Understanding Middle Eastern Politics and Global Hegemony - Essay Example

?Running Head: International Relations of the Middle East Understanding Middle Eastern Politics and Global Hegemony An Essay of Professor Date of Submission 1956 Suez Crisis Scholarly works on the foreign policy of the United States and Great Britain throughout the 1956 Suez Crisis supported by the realist theory has shifted their interest to a multitude of political explanations of American and British policy throughout the Suez crisis. According to Guzzini (1998), these realist accounts try to give an explanation of the unsuccessful attempt to bolster the objectives of British foreign policy through the use of force, as well as: weaknesses of the British institutional system; an ill-advised focus on defending the British honor in the region; unsuccessful attempt to appropriately understand American objectives and misunderstanding of the Anglo-American affiliation; Prime Minister Eden’s absence of certainty and resolve; and the unsuccessful attempt to appreciate the importance of Nasser’s decisions within the perspective of regional politics in the Middle East vis-a-vis its presumed effect on British authority and control in the region. Likewise, there have been realist accounts of the foreign policy of the United States throughout the Suez crisis. International law, in most of these accounts, is totally missing from the analysis of political aspects of American foreign policy throughout the Suez crisis. The move of the United States to go against Britain is justified completely in terms of the Cold War intentions of the United States to control the U.S.S.R. (Soviet Union) in the Middle East (Verbeek, 2003). Henry Kissinger introduced a representation of a realist interpretation of international law, and condemned American policy throughout the Suez crisis for trusting in “the notion that international relations could be exhaustively defined by international law [and]… unaffected by national interests or geopolitics or alliances” (Withana, 2008, 155). He gave a description of international law as an independent, practically inclusive set of principles different from the process of power politics, and favored the disapproval of a rule which seemed to prioritize law over forceful concerns for national interest (Withana, 2008). This perspective, according to Verbeek (2003), is strengthened by a traditional realist framework which integrates the positivist handbook reflection of international law and hence believes that international law is either at best simply a rationale for decision made based on interests in power politics or immaterial to concerns for national interest. Existing literature reviews show evidently the meagerness of scholarly attempts to explain the Suez crisis within the context of realist theory. The realist argument that law was quite irrelevant to either American or British foreign policy, outside its ability to give explanation for foreign policy, seems to neglect the historical proof that suggests international law had a greater significant effect on British and American foreign policy conduct (Fawcett, 2009). The realist argument that international law was either an easy alibi for policy motives or lacking relevance, as regards to British policy, seems to be flawed. Historical documents indicate that legal concerns were a major component considered by both American and British legislators in the development and execution of foreign policy throughout the Suez crisis (Fawcett, 2009). Realist theory, according to Hansen (2011), with its focus on actual exercises and demonstrations of power, would expect that if ever international law could consider the conduct of the State it would be to defend course of action where law reinforced the favored policy. If the State is somewhat less dominant or influential and in a ‘lower’ legal status, in the sense that its favored course of action would more simply be judged ‘unlawful’, realism would expect that law would become irrelevant to the policymaking process (Mattern, 2005). Realism would expect that international law would become immaterial to a State where law and policy objectives conflict, and particularly in cases where the State is rivaling a quite stronger State and law is not an expression of ‘actual power’ as defined by realism. However, realist theory does not have the capacity to give explanation of the role of law in the conduct of a State that was somewhat ‘weaker’ and more easily judged ‘unlawful’ than the ‘stronger’ State, just like the situation of Britain in relation to the United States throughout the Suez crisis (Verbeek, 2003). Studies on American foreign policy conduct throughout the Suez crisis underlines as well the deficiency of realist interpretations of American foreign policy throughout the Suez crisis. As stated by Withana (2008), realist accounts presuppose that, to the point law could include the conduct of the State, law conforms to policy development: policy heralds legal issues. From past accounts it would seem that scholarly analyses of the Suez crisis have presented an inadequate explanation of the effect of international law on American and British foreign policy throughout the Suez crisis. Past accounts would appear to suggest a much more complicated scenario, where in international law did integrate firmly into British and American policymaking and international relations was an integral political process by which both American and British foreign policy goals were performed throughout the crisis (Hansen, 2011). This narrative, which has not been evident in current analyses of the Suez crisis, can be mainly ascribed to the theoretical supports of such analyses exposing the deficiency of realist interpretations of the connection between the conduct of the State and international law. In the meantime, with regard to international structure, there are, as expected, other ideas about where conducts and views of diplomacy could have emerged at some point in the Suez Crisis. In general there are two forms (Kanet, 1998): (1) institutional analyses that put emphasis on the function of common-interest-based agencies in organizing behavioral rewards and punishments; and (2) alliance analyses that put emphasis on the actual power distribution in the international structure. While the latter gives explanation of the actions and assumptions of the states with regard to material power politics, the former elaborates them with regard to common good. In so far as either accurately interprets American diplomatic approach toward its friends throughout the Suez crisis, the importance of taking into consideration identity in any way in analyzing international order is hindered (Mattern, 2005). Thus, if any of these traditional explanations were capable of deciphering the Suez enigma, then debates over the origins of international order will cease. However, none of such nonidentity options is fruitful. Strangely, neither is capable of giving explanation for that determined diplomatic order without invoking ‘we-ness’ (Mattern, 2005, 63). Both explanations, specifically, relies on identity to explain the diplomatic conduct of the United States. Explanations of diplomacy based on ‘alliance’ start with the arguments of neo-Realism about the value of material power distribution in international relations. Due to the persistently aggressive lawlessness, nations should persevere to balance power against outside intimidations by building alliances (Fry, Goldstein, & Langhorne, 2004). However, obviously, the Suez Crisis enigma is exactly that this is not what took place. The order continued peacefully; there was no threat of military force. In reaction to this, other thinkers in favor of the alliance account of diplomacy have been persistent in their advice that power distribution is what determines the importance of alliance. A prevailing outside threat would obviously defeat the aspiration of the United States to educate its ‘weaker’ allies through military bravado (Withana, 2008). Therefore, within this perspective, the international system’s bipolarity throughout the Cold War situation was ruthless. A well-built Western pact was crucial for successful balancing in order to discourage the United States from isolating its allies by intimidation or military threats. According to Mattern (2005), the neo-Realist theory depends on the prevailing need brought about by material power distribution: an alliance of Western powers was necessary. The global setting where in the Suez crisis took place was exemplified by transformation or change. Internationally, the world had become more and more bipolar during the 1950s. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S., each governing an alliance, were the enemies of each other. The development of a global bipolar system had occurred without regard for long-established hegemonies like Great Britain (Verbeek, 2003). Concurrently, the world had seen the development of nationalism in poor countries and a consequent boost in key decolonization efforts, as well as in the Middle East. Neo-realist views of international politics definitely explain the consequences of the crisis. They find it difficult to explain the reason Great Britain decided to take part in the war (Ham, 2010). According to Quandt (2001), neo-Realism considers the likelihood that states become victim of inaccuracy and misunderstanding, which may explain their lack of ability to evaluate correctly power distribution and the risks involved. On the other hand, the constructivist paradigm in international relations highlights the development of international standards and their effect on States’ conduct. Constructivism claim that states are not stimulated wholly by the repercussions of global anarchy, but could also formulate and value certain guidelines (Fawcett, 2009). Using this paradigm, according to Fry and colleagues (2004), some scholars argue that American and British policies over Suez as an outcome of the failure of Great Britain to conform to the standards formed among allies to sustain open communication between them. Effect of the Cold War on Middle Eastern Politics Generally, Middle Eastern politics is more than a mere outcome of the Cold War; it is more an outcome of the legacies that powerful European nations bestowed upon the region. One of these legacies has been to help establish a network of independent nations. This legacy has created a sense of solidarity, belongingness, and mutuality (Amineh, 2007). Hence, generally, this established, continuously strengthened, prevailing particular cultural circle in the Middle East has endowed it with a unique identity. Nonetheless, European heritage organized Middle Eastern politics into efficient parts within which a ‘transformed’ political institution surfaced from the chaos caused by the departure of the Ottoman Empire (Halliday, 2005). Even though the legacy of powerful European countries influenced the core and specific foundations of Middle Eastern politics, the Cold War, in contrast, had more influenced on the limitations, behavior, and approach within which the politics of the region developed (Khalidi, 2009). Concurrently, according to Halliday (2005), it has to be understood that the Cold War in the Middle East had a dividing influence on the nations of Greater Middle East (GME) and promoted the growth of military-oriented nations. Without a doubt, matters quite apart from the Cold War affected the economic and political growth of the Middle East, such as “oil resources and the need of Western powers to secure access them, the Israeli Palestinian conflict, and the growth of political Islam” (Kanet, 1998, 26). Such events were merely a portion of a steady change in the balance of power in the Middle East. As stated by Fred Halliday (2005 as cited in Amineh, 2007), there are key factors that aided the United States in becoming Middle East’s most powerful player (Amineh, 2007): Firstly, the establishment during and after the Second World War of police and military links with some states, initially Iran and then Turkey; secondly, a rising US interest in what was now the major economic prize in the region, oil; thirdly, the growth, slowly formed if decisive at first and later much more comprehensive, of an especially close relationship between the US and Israel; fourthly, a strategic concern with the newly influential and potentially ‘forward’ Soviet Union (p. 34). According to Barrett (2007), when these factors are combined they will establish the ground for what was to turn out to be the foundation of international politics in the Middle East throughout the subsequent major stage of international politics that existed from the 1940s to the 1980s. Meanwhile, it is certain that ideology served a major function in the competition of the Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East. By the finale of the Second World War, the entire North Africa and Middle East remained under a particular kind of Italian, French, or British imperial authority. At that juncture, the Soviet Union and the United States may proclaim that they had no experience with colonial power (Shalom, 1993). The United States introduced itself as the head of the ‘free world’ against Communism, helping nations that were having difficulties transitioning to a ‘free society’. On the contrary, the Soviet Union introduced itself as an advocate of a fair, just, and independent society where in class hierarchies were removed. Both ideas had their critics and advocates in the Middle East (Khalidi, 2009). As further argued by Khalidi (2009), with the exception of the disorders in Kurdistan, Iranian Azerbaijan, and Greece, the Middle East was not a key stadium of Cold War clash in the initial post-war period. The United States was extremely vigorous in structuring the ‘free world’ via the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The new international politics that has surfaced in the post-Cold War period is exemplified by international economic tripolarity and unipolar military control (Shlaim, 2001). The Anglo-Saxon battle against Iraq has granted the United States the opportunity to build a strong and durable military power in the GME (Amineh, 2007). If it is triumphant, according to Halliday (2005), a permanent American military power in the Middle East will allow American ventures and non-government organizations (NGOs) to seize a strong grip of the region, which could motivate the United States to influence its other nations and determine provisions for external access to the valuable resources (e.g. gas, oil) of the Middle East. The book Sowing Crisis: American Dominance and the Cold War in the Middle East by Rashid Khalidi (2009) addresses the concerns that emerged from outside incursion in the region. According to him, the Middle East was of interest to the United States and the Soviet Union because of its strategic position and rich energy assets. The arguments of Khalidi put emphasis on the historic stability of American policy in the region. Furthermore, there has been an extension “of many policies that were supposedly predicated on a powerful Soviet influence in the region” (Ham, 2010, 40). After the downfall of the U.S.S.R., the reestablishment of the Middle East sealed the gap left by Communism. According to Quandt (2001), the United States initiated another ideological undertaking in the region by forming an ‘evil other’ in the minds of the people. In their effort toward global hegemony, both the U.S.S.R. and the United States took part in battles by replacement in the Middle East. Khalidi claimed, the “small actors generally came out much worse from the superpower confrontation” (Hansen, 2011, 45). Regionalism emerged during the 1960’s and 1970’s Arab-Israeli wars. In the war between Iran and Iraq in 1980, the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union each provided both countries with armed assistance (Barrett, 2007). Marginalized people and/or groups were frequently harmed when the great powers disturb the current system of power relations in the region. Because of this, the strategic requirements of the Cold War discouraged all attempts to set up democratizing initiatives in the Middle East (Amineh, 2007). Hence, Henry Kissinger notably remarked that “covert action should not be confused with missionary work” (Shalom, 1993, 41). Ultimately, as argued by Khalidi (2009), the United States did not take part in the conflicts in the Middle East with any predetermined ideological plan, but instead sustained a strategy of ‘realpolitik’—diplomacy or politics rooted mainly in power and in concrete issues, rather than abstract aspects like ideologies—to achieve its world domination. Conclusions International relations are defined by the order of the global system. In the period immediately after the Cold War it is established by a solitary world dominion, the United States, and a more rapid and intense globalization, boosting technological and armed abilities and thus the capacity of nations to establish authority. This essay examined the appropriateness of the realist theory in interpreting the cause of and events in the 1956 Suez crisis. And as discussed, realist explanations of this historical event had been inadequate, until now. Therefore, particular emphasis has been given on the importance of the realist theory, as well as neo-Realism and constructivism in understanding the mechanisms and aspects guiding the unipolar realm of the post-Cold War period. References Amineh, M. (2007). The Greater Middle East in Global Politics: Social Science Perspectives on the Changing Geography of the World Politics. The Netherlands: BRILL. Barrett, R. (2007). The greater Middle East and the Cold War: US foreign policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy. London: I.B. Tauris. Fawcett, L. (2009). International Relations of the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fry, M., Goldstein, E., & Langhorne, R. (2004). Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy. 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Shalom, S. (1993). Imperial alibis: rationalizing U.S. intervention after the cold war. New York: South End Press. Shlaim, A. (2001). The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. New York: W.W. Norton. Verbeek, B. (2003). Decision-making in Great Britain during the Suez crisis: small groups and a persistent leader. England: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. Withana, R. (2008). Power, politics, law: international law and state behavior during international crises. The Netherlands: BRILL. Read More