Has State-Focused Nationalism Replaced Arabism Region-Wide Reform - Term Paper Example

Has focused “nationalism” replaced region-wide reforms such as Arabism? The status of the Middle East as a territory of perpetual conflict hasbeen well documented and some commentators have argued that central to the continued instability in the region is the contrast between the concept of Arabism and state nationalism particularly in the contemporary regional political environment as a result of the Israel issue and complex cultural units falling under the “Arab” aegis (Hinnesbuch & Ehteshami, 2002, p.115). For example, Dawisha posits that the 1967 Six Day War with Israel operated as the seminal turning point in Arab state nationalism, moving towards a regional preference for “Arabism” (2003, p.252). On the other hand, Efraim and Karsh comment that the debate regarding Arab nationalism as a model of homogenous states bound by common language, religion and history has “dominated Middle Eastern political discourse for the most part of this century” (1996). However, they highlight that regardless of the concept of Arab nationalism in academic rhetoric; Arab nationalism has not succeeded in achieving the goal of unifying the “Arab” nation under a model of pan-Arabism, which in turn has fuelled a polarised debate regarding state focused nationalism and Arabism in the region. Moreover, Biersteker and Weber highlight that in terms of Arab nationalism the central issue in Arab states is “whether Arab nationalism was or was not consistent with state sovereignty and the territorial legacy” (1996, p149). Additionally, Biersteker and Weber refer to the argument that 1967’s turning point led to Arab recognition of state sovereignty, thereby dispelling pan-Arabism and replacing the state versus nation conflict (1996,p.149). The focus of this paper is to critically evaluate whether state focused “nationalism” has replaced region-wide reforms such as Arabism. To this end, it is submitted at the outset as a central proposition in this paper that it is far too dogmatic to assert that either state focused nationalism or Arabism prevails in the region and that the predominant influential factor in shaping national identity is the intrinsically complex relationship between ethno-national identity, historical backdrop and socio-political climate in the area; particularly within the contemporary international relations model (Halliday, 2005). This is further highlighted by Bierksteker and Weber’s assertion that: “Neither internal sovereignty, with its conception of citizenship and national identity and loyalty, nor external sovereignty, with its idea of mutual recognition of boundaries and authority over that territory, has a real counterpart in Arab-Islamic history” (1996, p.149). Moreover, it is further submitted that central to the debate regarding territorial nationalism versus pan-Arabism is the contemporary definition of nationalism (Tibi, 1997, p.3). For example, arguably it is the Western definitions of sovereign territory and nationalism that is intrinsically flawed when applied to the complex nature of the Arab territories particularly when considered against the territorial and historical backdrop of the Middle East (Tibi, 1997,p.1). This argument is further reinforced by Tibi’s argument that the modern Western concept of nationalism in context of Arab nationalism must always be considered in context and that as such, “Nation, nationalism and nation states are phenomena strange to Islamic history” (Tibi, 1997, p.1). Additionally, Tibi asserts the point that the concept of national identity and nationalism came to the fore post the Second World War as a distinctly European phenomenon, which in turn has moved the concept of nation state into the consciousness of other non-Western states through globalisation (Tibi, 1997, 1). As a result, it is submitted in this paper that the concept of “nationalism” is intrinsically complex and a continuously evolving notion and therefore cannot necessarily be considered to be mutually exclusive from the concept of Arabism in the Middle East. This proposition is further supported by the complex issues of national identity at the heart of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; the failures of the US in Operation Iraqi Freedom and the complexity of distinguishing between state and non state terrorism within Arab territories under the growing reality of the global terrorism phenomenon (Shimko, 2009, p.315). Indeed, this is reinforced by the arguments of Dawisha that the central distinction within the nationalism paradigm in a post Israel Middle East is Arabism and not Arab nationalism on grounds that 1967 did not signify Arab nationalism’s “last stand”. To this end, Dawisha asserts that: “Arabism was not lost as an identity; it continued to set general parameters Arab regimes would be loath to transgress…. What continued to live on was Arabism, not Arab nationalism” (2003, p.252). Accordingly, in evaluating the debate regarding state nationalism and Arabism in the Middle East, this paper reiterates the central proposition that the concept of nationalism is intrinsically complex and ultimately it is the socio-political backdrop in any state that will determine the level of adherence to state sovereign nationalism. Moreover, the Israel/Palestine conflict and the aftermath of Israel’s inception on contemporary Arab culture