Democratic Transition of South Korea - Research Paper Example

Pimadej Siwapornpitak Dr. Sujian Guo PLSI 418 Due 04/15 Democratic Transition of South Korea IntroductionThe democratic transition of South Korea started from simple student protests to a full-blown revolution. The transition began with the opposition taking action followed by protests by students and civil society against an authoritarian and repressive regime. Korea’s democratic transition is a long and complicated process. The result is a democracy which Koreans now enjoy, but which was not the kind of outcome the main actors foresaw when the transition was begun. Democratizations of countries undergo a process known as transition. The third wave of democratization has an almost similar pattern or mode of transition for countries in the third wave, but they go in different forms. Modes of transition create strong legacies, which can affect future regimes and politics and can tell us what it will be like in the future. Regime change usually results into democratization and modes of transition predict what kind of democracy will emerge (Karl & Schmitter, 1991). The topic on South Korea and the third wave of democratization encourages discussion and debate on how the countries evolved in their democratization and how the people view and value democracy in the midst of economic struggles. This essay will talk about theories and the democratic transition in third-wave cases. First, we talk about theories and connect these theories on democratization. Transitology is about transition and is very important in the subject of democratization. Transitology also refers to political transitions and evolution of political systems. In recent times, transitology has gained narrower perspective as research focused on transition from authoritarian rule to democratic regimes. Transition is about change of government and the future of these governments. There are aspects of democratization that influence the speed, intensity and nature of the institutional changes of the countries undergoing the process of transformation (Munck & Leff, 1997). Our primary focus is to investigate how the transition process occurred and, in the process, investigate the balance of power between the existing regime and the opposition and the parts played by the key actors as the drama unfolds. Modes of transition Munck & Leff (1997) argue that regime and politics after a transition are affected by transition modes through its influence on the model of elite struggle, the policies promulgated during the process, and the acceptance and rejection of new rules by the elites and counter-elites in the transition process. Democracy as an outcome only appears if there is sort of balance among the elite parties in the transition. When the different players agree on democratic rules and principles, democratic institutions will emerge in the process (Munck & Leff, 1997). Burtun and Ryu (1997), following the framework espoused by John Higley and other authors, define elites as “persons who hold top decision making positions in major societal organizations and are thereby able to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially” (p. 4). This definition does not only include the familiar “power elite” of political, military, and economic leaders, but also those who lead professional, cultural, labor and media organizations, leaders of opposition and movements, to include dissident organizations. All persons who are capable of organizing to create substantial political problems against an existing government without being suppressed are also called elite, following the definition of Burtun and Ryu (1997) and their colleagues. The principle behind mode of transition differentiates the various activities wherein rules that distinguish political regimes are abandoned. The literature focuses on the ‘degree of control’ exerted by the rulers or the incumbent elite. The studies emphasize the strategies used by opposing parties in the transition and define the transitions that went through various levels of changes and conflicts between the parties seeking change and those who defended the status quo. In other words, the studies differentiated transitions that departed from the former regime with the new “force” trying to advance through a legal framework, or with the support of the “incumbent elites” (Munck & Leff, 1997, p. 344). Democracies are outcomes of transitions in which actors do not even expect it will happen. Rustow (1970) argues that “the factors that keep a democracy stable may not be the ones that brought it into existence.” Events unfold in the transition, drastically or gradually. First, there might be protests and elites and counter-elites may take their side, but things are still unclear. There are doubts, ambiguities and possibly rallies and rumors of war or coups. Nobody knows exactly what is happening and no one knows the outcomes, i.e. if the authoritarian regime holds power, democracy wins, or if another authoritarian regime takes control. The normal course of action of the agencies in power seems rather suspended and the actors are likely to be making hasty and baffling decisions, and if they do make compromises with the opposite side, these are interpreted as momentary and opportunistic. The results of the conflict might not be what one group expects to happen. There are transitions that last for years, others for a short period, but transitions have lasting effect (Karl & Schmitter, 1991). Early literature suggests that transitions can be determined by identifying the key players of change. We can tell of the type of transition that may come out if we know who are the key players, whether elites within the regime in power, those who are against the incumbent elites, or a mix of those two. People who prefer strategies that can provide change from a specific regime to another kind of regime create transitions. Actors in the transition have their motives, construed as in line with existing