The Bureaucracy and Public Policymaking in the United States - Essay Example

The Bureaucracy and Public Policymaking in the United s One of the essential aspects of governance is public policymaking. It is one of the means by which the government concretely addresses perceived social problems, thereby “affect(ing) citizens, organized interests, and society itself in a plethora of ways” (Gromley & Balla, 2009, p.96). It encapsulates the philosophy the government in power espouses, as public policies in many ways characterize the government’s standpoint, priorities, toughness, etc. Besides, public policymaking is the legitimate exercise of one of the powers bestowed by the people on the elected government, specifically on Congress – the legislative branch. Policymaking is not just about its outcome but most importantly the process by which it has been made, because the crux of public policymaking is the constant interaction among its key players: the institutions that draw the structures and rules which govern the making of decisions; the interest as represented by group and individual stakeholders who would gain or lose in the policy; and ideas that would give logic to the policy (John, 1998, cited in Overseas Development Institute, 2007, p.1; Kirst, Meister & Rowley,___, pp.248-249; Gormley, __, p.100).” This interaction of its key players in many ways has resulted to the policy, which may be beneficial to some but burdensome to others. Public policymaking in itself is normally complex, as it goes through five tedious stages: “agenda-setting, policy formulation, decision making, implementation, and evaluation (Fischer, Miller, & Sidney, 2007, p. 43)” – of which the agenda-setting is seen the most crucial stage (Thomas Dye, as cited in Gertson, 2004, p. 52) by which policymakers critically take on specific issues (Kirst, Meier, & Rowley, 2007, p.247) involving hundreds of actors widely differentiated by their backgrounds, goals, perspectives, preferences, etc. The complexity of public policymaking is most evident in a democracy, as people are granted their constitutional rights to participate and to be heard in the policymaking process, much more in a democracy as big as the Federal government of the United States of America, not only because it is understandably laden with extensive issues, but also because it is surrounded with many varied aggressive players competing for their stakes, believing that theirs is what merits the government attention. Needless to say you have 50 states to consider. The hugeness of the US government, has also adversely affected policymaking in a way that the US Congress with 435 Representatives and 100 Senators (Chambers, 2009, par. 24) is too heavy to act on time, consequently, to function effectively, that it “divided itself into tens of committees and hundreds of subcommittees, all more or less independent of Congress as a whole. As a result, Congress evolved into 535 separate political actors each pursuing different goals (Meier, 2007 p.47).” However, public policymaking in the US does not reside solely in the chambers of Congress, but in fact outside it – the bureaucracy, the ‘fourth branch’ of the government, which role in public policymaking turns out to be more powerful and more influential than the Congress. How could this be? Faced with the gargantuan task of acting on a large public demand, yet confronted with the lack of technical expertise needed on many public concerns, Congress, acknowledging the organizational cohesiveness and technical expertise of the bureaucracy, delegated to it the difficult problems of public policy, which the court legitimized (p.45). This has placed the bureaucracy in a very influential and powerful position in the policy process, hence, blurring the distinction between the political and administrative functions (p.46). Primarily, the bureaucratic function is to implement public policy (Anderson, 1997, and Jones 1984, as cited in Ibid, p. 51). However, inherent to this function are “additional opportunities for discretion and power (p.74),” as policy statements are too broad. Thus, bureaucracy has to fill in those gaps for the policy to be implemented, which essentially gives the bureaucracy its discretionary power. And as laws become less specific, the greater the discretionary power of the bureaucracy become, giving them greater influence in the policy process, as policy implementation, which is a bureaucratic function, has greater bearing on public policy (Meier, p. 52). Models vary as to how public policymaking in the US is being participated in, manipulated, and shaped by stakeholders. But one thing is sure – policy struggle starts right at the initial stage of the policymaking process – the agenda setting. Agenda setting is putting an issue for legislation in Congress. And this is not a simple matter, because manipulation, coercion, persuasion, and so on start here, as an issue can never be considered for legislation not unless it enters into the agenda of Congress. It simply means: no agenda on Congress, no policy. In order to be defined as ‘on the agenda’, an issue must pass through four agenda setting stages: (1) issue recognition, where an issue is noticed by legislators, and is felt to be a topic for potential action; (2) issue adoption, whereby the legitimacy of government responsibility and the possibility that an appropriate response could be found are acknowledged by state legislators; (3) issue prioritizing, so that the existing agenda is