An Assessment of the Implementation of Maritime Policy in Nigeria - Case Study Example

An Assessment of the Implementation of Maritime Policy in Nigeria: A Case Study on the Application of ISPS Code in Nigeria Introduction The 9/11 terror attack in America’s Twin Towers gave a bitter insight of the security vulnerabilities that were in place and provided loopholes for a terrorist to conduct their inhumane acts. It is from this premise that security pundits came up with the argument that if air as a medium of transport was jeopardised, then other modes such as ports were at a higher risk due to existence of numerous loopholes that could be capitalised by criminals to launch attacks. The Safety of life at Sea (SOLAS) made a bold step to sensitise maritime countries on the importance of the formulation of policies that would enhance security in maritime facilities to safeguard both peoples’ lives as well as critical assets (Bichou, Szyliowicz, & Zamparini, 2014). In 2002, the month of December the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) an agency of UN convened a meeting that brought together 150 representatives from its member states. The members present came up with an amendment to chapter five and nine of the SOLAS convention and adopted the ISPS code. It is from this school of thought that the International Ships and Ports Security (ISPS) was formulated to act as a guideline that provides security provision that each port all over the world is supposed to comply with, to safeguard the passengers transiting through them, international trade, as well as other key installations within the port premises. The code came into force in 2004 with the aim of achieving a number of objectives that are elaborated as follows (“ISPS Code Compliance”, 2014). The ISPS code was supposed to create a global framework that brings together all maritime stakeholders from government agencies to private entities to cooperate in assessing security threats that were affecting the ports and mitigate them. Relatively, the code outlines the roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder in ensuring the security of maritime facilities in enforced at all times. Each party had a role to play and thus any responsibility would befall the entity that failed to perform his/her duties as required. Furthermore, the code was meant to ensure coordination between regional and international player by sharing of crucial intelligence information that would be vital in averting any form of attacks. Similarly, ISPS was meant to provide a rationale for assessing maritime security at the same time instill confidence on port users that sufficient security measures are in place that safeguards all forms of operations within the port’s premises (Ziakede, 2013). Role Played By Government Agencies in the Implementation of ISPS Code After the International Ships and Ports system came into place in 2004 the Nigerian government mandated the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) as the Designate Agency (DA) to oversee the implementation of the ISPS code in Nigeria. The move bestowed the agency with constitutional powers and privileges to fast track the application of the provision of the code (“Nigerian Maritime and Safety”, n.d.). The company rolled out a national continuous plan that constituted a year by year progress whereby it constituted committees that were tasked to conduct periodical visits to port facilities within Nigeria and assess their level of compliance with the ISPS code. Prior to the implementation of the system the U.S. Coast Guard had has issued a detailed report that documented a number of Nigerian ports that were on the watch list thus needed to comply speedily with the security provisions of the ISPS code. Notably, NIMASA did not entirely focus on the ports that were on the watch list alone but conducted a national implementation program that would see all port facilities in Nigeria be ISPS compliant within the shortest time possible (Johnstone, 2015). In 2003, a delegation of the US Coast Guard visited Nigeria to assess the progress of their implementation of the ISPS code. After a series of visits to major port facilities, the team concluded that massive non-compliance incidents were noted that implied the reluctance of the nation in complying with international security regulation. NIMASA as a Designate Agency was given a three-month ultimatum to fast track on the speedy implementation of the code failure to which the country would be slapped with unspecified consequences. The move instigated NIMAS to embark on a thorough operation that would ensure a majority of Nigerian port facilities implement the code as required. NIMASA commissioned an in-depth audit to be conducted in all maritime facilities within Nigeria to precisely determine their nature of operations, geographical location as well as their numbers to facilitate the ability of the agency to implement its mandate (“ISPS Code Compliance”, 2014). Prior to the audit, the DA has initially carried out firm Verification Inspection Exercise to all port facilities that are on-shore within Nigeria’s maritime territory. The exercise was meant to act as a benchmark for a re-certification process to the firms in the sense that they were examined if their operations complied with ISPS before being certified again to continue with activities. Firms that were found to be non-compliant were denied re-certification and in extreme incidences they would be subjected to punitive measures (NIMASA, 2014). Conversely, the agency submitted all security companies that provide guard services to firms operating within port facilities to train their personnel in security matters according to the provisions of the ISPS code since they formed an integral part in implementation of security within maritime facilities. That notwithstanding, all