The Diplomatic Role of Residual US Forces in Iraq - Research Paper Example

The Diplomatic Role of Residual US Forces in Iraq On February 27, 2009, President Barack Obama announced in a speech he made at a Marine Corps base, the withdrawal of most US troops in Iraq by the end of August 2010. He said the US combat mission in Iraq would officially end by that time. However, up to 50,000 of 142,000 troops now there will stay into 2011 to advise Iraqi forces and protect US interests, to leave only by the end of 2011. Democrats were concerned the timetable falls short of his election pledges on troop withdrawal that he would completely pull out troops within 16 months of taking the top job. Mr. Obama explained, "Iraq is not yet secure, and there will be difficult days ahead” (“Obama outlines Iraq pullout plan” BBC.co.uk). Starting last August 31, 2010, Iraqi security forces have had full responsibility for major combat missions while the mission of US forces in Iraq have fundamentally changed into implementing three tasks: 1) training, equipping, and advising the Iraqi security forces; 2) conducting counterterrorism operations; and 3) providing protection for military and civilian personnel. Under the Status of Forces Agreement all US troops will leave Iraq by the end of 2011 (“Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq” Whitehouse.gov). Last August 19, 2010, the last US combat brigade exited Iraq. The missions of the remaining troops have shifted from combat operations to counter-terrorism and training, equipping, and advising Iraqi security forces. Obama had announced last August 31, 2010 that the US’ combat mission in Iraq was over Name 2 (Jones, “Obama Announces Iraq Plan”). State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said the US involvement in Iraq was far from over, but that it would be taking on a more civilian role. US long-term commitment to Iraq is spelled in a trillion-dollar investment to protect in the country and the memory of the 4,415 US troops who lost their lives in the conflict (“Last US combat brigade” BBC.co.uk). The principal aim of US policy in Iraq, behind all these efforts, including the rearming of Iraq, which is already underway, is intended to ensure that the post-Saddam state remains within the US sphere of influence rather than becoming an Iranian satellite. On the other hand, Iran is stepping up its campaign to install a Shiite-dominated Iraqi government that leans toward Tehran which involves covert political action as well as paramilitary operations. To implement this program, the UPI reported, “The Pentagon has proposed selling arms worth $4.2 billion to Iraq to bolster the country's military and provide other Persian Gulf states with massive infusions of weaponry to stand up to Iran. The package proposed by the Department of Defense includes 18 Lockheed Martin F-16 strike jets, Raytheon AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air, heat-seeking missiles for dogfighting, laser-guided bombs and reconnaissance equipment. Already, President Barack Obama has admitted to plans to also provide Saudi Arabia with 84 F-15SA, 200 helicopters, including AH-64 Apache gunships, and other systems worth at least $60.5 billion. By building up Iraq's military capabilities the US aims to isolate Iran, which in the space of two decades has been transformed into a nuclear power. The Iraqi navy recently inaugurated its first US-built, $20 million, 50-foot, Swift Class patrol boat at Umm Qasr, Iraq's main port and is ready to take delivery of 14 more of these before US forces depart. Its main mission will be to protect the oil terminals at al-Basra and Khor al-Amiya through which 1.7 million barrels a day are exported. Name 3 Two US-built offshore support vessels, each costing $70 million, are expected to be delivered in 2011” (“US plans $4.2 billion” UPI.com). The program is currently implemented even as Iraq struggles to form a coalition government six months after a stalemated parliamentary election. The US Government Accountability Office however, has questioned whether these arms sales, among the largest ever proposed by a US administration, are in the national interest. The GAO expressed concern that US priorities are not consistently considered before such sales are authorized. Since Congress has yet to approve these arms sales, the GAO is likely to raise questions over future sales plans. An audit of 15 authorized commercial weapons sales and 13 foreign military sales to six Gulf countries worth around $22 billion beween 2005-09, by the GAO, said the State Department did not document how it applied criteria to review the arms transfers. The GAO criticized the US government’s increasing arms transfer authorizations to this part of the world without reviewing them for their foreign policy and national security implications because it is not certain whether these arms sales will help curb