The United Nations Involvement in Rwanda during the Genocide - Research Paper Example

Insert Rwandan Genocide: UN action The Rwandan genocide case offers a clear account of conflict in the Central African region, toward the end of the 20th century. The political acts that culminated in the 1994 genocide were pre-planned; however, the international community failed to act on the hostilities leading up to the wanton extermination of the masses. The elite surrounding President Habyarimana, who was popular for his despotism, superimposed a dangerous plan to eliminate all Tutsis and other dissenting figures among the Hutu, to circumvent a power-sharing agreement signed in Arusha, a year earlier. In spite of the apparent pointers to an imminent civil strife, the United Nations failed to act due to disunity among member countries. History of genocide Although, genocide is historically linked to Hitler’s Final Solution, there were several cases of the crusade of mass murder. The Young Turks perhaps were the first to execute genocidal crimes as they execution Americans beginning in the second quarter of 1915. This scenario that was apparent in Lemkin’s initial idea of the significance of trying the perpetrators, later culminated in the first genocidal act of the last century (Dadrian 487-522). Heartened by the non-committal stance taken by the major players in the world, the execution of over one million Armenians happened unabated. And in other cases that amount to genocide, some historians have pointed that the 1937-1938 wholesale execution of humans that happened in Turkey, in which Kurds in the Dersim bore the brunt of heinous crime; the 1972 mass execution of Hutus by Tutsis in Burundi, the Khmer Rouge crusade of massacres in around the 1975, and the 1988 Anfal execution of Kurds of Iraqi descent can be classified as genocide cases. Among these developments, perhaps the worst case of genocide was witnessed in Cambodia, if the 1948 description of term genocide (Barta, Finzsch, and Stannard 111-133). In light of the degree of the mass killings, almost one-quarter of the whole 7 million Cambodia is believed to have been put to death following the erratic policies implemented by Khmer Rouge; a persistent call to classify the crimes under the category of “genocide” has been going on (Dicklitch, and Malik 515-530). Since then, both the architects and the larger percentage of victims were from the same ethnic group, the Khmer; this complicates any attempt to reach a rational or legal conclusion. A certain school of thought is based on the theory of auto-genocide; in view of this, it is likely to meet the thresholds of the mid-twentieth century description even when the architects intended to slaughter a big number of their kin (Dadrian 487-522). Others concur that the large proportions of the victims were forced to suffer due to political reasons, though particular minority groups, were specifically targeted for annihilation and hold that these activities amounted to genocide. According to Verdeja (45-51), it is significant to note that the scope of a trial chamber set up in 2006 to administer justice to the victims who survived the carnage, a joint commission of the United Nations and the local administrative authorities classify the acts as genocide. Since the second half of the twentieth century, the bleak nature of precedents in regard to the implementation of the Genocide Convention exposes a grim account of the stance taken by the international community to crack the whip on the perpetration of such heinous acts (Verdeja 37-54). This has left experts at loggerheads concerning whether prominent cases that justify the description “genocide” passed the legal thresholds. In the current world, the wheels of justice at different levels of jurisdiction such as international tribunals and internal trial courts are slowly elaborating definitional uncertainties and raising the re flag, though hesitantly, that perpetrators of genocide may be tried and jailed or executed depending on their level of culpability (Barta, Finzsch, and Stannard 111-133). Yet, the very realities that trial chambers are seeking justice for perpetrators of genocide-related crimes stands as an apparent proof of a deeper rot, which probably led to the Rwandan genocide (Verdeja 37-54). The key perpetrator of the Rwandan massacres had not seen a serious court that would try the perpetrators of such grave crimes. United Nation’s response The United Nations established the United Nations Assistance Mission For Rwanda (UNAMIR) on 5th October 1993 to provide the security within Rwandan capital Kigali (Fischel 263-274). Other responsibilities of the UNAMIR included watching the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, including the setting up of peace in more regions of the country and dissuading both sides of the social composition from engaging in more violence. Further, the mission