The Unsuccessful Attempt to Build Political Union After the Second World War - Research Paper Example

Introduction The most thriving feature of the integration of post-war Europe, a force that endows it with legitimate advantage and power worldwide, which through its commercial influence and appeal attaches to the European Union (EU) almost all European countries which are outside of its membership, is the single market (Milward, 2005). However, even though the EU is powerful in economic terms, it is not a single nation. Even though there are no taxes in the single market, there are still other regulations and barriers of different forms on global trade. Agricultural trade inside and outside the EU is still, particularly, strictly controlled by the policies of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Because the Treaty of Rome mandates that it is the European Commission (EC) which should carry out trade negotiations with other countries, the EU almost became one nation, at least on the surface, in global trade than in any other features of its operations (Milward, 2005, p. 1-2). Nevertheless, the truth is that its constituent states directly oversee any decision or steps on the part of the trade negotiators of the EU. In the political domain, on the contrary, the EU has merely a momentary and seldom integrated global presence. It is often unsuccessful in pulling off agreement on shared foreign policy goals. It cannot independently safeguard its constituent states if they are threatened or assailed by a more powerful entity, because it only has an autonomous national army to summon (Schiek, 2012). Those countries which became members of the EU in 2004 may frequently oppose these components of a shared foreign policy. Beyond the commercial domain other features of economic policy are still generally conflict-ridden (Milward, 2005, p. 2). It is a fact that the EU has been successful in establishing political guidelines for new members, largely to make sure that democratic regime survives, even though a number of older members refuse to implement these rather rigidly to themselves. The people of the EU of 15 states as of 2003 view however its political system as remote from them, difficult to understand, and poorly democratic (Milward, 2005, p. 2). The citizens of member-states, when asked, differ between conveying a fragile commitment to the EU and expressing a considerable extent of aversion towards it. Basically, economic integration usually fulfils political goals. Europe is a perfect example. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC) have been established for political purposes. The eastern expansion of the EU is the outcome of a political reversal of the states aspiring to become members of the EU. The collapse of the communist regime allowed, and pushed, the states involved to modify their economic and political structure completely (Cini, 2007). Integration into the European Union was appealing not merely due to market access, but also due to financial assistance and investments from the EU. More significantly, integration is associated with free enterprise, economic liberalisation, human rights, and democratic structures (Cini, 2007). The currently founded Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) represents the greatest development in the economic integration process in Europe. This is a landmark and will, simultaneously, be a channel for political integration. Europe as a model was consistently a political agenda motivated by political choices and objectives (Milward, 2005). Yet, after initial obstacles on the political sphere, the attention shifted to economic issues. In the end, economic integration has triumphed in strengthening the unity among European states and has therefore also realised its broader political objective. Given the above considerations, this essay tries to answer the question, to what extent is the European Union economically and politically integrated? An analysis of the historical development of the political and economic integration of the EU is undertaken in order to determine the growth, or, possibly decline, of the processes of the political and economic integration of the EU. The historical analysis starts from the end of the Second World War. By tracing the history of EU’s integration efforts, it would be possible to determine the extent of EU’s political and economic integration. The analysis takes into consideration the implication of the establishment of the different instruments of the EU, like the ECSC, EEC, and EMU, for the intensity of the political and economic integration of the EU. History of the Political and Economic Integration of the EU The European Union traces its beginnings in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), founded by the Treaty of Paris on the 18th of April 1951 (Thody, 1997, p. 1). The direct political objective of the ECSC was to prevent the threat of future disagreement between Germany and France by connecting the two core components in their economies, the generation of coal and the production of steel. The paramount way to prevent conflict, it was proposed, was to bind the economies of the France and Germany strongly that it would become very difficult for them to wrestle each other (Thody, 1997, pp. 1-2). This first political objective has been fully realised. Moreover, the ECSC was also triumphant in its direct economic goals. It granted France access to the abundant coal