The Effect of Energy Policies on the Russian Foreign Policy - Coursework Example

the Effect of Energy Policies on the Russian Foreign Policy As Russia’s economy has grown, so have the country’s global involvement and influence inglobal activities. Russia has become assertive latterly and the role of energy as a key factor in shaping the country’s behaviour in international relations cannot be understated. When the country’s economy was on a steady decline in the 1990s, the energy sector in the country helped revive any ambitions as well as transform Russia’s fortunes. The wealth that was generated during this era from energy exports helped spark an economic recovery and hence some form of political stabilization. This achievement has thus contributed greatly in its ability to influence political systems as well as foreign relations in both Eurasia and the globe as a whole. The continued development has however brought with it some worry especially in Europe and the United States. The gaining political weight continuing in the Russian republic has made many uneasy and there are several issues and concerns that come from it. What one needs to understand is that Russia’s position as an energy exporting nation makes it a power source that enhances its status in foreign negotiations. Despite possessing a fraction of America’s military prowess, the continued exploitation of energy resources has given it impetus to spend largely on improving their military base which makes it one of the best equipped countries in the world. As such, their veto power in the UN Security Council, influence across Eurasia, its disposable wealth and its natural resources, Russia plays a great role in the way international issues are run. Consequently, there are both internal and external factors that play a great role in shaping Russia’s reactions and interactions in foreign policies and diplomacies throughout the world. The purpose of this paper is to explore these two factors in detail and provide a comprehensive outlook on the foreign policy practiced by Russia given its energy sector revitalization. Internal Factors An outlook on the way a country is run and how it relates to its neighbours has to be based on an understanding that no state acts or behaves in a constantly rational way (Malcolm, 1996:12). Each country has priorities which shapes their policies. Therefore, different states will react differently when faced with external pressures. Some of the reactions may be sought in relation to the impact of bureaucratic politics and organizational processes. In Russia, there are certain internal factors that have played a great role in foreign policy hence domestically changing some of the attributes allowing for involvement in activities of international cognizance. Some of the factors that have played a major role have emanated from Gorbachev’s embracement of the new political thinking that has affected the social dimensions and the economic outlooks which have increased sharply ever since. The greatest internal determinant in the way Russia has behaved in relation to its foreign policies mainly rest on three key-dimensions of change in the post-Soviet Russian foreign policy. These are leadership and decision-making, values and interests. Leadership and decision-making Russia’s leaders seek to reclaim much of global power and influence they lost at the end of the cold war. When President Vladimir Putin called the collapse of the soviet as the greatest catastrophe of the century (kagan, 2008:28), everyone was in one accord in the Russian states. Though they did not yearn to return to the past, they yearned for revenge, for having been humiliated by the west; more so America and Europe. There was a growing concern amongst citizens of the power and grip lost by Russia after the cold war. They wanted to regain the dominance they had lost and the re-establish themselves as one of the greatest powers in the world. The dissolution in itself was occasioned by the fiasco of the Soviet foreign policy which invested in adventurous projects which mostly failed (the most famous being the Afghanistan project). The process of revival, which the elite are so much geared towards, has taken off and led the country to a new era through which its economic prowess has risen way above many of its competitors and its sovereignty recognized globally (Trenin, 2007:95). But it had to first take care of its leadership structures. After Putin took over from Yeltsin in late 1999, foreign investors believed that new opportunities would arise (Wilson & Torjesen, 2009:1). The arrests of top managers in several private companies such as Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky was seen as unwelcoming to foreign investors while the Putin administration was trying to put its house in order. With time, Putin made the oil issue a key election attribute, stripping off ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco and Rosneft the privilege of exploring a natural gas rig in Sakhalin, despite having been awarded tenders back in 1993. This could be meagrely defined as national foreign policy focused on bolstering its prestige, supporting economic growth and recovery and even more effectively demonstrating power to keep Russia secure and able to pursue its policy. Though observers had viewed the one-time pro-western