social, economic and political situation. The results of their action might still be unclear from the beginning, but they are proceeding based on their objectives (Karl & Schmitter, 1991, p. 274). Munck and Leff (1997) identified forms transitions as they happen: “reform from below,” “transition reform,” “negotiated revolution,” “transition through rupture,” and “revolution from above.” a. Reform from below In Chile, the driver for change started from below (Munck and Leff, 1997, p. 346). Groups were formed, particularly groups who mostly opposed the powerful military under General Pinochet who ruled Chile with impunity. A plebiscite was conducted in October 1988 in which the opposition gained power. The Chilean mode of transition determined the outcome of future Chilean politics wherein the opposition won the election and started to hold power in March 1990. Chile now has a controlled form of democracy but the government is stable (Munck as cited in Munck and Leff, 1997). What happened to Korea is similar to that of Chile. The transition started from below in the early 1960s, in which the students opposed the authoritarian regime under Syngman Rhee by means of rallies and demonstrations. They protested in a sudden and unexpected action. Tens of thousands of students from middle school to high school and university students gathered and assembled in the streets of Seoul to ask for Rhee’s resignation. What started as political rallies and protests, characterized by activism among youths supported by intellectuals and politicians from two parties (the elites) became a rebellion (Kim, 1996). The elites in power supported the protests. The largest force came from low-income sectors and civil society (Karl & Schmitter, 1991). Other factors related to “reform from below” are economic factors. Korea possessed a certain degree of economic development, which the people believed should be enhanced with democratic principles and practices. Rapid economic growth could destabilize authoritarian governments (Huntington, 1991). There is a relation between economic progress and democracy, but there is no pattern of economic progress as a prerequisite for democratization. At the outbreak of so-called third wave, economic factors were considered the “culprit”. In other words, many countries were possessing a certain level of economic development that allowed them to transition to democracy. However, there were crises one after another that affected it, for example, the oil crisis in some areas and the Marxist-Leninist restrictions in others that caused economic downturns in authoritarian countries (Huntington, 1991). b. Reform through transaction Reform through transaction occurs when the incumbent elite and the counter-elites are equally powerful that a transaction is an alternative. Brazil and Poland are two examples of this second type of transition. The outcomes of the two countries’ transitions had significant similarities. Incumbent elites were powerful enough that forced the opposition to negotiate. Brazil’s transition started when the government introduced liberalization reforms. The government’s purpose was to gain mass support. Elections were held in 1982, in which the opposition obtained substantial number of votes, after which a negotiation for democratization occurred. A series of events happened before Brazil could fully attain democratization and end the transition. The military was able to counter the opposition’s moves by proposing another election to prolong the transition and still hold on to power. The events included elections of the assembly in 1986, a plebiscite for the approval of the new constitution in 1988, more national and local elections, until the end of the transition in 1990 (Munck and Leff, 1997). c. Reform through extrication (negotiated revolution) Hungary is one great example for this type of transition – negotiated revolution. Opposition and incumbent elites were major players of the negotiation. Some members of the Communist Party wanted to negotiate through political liberalization, but young Communist leaders took over and started the negotiation with opposition groups, and failed. The opposition started to gain popular support, while all throughout eastern Europe groups in favor of democracy were gaining control while the communists were starting to weaken. The communists and major opposition groups, including civil society, held talks until they reached an agreement. This was known as the ‘negotiated revolution’ (Munck & Leff, 1997, p. 352). d. Reform through rupture An example of reform through rupture is what happened in Argentina and Czechoslovakia. Civil society groups in Argentina were opposed to the military in power. Soon, the military gave in to the demands of the people for a change in government after the war with the British in the Falkland Islands, in which Argentina was defeated. The transition occurred as the military could not anymore support or defend the incumbent elite, enabling the counter-elites to make their move. The military leaders gave in to the demands of the opposition alliance, and elections were held. The 1853 constitution that favored a presidential form of government was restored and Argentina now has a full democratic system. e. Revolution from above An example of revolution from above is Bulgaria. The revolution started when, in 1989, younger and energetic Communist leaders were communicating with Gorbachev until the regional disintegration of Communist power. The young leaders formed the Union of Democratic Forces, which resisted communist rule. The communists were slowly disintegrating when the Bulgarian Socialist Party won the parliamentary elections and eventually rose to power (Munck & Leff, 1997). Huntington’s theories on transition Huntington (1991) focuses on the third wave of democratization that happened in the modern world. He cited four basic forms of transition processes: transformation, replacement, transplacement, and intervention. The third