Peruvian Communist Party Shining Path - Coursework Example

Sendero Luminoso Peruvian Communist Party Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) Introduction Sendero Luminoso (shining path) was founded in 1969 by Abimael Guzman, a philosophy professor who advocated the use of guerilla tactics to overthrow Peru leadership (Stern, 1998). The revolutionary organization took its name from the founder of Peru’s first communist party, Jose Carlos Mariategui (Marxism-Leninism will open the shining path to revolution). The leaders sought to restore Mao Zedong’s ‘pure’ ideology and adopted China’s Cultural Revolution as its model (Manwaring, 1995, p 158). Guzman was an autocrat who unified the centralized ideology of the organization since his scholarly training, trips to China during the Cultural Revolution and his relationship with Stalinist intellectuals such as Carlos De la Riva. Guzman received instructions in Peoples; War Doctrine during his trips to China and absorbed Mao’s hatred for ideological and political reforms (Stern, 1998). The group consisted of pro-peasant and disaffected intellectuals, but evolved to army of ideologies committed to the ultimate collapse of the state. The paper will discuss Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) history and origins, the party ideology, organization, the terror acts committed and the government abuses in response by the Peruvian government. The top leadership consists of the capula, the political and intellectual elite and each region is controlled by a Party Committee (cuadros) (Manwaring, 1995, p 159). The militias or popular guerilla army consists of the main and regional forces that violently confront the higher political authority. All the zones have a local base while each region has a principle force that controls the area. The roster of full-time fighters climbed to 10,000 in 1990s while the part-time supporters of the organization were estimated at 50,000 to 100,000 (Ron, 2001, p 569). The organization has several activists that are tasked with hanging posters and painting slogans. The activists also provide food and other sustenance and are clearly vetted before ascending to the higher ranks in leadership (Stern, 1998). The activists are recruited from the peasantry and consist of the landless workers and peasants while the armed militias are mainly recruited from the social class whose parents are small land owners. The Shining Path has established an external organization referred as the Peru People’s Movement that is tasked with radicalization of the sympathetic political factions and groups such as the dormant Zarate Willka Revolutionary Organization based in Bolivia (Manwaring, 1995, p 160). In the recent years, Shining Path has teamed with small Maoist parties across the world such as Communist Party of Turkey (Tarazona-Sevillano & Reuter, 1990). During the early 1960s to 1980, Guzman concentrated on the doctrine, development of leadership structures and forming relationships with peasant communities in highlands around Ayacucho City (Bennett, 1998). According to various theorists, the interaction of various ideological, political and social contexts prevailing in Peru contributed to the movement trajectory (Tarazona-Sevillano & Reuter, 1990). According to critics of Peru government, racism, poverty and unemployment contributed to the rise of the revolutionary movement and thus structural adjustments were essential before the organization could seize power (Bennett, 1998). The1968-1980 dictatorship led to tremendous growth of Peruvian left as the repressive military rule supported redistribution and progressive economic growth. The military junta created an alternative mobilization of masses since it believed the traditional landowners were hindering modernization of the economy (Erulkar, 1990, p 43). The military rulers created groups such as unions, peasant federations and rural cooperatives, but the military government took a conservative approach in 1970s and the political left started organizing protests against the military dictator. Although the military and political left worked together in 1970s, the political left demanded civil rule and the military organized elections in May 1980 leading to an impressive 29 percent popular vote in favor of the left (Tarazona-Sevillano & Reuter, 1990). However, different Left-Wing coalitions and groups were concerned about their future participation in civil elections since some groups feared that the other political factions would not abide by the rules of the electoral process or accept the legitimacy of the electoral politics (Ron, 2001, p 577). Certain groups feared that a legitimate democracy would not further the social justice agenda and thus did not guarantee the distribution of political power, land, and wealth since the civilian elite would easily centralize political power (Weinberg, 1992). The new political rules meant that each group had to define its ideology and use tactics and Sendero was the most uncompromising and anti-reformist of all political groups in 1980. The unique ideological stand of this organization interacted with the existing political environment thus leading to its armed struggle. Sendero was successful in attaining peasantry sympathy and passive support due to the frustrated agrarian reforms and the historical opposition of the merchants by the peasants (Berg, 1987, p 174). The organization was capable of exploiting the popular resentment against the state and merchants