security companies, infrastructural service providers and any other vendors that were operating within marine premises were subjected to fresh registration after undergoing a thorough audit to streamline their operation to be in accordance with provisions of the code. Intelligence is an integral element in implementing security procedures (Ziakede, 2013). The Designate Agency developed in-house capacity to gather intelligence information as far as port facilities security is concerned to assist in policy formulation as well as coordinate its efforts with those of the central government to assist in mitigating any security threats that may be on the nose. It is prudent to note that a majority of the technical roles were conducted by the Designate Agency which, in this case, is NIMASA since the government delegated all functions regarding the implementation of ISPS to this particular agency entirely. However, other maritime agencies like the Nigerian Port Authority through the management boards of various sports played roles such as erecting perimeter walls around ports to secure the premises as well as conducting the installation of closed circuit television cameras around the ports to ensure all-day security surveillance according to the provisions of ISPS (Ndikom, 2008). Level of Implementation of the ISPS Code and Its Impact on Shipping and Port Activities The ISPS code has not been fully implemented in Nigeria due to a number of bottlenecks that have marred the process of implementation. However, the rate at which Designate Agency took off in applying the code was so sluggish that it caught the eye of international maritime players. In 2013, the United States Coast Guard toured the country and assessed a number of elements at the ports in line with provisions of the ISPS code. The outcome of the assessment was not pleasing at all, and this prompted the US Coast Guard to issue a three-month ultimatum for compliance failure to which the country would be adversely affected by international trade sanctions. The move notably stimulated the level of activities of the agency as within the time frame that the ultimatum was given a number of notable steps had been achieved in line with complying with ISPS (NIMASA, 2014). The American Coast Guard had earlier warned that failure to comply with the code would lead to any vessels that visit Nigerian ports or jetties to be barred from accessing the United States of America a move that would be reciprocated by all its international trade allies. Such a move would be detrimental to the economy of Nigeria given the fact that it is an import-dependent economy, and thus maritime insurance and freight charges would significantly escalate with such a move being implemented. Notably, the country stood to lose a significant amount of revenues since most vessels will not be willing to dock at its ports due to the security and international trade ramifications (NIMASA, 2014). The level of implementation of ISPS can be viewed from a number of perspectives depending on the particular parameter that is under study. For this particular paper the level of implementation of ISPS in Nigeria is informed from the premise of how many ports have attained fully compliant certification and the progress that is made by those that have not been declared fully compliant towards achieving compliance. Currently, the number of ports that have been declared compliant in Nigeria’s maritime sector stands at twenty-two with nearly 60 other been categorised as non-compliant. The two statuses of ports have various implications on the operations of the ports (Anonymous, 2000). For instance, the US Coast Guard only allows direct access to vessels that have passed through Nigerian ports that are fully compliant with the ISPS code. Vessels from the other ports have to undergo an extra security procedure commonly referred to as Condition of Entry (COE) before being allowed to enter America (Ziakede, 2013). The primary reason behind that move is that ports that have not fully complied with the provisions of the ISPS code are rendered to be unsafe since the security measures that are implemented there are not satisfactory to guarantee safety of the passengers transiting and crucial assets. It is safe to note that the level of implementation in Nigeria is still low despite a decade elapsing since the program was initiated. Going by the statistics less that 40% of the total number of ports in Nigeria has complied with ISPS provisions. However, relevant efforts are being made by NIMASA to ensure the ports steadily working to achieve full compliance with the Code (“ISPS Code Compliance”, 2014). The effects of non-compliance to the code are evident since vessels from ports not compliant with the law have to undergo extra security procedures before entering other nations, for instance, USA. Back in Nigeria NIMASA has cracked the whip on non-compliant ports based on an assessment that was conducted the ports that were lagging behind or demonstrated lack of good will in implementing the code have seen crucial maritime activities being discontinued in those port facilities. That notwithstanding, international vessels are keen to avoid non-compliant ports in Nigeria to save them the extra security procedures that they will be required to undergo before visiting individual nations. The effect of the above scenario is a number of ports experiencing a significant drop in their operations due to apathy from vessels due to their non-compliant tag (NIMASA, 2014). Challenges Faced In Implementation of the Code and Its Effects on Shipping Port Activities In Nigeria Despite the spirited efforts by NIMASA is ensuring all of Nigeria’s ports are declared ISPS compliant it faces numerous challenged that have threatened to derail implementation of its mandate. To begin with, initially when the agency was mandated