wave, which started in 1974, involved the democratic transition of 16 countries. Transplacement, a combination of transformation and replacement, occurs when the key players in the democratic transition, i.e. government opposition to include the moderate opposition, agree on the rules of the game for a democratic transition. Transplacement takes place in three phases. The first phase occurs when reformers in the political system would try to challenge the authoritarian regime. Next, the opposition would expose the regime’s repressive rule and use it to mobilize mass support and assemble rallies and demonstrations. Radical groups would come in and call for a revolutionary struggle. In the third phase, conservative forces use their influence to reform the system by means of peaceful and legal means. If these conservative forces and the moderate opposition are able to control the radicals, there will be a protracted process of negotiation between the key actors, which can lead to a compromise solution for a democratic transition. Korea’s transition is a combination of the different stages in the transformation process. Elites were comprised of members of the opposition who boycotted parliament, student leaders who assembled various student groups and led marched protests, rallies and demonstrations, and members of the academe, the university professors and members of the opposition. These opposition elites supported student protests and mass actions. Although there was no armed struggle at the start, the protests ignited an armed rebellion. Huntington (1991) considers Korea’s transition as “transplacement” because moderate leaders in the authoritarian government and in the democratic opposition jointly negotiated the transition to democracy. The transplacement concept includes countries with considerable different post-transition records in attaining firmness and progressing toward consolidation. These records attribute positive events for countries like Poland, the Czech Republic, Uruguay and South Korea, but are not too positive in Bolivia, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Mongolia (Burtun & Ryu, 1997). Transformation category includes events in Hungary and Spain, and questionable events like Bulgaria, Turkey, and Peru. Huntington deems other aspects that might account for differences within types, but the general outcome is considerable ambiguity about ‘the relationship between the transition path and regime outcome’ (Burtun & Ryu, 1997, p. 4). The events in the third wave of democratization The series of democratization in different areas around the globe was contaminating. Democratic ideas are common in different times. In the ancient world, democracy was limited and excluded women and slaves and several categories of people. Modern democracy refers to governments or nations governed by people elected by means of voting. Western democracy gained momentum during the seventeenth century. In England, pushing for democracy was one of the features of the English Revolution. The United States traces its democratic roots from “The Fundamental Orders of Connecticut,” which was an answer to the cry of the people of Hartford and the surrounding towns on January 14, 1638, wherein they regarded it as a “written constitution” (Huntington, 1991, p. 13). Generally, the origins of protest stem from economic deprivation. Deprivation theory underscores substantive complaints of injustice, stimulating protest actions predicting demonstrations and rallies due to discontent from economic situations, which deprive citizens of the needed quality of life. Injustice, joblessness, poverty and low standards of living are some of the main causes of rebellion (Kim, 1996). Economic deprivation in relation to protests and rebellion can be traced back to Korean history. The traditional elite, the yangban or landowning elite, disintegrated because of the rise of the working class and the introduction of land reform. This was exacerbated by the Japanese colonization during 1910 to 1945, and land reforms in the early post war period. There were also bitter rivalries among independence leaders who became popular during the Japanese occupation. The Republic of Korea was established with American support. Syngman Rhee became the first president after three years of bloody conflict in which right-wing forces killed leftists and moderates and drove the rest underground. For the next twelve years, Rhee ruled with abuses unchecked and continued to rule until the protests from below, supported later on by the elites in power. As mentioned, Korea’s transition was marred by elite disunity. This was what happened to the other countries in the third-wave of democratization. However, the disunified elites eventually became unified to end the transition. This scenario can happen in two ways, according to Burtun and Ryu (1997), which are: elite settlements (Burtun & Higley as cited in Burtun & Ryu, 1997), and elite convergences (Burtun, Gunther, & Higley as cited in Burtun & Ryu, p. 5). In elite settlements, former conflicting elites quickly reorganize and patch up previous disagreements by “negotiating compromises on their most basic disagreements and committing themselves to restrained partisanship” (Burtun & Ryu, 1997, p. 5). In elite convergences, elites who won successive elections “de-radicalize extremist factions” to form new alliances for “consensual unity” (Burtun & Ryu, p. 5). In the Korean case, along with all third-wave cases of democratic transition, the basic question is whether and how disunified elites become consensually unified. The Korean transition was an elite settlement that occurred in 1987. Elite settlements are characterized by past elite conflicts and precipitated by problems of hostilities between elites. Korea’s transition is long and complicated. This can be traced to the time of the Yi Dynasty, i.e. from the 14th to the 20th centuries, which was characterized by never-ending and mostly bloody elite conflicts to control or