reserves of the Ruhr, and terminated the dual pricing structure. It abolished every customs barrier to the trade of steel and coal among the six trading states (Thody, 1997, p. 2). What was more directly significant, within the perspective of the wide-ranging transition towards the integration of Europe which has been a distinguishing attribute of the past five decades, was the framework provided by the ECSC, and how it allowed other issues to be, if not resolved, at least prevented. In the political arena, it was to build the foundation for the 1958 European Economic Community (EEC), with the individual countries consenting to entrust the supervision of major sectors of what had earlier been regarded as their national economy in line with Directives laid out by a supranational entity, the High Authority (Svendsen, 2003). This body had the power to determine production levels and prices, and created positive circumstances which allowed, for instance, the coal industry of Belgium to be financially supported by Holland and Germany, and Italy to have the right to use coal from French North Africa. Furthermore, the formation of the ECSC prevented another source of global conflict by allowing the Saarland to be incorporated into an integrated European process for the manufacturing of steel and production of coal (Thody, 1997, pp. 2-3). Basically, the history of the EU is a history of expansion. As stated in the European treaties, all European states have the right to become members of the EU. The first expansion took place in 1973 when Ireland, Denmark, and Great Britain became members of the European Community (EC) (Woyke, 2002, p. 27). The effort of Britain to create a competing association, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), had been unsuccessful. Greece became EC’s 10th member in 1981. Five years afterwards, Portugal and Spain, after finally deposing their authoritarian system, joined the Community in 1986. There are uncertainties whether the admission of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to the EU can be regarded another expansion (Woyke, 2002, p. 27). However, the actual fourth expansion took place in 1995 when Sweden, Finland, and Austria joined the European Union, an organisation which deviated from the EC (Schiek, 2012). Yet, expansion has continued. Thus, the fifth expansion of the EU is a mere continuation. However, in comparison to the previous expansions there are major disparities this time. The expansion of the EU to include the Central and Eastern European States (CEES) is considerably exceptional. These states have little or no familiarity with the democratic system. These states were not incorporated into Western economic structure (Schiek, 2012; Woyke, 2002). According to Dinan (2000 as cited in Woyke, 2002, p. 27): By contrast, all ten Central and Eastern European applicants are economically far worse off than even the poorest EU member state, and all are fledgling democracies. All had been cut off from Western Europe either by incorporation into the Soviet Union (i.e., Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) or by Soviet occupation and domination. The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union therefore presented a historic opportunity to reintegrate into Europe culturally, politically, and economically. EU enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe is an important part of that process. The newly formed Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) distinguishes an ultimate move towards the course of economic and political integration in Europe. This is a highlight and will, simultaneously, be a medium for some sort of political integration. Primarily, the launching of the euro will expose the institutional agreements of the present 12 member-states to numerous recent investigations (Barens, Caspari, & Schefold, 2004, p. 37). Furthermore, political entities are setting up for the expansion of the EU, with several countries hoping to accede. Thus, the near future will not be a mere extension of present developments. The Current Status of the Political and Economic Integration of the EU The post-war era was characterised by a need for political compromise. The first actual move towards integration was the establishment of the ECSC in 1952. Its core agency, the High Authority, was basically supranational. It pushed the Europeanisation of the manufacturing of steel and generation of coal, which had formerly created the justification for conflict (Barens et al., 2004, p. 38). This was essentially a political venture that was immediately followed by a planned Treaty on the Establishment of the European Defence Community among the ECSC’s six member states. Nevertheless, in 1954the French National Assembly refused to endorse the treaty. This resulted in the discontinuing of plans to form a European Political Community and in the dumping of the plan to form a European Union designed mainly as a political body (Barens et al., 2004, p. 38). The relationship between economic and political integration, or, between the market and the state, is interesting, but also complicated, and has numerous repercussions. Europe as a model was consistently, essentially, a political venture motivated by political actions and choices. Yet, after early hindrances on the political arena, the emphasis fell back on economic, and afterwards on currency issues. After the Second World War, the ‘forefront’ was seized by