is a prime example of the intrinsic paradox between ethno-national constructs defining national identity and Western concepts of state nationalism. Additionally, as mentioned above, the US military efforts in Operation Iraqi Freedom whilst initially viewed as a blow to Arabism, reinforces the point that concepts of national identity and nationalism are continually evolving and intrinsically dependent on the political events and socio-economic backdrop impacting individuals on a day to day basis. For example, Tibi highlights the development of the nation sovereign state as fundamentally European in nature and that as such, the argument regarding “nationalism” in the Middle East region becomes inherently flawed (Tibi, 1997, p.2). This is particularly evident in the Middle East as a result of the colonial legacy. On the one hand, the very concept of nationalism in the European sense relies on the unity of state, however in the Middle East the territorial borders fail to account for the complexities of the cultural units within it (Cole & Kandiyoti, 2002). For example, Baram refers to the example of the Ba’th party in Iraq, which chose to introduce a novel form of territorial Iraqi nationalism intertwined with an imperial Iraqi centred brand of Pan Arabism through a purely cultural rather than explicit brand political campaign”(Baram, 1990). Additionally, Baram refers to the Ba’th party’s earlier cultural campaigns intending to fuse Iraqi folklore, music through media campaigns attempting to link the history of Mesopotamia and the contemporary Iraqi people in order “to fuse the bonds between Arabs, Kurds, Sunnis and Shiis and Muslims” (Baram, 1990). However, the recent insights into Iraq through Operation Iraqi Freedom has exposed the tribal conflicts of the peoples within this territory with conflicts between the Sunnis and Shiis and the previous history of conflict with the Kurds, who also have their own concepts of “national identity” (Stroheimer, 2003). These very differences again reinforce the intrinsic complexity of applying the European state nationalism model to the Middle East Region. Additionally, the differences between the concepts of identity for various cultural groups within the region also undermine an absolute concept of Arabism prevailing in the region as a replacement of state nationalism. This is again reinforced by Tibi’s assertion that in the region the “bulk of nation states lack the very substance of the nation. We are talking about artificial nations compounded of divergent groups, and about nominal nation-states whose boundaries have been drawn by colonial powers” (Tibi, 1997 p.2). Moreover, in undertaking a contextual study of Jordan and the Palestinians Anderson highlights the central point that national identity is intrinsically dependent on the development of “day to day events and relationships” (2005, p12). In reinforcing this argument, Anderson refers to Chattarjee’s model of the “domains of national identity”, which “give structure and meaning to new state institutions and feelings of shared experiences” (2005, p.12). For example, Anderson refers to the Jordan and Palestine as being examples of the inner and outer domains as a result of political activity and the reshaping of the international world order and model for international relations (Anderson, 2005, p.13) As such, the political dimension was co-existent and directly impacts the status of national identity from a subjective perspective (Anderson, 2005, p.13). In supporting this argument Anderson opines that: “Nationalism became a passion for political activists of all stripes whether for those in Palestine fighting against the British, or for others in Jordan fighting against the Hashemites, because nationalism became equated with political freedom. Everywhere people sang nationalist songs and recited poetry extolling past Arab glories” (2005, p.14). This in turn shaped the parameters of not only national identity but the concept of “nations”; hence the inner and outer domain model. For example, Anderson highlights how in the aftermath of Israel’s inception, “institutions constructed by the British, the Hashemites, and the Palestinians began slowly to define the two nations”; which again underlines the essential point that concepts of national identity are inherently subjective. Indeed, particularly in the contemporary international framework there are clearly different models of Arab nationalism as “Arab nationalism refers to the political divisions and economic and social problems” (Anderson, 2005, p.15) Accordingly, it is submitted that Anderson’s arguments reinforce the proposition in this paper that state nationalism and Arabism should not be viewed as mutually exclusive on grounds that identity is dependent on subjective experience, which in turn is shaped by the interrelationship between the socio-political context of any particular region and the ethno-national construct. To this end, Anderson highlights Bhaba’s argument that “the scraps, patches and rags of daily life must be repeatedly turned into the signs of a coherent national culture, while the very act of the narrative performance interpellates a growing circle of national subjects” (Anderson, 2005, p.15). This argument regarding the relationship of self to national identity within the political and ethno-national construct is further supported by Joffe’s consideration of the relationship