influence the monarchy. In the 20th century, the struggle continued with the protests and mass actions against the incumbent elite and the repressive regime of Syngman Rhee in the 1950s to the 1960s. Common features of these conflicts include some scenarios. First, there are settlements formed for only a short time, maybe weeks or months to just about two years. The second scenario involves settlements wherein opposing elites negotiate, resulting in major agreements and settlements for all parties. Third, these elite settlements are provided in public documents and constitutions, and they are agreed upon in tacit understandings and commitments. Fourth, respected and experienced political leaders are behind these settlements rather than new faces in the political arena. Finally, demonstrations and popular votes play an important role in providing these settlements. Korea’s transition continues and still shows elite disunity (Burtun & Ryu, 1997). In so-called 4-19 Righteous Uprising, the events showed the role of the students and civil society, which inspired subsequent student radicals and other organizations. This did not stop there. In 1961, General Park Chung Hee led a military coup to remove the new head of state, Prime Minister John Myun Chang. Subsequent events made Park resign his military post to become an elected president in 1963, until his assassination sixteen years later (Lee, 2008). In the 1980s, authoritarian rule triumphed but was suppressed by counter-elites and civil society groups. These organizations would help define the nature of democratic consolidation (Lee & Glasure, 2007). Democratic consolidation, or consolidated democracy, occurs “when no significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede from the state” (Linz & Stepan as cited in Burton & Ryu, 1997, p. 17). The authors further added that a democratic regime can also be consolidated when there is a public perception that democratic procedures and institutions should not be replaced with undemocratic systems or authoritarian ways. Linz and Stepan (as cited in Burtun & Ryu, p. 17) further states that: “Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike, throughout the territory of the state, become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process.” A democracy can be considered consolidated if “it is the only game” that people play (Linz & Stepan as cited in Burton & Ryu, 1997, p. 17). We can refer this back to Korea. Democracy has been widely accepted at the ouster of Rhee until today, and even before the democratic transition. This was shown by the strong support for the democratic opposition in the 1985 legislative elections. Democracy was also promoted by Koreans’ overwhelming approval of the new constitution in the 1987 plebiscite, and two-thirds of the electorate in that year’s election voted for candidates of the democratic opposition, but only a third voted for the candidate of the previous authoritarian regime. As Huntington (1991) indicated, military coups, suppression of right, rigged elections, harassment, and silencing the opposition are not in consonance with the ideals of democracy. However, these were parts of Korea’s mode of transition. Since the country started to tread the path to democracy in 1987, various voluntary organizations have sprung up, involving in social and political exchanges to improve the Koreans’ way of life. Many voluntary organizations are now operating in the country, whose growth has triggered a high level of political activism (Lee, 2008). There are still transitions for reforms and deepening of democracy. Counter-elites have played instrumental roles in shaping equitable government policies. There is also the rejuvenation of civil society and its re-involvement in the larger political arena (Wong, 2005). Transition is continual Korea is now dominated by the presence of a powerful civil society, which influences government policies and programs. These past two decades, its actions have focused on public concerns. Civil society is perceived as a driving force for democratization and democratic consolidation. Civil society has enhanced people’s freedom of expression through political activities to influence government policies, promote fair elections, and protect “minority shareholder rights, healthcare reform, labor rights, and environmental protection” (Kalinowski, 2008 as cited in Oh, 2012, p. 529). Despite the presence of a stronger civil society, this has not generally affected the relations of state and society in Korea. Associations have encouraged mass mobilization against certain government policies. However, there are still mass actions and protests since those from civil society are not included in major policy making. Civil society in the democratic transition Lee (2008), using the concept of social capital, addressed the question of whether civic participation has affected the process of democratization among the Korean people. Lee also dealt on the questions: What happened to civil society in the course of democratization? To what extent do Koreans participate in voluntary associations? Lee used the Korea Democracy Barometer (KDB) surveys, conducted in 1996 and 2004, with samples of 1,000 and 1,037 respectively. The surveys focused on two social capital components and helped to trace their dynamics in the course of time. KDB 2004 survey has a way of knowing the link of the two components of social capital and the way the Korean people react to democracy (Lee, 2008). Social capital, according to Lee (2008), is “concurrence of objective features of society (network structure) with a subjective social norm (social trust)” (p.582). This definition allows for a wide-ranging and active explanation for the link between “civic activism and democratic citizenship”. Moreover, it permits for exploring whether involvement in voluntary associations creates positive results for the growth of democratic attitudes and behaviour among Koreans. Social capital has become popular and