economic integration (Svendsen, 2003). Eventually, economic integration has triumphed in uniting European states and has thus attained its broader political objective. The greater level of economic relationship has consequently validated the move towards monetary integration based on two rationales: to sustain the accomplishments of economic integration and to initiate more developments in this regard. At this time, with EMU in force for several years now, matters of political integration are gradually returning to the scene (Woyke, 2002). The economic integration process that began in 1957 with the proposal for the customs union has progressed through different stages. After the enforcement of the 1986 Single European Act and the 1992 Single Internal Market Directive, this process is presently approaching near completion (Barens et al., 2004, p. 41). European states have succeeded in abolishing non-tariff and tariff blockades between member states. The accomplishment of this economic integration is manifested, among other things, in the following: (1) the steady expansion from the initial six member states of the European Economic Community (EEC) to the present 15 member states of the EU, and the numerous petitions to become members; (2) substantial and growing foreign direct investment between European states; and (3) the increased level of interdependence of European states (Barens et al., 2004, p. 41; Chryssochoou et al., 2003). In other words, the common market is currently existent and it can be safely assumed that the economic integration has advanced tremendously. All member-states of the EU are currently more mutually supporting than in earlier years, and everyone is involved in the development of its associates. Within these conditions, excesses from national policies may be important and the instability of the currency could weaken the financial strength of the entire region and impede investment and trade within the EU (Asselborn, 2006). The 1992 crisis is an example. It involved a major adjustment in real and nominal rates of exchange, a fluctuation in prices within the EU and had enormous implications for intra-European trade processes. Thorough liberalisation of capital following potentially new economic and monetary policies, alongside the European Monetary System’s (EMS) exchange rate mechanism (ERM) would consistently expose its member states to the threat of 1992 (Milward, 2005, pp. 5-6). In this context, opposition to free trade and a threat to the current situation per se, such as the recognised norms of integration, would be likely. In this regard, the common currency expresses a need to reinforce and protect the level of economic integration attained up till now and can also viewed as a protection against possible crises. With the absence of a common currency, the accomplishments and expansion of the common market could be threatened (Bonefeld, 2002; Mirow, 2009). Then again, the transition to Monetary Union is not just self-protective but also aimed at expansion as it is linked to, in certain instances, important prospects of stronger political integration. Monetary Union in Europe began on January 1, 1999 with eleven EU member states and another state entered in 2001. The common currency furnishes the common market and, with a common currency for nearly 300 million individuals, enhances the efficacy of the use of currency in an exceptional way (Barens et al., 2004, p. 42). Monetary integration in Europe is hoped to protect and strengthen the survival of economic integration. Simultaneously, Monetary Union has a political feature, as well. Monetary Union on this wide range, with a single currency among twelve independent states is, historically, an unparalleled episode. It involves handing over the power over national monetary policymaking to the European Central Bank (ECB), a supranational body (Milward, 2005; Barens et al., 2004). This measure characterises a major adjustment in the institutional system of the member states. The launching of the common currency has facilitated the finalisation of the common market. And, giving up control in such an integral sector as monetary policy and handing it over to a supranational body is advancement towards the formation of ‘European statehood’ (Western Mail, 2011). This handing over of control reflects a union of political determination and reveals that members of EMU have attained a high level of agreement in terms of monetary policy objectives and approaches. The political aspect of Monetary Union was acknowledged in the Maastricht Treaty or, also referred to as the Treaty on European Union. The Maastricht Treaty emphasises the resolve “to mark a new stage in the process of European integration undertaken with the establishment of European Communities” (Bubholz, 2007, p. 2). For the moment, the launching of the common currency is situated between the member states’ integrating economies and the state components which they already have in common. The common currency merges economic components with political aspects. It was a political move to form a monetary union for a cluster of states which did not create a political union (Eger & Schafer, 2012). Hence, ultimately, the influence of monetary union on Europe must be a subject matter in both the economic and political areas. The Maastricht Treaty, with the introduction of monetary union, has built a distinctive, historical imbalance. A national European monetary system, on