with the task of implementing the ISPS code it lacked a constitutional backing to give it the powers and privileges to conduct the same. It proved very difficult to achieve its objective since most of the actions involved stern directives being issued to port operators and without powers being bestowed on them it were virtually difficult for them to accomplish any meaningful goals. However, the situation was later rectified and the agency’s mandate was strengthened by constitutional provisions that gave it power to undertake the exercise thus enabled it to achieve what has far done (UNCTAD Secretariat, 2007). Relatively, it is prudent to note that had the powers been banqueted on the agency earlier enough it is evident that the level of implementation would have been much far hence allowing many Nigerian ports to accommodate international vessels without being declared non-compliant. Similarly, the cost of complying with ISPS is significantly huge, and it takes several economic considerations before a nation can decide to roll out the exercise in all its ports. For instance, Nigeria has close to one hundred on shore ports and jitters along its coastline, the economic implication of undertaking ISPS compliance in all these facilities at the instance is enormous and would lead to cash flow problems befalling the nations. Additionally, most sports transcend the cost of implementing the code to port users and who in turn pass it on freight charges leading to increased cost of commodities in the nation (Ziakede, 2013). The dynamic nature of security threats is yet another challenge that NIMASA is facing in its effort to implement ISPS. The code is typically a security procedure that is not specific thus most of its provisions tend to change with the dynamic security environment. Thus, a port that implements the code in a step by step manner will face the challenge of some provisions being rendered irrelevant or rather obsolete before the rest are complete thus denying it the opportunity of being declared compliant. The ultimatums from foreign powers i.e. USA are not assisting in any way rather they are just piling pressure in an already complicated matter hence hindering efforts towards ISPS compliance. Typically, the ultimatums come along with certain consequences for non-compliance, Nigeria as a country will continues been negatively affected by unnecessary warnings instead of America collaborating with the agencies mandated to implement the code to achieve its objective in a timely manner (UNCTAD Secretariat, 2007). Solution to the Challenges The main challenges that are hindering the smooth implementation of the code are mainly due to financial constraints and interference from external forces. Nigeria is a developing nation, and thus the pace at which it should implement the system should not be compared to that of developed countries. The country has limited finance to bankroll all operating the country’s one hundred plus ports. As much as America and its allies are playing an oversight role they should be more interested in partnering with the Designate Agency by providing useful guidance to enable it fully implement the code in all ports instead of issuing threats and ultimatums that further complicates the state of affairs. Additionally, the international convention that came up with the ISPS code should provide the rationale of how the security procedures should be financed since the entire process will significantly costly especially for a nation that has over hundred ports and jetties (Lazokoroji, 2013). Conclusion The maritime authority of Nigeria just like its international counterparts has made substantive efforts to ensure the implementation of the ISPS code. Though it is slightly lagging behind in terms of the general level of implementation the agency that was tasked with the exercise has instituted stringent measures that have seen roughly twenty-one ports being declared ISPS compliant with many other on the way to being declared. The state of affairs with regard to the implementation is far given the fact that NIMASA has encountered a number of bottlenecks that have derailed its goal of complying with the provisions of the ISPS code. In a nutshell, the progress that has been demonstrated so far is worth acknowledging, and more collaboration with external entities is required to enable the nation achieve full compliance with the code. References Anonymous, 2000. Business & maritime West Africa. Apapa, Lagos [Nigeria], Kotzmatz Media Consults Ltd. Bichou, K., Szyliowicz, J. S., & Zamparini, L., 2014. Maritime Transport Security Issues, Challenges and National Policies. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing. ISPS Code Compliance In Nigeria: 10 Years After. (2014). Available at: http://businessandmaritimewestafrica.com/shipping-development/isps-code-compliance-in-nigeria-10-years-after [Accessed on 22 Apr. 15]. Johnstone, R. W., 2015. Protecting transportation: implementing security policies and programs. Available at: Lazokoroji, I., 2013. A Paper on the International Ship and Port Facility Security Chris, T., 2005. Ndikom, O., 2008. Maritime transport: management and administration in Nigeria. Lagos, Bunmico Publishers. Nigerian Maritime and Safety Agency Guidelines on Implementation of Coastal and Inland Shipping. (n.d.). Available at: nimasa.gov.ng [Accessed on 22 Apr. 15]. NIMASA, 2014. NIMASA and ISPS Code Implementation Momentum Stakeholder Meeting. UNCTAD Secretariat, 2007. Maritime Security: ISPS Code Implementation, Costs and Related Financing. Available at: unctad.org/en/Docs/sdtetlb20071_en.pdf [Accessed on 22 Apr. 15]. Ziakede, P., 2013. ISPS code: NIMASA To Begin Training, Port Audits Article In News Watch 13th July 2013. Available at: http://www.Newswatchpaper/articles/nimasa-to-begin-training/portaudits [Accessed on 22 Apr. 15]. Read More