Iran or antagonize it instead into further development of its nuclear weapons and ability to threaten the region, including Israel (“US plans $4.2 billion” UPI.com). Selling sophisticated weapons to Arab states whose relations with the US are questionable is meeting criticism in Washington. Arming Iraq, which under the late Saddam Hussein twice invaded its neighbors, has caused some jitters in the Gulf Arab states themselves. Providing Iraq with 18 F-16s with Sidewinder missiles and 96 more planes in the immediate future, will not transform it into a military power. The plan apparently, calls that Iraq’s offensive capabilities be enhanced rather than simple counter-insurgency operations. Furthermore, as the last brigade of US combat troops leave Iraq, the number of private security guards are being Name 4 raised to protect civilians against al-Qaeda-linked insurgents and Iranian-backed militias. Contractors employed by the US State Department are training the Iraqi police and US diplomats in two new $100 million outposts. The security contractors, defending five fortified compounds around the country, are: equipped with radars to warn of enemy rocket attacks, search for roadside bombs, and fly reconnaissance drones and staff quick reaction forces to help civilians in distress (“US to Double Private Security” Myfoxboston.com). Despite these, human rights violations have posed serious obstacles in their use in the pacification of Iraq, particularly because of abuses’ direct effect on the increase in tenacity and ruthlessness by which insurgents carry out their attacks and the sympathy and support it generates from the local people. As early as 2004, US military tactics, referred to as “high-handed” by UK’s most senior official in Iraq, made security worse following the 2003 invasion. Sir David Richmond in a letter to Iraqi government officials said the coalition was unpopular, but the UK had managed to alter US thinking in some areas. Former Prime Minister Tony Blair said the UK's planning for post-war Iraq, however, accounted for the destabilizing effects of insurgency following the increase in suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks which began in late 2003 (“Ministers warned over” BBC.co.uk). Originally targeting the coalition forces, the insurgents now attack not only police and security forces, but Iraqi civilians and institutions, as well. Attacks have also taken place against Shiite mosques, where majority of Iraq’s population worship vis–à–vis the minority Sunni Muslims constituting Saddam’s Ba’ath political party. Also attacked were political party meetings in hotels, foreign embassies supporting them, the UN headquarters, the International Name 5 Red Cross, and international diplomats of countries who recognize the new Iraqi administration. Insurgent tactics include IEDs, car bombings, suicide bombings, kidnappings, hostage-taking, assassinations, and mortar attacks carried out by relatively few insurgents. Attacks by larger numbers of more than 100 have been rare but were reported as well. The attacks are swift and use excessive lethal force against the target. Kidnappings and beheadings have been especially applied for its psychologically terrifying effect, towards foreign journalists and private contract workers to instill terror on others and force their governments to back out of Iraq. The insurgents’ tactics capitalize on the anti-occupation sentiments of the majority of Iraqi population and generate sympathy for the insurgents. These guerrilla tactics are testing how steadfast US commitment and determination to win over the long term would be (Deflem and Suthpin 272). A 2005 article in The Boston Globe reported that an internal poll conducted for the international coalition found that almost 45% of the Iraqi population supported the insurgency, while only 15% said they strongly supported the coalition (Bender A1). The enormous casualty rate among the Iraqi police notwithstanding, the vacancies are not found wanting. Economic urgency rather than patriotism is a major motivation for many young Iraqis to join the police (Chandrasekaran A1). The situation is explained to be one of the few options available for employment, although recruits are fully aware that police or army officers are “walking dead men” (Fainaru A1).   