leader as an opening door to foreign investment in Russia, and particular western powers, Putin was bent on creating a re-organized Russian oil and gas industry to enhance the power of the Russian state. Any activities or policies that other countries may have that may in one way or the other limit Russia’s influence are always found to be threatening (Trenin, 2007:95). Russian relations with the west formed most of Putin’s initial presidential bid and his first term was bent on creating a political and economic statement to all those who would wish to conduct business with Russia, especially in the oil industry. Only after the completion of the re-organization and the assurance of protected interests amongst the Russians would they reaffirm foreign involvement in Russian oil industry (Kagan, 2008: 30). It may be said that Putin is eagerly looking for opportunities of developing Russia’s economy with foreign policies being changed to accommodate these ambitious plans throughout the reign of Putin and those who share in his ideals (Wilson and Torjesen, 2009:2). It may be said that however, the creation of the position of an elected president has led to the new democracy within the Russian state. This has been as a result of new ideologies that have depoliticized the country and let the electorate get involved in manners beyond the borders. The internal transformation has led to new strengths that have led to greater involvement. This has made the foreign policies more purposeful and productive. The fact that the current regime has helped improve the economy makes it even easier to offer a bargaining position that other countries may lack or may have ignored before (Trenin, 2007:96). The new found wealth has enhanced decision-making strategies as they are able to use it as a way of influencing relations, especially in Western Europe and much of Asia. Its diplomacy has become increasingly relevant in the world affairs currently and its presidents have gained much importance to competitors such as the US and the UK. What Russians yearn for today is mainly a return to their former greatness and importance rather than integration. This is taking form, albeit at a slow but constant pace (Kagan, 2008: 29). Values: Better educated and younger liberal elites led to a new regime that sought to enshrine some of the western values into liberal attributes of the Russian population. As a matter of fact, the loosening control over the content of mass media in the country allowed for more people to voice their opinions further, the deepening social inequalities led to divisions and this created different attitudes amongst the young and older generations (Trenin, 2007:96). There were those who favoured an integrated economic upsurge that catered for all people across the divide while the old political remnants wanted the status quo maintained. But the growing economic certainties due to the growing economic attributes made it easier for the country to shelve its differences and pursue a common goal (Malcolm, 1996:14). As far as the wider public opinion was concerned, it was very difficult to discern the impact of the new found nationalistic rhetoric that had brought together people across different political divides. However, it is agreeable from all quarters that Putin is working hard to ensure all their interests and values are upheld by all those wishing to seek popular mandate. As far as the nation was concerned, Putin and his administration are looking for ways and means of imposing their guardianship over what they consider to be their property. They want to create more regulations, partial ownership of the energy sector by private individuals as well as maintain the primacy of the energy sector which is non-negotiable (Wilson and Torjesen, 2009:6). Furthermore, the volatile domestic political context plays a great role in ensuring the consistency of public opinion especially in regard to developments that take place in their neighbouring countries or areas of interests. National pride, territorial integrity and overriding emotions are always key components of the nation’s nationalism. Policy effects of shifts in public opinions will vary depending on a society and the inherent political situation (Trenin, 2007:97). The fact that soviet politicians are unaccustomed but committed (albeit nationally) to competitive elections means that they are willing to sensitively align their ideologies to national emotions and attitudes. This implies a direct relation towards their foreign policy and their involvement in all that takes place within the nation. Therefore, the energy policy created must reflect all the values that the political scene ascribes to in a bid to please not only the citizens but also maintain good relations with other countries. Interests: As Lord Palmerstone states, there are no permanent friends but permanent interests amongst nations, the same case applies to the Russian state. A nation’s perception of its interests is never fixed and changes in relation to power changes or political scenarios (kagan, 2008:29). Russian for instance has been driven by enhancing their influence amongst its traditional spheres of interests and reversing pro-western trends of the past decades. This has led to the creation of a new state and a new society that seeks to establish its influence through