was meant to keep an eye on security issues in the run-up to the polls, under the care-take administration. UNAMIR also helped with the clearance of the mines; and contributing toward the implementation of humanitarian aid programs under relief organizations. Although, the United Nations authorized the participation of 2,500 security officers, it took about six months to fully implement the program (Power 84-108). Why the UN had to act According to Fischel (263-267), the UN peace mission was headed by Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, a Cameroonian, and was assisted by Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire. The Canadian citizen was the commander of the force. About 10 percent of the soldiers, who took part in the initial stages of the mission, were Belgian. The reason for such a thin force from the former colonial power in Rwanda, explain the UN tradition: the global organization bars former colonial rulers from taking part in such a peace mission. In light of the “conflict of interest,” other countries without any historical colonial links such as Canada, Bangladesh, Tunisia, and Ghana were asked to step in (Fischel 263-274). During the second half of 1993, both warring sides of the conflict showed signs of commitment to implementing to the provisions of the Arusha Accords. The parties also reiterated such dedication to establishing a new, inclusive provisional administration by early 1994; perhaps, due to the grave loss of life and property that they suffered within a short period of time (Gold et al 50). According to Power (84-108) political intrigues between parties with vested interests caused the delay of the UN mission of helping with the establishment of the care-take government after the installation of President Habyarimana on early 1994. The resulting grave clashes, including the planned killing of two key political players and the hostilities that the UNAMIR faced on the ground impacted the UNAMIR troops to take cover and participate in a defensive way (Gold et al 50). The United Nations, nonetheless, played out a significant role in the conflict by aiding the government troops and civilian leadership in Rwanda, while piling more pressure on the newly installed president and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) to adopt the provisions envisaged in the Arusha Accord (Fischel 263-274). The need to ensure that the country returned to normalcy inspired the UN to approve the extension the scope of UNAMIR, in April 1994, by three months (Sadat 543-562). Gold et al (50) indicate the organization believed the extension would speed up the setting up of the inclusive care-taker administration and legislature and bolster the security situation in the society, especially in Kigali to any new cases of violence Why the UN failed The UNAMIR program was not effective because its activities were hindered from the very beginning by the refusal from several UN Security Council member countries, who could not stomach the involvement of the UN, either to oversee the implementation of both the agreements reached in Arusha and to deter or neutralize the genocidal acts. Only the colonial power had requested for a more proactive role of the United Nations through UNAMIR (Fischel 263-274). Nevertheless, after the execution of a about a dozen Belgian troops, most of whom were charged with the duty of offering security to the key government officials in early April, and the inaction of the UN Security Council to intervene, led the former colonial power to withdraw from UNAMIR. Just prior to the beginning of the massacres in April 1994, the United Nations and to the United States received adequate information on the planned genocide targeted at the Tutsis, who was in the offing (Power 84-108). The fax sent by a leading Hutu member offered the exhaustive details regarding those who would be on the receiving end, what would be used to carry out the massacres, and how the harrowing acts would be executed. The details were ignored, perhaps on grounds that the term “genocide” had not been used commonly by then, in the UN sanctums (Fischel 263-274). Further, the troops under the UN aegis were deployed, but operated under specific orders not to meddle unless they came under attack from the locals (Fischel 268-271). The soldiers were expected to act in the best way possible to bring to an end the violence; nonetheless, it was the duty of the organization in charge of security to sanction the use of force. The member states under the United Nations failed to act on the violent acts, which were spreading across the society like a bushfire. In the wake of the worsening catastrophe for Tutsis, the UN instructed Lt. General Roméo Dallaire to channel the efforts of his troops to securing a safer passage of foreign nationals back to their countries of origin. Following the alteration of the UNAMIR mandate, Belgian soldiers serving