between a Palestinian identity shaped by its conflict with Israel; which is sometimes at odds with the widespread concept of Arab nationalism (Joffe, 1983). Similarly, Berkowitz’s reference to the debate as to whether nationalism is reconcilable with the ethnic identity and loyalty to Zionism and Judaism by analogy highlights the overriding importance on ethno-cultural and social cultural norms in shaping identity by analogy (Berkowitz, 2004). Indeed, Berkowitz refers to the centre of the debate in terms of the intrinsic “paradox” of simultaneously having a Jewish identity alongside the concept of nationalism (2004). On the other hand, it is submitted that this would point to a narrow view of the concept of nationalism and that perhaps the concept of “nationalism” shouldn’t be viewed so rigidly as it is intrinsically dependent on developing and socio-economic and political factors. For example, Berkowitz refers to Roshwald’s comments that “the history of Jewish identity raises serious questions about the validity of narrowly modernist understandings of nationalism” (2004, p12). This again reinforces the proposition that nationalism and the concept of national identity cannot be restricted territorially and remains evolutionary. For example, Berkowitz refers to Roshwald’s criticism of rigid concepts of state nationalism failing to account for the complex interrelated factors influencing national identity particularly in the Middle East: “modern nationalism is intimately linked to the idea of popular sovereignty, whereas the Bible’s ultimate justification of political authority is theocratic and that most means and forms of mass mobilization associated with contemporary nationalism were non-existent in ancient times” (In Berkowitz, 2004, p.15). Moreover, Haddad argues that the politics and policies ultimately impact nationalism and supports this argument by considering the fallacy of the debate regarding the origins of early Arab nationalism on grounds of the different sub units in the region with their own concepts of “national identity” (Haddad, 1994). Halliday reinforces this argument by commenting that ultimately, the international relations and policy makers have direct impact on the construction of national identity and that therefore it is the interrelationship between culture, socio-political constructs and subjectivity that shapes identity constructs beyond artificial territorial borders (Halliday, 2005). Indeed, Hinnesbuch and Ehteshami highlight that regardless of the Arab league and territories, there is a “high incongruity between identity and territorial state” particularly as a result of the religion, which is further compounded by international foreign policy (2002). These observations are reinforced by the arguments of Hourani, Khoury and Wilson (2004) and Telhami and Barnett who highlight the dichotomy between the political constructs of state and nationalism in the Middle East and the revival of rival ethnic conflicts undermining sovereign state authority (2002). Additionally, Khalidi asserts that the very concept of “Arab Nationalism” was “a child of the intellectual atmosphere of the nineteenth century and one of many responses to the process of incorporation of the world into a single system with Europe at its center which that century witnessed. Like these other ideologies, Arab nationalism in its fully developed form represented an expression of identity and of group solidarity within the projected new format of the nation-state by an amalgam of old elites and new social forces at once desirous of seeing their society resist control by outside forces and deeply influenced by the example and the challenge of the West” (Khalidi, 1991). As such, the Arab nationalism model was arguably part of the colonial legacy, which failed to account for the reality of what Tibi terms as “administrative units” living within the territories delineated by geographical borders. As a result of the colonial nation state imprint in the Middle East, Khalidi observes that: “By some time early in the twentieth century, at the end of this process of synthesis, the idea was widespread throughout the Arab world (itself a concept born of the rise of Arab nationalism) that anyone who spoke Arabic, looked back on the history of the Arabs with pride, and considered himself or herself to be an Arab was one, and that this sense of shared identity should in some measure find political expression” (Khalidi, 1996). However, as highlighted by Tibi, a rigid interpretation of state nationalism and Arabism has failed to account for the complex factors shaping national identity; which in turn has contributed to the fallacy of the Arabism ideal and undermined the unity of Arab peoples beyond the intricacies of individual group cultural variances (Doran, 1999; Schwartz, 2002). A prime example of this is the continued Palestinian/Israel conflict, which remains one of the most contentious and debated socio-political conflicts in contemporary history and whilst international efforts to secure peace in the region continue, any meaningful attempts to achieve peace and stabilise the region have remained elusive. It is submitted that a historical perspective of the conflict highlights that at the root of the continued conflict is the religious beliefs fuelling primacy over the territory that is the fundamental problem. Additionally whilst this clearly undermines state