The Power of Realism Theory - Essay Example

Explaining International Relations: The Power of Realist Theory The paradigm of realism emerged to address the inadequacy of liberal idealism to understand the political currents of the inter-War period from 1919 to 1939. Realism, essentially, looks at the world as it is, rather than how it ought to be, and remains pessimistic about the prospects of peace in international society. All strands of the theory maintain that the international system is anarchical or without any central organizing mechanism, populated by nation-states that are in permanent conflict. Nation-states have lexical priority over all other institutions and their national interests are defined in terms of power; every state aims at the satisfaction of these interests by maximizing power (Donnelly 2000: 7-8). The purpose of this essay is to argue that realism represents an analytically clear and methodologically rigorous body of theoretical knowledge, and offers an accurate and compelling explanation of international relations (IR). The international system has undergone many changes since the first realist treatises were conceived and articulated; the analysis of whether realism offers an accurate picture of IR or not shall hinge squarely upon how well the key tenets of realist theory explain these changes down to the contemporary currents that shape world politics today. One of the central concepts of realism is the balance of power thesis, leading to the security dilemma. This thesis holds that “because states pursue power as a means to security, they frequently tend to expand,” and the increase of one state’s power – understood as military capability – is checked by the countervailing power of another (Wohlforth, Kaufman, & Little 2007: 8). Realism holds that states are security maximizers, and the increment of one state’s (or a group of states’) power breeds insecurity on the part of a rival state (or alliance). This insecurity is then serviced by an increment in the military capability of the second state, which subsequently insecuritizes the first. This vicious cycle of graduated military buildup eventually culminates in the security dilemma of an arms race that may finally break into open war. The balance of power is used by realist theory to explain the behavior of the great powers and the revisionist forces during the inter-War years and the Second World War, especially the actions of Germany and Italy during 1919 to 1939. The remilitarization of the Rhineland, the conquest of Abyssinia, Germany’s pact with Stalinist Russia and Hitler’s march on Europe, are all accommodated by this tenet of realism, which maintains that it was the aggressive pursuit of power by revisionist Germany that led to insecurities on the part of Britain and France (Morgenthau 1985). Thus, we find that the realist explanation of great power behavior during the inter-War years accurately depicts the events of the time in IR. Another key aspect of realism remains a systemic persuasion, which maintains that the absence of an overarching authority in international politics makes the international system anarchical, and this anarchy fuels inter-state conflict and security competition (Walt 1998: 31). Of the formative questions studied by the IR academy were the causes of war between great powers; for realists, anarchy offers the most comprehensive answer to this puzzle, instead of other explanations rooted in human nature or the internal configuration of states (Waltz 1959: 159-223; 1979). The lack of a central organizing principle in the international realm leads states to opt for policies of self-help, since states inherently try to maximize their national interests and security considerations. The selfish interests of states, thus, explains the failures of international cooperation, not only during the Cold War when the United Nations was hamstrung by superpower rivalry, but also the post-Cold War era, which has seen the lack of political will characterize the inability of effective multilateral action in Rwanda, Bosnia (Srebrenica), and presently Darfur. In fact, one realist scholar described the Bosnian conflict after the Yugoslavian breakdown through the lens of the security dilemma, by taking the three dominant ethnic groups to exhibit similar behavior as state in the international system (Gagnon 1995). Thus, we find again that realism offers an accurate explanation of another fundamental dimension of international politics. Realism explains the problem of order in IR, and the resultant effects of that order, by looking at the capability – understood as military might, economic resources, and war preparedness – of states in the international system. For realists, “…the units of the international system are functionally similar sovereign states, hence unit-level variation is irrelevant in explaining international outcomes. It is the third tier, the distribution of capabilities across units, that is…of fundamental importance to understanding crucial international outcomes.” (Dunne & Schmidt 2001: 169). This distribution of capabilities can then be used to obtain the number of great powers within the international system at any given point of time, and that number, in turn, determines the structure of the international system. Therefore, the Cold War order was bipolar since the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR) were the two great (or super) powers of the time. Similarly, the Westphalian system was multipolar because it had several great powers, while the post-Cold War order has been unipolar, given the primacy of the US since 1991. Because of the rise of China and the consolidation of the European Union as an economic powerhouse, there has been a tendency towards multipolarity in this century; capability calculations along realist lines obtains an objective rank-ordering of state strength and provides a clearer picture of IR. Here, too, realism offers analytical clarity in revealing an accurate visage of the international. The bipolar peace of the Cold War has remained a challenging theoretical puzzle for IR scholars, but the realist perspective comes closest to providing a causal analysis of the same. From the idea of the offense-defense balance, we understand that the US and