States' Role in Darfur and Rwanda's Genocides - Assignment Example

Comparing and contrasting the role of behaviour and international action in the genocides in Darfur and Rwanda of Submission Introduction Human rights violations and mass atrocities have marked the 20th century. The ethnic cleansing or genocides in Darfur and Rwanda simply illustrate the most unspeakable instances. Not like some forms of conflict, genocide is usually a criminal act organised and led by the state. If efforts to thwart mass violence and genocide would be effective then the pursuit of knowledge has to place emphasis on several interconnected issues. The causes of genocides in Darfur and Rwanda have multiple components but a shared feature is the marginalisation of minority groups due to ethnicity (Straus, 2006, p. 42). Hence the dynamics of ethnicisation have to be understood, because ethnicity has long been a source of political oppression and marginalisation. The failure of the state and ethno-politics are intimately connected. It is now widely known that failed states are highly perilous. Failed states are more likely to resort to genocide (Snow & Su, 2011, p. 10). This paper compares and contrasts the role of state behaviour and international action in the genocides in Darfur and Rwanda. It argues that both the Rwandan and Darfurian genocides have commonalities in terms of the role of the state and the response of the international community, while the difference lies in the involvement of the U.S. and the presence of local political action during these genocides. State Behaviour in Darfur and Rwanda The Darfur Genocide describes the recent mass violence against children, women, and men in Darfur, Western Sudan. The slaughters started in 2003 and are still happening at present. The genocide is being perpetrated by an organisation of government-subsidised Arab mercenaries called the Janjaweed (Totten & Markusen, 2013, p. 12). The Janjaweed methodically exterminate the people of Darfur by torturing, raping, slaughtering civilians, contaminating sources of drinking water, plundering economic coffers, and destroying villages. These mercenaries are the major enemies of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) (Totten & Markusen, 2013, p. 11). In 2003, JEM and SLM carried out an armed protest against the Sudanese government, condemning the marginalisation of the region and the inability to defend established communities from nomadic raids (Snow & Su, 2011, p. 10). The Sudanese government reacted by letting loose the Janjaweed. In the unending genocide, Darfuri people, especially African farmers, are being methodically slaughtered and dispossessed by the state of Sudan itself. The government seems hesitant to deal with the human rights disaster in the area and has not implemented the needed measures to limit the operations of the Janjaweed (Snow & Su, 2011, p. 11). The International Criminal Court (ICC) intervened in 2005 and terminated liberties in Darfur by carrying out human rights investigations in the area. Unfortunately, the Sudanese government declined to take part in the investigations (Totten & Markusen, 2013, p. 159). On the 4th of March 2009, Sudanese President Omar al Bashir was prosecuted by ICC for leading an operation of mass plunder, rape, and slaughter against citizens of Darfur (Totten & Markusen, 2013, p. 17). But the Sudanese government remains uncooperative. Similarly, the Rwandan Genocide, which was the mass killing in Rwanda in 1994, was perpetrated mainly by Hutu racist paramilitary groups, with the support of the Rwandan state government, the military, and citizens in obedience to the ‘Hutu Power’ campaign (Brannigan & Jones, 2009, p. 192). The support of the state for the Rwandan genocide was certainly one of its key motivators. The Hutu-dominated government supplied weapons, leadership, and structure for the paramilitaries. It also financially supported the RTLM ‘Hutu Power’ radio programme, the main medium of ‘brainwashing’ for the people of Rwanda who also participated in the genocide (Brannigan & Jones, 2009, pp. 193-4). The function of the state, both in Darfur and Rwanda, in daily life carried some weight in the perpetration of genocide. First, the state is important at the local arena. The people of Darfur and Rwanda were accustomed to state power in the local arena. This is contrary to numerous African states where activities in the centre have negligible effect in the local context (Straus, 2006, pp. 42-44). Second, the state influences balance of power in the local arena. By taking control of the state, the extremists were able to connect murdering Tutsis to power. And, lastly, Darfur and Rwanda had long been practising compulsory labour (Grunfeld & Huijboom, 2007, p. 27). Obligatory enlistment to provide labour for government activities was common. This implied that people knew the government has the authority to recruit them and demand their participation (Straus, 2006, pp. 42-45). When the moment came to rally for genocide, the state had wide-ranging influence in the local arena. International Response As the genocide escalated, the international community abandoned Rwanda. Initially, Western countries provided manpower to Rwanda to relocate the civilians to a safer place. But they sooner or later withdrew their troops and abandoned Rwanda. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), formed in 1993 to maintain peaceful relations and support governmental reforms in the country, tried to arbitrate between the civilians and the murderers (Grzyb, 2009, p. 33). Moreover, it attempted to intercede between the Rwandan military and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) after the latter attacked from Rwanda to defend Tutsi and save their troops based in Kigali. On the 21st of April 1994, the UN Security Council, as per the orders of Belgium, the U.S., and others, agreed to pull out everything except for a residue of UNAMIR (Melvern, 2006, p. 94). After diplomatic groups, the media, and human rights organisations reported the escalating mass violence in Rwanda, the UN organised and discussed and ultimately made a decision. UNAMIR II would be a stronger army of 5,500 combatants (Gryzb, 2009, p. 53). Yet, unfortunately, the international community was still unsuccessful, for the complete provision of materials and manpower would not reach Rwanda until after the end of the genocide (Melvern, 2006, pp. 94-95). Simply put, the international community was totally unsuccessful in preventing and putting an end to the mass violence. According to Straus (2006), there are several interrelated and multifaceted forces that resulted in the failure of the international community, such as peacekeeping exhaustion, the United Nations’ bureaucratic system, and an inaccurate perception of African conflicts. Likewise, the planned actions of Khartoum-- Sudan’s capital-- are maybe reasonable for a violent administration intently focused on its continued existence, but no less worthy of prosecution because of it (Gryzb, 2009, p. 165). However, just like in Rwanda, the international community does not have a justification for its failure in Darfur. What makes the failure of the international community in both Rwanda and Darfur is the fact that leaders and officials across the globe were thoroughly aware of what is happening in the regions. Because of the efforts of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group, and some media groups, these genocides are accurately and systematically reported and broadcasted (Gryzb, 2009, p. 12). However, in spite of all these information and knowledge, the international community has clearly failed in its duty to defend the Rwandan and Darfuri civilians. The African Union (AU) was the key international entity on Darfur. Darfur has been a trial site for the inexperienced organisation. A fundamental weakness of the AU operation is its command. It is mainly a ‘bystander’ operation. It does not have an instruction to directly intervene and aggressively defend civilians (Gryzb, 2009, p. 129). In truth, according to Melvern (2006, p. 96) it can merely defend civilians when they are being harmed or violated upon in direct sight, and merely then if it thinks it has sufficient manpower to arbitrate—and quite frequently it does not. Meanwhile, the United States has also been at the vanguard of international action. However, although the United States has referred to the mass violence in Darfur genocide, it has yet to deal directly and aggressively with the Sudanese government. There is an unfortunate inconsistency about the response of the U.S. to Darfur when evaluated against its reaction to the Rwandan genocide (Melvern, 2006, p. 101). The U.S. exerted its best efforts to avoid referring to Rwanda a case of ‘genocide’, embarking on all kinds of linguistic adjustments to prevent that conclusion, worrying that if it did it would have to implement greater measures than it was equipped to handle (Melvern, 2006, p. 101). But in Darfur, according to Totten and Markusen (2013, p. 88), the U.S. did not have any qualms calling it ‘genocide’, despite unclear evidence—seemingly on the suspicious belief that doing so did not enforce any equal responsibility to intercede. Rwanda and Darfur also offer an informative difference on local populations. In Rwanda, there was not much of a political action as the mass violence took place. Human rights groups applied pressure to the UN and the Clinton government, and numerous media sources made their Rwandan genocide their headlines, particular towards the conclusion of the catastrophe (Straus, 2006, p. 51). However, there was no massive public uproar to put an end to the Rwandan genocide. Certainly, the violence in Rwanda was immediate, and hence there was insufficient time to raise massive local pressure on the problem. Darfur was not the same. It is a fact the mass violence in Darfur was largely ignored by the international community in 2003. But the circumstances became different in 2004; specifically, a UN official made a comparison between Rwanda and Darfur in 2004; and, the commemoration of the Rwandan genocide ten years later came about, and raised a great deal of concern and attention for Darfur (Straus, 2006, pp. 51-52). As further stated by Straus (2006, p. 52), not like in Rwanda, student activism and local political action was alive in Darfur. Conclusions The genocides in Rwanda and Darfur have similarities and differences. First, in terms of the role of the state, both cases are similar, in the sense that both genocides were led, supported, and organised by the state itself. Second, international response failed in both cases. The differences between the two are the U.S. involvement during and after the incidents and the presence of local political action in the regions. References Brannigan, A & Jones, N (2009) Genocide and the Legal Process in Rwanda: From Genocide Amnesty to the New Rule of Law. International Criminal Justice Review, 19(2), pp. 192-207. Gryzb, A (2009) The World and Darfur: International Responses to Crimes against Humanity in Western Sudan. Canada: McGill-Queen’s Press- MQUP. Huijboom, A & Grunfeld, F (2007) The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders. The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. Melvern, L (2006) Rwanda and Darfur: The Media and the Security Council. International Relations, 20(1), pp. 93-104. Snow, D & Su, Y (2011) Criminology, Racial Dehumanisation and the Crime of Genocide in Darfur. Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews, 40(1), pp. 10-12. Straus, S (2006) Rwanda and Darfur: A Comparative Analysis. Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal, 1(8), pp. 41-56. Totten, S & Markusen, E (2013) Genocide in Darfur: Investigation the Atrocities in the Sudan. UK: Routledge. Read More