International Relations Theory and the War on Terror - Coursework Example

International Relations Theory and the War on Terror The world forever changed the morning of September 11th 2001. The attacks on the World Center represented the most serious terrorist acts ever carried out on US soil. A watershed moment in world history, that fateful morning will forever be engrained in the American national psyche. From a political, social and economic perspective, the hijackings of 9/11 were unparalleled in scope and sheer devastation. In a fascinating article entitled “Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack on New York City”, it was estimated that the direct cost of the attack stood at between $33 billion and $36 billion to the city of New York (Orr, Bram & Rappaport 55). In addition to the direct economic costs associated with terrorism and the threat of further terrorism, 9/11 also had important political ramifications. Importantly, political scientists have been wracking their brains trying to make sense the horrific violence undertaken the morning of 9/11 and further violence inspired by global jihadists bent on taking over the world. Psychologists sought to explore the psychological factors leading people to kill in the name of Allah, domestic-level theorists explored the domestic antecedents to terror including extreme poverty, a lack of education and political repression. System-level theorists, however were at a loss to explain the attacks of September 11th and the ensuing War on Terror. Contrary to popular opinion, this essay will persuasively argue that international relations theory can and will explain the War on Terror. Accordingly, realism as an explanatory theory of international relations is the theory most applicable to the present international order. Although realism will have to evolve to take into consideration the changing face of the international order, particularly in light of the emergence of sub-state actors who wish to fundamentally destroy this present international order, realism is the best system-level theory to understand the global War on Terror. Realism, as an explanatory theory of international relations, provides perhaps the most concise and strongest definition of what constitutes state interest, behavior and the establishment of the international order. Accordingly, realists argue that states exist within an anarchic geopolitical framework and this framework is an inherent component of international relations. In fact, for realists the desire to maximize state interest within a situation of global anarchy is the most crucial component required in the understanding of political actors and state behavior. Seeking to address how realism, as a positivistic theory of international relations, explains the international order despite the condition of anarchy with the international system, this essay will explore state interest and behavior. We will begin with an overview of the international system and discuss the anarchic nature of the international order. We then explore the realist definitions of state interest and employ structural realism to explain the reasons for the international order. As we analyze the existence of international order from the Cold War until today, this research paper aims to undertake a thorough analysis of the key principles of international affairs, state interest and state behavior. An in-depth exploration of the phenomenon of international order, despite an anarchic international environment, will guide this assignment. Anarchy and the International System First and foremost it is important to remember that state interest operates within an anarchic environment. The international system is inherently unstable and is aptly characterized by widespread anarchy. This anarchic environment is particularly revelant to system-level analyses of terrorists who naturally operate in an anarchic environment and thrive in such conditions. Due to the absence of a suprastate or overarching Leviathan authority, realism argues that states are placed in inevitable and perpetual competition, described as the security dilemma. Because of the anarchic nature of international affairs, state actors are perpetually concerned with their survival. For realists, the international system is a “dog-eat-dog world” and ensuring survival is paramount for any and all states. According to Hans Morgenthau, pioneering German political scientist and an early proponent of realist thought, due to the inherent instability of the international system, the fundamental national interest of all states is to “protect [its] physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations” (Morgenthau, 1952). Specifically, threats to states are determined by their relative power vis-à-vis one others in the international system. The structure of the system – the distribution of power and capabilities state wide - is important because threats or challenges facing a state which affront the national interest should be “calculated according to the situation in which the state finds itself” (Waltz, 1979). Thus, power and security requirements are paramount in attempting to define state interest and what motivates states to act. Today, states face a variety of challenges from non-state actors such as Hamas (Isreal/Palestine), Hezbollah (Lebanon), Al Qaeda (Global), ETA (Spain), the PKK (Turkey) or any host of other clandestine sub-state actors. While the challenges, and challengers facing states may have changed since the days of Morgenthau, the fundamental anarchic conditions he describes have not. Since we have established that the international order is one in which anarchy reigns supreme – an