Figures from Table 1 (Insurgent Attacks Against Iraqi Police, May 2003 – July 2006) clearly indicate a military solution to pacify Iraq will not suffice (Iraqbodycount.org). If 150, 000 US troops did not see a significant reduction in Iraqi police casualties; neither will a million troops on a solely military mission. Name 6 Month Incidents Casualties Casualty Rate May 2003 1 16 16.0 June 2003 1 18 18.0 July 2003 3 24 8.0 Aug 2003 2 27 13.5 Sep 2003 4 31 7.75 Oct 2003 13 63 4.85 Nov 2003 9 38 4.22 Dec 2003 10 50 5.00 Jan 2004 14 37 2.64 Feb 2004 11 101 9.18 Mar 2004 15 33 2.20 Apr 2004 12 108 9.0 May 2004 8 16 2.0 June 2004 16 116 7.25 July 2004 22 117 5.32 Aug 2004 20 61 3.05 Sep 2004 12 103 8.59 Oct 2004 16 78 4.88 Nov 2004 16 83 5.19 Dec 2004 25 109 4.36 Jan 2005 41 115 2.80 Feb 2005 40 120 3.00 Mar 2005 28 79 2.82 Apr 2005 28 88 3.14 May 2005 38 233 6.13 June 2005 46 147 3.20 July 2005 43 142 3.30 Aug 2005 41 98 2.40 Sep 2005 32 96 3.00 Oct 2005 39 123 3.15 Nov 2005 30 105 3.50 Dec 2005 35 108 3.09 Jan 2006 41 202 4.93 Feb 2006 38 98 2.58 Mar 2006 45 134 2.98 Apr 2006 39 89 2.28 May 2006 58 162 2.79 June 2006 34 111 3.26 July 2006 35 161 4.6 Total 964 3640 Table 1: Insurgent Attacks Against Iraqi Police, May 2003 – July 2006 Name 7 The task of crime control and maintenance of order, usually assigned to the police is burdened by the lack of trained professionals after police officers loyal to the Ba’ath Party of Saddam were fired or had become insurgents themselves. Besides the difficulties of forming a democratic polity, the democratization of policing poses an additional set of concerns. The police function in a democratic society must at least, fulfill the following two conditions: the police must have a position of independence relative to the center of the state and be responsible towards the needs of citizens and accountable to law; and police actions must and be transparent and abide by standards of human rights (Bayley 16). In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion, Saddam Hussein’s regime collapsed quicker than expected, but the post-war reconstruction of Iraq faced serious concerns with the resurgence of ethnic and religious rivalries, an insurgency that threatens to drag Iraq into a civil war, difficulty in mobilizing basic services, and the restoration of Iraq’s primary social institutions (Roxborough 16). The Iraqi insurgency is best defined as one without a unified collective and clearly defined objective. Among the insurgents are Ba’athist sympathizers of Saddam Hussein, Sunni extremists, foreign Islamist fighters, including members of al Qaeda, the group the led by the slain militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, as well as criminal groups sans a political agenda. Notwithstanding its lack of a cause, it has effectively managed to destabilize Iraqi society and sow chaos against pacification. (Deflem and Suthpin 272) The Bush administration and its allies did not adequately anticipate what had to be done to establish a new police force in the process of the pacification and reconstruction of Iraq. Justice Department officials had advised the US administration about what lies after Saddam’s Iraq is subdued. It was not the first time such a problem was encountered, particularly when the Name 8 decades long reign of a tyrant suddenly ceases. A well-developed civilian police in Saddam’s Iraq was extremely unlikely because its strong military and dictatorial past had inherent difficulty in separating internal security from national defense functions. International support and a determined political will by both the new regime put in place and its supporters are the minimum conditions for the successful creation of a well-functioning civilian police in countries following a radical regime change such as in Iraq (Stanley 37). Also needed are a careful consideration of Iraq’s local cultural and political circumstances and a clear separation of military and police functions (Bayley 38).   Large-scale breakdowns in public order are usual in the aftermath of international armed interventions by the UN, or in this case by the Coalition of the Willing, in societies emerging from brutal oppression such as Saddam’s Iraq (Perito 5); for this reason, police reform will always be difficult even with new equipment and better training, because officers will be under great stress to perform in an effective and accountable manner. On the other hand, it is faced with an enemy that cannot be readily identified and operates in a manner that defies international conventions and has no intention of accepting accountability. It is estimated that such training in post-war situations requires the help of international police experts with foreign experience and could take at least five years (Perito 10). To assist in the training of Iraq’s police force, more private security officers are needed. As of December, 2006, 100,000 contractors worked directly for the United States Department of Defense in Iraq; ten times the increase in the use of private contractors for military operations since the first Persian Gulf War (Merle, "Census Counts 100,000”). The prevalence of Private Military Contractors (PMC) has led to the creation of a trade group: the Private Security Name 9 Company Association of Iraq. Accountability, especially in the case of contractors carrying weapons is however, a sensitive one. Before leaving office as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Paul Bremer