the USSR exhibited two types of strategies: defensive realist postures, when each superpower was satisfied with as much capability as could guarantee their security; and, offensive realist postures, when each sought to maximize power till they achieve hegemony, in that no “other state has the military wherewithal to put up a serious fight against it” (Mearsheimer 2006: 56). This explains why the US and the USSR swung between periods of peaceful coexistence and open hostility. In the second scenario, the bipolar peace is explained by the logic of nuclear deterrence and mutually assured destruction: since both states possessed enough nuclear weapons to destroy the other several times over, nuclear weapons acted as the guarantors of security. All states, it must be remembered, have the primary goal of survival, and this realist underpinning is another accurate description of international life. Realism does not argue for mindless aggression; an offensive capability that would deter a challenge to its security from any challenger is a matter of national interest. In fact, national interest can go a long way in explaining perturbing behavior on the part of nation-states. The US intervention in Iraq in 2003 was deemed “unnecessary” by several leading realists, who felt that deterrence and containment were better strategies to use in the situation (Mearsheimer & Walt 2003). However, the Bush administration deemed Operation Iraqi Freedom as an express purpose of American foreign policy. As history shows us, the American experience in Iraq was contrary to the expectations of the US government, though realism had a sound reasoning against going to war in the first place. A realist turn in policy circles, thus, would have saved the US from going headlong into a costly war; this also demonstrates, once more, the accuracy of realist analyses of IR. It is important, however, to understand that while a synthesis of different versions of realism may offer a comprehensive and accurate explanation for international events, there are several disagreements and points of departure within the paradigm itself. Thus, while classical realists emphasize human nature and the role of power, neo-realists speak of the structural constraints of anarchy. These varied perspectives, however, gave rise to a vigorous critique of realist theory from John A. Vasquez. Vasquez used the Lakatosian idea of paradigmatic progress – itself derivative of Kuhn and Popper’s ideas – to claim that realism was essentially a degenerative research program, since its many variants combined to make it unfalsifiable (1996). Essentially, Vasquez argues that any good theory should specify its limitations; advancement can only be made once that objective standard is shown to be inadequate and a new standard forwarded. Realism escapes this cycle due to the many interpretations its proponents forward, in order to bring discrepant evidence into the theory’s fold. The realist response here was two-fold: firstly, it was argued that the purpose of theory was not falsification, but clarification and explanation (Waltz 1997); and secondly, it was argued that Vasquez failed to consider any meaningful sample of contemporary realist research, thus failing to grasp its potential and demonstrated progressive scholarship (Walt 1997). It has also been argued that realism fails to predict change in IR and is fundamentally a status-quoist theory; in fact, realism was guilty of failing to predict the end of the Cold War itself. But as some scholars have pointed out, the strength of realism lies not in ex-ante prediction but in ex-post explanation (Wohlforth 1994: 93). Moreover, realism is not completely devoid of predictive ability, as we have seen above from the discouragement that the US aggression in Iraq received. Following from the above discussion, thus, we can see that realism forms a vibrant and powerful explanatory theory of IR, and presents an accurate picture of the landscape of international politics. Through the concepts of the balance of power, the security dilemma, anarchy, national interest, distribution of capabilities, and nuclear deterrence, realism explicates the major events of world politics with customary aplomb. IR involves a complex web of processes, which are inextricably intertwined in a causative flow of actions: realism holds a light in this milieu to unravel this tangle and give these events coherent theoretical expression. Indeed, realism presents a compelling perspective for the study of IR List of References Donnelly, J. (2000) Realism and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dunne, T. & Schmidt, B. C. (2001) ‘Realism.’ In The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations [3rd Edition]. Ed. by Baylis, J. & Smith, S. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 161-183. Gagnon, Jr., V. P. (1995) ‘Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia.’ International Security, 19, 3: 130-166. Mearsheimer, J. J. & Walt, S. M. (2003) ‘An Unnecessary War.’ Foreign Policy, January/February: 51-59. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2006) ‘Anarchy and the Struggle for Power.’ In International Politics: Enduring Concepts [8th Edition]. Ed. by Art, R. J. & Jervis, R. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson: 50-60. Morgenthau, H. J. (1985) Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Vasquez, J. A. (1996) The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Walt, S. M. (1997) ‘The Progressive Power of Realism.’ American Political Science Review, 91, 4: 931-935. Walt, S. M. (1998) ‘International Relations: One World, Many Theories.’ Foreign Policy, Spring: 29-46. Waltz, K. N. (1959) Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press. Waltz, K. N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill. Waltz, K. N. (1997) ‘Evaluating Theories.’ American Political Science Review, 91, 4: 913-917. Wohlforth, W. C. (1994) ‘Realism and the End of the Cold War.’ International Security, 19, 3: 91-129. Wohlforth, W. C., Kaufman, S. J., & Little, R. (2007) ‘Introduction: Balance and Hierarchy in International Systems.’ In The Balance of Power in World History. Ed. by Kaufman, S. J., Little, R., & Wohlforth, W. C. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Read More