reordered to include the new issue; and (4) issue maintenance, so that the new issue remains on the agenda after initial consideration. (Nelson, 1978, as cited in Kirst, et al., p.250). The above discussion clearly illustrates the power bureaucracies have to pursue their issues in Congress. However, that power could only be realized in given conditions: that the bureaucracy has a positive relationship with Congress, specifically with the appropriate committee; that the bureau is the best organization there is to speak for the issue that Congress has no other option but to listen to the bureau; or that the bureau represents a voting constituent – although this one, may be effective only to those seeking re-election. Though, sometimes they only act on behalf of other interests (local states, big business, civil society, etc.) in exchange of something more valuable to the bureau, in effect, becomes an indirect interest of the bureau. Once an issue has been successfully put into agenda, deliberations would be left to the legislators through committee hearings to substantiate proposal and counterproposals, which bottom line is to win votes. Swaying of votes could be done in many ways as allowed by a given situation, which ultimately depends largely on the dynamics of the three key players: the institution, the interest, and the idea. The most traditional view in understanding public policymaking in the US, which today many find it very inadequate to illustrate the nitty-gritty of the policymaking process, is the so called ‘iron triangle’ – a term used to illustrate the relationships among three major actors: Congress, bureaucracy, and interest group in making public policies. “These three parties jointly control policymaking by determining what issues make it onto the political agenda, and how these issues will be resolved” (Gromley & Balla, p.100). A classic example of the iron triangle model is the military-industrial complex, whereby the Committees on Armed Services (Congress), the U.S. Department of Defense (bureaucracy), and defense contractors (interest group) work interdependently in patterns of mutual support and gain. Meaning to say, to ensure its power base, Congress has to support the military interest, and that is to profit from contracts. However, citing the dynamics of the changing influences of each major actor on each other and on the policymaking process as a whole, other configurations were presented such as ‘subgovernment’ (Carter 1964), ‘subsystem’ (Freeman 1965), ‘cozy triangles’ (James 1974), and ‘sloppy hexagons’ (Jones, 1979) (as cited in Swaim, 1996, p. 1), which aside from the need to interpret them, are similarly found insufficient to encapsulate the complex policy dynamics. Considering the varied complex webs of relationships between and among social actors surrounding public policymaking process, made more sophisticated by new technology, Anderson rightly states that: “… there is no need to assume that only one kind of subsystem can exist at a time… subsystems take various forms that can be arrayed along a continuum” (as cited in Ibid, p.2). Thus a new paradigm – ‘chaos paradigm’ – that better illustrates “the emerging postmodern culture insofar as indeterminacy and the role played by social actors in constructing the social institutions in which they find themselves” (p.7) is developed. This paradigm, which more accurately likens policymaking to a spider’s web, is essentially based on three characteristics: “First, chaotic systems are highly dependent on initial conditions. Second, phenomena are dynamic… And third, the indeterminacy of social systems is a matter of almost daily experience” (Prigogine, cited in Ibid, p. 8). Another way to understand policymaking is to understand the relationships between state agencies (bureaucracy) and nonprofit organizations or service providers, which Saidel (1991) described to be characterized mainly by resource interdependence (p. 543), wherein “the organization of public services relies to a substantial degree upon… third-party government” (Salamon, 1981, cited in Ibid), or nongovernmental actors who not merely deliver services funded by the government, but relating interdependently with the legislature, governor’s office, and division of the budget are also in a better place to actively participate in the policy process, as “nonprofit organizations supply their service-delivery capacity, information, political support, and legitimacy to state agencies” (p. 545) in exchange of “revenues, information including expertise and technical assistance, political support and legitimacy… (Galaskiewicz, 1985); and access to the non-legislative policy process (Rourke, 1984, cited in Ibid, p. 544).” Saidel underscores the fact that: “political support and legitimacy are included as resources because of the public arena in which resource relationships between state agencies and nonprofit organizations are forged” (p. 545). Although public policymaking can be illustrated in many ways, one thing is clear: that in all of these models, the influential position of bureaucracy in the policy process is very evident – “Bureaucracy is a key policy actor with opportunities to exercise political power whether the policy arena resembles a policy subsystem or an issue network” (Meier, p.50). And this bureaucratic phenomenon has been caused by the following: “(1) nature of politics – what questions are considered in the realm of politics and what questions are the sphere of professionals and