under the UN were forced to leave thousands of Tutsi refugees to their own devices (Power 84-108). Hutu militants, who were waiting outside, in bated breaths pounced on the hapless civilians and killed all of them, including children due to the lack of co-ordination within the UN circles, perhaps due to the lack of vested interests among the international community. How the UN can act to stop genocide The United Nations can be more pro-active in the war against genocide-related crimes. For instance, as social instability in Darfur, degenerated into genocidal-related crimes, there was a growing harmony on the significance a more active role for regional and international organizations. The wider role of the African Union (AU) peacekeeping efforts and a more prominent input of the international community to sustain the AU efforts both financially and technically to safeguard the welfare of Darfur survivors could go a long way to mitigate genocide in the region (Barta, Finzsch, and Stannard 111-133). The UN, by virtue of being a global entity is the most effective organization that can midwife any intervention. This can only be achieved through a wider role of the key global players such as the United States contribution to the reorganization of the AU mission into a more effective force that can limit the increasing cases of genocide-related crimes in the region. Based on the history of the Northern African countries such as Sudan, such an act by the international organization in support of the African Union is a proven intervention measure that can offer important assistance to the AU efforts and guarantee Darfur residents the needed security (Afflitto 77-97). In this statement, Africa Action addresses the feasibility of such a UN intervention in Darfur. Although, the United Nations is working hard to ensure that the perpetrators of the Darfur genocide-like crimes are brought to book at the international corridors of justice such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), key suspects indicted for the crimes such a the Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir is still walking free, and enjoys the protection of the offices they hold in the government. The African Union has been reluctant to arrest and surrender Bashir before the Court. This calls for a more active role of the UN in convincing the AU to act tough on the suspect, by demonstrating a readiness to mitigate the security situation in the country in the event his arrest causes some ripple effects. Conclusion Generally, the although, the 1994 Rwandan genocide was preventable or at least controllable, the harrowing acts were never officially acknowledged or treated with the gravity it deserved, by the international community, especially the United Nations. Several aspects, including recognition of the term “genocide,” sovereignty, and unity of the UN member countries, might have impacted inaction. These factors should be handled more effectively to guarantee the country and the general world peace and stability. Even though UNAMIR troops were in Rwanda to oversee the implementation of the new Tutsi vs. Hutu agreement, and despite a Hutu informant offering damning details to the international community that a precise goal of the Hutu soldiers was to eliminate their Tutsis, the UN troops had their hands tied, impacting the killing of almost 1,000,000 people. The United Nations has, however, learned several lessons from the genocide and as a result made numerous amends: the organization has established international mechanisms to enable it read early warning signs; take opportune steps to avoid escalation of violence; and institute the trial of key perpetrators of internal crimes both locally and internationally. Works Cited Afflitto, Frank M. Victimization, survival and the impunity of forced exile: A case study from the Rwandan genocide. Crime, Law & Social Change, 34.1 (2000): 77-97. Barta, Tony, Finzsch, Norbert, and Stannard, David. Three Responses to Can There Be Genocide Without the Intent to Commit Genocide? Journal of Genocide Research, 10.1 (2008): 111-133. Dadrian, Vahakn N. Patterns of twentieth century genocides: the Armenian, Jewish, and Rwandan cases. Journal of Genocide Research, 6.4 (2004): 487-522. Dicklitch, Susan, and Malik, Aditi. Justice, Human Rights, and Reconciliation in Postconflict Cambodia. Human Rights Review, 11.4 (2010): 515-530. Fischel, Jack R. Genocide in Rwanda. Virginia Quarterly Review, 82.1 (2006): 263-274. Gold et al. Eyewitness to Genocide (Book). Publishers Weekly, 249.8 (2002): 50. Power, Samantha. Bystanders to Genocide. Atlantic Monthly, 288.2 (2001): 84-108. Sadat, Leila. Transjudicial Dialogue and the Rwandan Genocide: Aspects of Antagonism and Complementarity. Leiden Journal of International Law22.3(2009): 543-562. Verdeja, Ernesto. On genocide: five contributing factors. Contemporary Politics, 8.1 (2002): 37- 54. Read More