apt characterization of the world order in which terrorism reigns supreme - how do realists define state interest and what determines the behavior of states? (Hellmann & Wolfe 1993). State Interest and Behavior For realists, power and wealth supply the means for states to survive, to meet their security requirements, and thus to continue to compete in a system in which other states and, now increasingly, sub-state actors are necessarily either actual or potential threats. State officials and policy analysts are therefore advised realistically to asses the distribution of power; they should overcome their ‘aversion to seeing problems of international politics as they are’ in order to objectively asses the national interest in light of the distribution of power. Every state, that is, must pursue its national interest “defined in terms of power” (Morgenthau 1952) because this is the surest road to security and survival (Weldes, 1999). Although anarchy breeds insecurity and potential conflict is a feature of the system, realism does not imply unremitting conflict. To conceive of international politics as a Hobbesian state of nature means not that warfare is constant, but only that it is always a possibility and that actors understand this. Although the anticipation of conflict may make it more likely, it can also lead actors to take measures to reduce the danger. The War on Terror can thus be justified as an attempt by states to pre-empt sub-state threats caused inherent in the anarchic international environment (Jervis, 2005). Accordingly, realism focuses on states as constituent units who behave as rational actors and exist in an anarchic environment lacking a supranational authority. For neorealists, the structure of the international system is fundamental to the theory and we now turn to an overview of structural realism. Structural Realism Structural realism is an important theory of international relations best articulated by Waltz in Theory of International Politics. As a systemic approach to the study of state behavior, structural realism places emphasis on the structure of the international system – note that structure can be present under a system of anarchy – and this structure constrains overall state behavior. Accordingly, neorealists – as structural realists are often called – assert that the international order is characterized by its primary ordering principle, anarchy. Anarchy within the international system is directly caused by the fact that there is no central, overarching or omnipotent authority within the international system. Unlike domestic level analyses which view the state as the actor who is responsible for maintaining order and using a Weberian term enjoys a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, the international system is most aptly characterized by the lack of a central authority. The result is chaos within the international system. Accordingly, there are three elements of structural realism which define this theoretical paradigm as an extension of the realist tradition. First and foremost is the continued primacy of the political sphere; by this what is meant is the anarchic political structure of the international system. Accordingly, the anarchic nature of the international system for realists and structural realists alike is a necessary attribute of the world order. The second defining feature of structural realism is the belief that the state is the defining feature of the international system and the focus on the state as the most important actor in the international order. Power as an inherent attribute and goal of all states is an intrinsic component of this second feature of structural realism. This state-centric feature of structural realism which will need to evolve in the post-9/11 period. Since sub-state actors have gained more prominence in the international area through terror and terrorist acts, this aspect of realist doctrine will need to evolve. Finally, the third element is the acceptance of Waltz’s basic framework for the structure of the international system (Waltz, 1979; Buzan, 1993). Additionally, structural change affects the behavior of states and the outcomes their interactions produce. It does not break the essential continuity of international politics. The transformation of international politics alone could do that. Transformation, however, awaits the day when the international system is no longer populated by states that have to help themselves. If the day were here, one would be able to say who could be relied on to help the disadvantaged or endangered. Instead, the ominous shadow of the future continues to cast its pall over interacting states. States’ perennial uncertainty about their fates presses governments to prefer relative over absolute gains (Waltz, 1979). Anarchy and uncertainty are intrinsic to the international system. What was the international order during the Cold War? Global Stability during the Cold War During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in a bitter confrontation pitting two opposite poles in the international order against one another. In this period of bipolarity, state behavior was mediated by concerns regarding the stability of the international system as well as the state interest and behavior of the other major power. If we apply the realist conception of states power and apply it to the United States, state interest is culmination of a variety of factors and is determined in terms of power politics and system-level concerns. Today, the United States operates in a unipolar world and is the world’s hegemonic state. State behavior is less constrained as it was during the Cold War but US state interest