However, the fact remains that even the economic growth has not been smooth. The late 1990s have witnessed economic decline. Politicians have also been exposed in matters related to corruption. These kinds of crises are normally the reasons for changes of government in democratic functioning, but it has not been sufficient to dislodge the Liberal Democratic Party (LGP) from power in Japan’s case. The opposition has failed to seize power in Japan even in conditions which favored it to do so. The uninterrupted run of the LDP in power, even in the face of economic crises and cases of corruption, cannot be explained by any common theory of democratic politics (Scheiner, 2005). Why has an entire nation of literate and secure people not enforced any change of the party in power, even in the face of circumstances which strongly suggest such directions? The Japanese are known for strong opposition to U.S. military bases on their territory, and have been resolute in their opposition to nuclear proliferation in any form. Yet they have failed to assert any such clear direction with respect to the uninterrupted stint for the LDP ever since 1955. Japanese leadership in the competitive business fields of electronics, automobiles, steel, and optics, would not have been possible without strong bonds of cooperation between educated people. Such economic achievements require coordination between business executives, scientists, and professionals from various disciplines. Yet the learned people who could create such great wealth, and compete with established companies of the developed world, could not express discontent in the running of their own country! Could there be a possibility that the unusual dominance of the LDP does not reflect on the quality and effectiveness of Japanese democracy? The country does have a functioning legislature, and Japan has considerable influence in world affairs. So does it mean that Japan has adequate democracy even though the LDP has remained in power for so long? Change of government, with the opposition taking over from the party in power, is called ‘turnover’ in political language. Turnover is a gold standard for the benefits of democracy to be realized (Scheiner, 2005). Political observers believe that people will vote parties out of power, and that the opposition will have regular and cyclical opportunities to implement the wishes of the electorate. This pattern is so clearly established in all major democracies of the world, that Japan cannot escape evaluation and measurement by this universal yardstick. The LDP could not be removed completely from power even after widespread disenchantment in the early 1990s (Scheiner, 2005). The party has survived extremely bad years for the economy, and repeated incidents of scandals involving top leaders. Public disasters included such matters as transfusion of HIV tainted blood to Kobe earthquake survivors, which infuriated the public. Most governments all over the world have fallen for much less! The LDP record in the light of Japan’s economic woes during the recent past, and the poor records of some politicians with respect to integrity, indicate that democracy works differently in the country compared to the rest of the free world. We have to consider the unique culture of Japan. The people are also known to place great importance on consensus-that is ensuring the agreement of all people affected by a decision. However, motions of cultural distinction and of consensus do not explain the LDP story (Curtis, 1988). It is true that the Japanese have unusually strong bonds with their culture, but there is nothing in this which takes away the natural ability of an opposition to cease power over reasonable periods of time. Rather, the country’s long record of fighting medieval colonial influences from China and from the west, indicate traditions of strong tendencies to exert power. Similarly, the commitment to consensual decision-making in business matters does not explain the inability of the opposition to come to power even after the traumatic developments of 1993. Public dissatisfaction over the conduct of the LDP was so evident at this time, that all observers would agree that consensus existed for change during this phase. There must be other factors related to the system of Japanese politics, which have prevented the development of an effective and united opposition in Japan. Such factors have countered the forces of democracy, for there have been no signs of forceful occupation of office by the LDP, or of any executive intervention by the monarchy, even in times of severe national strain. There seem to be some systems in place, unique to Japan, that have prevented turnover of governance for so long, and even after established public dissatisfaction with the state of national affairs. It is evident that the leading lights of the LDP hold such influences over institutions and political processes that the opposition has failed to come to power in even the most favorable circumstances for such a change. However, it is a debatable point whether some of the LDP’s extraordinary innings in power is due to its own adaptability and willingness to change to meet the changing expectations of the electorate. Both aspects, namely the nature of Japanese politics and the capabilities and responsiveness of the LDP need to be examined in close details, in order to explain the last three decades of governance, and the likely political trends in the foreseeable future. The distribution of favors and resources to client structures and to supporting institutions has been identified as a major obstacle to real democracy, in the international sense of the term (Scheiner, 2005). ‘Clientelism’ is not a word in the English dictionary, but it is an appropriate description of real politics, especially in Tokyo. The LDP is able to garner support in return for decisions it