its economic interests and more so through its expansive energy sector. As trenin puts it, geopolitics plays a great role in shaping primary economic interests and more often than not, Russia has created foreign policies that are pegged at extracting profits while simultaneously expressing great power dimension (Trenin, 2007:96). Lately, oil and gas have replaced the previous nuclear and tanks that were so much prided in by the former Soviet Union. The high national revenue especially from resource exports has created the wrong impression not only for its own economy but also to political development and foreign policies. It has led to incentives that have blinded the domestic political calculations often encouraging them to wage virtual battles with foreign counterparts while aiming at primarily reaching the domestic audience. Government controlled television channels air these battles with an aim of creating extremist stances and representations (Malcolm, 1996:14). They want to maintain a clean image at home while portraying the rest of the world as unjustified enemies of the Great Russian Empire. They are opposed to NATO’s bid of enlisting the Baltic countries into the organization and oppose vehemently the placement of US missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic. As Krastev (2006) notes, the US may have declared the tumbling of the Soviet rule in 1981 and 1982. However, the recent reactions place the whole of Europe under Russia’s dependency and not the US. Poland for instance has had different regimes since 1981 and wishes to put the economic and policy interests of the EU against those of Russia. However, Russia is more aware of what the Europeans want to use against them and are well prepared. Given their reliance on oil and gas from Russia, it is now easier to control how policies are made within and without the EU (Krastev, 2006). To put a spanner into the whole European debacle, the entry of Russia into the group of eight has turned the organization from a club of western powers into a more representative mechanism. Its continued improvement in financial outcomes has placed it in a very interesting position due to its financial capability and its organizational input into the development of other democracies (Wilson and Torjesen, 2009:8). The continued exploitation of oil and natural gas has improved its revenues and as long as it maintains this trend, the country is more or less likely to be an influential partner in international affairs. Furthermore, it has interacted with several countries in the commonwealth of independent states (CIS) space and economic incentives have enabled Russia to maintain an upper hand in the region (Trenin, 2007:99). Most of those countries that were members of the Soviet Union have joined forces and are seeking for a way out in terms of economic incentives or grants. This has made Russia to take advantage of this and participate in shaping other countries while ensuring they entrench some of their policies in the main government agendas, hence promoting Russian ideologies albeit indirectly. External Factors The fact that Russia acts simultaneously as an oil producer, exporter, importer and consumer has led many scholars to believe in its greatest potential in affecting international policies. However, different organizations such as the EU, the World Trade Organization and other transient organizations have led to greater pressure while determining how to deal with each state diplomatically. Factors such as global politics and economy as well as developments at regional and bilateral levels have played a great role in shaping foreign policies in Russia. The dynamics of the energy market also play a key role and despite variations in Russia’s approaches within each of the geographical dimensions present globally such as the EU, Central Eurasia and North East Asia, policy determinants are based on common features between the trading partners. The European Union (EU) The internal regulations harboured by the Eu will directly influence how the policies are determined and how bilateral arrangements will be carried out. The relationship between the Eu and Russia shows a coordinated policy-making process that has the input of both parties and thus relies on their commitment for continuity. In fact, Russia is more than willing to abide by the rules of the EU and entrench EU’s market principles introduced in the Eu energy governance. It has also complied with the provisions of the EU’s third energy package, the action plan, institutional and regulatory novelties that were enacted in Lisbon Treaty’s adoption and retains the EU Energy dialogue framework (Wilson and Torjesen, 2009:15: Trenin, 2007:100). Though many view this as compliance to western bureaucracies, Russia approaches the whole ideology with an open mind. It seeks to capture the trust of the European nations and hence provide leverage in case the US seeks to use the European nations as an attacking base. In fact, its relations with Germany have opened up more ties which make Germany and Poland some of the tilting forces in case discord against Russia emerges within the EU. Through such policies, Russia can comfortably use the cooperation to increase its energy security, energy efficiency of the economy and the fuel energy complex’s efficiency and ecology of