in rallying the peasant population to continue with an armed struggle under the ideology of Mao. For instance, Andahuaylas highland province was characterized by high peasantry population who posed tiny plots in exchange of unpaid or poorly-paid labor duties (Berg, 1987, p 175). Although the organization was formed in the late 1960s, it was not until 1980 when Peruvian left’s attained political victory after the military ceding power. Abimael Guzman believed in anti-electoral sentiment as the elections had not transferred power to the people or working class and only option was a prolonged and hard armed struggle (Manwaring, 1995, p 161). The organizations militants disrupted voter registration in Chuschi town thus marking the long period of armed struggle and violence. The enhanced political openness and democratization agenda was stimulating the struggle and ideological survival was enhanced through radicalization of the organizational structure (Bennett, (1998). The founders outlined that Peru’s legal Marxist left which had accepted elections was a component of bourgeois and opportunist agents that were infiltrating in to workers’ movements after the transition from the military to civil rule (Kent, 1993, p 443). The insurgency bombed buildings and hanged dogs from lampposts as a warning to the supporters of the illegitimate state. The organization attacked political figures and initiated assassinations with the objective of creating a political vacuum that lead to the Sendero being regarded as the de facto authority in the areas abandoned by the state. Sendero attacked Ayacucho Department prison in March 1982 and Lima’s electrical grid in December the same year thus causing a blackout in the capital and major cities. Sendero targeted individuals with excessive wealth, corrupt individuals and individuals detested by rural communities during 1980-1982 conflict before the anti-left campaigns gathered steam in 1983 (Ron, 2001, p 572). The attacks on other Peruvian Leftists can be attributed to competition for broader institutional changes since the groups competed for personnel and funds through challenging the credibility of each other. Legal Peruvian Left grew tremendously in 1980s as evidenced by IU and APRA that together garnered 30 percent of popular vote in 1980 and subsequent 67 percent in 1985 elections. APRA and IU performed impressively in municipal elections since the two garnered 45 percent in 1980 and a resounding 78 percent in 1986 (Ron, 2001, p 584). The ideological differences between Sendero and other Peruvian Leftists were few during the military rule, but the competition for recruits widened the ideological differences since APRA and IU criticized Sendero for its violent approach and opposition to electoral reforms (Ron, 2001, p 573). The Peruvian government held the second elections in 1985 and this marked a new wave of Sendero attacks and party politics. APRA’s candidate Alan Garcia won the elections with promises of economic reforms while IU candidate was a distant second. The right-wing parties entered in to tumult and this prevented the IU from tacitly supporting Sendero Luminoso. IU denounced Sendero as a terrorist organization and terrified middle class in Andahuaylas supported any party that could provide security against the reign of terror unleashed by Sendero Luminoso. Although Sendero had lost substantial grip in Lima, it consolidated its power through requiring strict adherence from rural peasants and merchants countrywide and continued to murder the wealthy individuals (Erulkar, 1990, p 44). In 1986, Sendero Luminoso staged a major organizing effort in Lima and other Leftists since unemployment still stood at 60 percent and the opposition exerted high pressure on Garcia. The subsequent nationalization of the banking system in 1978 by Garcia administration angered the citizens and Sendero moved to disrupt the food-rich Junin department and Huancavo mining town in coastal Peru (Erulkar, 1990, p 45). The violent attacks eased in September 1992 after the arrest of Abimael Guzman who later revealed that his intention was to covert the Popular Guerilla Army in to regular People’s Liberation Army (Manwaring, 1995, p 163). The organization assassinated 291 left-wing union leaders, municipal officials, community organizers and politicians between 1983-1996.Three district mayors of Leoncio Prado Province were murdered while three resigned after receiving death threats (Woy-Hazleton & Hazleton, 1990, p 29). The main targets for assassination were the pragmatic and social-democratic America Popular Revolutionary Alliance and the United Left. The intellectuals associated with these groups, volunteers, non-governmental organizations and students were also targeted for assassination (Bennett, 1998). The organization posted death threats in order to disrupt government institutions and declared the abandoned areas as ‘zones of liberation’. Sendero started a massive expansion of political and logistical bases in 1983 through use of armed propaganda. The group expanded in to 114 provinces leaving the coastal departments and large cities. The expansion efforts were financed through extortions and taxation of narcotraffickers in upper Huallaga Valley. Sendero portrayed its mission as that of protecting the livelihoods and indigenous culture when the US Drug Enforcement Agencies and Peruvian police tried to eradicate drug trafficking in Upper Huallaga region during the mid-1989 military offensive (Woy-Hazleton & Hazleton, 1990, p 27). The next phase of the revolution was besieging of the larger cities and ensuring total collapse of the state through economically starving the populated regions and scaring away businesses. About 30,000 people died from the hostilities, but human rights groups attribute half of the deaths to Peruvian security forces. Sendero’s criticized Legal left and used violent intimidation against the supporters of the legal left (Ron, 2001, p 572). The government carried out a full-scale military offensive against the guerrillas leading to high civilian casualties. The death toll of military forces from the confrontations kept doubling from 55 in 1986 to 133 in 1988 and thus communities suspected of harboring guerillas became a primary target for military suppression. The paramilitary forces were accused of human rights violations since civic leaders, regime critics, journalists and universities were raided in the pretext of countering guerilla’s activities (Taylor, 1998, pp 47). According to 1989 Amnesty International report, Peru reported the highest number of forced disappearances across the world since 288 cases were reported in first eight months of 1989. The report further accused the security agencies for forced disappearances, torturing of prisoners and civilian deaths (Woy-Hazleton & Hazleton, 1990, p 30). The groups involved tried to avoid military coup and the violent activities of Sendero forced the coalition parties to favor democracy (Erulkar, 1990, p 45). The US government has consistently ignored the Peruvian insurgency in order to concentrate on the war against narcotics. The Bush administration ultimately allocated $ 2 billion in anti-drug campaigns in Peru, Columbia and Bolivia in the next five years due to threat posed by Sendero. The violence led to temporal unification of the political parties behind democracy (Erulkar, 1990, p 45). According to alternative version, Sendero’s violent ideology is entrenched in the historical Peruvian racism since the country has three main races that include the Indians, light-skinned Spanish descendants and mixed-race mestizos. The elite are light-skinned Spanish descendants while the historical superiority of mestizos was eroded due to government intervention and economic growth (Weinberg, 1992). Conclusion Abimael Guzman started Sendero Luminoso on the ideology of Maoist commitment to long-term rural struggle. The organization combined Post-Mao and Soviet communism in order to attract external support and rejected partnerships with the Marxist Left or other guerilla groups in Peru. The organization commenced its armed struggle by burning ballot boxes and disrupting voter registration in 1980 presidential elections. The main aim was to destroy the urban society and Lima regime and redistribute wealth in the areas where the ruling government lacked control. The use of armed propaganda such as hanging dead dogs from lamp posts, issue of death lists and assassination of government officials created fear among the populations. Sendero Luminoso operates in small units through carefully planned ‘armed propaganda’ that aimed at lessening the government’s credibility. The organization aimed at ensuring total collapse of the state through converting the backward areas in to solid bases for revolutionary support, attacking the symbols associated with the bourgeois state and using guerilla militia to generalize violence across the state. The militia was determined to conquer and expand its support territories and siege the cities in order to reduce the credibility of the municipal authorities and ultimately ensure collapse of the state. Although Sendero Luminoso has maintained a low military profile, the group appears to be increasing its terrorism and sabotage activities. Sendero continues to fill its ranks with military, political and support components in order to consolidate its influence on the ‘masses’ across Peru. References: Bennett, J.B. (1998). Sendero Luminoso in Context. New Jersey: Scarecrow Press. Berg, R.H. (1987). ‘Sendero Luminoso and the Peasantry of Andahuaylas’, The Journal of Interamerican studies and World Affairs, Vol 28, 4, pp 165-196. Erulkar, E.S. (1990). ‘The Shining Path Paradox’, Harvard International Review, Vol 12, No. 2 (Winter 1990), pp. 43-45. Kent, R.B. (1993). ‘Geographical dimensions of the Shining Path Insurgency in Peru’, Geographical Review, vol. 83, No. 4 (Oct., 1993), pp 441-454. Manwaring, M.G. (1995). ‘Peru’s Sendero Luminoso: The Shining Path beckons’, American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 541, (Sept., 1995), pp 157-166. Ron, J. (2001). ‘Ideology in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso’s Tactical Escalation’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 5 (Sep, 2001), pp 569-592. Stern, S.J. (1998). Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995. New York: Duke University Press. Tarazona-Sevillano, G & Reuter, J.B. (1990). Sendero Luminoso and the threat of Narcoterrorism. New York: Praeger. Taylor, L. (1998). ‘Counter-Insurgency strategy, the PCP- Sendero Luminoso and the Civil War in Peru, 1980-1996’, Society for Latin American Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Jan., 1998), pp. 35-58. Weinberg, L. (1992). Political Parties and Terrorist Groups. New York: Psychology Press. Woy-Hazleton, S & Hazleton, W.A. (1990). ‘Sendero Luminoso and the Future of Peruvian Democracy’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2 (April, 1990), pp 21-35. Read More