takes in allocating resources, and can hand out economic punishments for those who support the opposition. The latter is not able to form effective groups, and cannot convert support for the causes which it takes up in to votes. The disbursement of resources in return for loyalty is a primary weakness, which disrupts true democracy in Japan (Scheiner, 2005). This is called clientelism. Though clientelism is not unique to Japan, a most crippling feature for the rights of people in the country is the centralization of financial powers. The latter means that all financial and material resources are controlled by national leaders. Clientelism and financial centralization make for a combination which leaves the opposition with no hope of getting sufficient votes to take power. The LDP is able to buy itself out of the most difficult situations, and can manipulate the system against the wishes of the people. The exchange of financial sops for votes, and denial of funds to people who vote for the opposition, is a flaw in the Japanese version of democracy, which explains how the LDP has been able to stay in power indefinitely. The LDP also has control over taxation systems down to the periphery of the political structure, so no effective local groupings are possible. People and their representatives at local levels do not have means to build organizations to challenge the establishment at the center. Local opposition failure leads to failure at the national level also (Scheiner, 2005) The Japanese opposition parties have their own structural problems which add to the suppression of the democratic rights of people (Scheiner, 2005). These splinter groups are on the margins of decision-making because they are top-down by nature, and lack effective bases at the periphery. A top-down structure refers to an organization which is formed and controlled by people at the top. The dominance of the LDP without any hope for a turnover to the opposition for governance means that alternatives are not considered, that the system is abused, and that central politics machinate around the biased interests of the rich and powerful, without adequate response for the opinions and views of people at large. This is why the Japanese seem to be so masochistic (Curtis, 1988) criticizing many major decisions and initiatives of the LDP, while the party continues in power regardless! Curtis uses the term ‘masochistic’ because the Japanese tend to criticize themselves so frequently and strongly. The range of LDP dominance is not without exceptions: some parts of Japan have rebelled against the client structure (Scheiner, 2005) but this has been limited to a few urban centers, without backing in large vote banks (Scheiner, 2005). Most voters have been content to enjoy the doles under LDP discretion, thus allowing the party to remain in power. This has led to major division between sections of Japanese society, but the opposition could never use the situation to effect real change. It would appear that the Japanese are content to be led! (Scheiner, 2005) However, there are signs of change, and it is possible that a more holistic form of political expression is on the anvil. A first sign of hope is the emergence of non party voters in Japan (Curtis, 1988). Such people can be trusted to exercise their franchise meaningfully and based on issues. Non party voters would be an effective counter to the problems of clientelism, because decision on governance structures would become broad based as they should be. Individuals, who hold the entire system to ransom for their personal gains, will no longer be able to exert influence over voting patterns of large blocks of people. Two trends will bolster the influence of non party voters: one is the establishment of powerful coalitions, and the other is the preponderance of local issues over the macro environment and international affairs (Scheiner, 2005). The Japanese political system has long depended on a large and all-powerful party system, but the kinds of coalitions which characterize other democracies, will change power equations in favor of greater accountability. Similarly, the grand notions on which the LDP has built a smoke-screen of U.S. ties and global matters will have to give way to emergent issues of direct concern to the domestic electorate. There are noticeable signs that Japan is headed towards a more transparent style of democracy (Curtis, 1988). Though the LDP has remained effectively unchallenged until now, its period of absolute hegemony may be over. Japanese voters are younger now, and their thinking is not as conformist as that of their parents. Many Japanese voters now have international exposure, and clearer concepts of how their future interests can be best served in future. Perhaps the emergence of non party voters is related to the change in demographics of the electorate, and may herald a new era of coalition politics focused sharply on the needs of people as a whole, rather than of just a few chosen individuals. Women are at the heart of new politics in Japan (Curtis, 1988). They are behind many development initiatives at the periphery, and have begun to fight the entrenched system of clientelism. Shedding the geisha image which is integral to the old style of Japanese society, may be good news for the power of people in the emerging power system. Women in politics may further the purpose of coalitions against the old notion of a large central party, and they are likely to be more concerned with equitable distribution of resources, based on domestic priorities. Women politicians are known to have affected major political reforms in other countries, and it is likely that Japan will reap matching benefits from their emergence. Koizumi is a powerful symbol of change (Scheiner, 2005). His rise to power must act as a beacon of hope for all sections of Japanese society which have not