today reflects power conditions and the maintenance of overall system stability which promotes the supreme status of the United States in the international system. Power is a “hard” issue and a primary concern for survival; so called “soft issues” like human rights and democracy are far less salient. In the anarchic world of international affairs, hard or core issues always supersede soft issues and are integral to defining state interest and behavior. Structural Realism after the Cold War What is the state of the international order following the end of the Cold War? In an article entitled “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy”, T.V. Paul addressed the issue of hegemonic power and stability in the post-Cold War period and explores the means through which other powers have attempted to counteract the global supremacy of the United States. As the world’s hegemonic power, the United States has, in the Cold War period, resorted to unilateralism and expansive military might. The systemic level response, according to this article has been a variety of soft-power strategies by second tier major powers (France, Germany and India) to counter the influence of the United States while not harming their economic ties with the world’s dominant economic and military power. Thus although balance of power theory has traditionally focused upon the military dimension of balancing and the Cold War remains perhaps the most poignant example of this theoretical paradigm, in a unipolar world dominated by the United States, second tier powers within the international system has used soft-power balancing strategies to restrain the global hegemon. An excellent example of this phenomenon was the united opposition of France, Germany and Russia to the United States-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. This essay now turns to the most prominent contemporary proponent of realist theory, Kenneth Waltz, and explores his conception of realism and the international order in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union (Paul 2005). Has realism made a resurgence in the post-Cold War period? According to Kenneth Waltz, in an article entitled ‘Structural Realism After the Cold War”, it has. Waltz emphatically argues that while the structure of the international system has changed with the disappearance of the Soviet Union, international politics itself and the underlying motivations for state interest and state behavior have not. Thus, bipolarity was a feature of the international order for more than fifty years and the collapse of the Soviet Union has ushered in a period of unipolarity with the United States alone at the helm of the current international order. Despite this profound change within the system, the system itself, according to structural realists, has not been transformed. Transformative of the system may occur one day, Waltz argues, but not until states become motivated by things other than self-interest and if anarchy no longer exemplified the condition of the international order. That is not the case and “until and unless a transformation occurs, [realism] remains the basic theory of international politics.” (Waltz 2000; Sheetz 1998). Concluding Remarks Realism, a positive theory which seeks to explain the international order, remains arguably the most important theory in international relations today. Realists argue that in spite of the inherent attribute of anarchy within the international system, order is achieved through the inherent structure of the international system. During the Cold War, the international order was characterized by precarious balancing between the two poles, a system of bipolarity between the Soviet Union and the United States. This period, remarkable for the sustenance of bipolarity for more than half a century, was also characterized by the prevalence of security dilemmas for both powers. Since each pole was engaged in ideological conflict with the other, the international system was conceived of in zero-sum terms with the potential to engage each superpower military conflict. As an explanatory paradigm, Hegemonic Stability Theory, expounded by neorealists and neoliberals alike, argues that a hegemon or superpower is necessary for the smooth functioning of the international system (the system can be economic or political). A hegemon is often described as a superpower and has a preponderance of power in the military, economic and sometimes social spheres. According to neorealists, a hegemonic power shapes the system in its interests and maintains the system through coercion. The system itself needs the hegemon to survive and instability reigns supreme when the hegemon declines. Structural analyses have thus provided excellent insight into the functioning of the international order. According to realism then, system-level concerns shape the behavior of actors on the international stage and the structure of the international system maintains international order despite the condition of global anarchy. Although realists will have to move away from their state-centric approach to the international order, their focus on anarchy as a defining feature of the international system and power and security as primary motivations for state behavior make realism the most relevant theory of international relations in the post-9/11 world. WORKS CITED Bergesen, A. J. and O. Lizardo (Mar., 2004). “International Terrorism and the World-System.” Sociological Theory, 22:1, 38-52. Bloom, M. (2005). Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror. New York: Columbia University Press. Bram, J., Orr, J. and Rapaport, C. (2005). 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