administration? (2) the organization of government – how is the political power of the state distributed among governmental institutions? (3) tasks demands – what tools are necessary to perform the tasks of government effectively? And (4) the nature of bureaucratic function – how does implementation generate additional power for bureaucracy? (Meier, 2007, p. 43) With its almost secure place in the government, acting as if its fourth branch, an interest groups’ positive association with the bureaucracy, would almost mean positive influence on the policymaking process that would most likely result to a policy outcome favorable to the bureaucracy’s client. As Beer (1977) cites, at the centers of influence in policymaking are the “professional-bureaucratic complex and the inter-governmental lobby” (cited in Kirts et al., ___, p. 248). And who could influence policymaking in the bureaucracy? There are varied ways in which clients try to influence bureaucratic policymaking such as: through advisory committees and negotiated rule making, political intervention, etc., but most importantly, the capacity of the clients to provide “legal, scientific and other forms of specialized information may be most relevant in affecting the course of agency decision making” (Gromley & Balla, p. 117), although, one theoretical perspective suggests that “organized interest can dominate policymaking in the bureaucracy but only under certain conditions” (Gromley & Balla, p. 99). Thus, for the bureau to enhance its power and to ensure its survival, especially so that constituency matters in the politics of policy process, it has to develop its clientele. (Meier, p. 63) It should be noted, however, that “cohesion makes a bureau more effective policymaker because it promotes better employee performance, and a reputation for effectiveness is an asset in power politics” (Maynard-Moody, 1989, as cited in Meir, p. 68). It could be surmised that public policymaking in the US could be characterized as follows: (1) it is a political activity that resides most prominently not on what is best to the general public’s interest, but on the collaboration of interest or power struggle among the social actors: the Congress, the bureaucracy, and the interest group, which may either be part of the government or non-government entity; (2) given the favorable environment and the expertise to manipulate these to its advantage, the bureaucracy is very powerful in influencing the policymaking process; and (3) public policymaking in the US is too complicated and is becoming more complicated with the advancement of technology, that traditional models are not adequate to illustrate it. Finally, it is noteworthy to say that policymaking in the US only reflects the kind of government it has and the kind of society that it is – a government of irony, reflective of a highly heterogeneous capitalist society. A government that prides itself of democratic principles, yet at its core is a government of bureaucratic elites, whose unseen powerful hands shape the direction of the nation. A representative government of 50 states, but which policies are primarily shaped by the unelected bureaucracy which interest is shaped not by the general public’s interest but by powerful interest, which most often than not is the big business, as it could make or break the economy – an economy driven by profit. However, the constitutional guarantee of civil liberties gives the electorate the power to be heard, but with it comes the challenge to be organized and be transformed into a powerful force. It is only then that the government of the people, by the people, and for the people could be truly realized. References Chambers, Steven. (2009, January 06). “111th Congress convenes and vows quick action on economy.” Newark Star-Ledger. Available at: http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/01/111th_congress_convenes_and_vo.html (Accessed 13 November 2009). Fischer, Frank, Miller, Gerald, and Sidney, Mara S. (2007). Handbook of public policy analysis: theory, politics and methods. Taylor & Francis Group: NW. Available at: http://books.google.com.ph/books?id=TEbippYQcqMC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_v2_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=&f=false (Accessed 13 November 2009). Gertson, Larry N. (2004). Policy making: process and principles (2nd edition). M. E. Sharpe, Inc: New York. Available at: http://books.google.com.ph/books?id=n-329I3vVFIC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_navlinks_s#v=onepage&q=&f=false (Accessed on 13 November 2009). Gormley and Balla. (2008). “Chapter 4: The Bureaucracy’s Clients” Kirst, Michael W., Meister, Gail, and Rowley, Stephen R.(2007). “Policy Issue Networks: Their Influence on State Policymaking.” In Meir, Kenneth J. (2007). Bureaucratic Power and Its Causes. Publisher: Place of Publication. Overseas Development Institute. (2007, October). “How can the analysis of power and the process in policy making improve health outcomes?” Briefing Paper. Available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/13641649/Power-Process-Policy-Making-Health-Outcomes (Accessed on 13 November 2009). Saidel, Judith R. (1991). “Resource interdependence: The relationship between state agencies and nonprofit organizations.” Public Administratuion Review, 51 (6), 543-553. Swaim, Richard. (1996, October 4). The visual geometry of cultural policy. Printed at the 1996 Social Theory Politics and the Arts Meeting. Read More