been willing clients of the old power structure. Koizumi has a background in the local level away from the center, and therefore marks a major break in the hold of central power. He also has a track record of taking stands on issues independent of the establishment, and is therefore a symbol of significant deviation from how the LDP has functioned during the last quadrant of the 20th century. The elevation of Koizumi is the start of a new beginning in Japanese politics, heralded by a change in the pattern of the country’s voters. Koizumi had an advantage of taking center-stage at a time of national crisis, and was therefore able to assert full authority from the outset of his time in office (Scheiner, 2005). He won important and lasting victories for the forces of decentralization and other major liberating changes. By threatening the legislature and the LDP with dissolution if it did not accept his structural reform proposals, Koizumi challenged established power structures, and demonstrated powerfully to the people, that such risks could be taken successfully. The people now have concrete evidence that their elected representatives at every level can act in empowered manner if they choose to do so, and that it is possible to break out of the closed cycle of acting as bonded clients of a central power with alien interests. Ordinary people have responded to Koizumi’s determined pursuit of reform as enthusiastically as some bastions of the old establishment have opposed his policies. This gap between people at large and the LDP power structure is for the good of democracy, because it encourages Japanese to think assertively about their issues, and to exercise franchise with greater authority and determination. Overall, Koizumi’s rise to power marks a major shift in Japanese politics (Curtis, 1988). The coming years of the new millennium may witness marked changes in the nature of Japanese politics, and a marked evolution of its truly democratic institutions. The LDP, to its credit, has not remained a mute spectator to the sea changes which have taken place in the environment. The party has changed substantially from its first days in power in the mid 1950s. A shared fear of Socialists was responsible for the first establishment of the LDP as a force in Japanese politics (Curtis, 1988). However, such trepidation is out of place in the conventional world, and the country is poised to take concepts of human freedom and private enterprise forward: the LDP has kept pace with such changes, and is a very different organization today. The party is now a conglomeration of various discrete parts, though it contributes substantially to each constituent. The LDP has developed a new rationale which is close to the central purpose of the nation. The party grew out of a rural-urban divide (Curtis, 1988) which saw conservatives with large bases in pastoral Japan seize power; the new LDP is more driven by young people, free of the emotional baggage of the past, and with inspiring vision of the future. Extremists from both ends of the political spectrum have been pushed to the margins of the Japanese power equation, and have lost both influence and relevance (Curtis, 1988). The LDP has taken on a more conventional, responsible, and liberal Avatar, and this move poses new challenges for opposition unity. It is possible to conceive the future of Japan within continued one-party dominance, with an LDP which embraces all shades of domestic opinion, and which corrects the past ways of client support and strong centralizations of financial controls and resource allocations. Rural Japan is really a relic today, so the voter community may achieve great homogeneity in terms of developing bottom-up organizations, which are highly responsive to the developments and trends at the periphery. The turnover imperative to which reference has been made earlier in this document, may not be relevant for a Japan with a responsive and liberal single party dominance. The power and influence of people at large determining key policies matter more than the convention of opposition parties coming to power. Though our concern has been for Japan in reviewing the works of Curtis and Scheiner, there are inescapable implications and conclusions for all democratic countries. Primarily, democracy is not an assured virtue, because structures can be manipulated (Scheiner, 2005). Countries with formal democracy may in fact function in most autocratic manner, effectively repressing the voices of people, and corrupting systems beyond recognition. However, no uniform pattern of democracy can be thrust on any people, and they may willingly accept low participation levels in national decision-making without demur. However, generational changes and international exposure are great levelers and posters of revolution at the same time, so communities have to be trusted to respond over time in their best interests. However, a strong periphery determines the long term stability of every organization, and a central role of all leadership remains to steer course in responsive manner. It is rarely too late to make major changes in outlook and values, and even a monolithic organization can become nimble and fresh as the LDP after Koizumi. The latter individual has demonstrated the immense power of committed individuals of integrity, and the essential soundness of the much-aligned Japanese political system as well. Much of Japan remains a puzzle for a world fed on a staple diet of post industrial revolution western ideology. This may apply to its political evolution as well, since it seems not only to have adopted a strange one-party template, but has of late, used it to great advantage as well! Works Cited Curtis, G. L. 1988 The Japanese Way of Politics, Columbia University Press Scheiner, E. 2005 Democracy without Competition in Japan, Cambridge University Press Read More