nationalism; the Palestinian and Israeli conflict highlights the contribution of ethnic concepts of national identity operating as a significant causal factor. For example, Milton-Edwards (2008) opines that “it is the people – Israeli and Palestinian – constituted as distinct nations and with competing aspirations for statehood over the same territory that truly explains why this conflict came about” (p.3). However, the undermining of state nationalism does not alternatively point to Arab nationalism as highlighted by the inaction of surrounding Arab states to aid Palestinians and intervene in the contemporary framework. Indeed, this is evidenced by Doran’s reference to the Egyptian trial of Eliyahu hakim and Eliyahu Ben Zuri for the assassination of Lord Moyne, which was a political move to aid Egypt’s position internationally clearly undermining any notion of Arab nationalism. This in itself highlights the intrinsic complexity regarding the concept of the “state” and applying the European concept of state nationalism and Arabism to the Middle East particularly where the religious influence on the ethno-national construct shapes socio-cultural norms and cross cultural communication. It is submitted at the outset that the religious belief system of Israeli Jews and a predominantly Muslim Palestinian population has shaped both communities in their attitudes vis-à-vis the other. In turn in both collectivist cultures, religious beliefs and culture are intrinsically intertwined and Milton-Edwards highlights the point that the continuation of conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is rooted in their entrenched cultural standpoints 2008). In turn, this reinforces the arguments of Berkowitz regarding the paradox of Judaism and state nationalism and Tibi regarding Islam and nationalism on the other side of the spectrum. For example, Milton Edwards observes that this polarity “is why the conflict may be considered to be a people’s war and….. Israeli versus Palestinian in a conflict with each other that is military, economic, political, cultural and religious in expression at one time or another” (2008, p.3). Accordingly, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict has roots in cultural differences and religious differences, which clearly shapes their current relationship with each other and indeed, Cofman Whites (2005) argues that culture clearly played a part in the failures of the Oslo peace process “shaping the domestic politics that constrained the talks and moulding each side’s perceptions of the other’s intentions and behaviour” (p.vii). Moreover, cultural differences intrinsically impact cross cultural communication and Cofman (2005) highlights the point that Israelis and Palestinians are both ethno-national groups, whereby social customs and political constructs are intrinsically intertwined with ethno-national identity (p.5). Additionally, this ethno-national backdrop has influenced the attitudes of both peoples in relation to the territory of Israel, fuelling the continued tension that hinders any attempts at genuine peace (Cofman, 2005, p.5). Additionally, the continuation of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict highlights the importance of ethnic heritage in both cultures, which in turn shapes the political culture of both groups (Cofman, 2005, p.5). Indeed a similarity in the ethno-national identity of both Israelis and Palestinians is the infusion of religion into social and political constructs. To this end, it is arguable that the continued conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is their varying approaches to religion, both of which teach superiority over the other. Accordingly, the above analysis highlights that whilst the foreign policy agendas and political interests of the sovereign state clearly point towards a concept of state nationalism in theory; the fragmentation of various ethno-cultural groups within these states has led to a dichotomy between political state identity and national identity. On the other hand, it is far too dogmatic to assert that the state nationalism model has been replaced by Arabism and for example, Rinawi refers to the example of Operation Iraqi Freedom as crystallising the distinction between sovereignty and pan Arabism, whereby with “this event the divide between the pan-Arabic and specific localised Arab agendas became apparent” (2006, p.xxi). This point is arguably the central issue in the nationalism versus Arabism debate and highlights the reality that national identity in the Middle East region is a continually evolving concept that embodies the pan-Arab consciousness, however is ultimately shaped by the interrelationship between the cultural norms of the relevant ethno-cultural group and the socio-political backdrop of the relevant state. Bibliography Anderson,B., (2005) National voice in Jordan : the street and the state ,Austin: University of Texas. Baram,A., (1990) Territorial Nationalism in the Middle East, in Middle Eastern Studies,Vol.26,NO.4(oct.,1990)pp:425-448. Berkowitz,M.(ed.) (2004),Nationalism ,Zionism and Ethnic Mobilisation of the Jews in 1900 and beyond Boston: Brill. Biersteker, T. J. & Weber, C. (1996) State sovereignty as social construct. Cambridge University Press. Cofman, Wittes, T., (2005) Israelis and Palestinians negotiate: a cross cultural analysis. 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