widely used by scholars in social science in defining various societal issues. They argued that social capital has greatly affected different social phenomena or political issues such as economic development, right of suffrage, education, governance issues, democratic citizenship, and trust in government institutions (Lee, 2008, p. 582). However, social capital has no clear definition, despite its wide applications. In pursuing the principles of social capital, researchers have used quantitative and qualitative methods. Additionally, scholars applied the concept at the different levels of analysis. Social capital can enhance democracy, first, by facilitating the installation of democratic regimes from non-democratic ones. Second, social capital can help improve performance of existing democracies, promote people’s rights and encourage government people and authorities to do their part in nation building through democratic principles. In doing this, people’s associations reduce the tendency of authorities to abuse their power. Ordinary citizens are encouraged to oppose authoritarian rule. There is a free flow of ideas and cooperation among the people. Voluntary associations encourage the people to embrace democracy. In Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s (1963 as cited in Lee & Glasure, 2007) work, associational involvement became a trend and considered important to analyzing democratic attitudes and civic involvement of people of a particular country. The authors provided concepts from the philosophy of Tocqueville, arguing that members of associations are more politically aware and involved in political issues. Inside organizations, citizens learn to discuss and debate about issues, allowing them to support democratic principles and norms. Being a member of a voluntary organization, one can acquaint himself/herself with other politically aware people. This can motivate their political awareness. Associational members, even if non-political associations, show higher level of political competence and participation than ordinary citizens. Putnam introduced associational involvement as an indicator of the presence of social capital stocks. However, there is no assurance that involvement in all kinds of associations effects on political participation, or whether participation in only some community associations causes political participation. Absence of social capital, even lack of it, results in government mistrust and a ground for protest (DiFranceisco & Gitelman as cited in Lee & Glasure, 2007). Social capital is a part of the democratization process in Korea and in maintaining that democracy as it helps in the development of democratic institutions. Voluntary associations and social engagement are “training ground for democracy” (Lee & Glasure, 2007, p. 103). However, social capital is not present in every society and access to it depends on the social location of individuals or groups people. Factors like geographic and social isolation may restrict the structural availability of social capital, for example, lack of resources or funds and lack of connectivity. Civil society is the vanguard of democracy. In the summer of 2008, civil society conducted candlelight vigils and led the protest against prospective imports of U.S. beef. The display of people power assembled about one million people from various socioeconomic backgrounds, highlighted by discussions in social media. Another civic action involved the coalition of progressive political parties, civic groups and social media discussion, focusing on the “People’s Action for Countermeasures against Mad Cow Disease.” The government was forced to give in to the demands of civil society by halting U.S. beef imports (Oh, 2012). Conclusion South Korea’s democratic transition is complicated, considering that it started from the 14th century up to the early part of the 20th century, and this is characterized by elite disunity. However, the transition still carried the pattern of the third-wave cases as described in the various forms of democratic transitions. The Korean transition has ended and it is now a full democracy, with no threat of coups or protests and rebellion from below. At present, Korean activities are characterized by continual involvement of civil society and voluntary organizations. Civil society in the Korean experience is perceived the vanguard of democracy, continues to influence policy-making, and promotes people’s participation through public awareness and policy debate on important issues pertaining to public concerns and governance. The democratic transition is sustained and continuous and cannot be left open. The people are socially and politically aware because they do not want a repeat of the authoritarian regime they experienced in the past. Voluntary associations in South Korea have been formed to enhance democracy. There are civic organizations promoting public interests, and also voluntary associations. A report from Encyclopedia of Korean Associations states that the number of voluntary associations has risen to 3,900 in 1996 and 23,000 in 2005 (Cho as cited in Lee, 2008, p. 588). However, the finding of the KDB survey mentioned earlier states that “democratization has not stimulated involvement in associations throughout the country” (Lee, 2008, p. 589). When it comes to civic organizations, in 2004 Koreans preferred to be members of sports and recreation organizations followed by religious affiliations. Despite the KDB survey that membership in voluntary associations has decreased, it still played a part in the democratic transition and Koreans saw the importance of voluntary associations. References Burton, M. & Ryu, J. (1997). South Korea’s elite settlement and democratic consolidation. ProQuest Sociology, 25 (1), 1-24. Huntington, S. (1991). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. New York: University of Oklahoma Press. Karl, T. & Schmitter, P. (1991). 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