the one hand, is in existence, and still there are largely national dominions in other areas. Efforts to encourage political integration after the Second World War were directly halted (Schiek, 2012). This reveals the complexity of integrating Europe by consolidating different countries with their distinctive political structures, cultures, and histories. Considering the position of political integration today, there are roughly three corresponding aspects whereby Europe has succeeded. The first aspect is that EU member-states are by now having mutual policy measures in the European setting. This mechanism of chiefly practical political integration at the inter-governmental arena is destined to intensify sooner or later, as the administrative and legal paradigm will be synchronised further. Moreover, although EU member states have the power over national financial matters, these are subjected to multilateral scrutiny and the Stability and Growth Pact (Barens et al., 2004, p. 45). The second aspect is that EU member states have by now handed over zones of national dominion to the supranational arena. This involves autonomy over exchange and monetary rate policies, but the structure for microeconomic policies has already been greatly consolidated in the sector of trade policies, competition, and Single Market (Eger & Schafer, 2012). The third aspect is that in every state several of the major established roles of state are gradually evolving under different forces. The force of globalisation, the intensification of economic interdependence, and the expanding sphere of modernisation and knowledge are currently influencing economic independence and national culture and identity. Thus, the EU member states already have in common several components of state structure. However, there are integral areas in the political domain which are indirectly associated with monetary integration, like a shared foreign policy (Chryssochoou et al., 2003). Thus, as EMU will have implications for the political system, there is also an intra-European political structure. It may not be suitable entirely to regard political integration for the European region in established, historical forms. The process must be kept open, for potential developments, and also for rectifying errors. Furthermore, it should not be thought that process of reform should not end otherwise it will collapse, and push into new legal agreements. Particularly, there are a number of dangers, or political alternatives that the EU cannot handle and should prevent. Most vital are the ill-advised demand for a rigidly controlled European welfare state, also called a ‘social union’ (Barens et al., 2004, p. 50; Milward, 2005). This form of political union would impede the elasticity of wages and prices that every state must follow for EMU to thrive. At present there is a monetary and economic condition in Europe that is rooted in a definite assembly of policies and based on solid market-oriented rules. They are producing net gains for every member state (Cini, 2007). This monetary and economic condition in Europe should be cultivated, identify the signs that the markets and the economy are conveying, analyse them and carry out all the changes required for Europe to flourish. Whilst a great deal of attention has been paid to improving political integration, the assumption is also surfacing that, politically, Europe may by now be much nearer to a stable nation than is usually believed (Cini, 2007; Eger & Schafer, 2012). Viewed from this standpoint, the present status of political integration simply’ has to be finalised with highly developed constitutional transparency and practical mechanisms. Conclusions If one is to examine the history of Europe and, especially, following the unsuccessful attempt to build political union after the Second World War, the present situations are a remarkable accomplishment. There is presently a considerable level of economic integration, several elements of political integration, and an operational monetary union. The euro is a major accomplishment. It has the definite capability to speed up development and changes in several more domains. As regards political integration, practical, measured development is the best strategy. Europe should not hustle into any established framework of political union. The likelihood of achievement for EMU currently depends largely on the capacity of every state to carry out its own changes. This idea should restore the confidence of not just the markets and economies, but also the people of Europe. References Asselborn, J. 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(2012) Economic and Social Integration: The Challenge for EU Constitutional Law. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Svendsen, G. (2003) The Political Economy of the European Union: Institutions, Policy and Economic Growth. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Thody, P. (1997) An Historical Introduction to the European Union. London: Routledge. Western Mail (2011) ‘Is History Repeating itself as EU Wrestles with Closer Integration? There will be no New European Union Treaty in the New Year Thanks to David Cameron’s Refusal to commit to a New Deal. However, as Thomas Pascoe Writes, the Progression towards Ever Closer Union has Seldom Relied on Treaties Alone’, Western Mail, 21. Woyke, W. (2002) ‘European Union Enlargement—Consequences and Problems’, German Policy Studies 2(1), p. 27. Read More