security. Ultimately, Russia’s energy relations with the EU will bear fruit as they are characterized by a strong symmetrical dependence of largest supplier and the largest consumer (Trenin, 2007:101). This is further intensified by each side’s dependence on the other for transit of the goods to other markets. This provides a multi-faceted pattern of relationship which helps in creating formidable relationships between the two and a dilution of past reactions and points of view that characterized the cold war (Kagan, 2008: 32). There developed some distrust between Russia and EU members as they chose sides against each other in the Russia-Belarus conflict, the Ukraine-Russian conflict and the Russian-Georgian war of 2008. These events shaped the expectations, ambitions and views, which were openly divergent, amongst the partners. It has also led to the creation of mini-groups that are both critical and cautious of Russia (composed mainly of former Soviet states such as Czech and Lithuania) (Kagan, 2008: 32), those that are critical but cooperate with Russia (such as Sweden, the UK, Bulgaria and Romania) and the loyal partners such as Germany, Italy and Ireland amongst others (Wilson and Torjesen, 2009:21). Russia is also non-committal on European unification while members of the EU are unable to confront Russia over its monopoly with each country wanting to protect its Russian investments while maintaining a closer relationship with Russia (Kagan, 2008:34). Central Eurasia The relations between the central Eurasian countries and Russia have undergone profound changes recently. The pattern of cooperation that was pursued throughout the post-Soviet period has led to some integration realities with new reflections being based on recent involvements between the countries and Russia (Wilson and Torjesen, 2009:22). A general customs union has been developed with the Eurasian Economic community coming to force to protect the business opportunities and ventures in the region. Nonetheless, there are certain roles that are playing in the region. Each entity wants to gain as much from the other as possible (Trenin, 2007:103). The overall trends of Central Eurasia’s foreign policies have been based on expanding the scale of their ties and modify them to reflect both the west and the east. In the energy realm, it implies an enlargement of their international cooperation policy and the consequent diversification of their oil and gas exports and imports. Russia is also trying to spoil any fortunes that countries like Russia could be eyeing in this region. It attempts to create a buffer zone through which it can ensure security both economically and militarily-wise. But central Eurasian countries are somewhat increasingly pursuing their own strategic goals both within the region and internationally (Wilson and Torjesen, 2009:24). They are slowly pushing away soviet era and post-soviet era economic systems and adopting new methods which favour domestic political developments and less reliance on Russia as their direct guard over central Eurasias natural resources. This forms a new problem and thus new ideologies over how to handle the foreign policies relating to this area. It is a crucial area since any other country that gets it could disadvantage Russias ability to create a sphere of influence in the region (Trenin, 2007:103). Emerging countries such as Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan in the area of natural gas and oil reserves respectively, have led to new considerations which could see Russia ousted from being the major supply of the two commodities in the region (Trenin, 2007:105). This implies that the tides may be changing and the Russians can no longer use its oil and gas economy as a way of dictating how policies will be formed. In fact, they may have to democratically get involved in decision-making rather than become the decision-maker during trade negotiations. Foreign policy is likely to follow suit since economic ties more often than not dictate how well one can interact with others (Wilson and Torjesen, 2009:25). Conclusion As such, the inclusion of the energy factor in its international policy making decisions has had some benefits and some downfalls as well. The current diversification in Europe seems to likely threaten their interaction and their relationship as a whole. Subsequently, the country is supposed to look for other ways of creating influence in Europe and Eurasia as well and also seek new avenues of relating to other countries rather than pick on economic incentives as a way of gaining favour. However, the continued democratization is seen as a great impetus towards sound policies and all the world can do at the moment is wait and see what results from their new strategies. References Kagan, R. (2008) "The rise of Russia", in The return of history and the end of dreams, Alfred A. Knopf, Toronto, Canada. Krastev, I. (December 21, 2006) Europes new Ostpolitik: a Polish echo, opendemocracy.net, viewed 21 Jun 2012 . Malcolm, N. (1996) Internal factors in Russian foreign policy, Oxford University Press, oxford, London. Trenin, D. (2007) ‘Russia Redefines Itself and Its Relations with the West’ The Washington Quarterly, 2, pp. 95-105 Wilson, R.E. & Torjesen, S. (Ed.) (2009) The multilateral dimension in Russian foreign policy, Routledge, New York, NY. Read More