signed Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17 where stating: “Contractors shall not be subject to Iraqi laws or regulations in matters relating to the terms and conditions of their Contracts, including licensing and registering employees, businesses and corporations; provided, however, that Contractors shall comply with such applicable licensing and registration laws and regulations if engaging in business or transactions in Iraq other than Contracts.” PMCs supply support to US military bases throughout the Persian Gulf, from operating mess halls to providing security. They supply armed guards at a US Army base in Qatar, and they use live ammunition to train soldiers at Camp Doha in Kuwait. They maintain an array of weapons systems vital to an invasion of Iraq. They also provide bodyguards for VIPs, guard installations, and escort supply convoys from Kuwait. All these resources are called upon constantly due to the war in Iraq (Yeoman, "Soldiers of Good Fortune"). However, it is the view that PMCs such as Blackwater are being brought in to provide covert operations into counter-insurgency. It is an admitted fact that guerrillas’ propensity to commit human right abuses and other atrocities considered inhuman cannot be underestimated for its virtue to instill terror into the morale of even the best soldiers. PMCs, the prime example of which is Blackwater, provides a way out of this accountability. Already, Blackwater has been involved in a number of cases questioning its ability to comply with Iraqi laws. A two-year UN study released in October 2007, branded PMCs as a "new form of mercenary activity" and illegal under International law. Many countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, are not signatories to the 1989 United Nations Mercenary Convention banning the use of mercenaries (Higgins). It is believed that with PMCs like Name 10 Blackwater, after it was banned, will strike Iraqis as the Coalition’s answer to recalcitrance and non-cooperation. Name 11 Works Cited Bayley, David H. Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice. 2001. Print. “Obama outlines Iraq pullout plan.” BBC, February 27, 2009. Web. March 30, 2011. “Ministers warned over 'heavy-handed' US tactics in Iraq.” BBC News UK Politics, January 26, 2011. Web. April 1, 2011. Bender, Bryan. “Insurgency Seen Forcing Change in Iraq Strategy: New Aim to Bring Sunnis into Fold.” The Boston Globe June 10, 2005: p. A1. Print. Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “Police Recruits Targeted In Iraq: Bomb Kills Scores Near Headquarters.” The Washington Post September 15, 2004: p. A1. Print.  Deflem, Mathieu and Sutphin, Suzanne. “Policing Post-War Iraq: Insurgency, Civilian Police, and the Reconstruction of Society.”  Sociological Focus 39.4 (2006): 265-282. Print.  Fainaru, Steve. “For Police Recruits, Risk Is Constant Companion.” The Washington Post September 27, 2004: p. A1. Print. Gordon, Michael R. “For Training Iraq’s Police, the Main Problem Was Time.” The New York Times October 21, 2004: p. 13. Print. Higgins, Alexander G. “US rejects UN mercenary report.” USA Today, October 17, 2007. Web. April 1, 2011. < http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-10-17-3392316246_x.htm>.  IraqBodyCount, July 25, 2006. Web. April 1, 2011. Name 11 Jones, Athena. “Obama Announces Iraq Plan.” NBC News, February 27 2009. Web. March 30 2011. “Last US combat brigade exits Iraq.” BBC News Middle East. August 9, 2010. Web. April 1, 2011. Merle, Renae. "Census Counts 100,000 Contractors in Iraq.” Washington Post, December 5, 2006. Web. April 2, 2011. < http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/04/AR2006120401311.html> Moss, Michael and David Rohde. “Misjudgments Marred US Plans for Iraqi Police.” The New York Times, May 21, 2006: p. 1. Print. “US to Double Private Security Force in Iraq After Military Pullout.” Myfoxboston. August 19, 2010. Web. March 30 2011. Perito, Robert M. The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Public Security in Iraq Special Report 137. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. 2005. Print.  Roxborough, Ian. “Iraq, Afghanistan, The Global War on Terrorism, and the Owl of Minerva.” Political Power and Social Theory, Volume 16. ed. Diane E. Davis. Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 2003. 185-211. Print. Stanley, William. “International Tutelage and Domestic Political Will: Building a New Civilian Police Force in El Salvador.” Policing Change, Changing Police: International Perspectives, ed. Otwin Marenin. New York: Garland Publishing. 1996. 37-78. Print. Name 12 “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq.” The Whitehouse. n.d. Web. March 30 2011. “US plans $4.2 billion arms sale to Iraq.” UPI, October 1, 2010. Web. March 30 2011. Yeoman, Barry. "Soldiers of Good Fortune." Mother Jones. June 1, 2003. Web. May 8, 2007. < http://motherjones.com/toc/2003/05> Read More