Towards Understanding the European Unions International Presence - Coursework Example

Understanding the European Union’s international presence is not an easy task. Scholars concur that the EU has an international presence (it is visible in regional and global foray) and that it exhibits some elements of ‘actorness’ (it is an international actor in some areas but not in others). Yet there is no much consensus over how to conceptualize the European Union’s actorness. EU’s actorness or the EU’s condition or not as an international actor has been related to the existence of a ‘European Foreign Policy’ (EFP). However instead of measuring the EU’s external behavior and its policymaking in order to conclude if there is or not an European Foreign Policy, the theoretical interest has been mainly centered in the theoretical capability-expectations gap and in categorizing and defining not the EFP but the EU’s international role. It is only lately that some studies have pointed out the relevance and the need of a Foreign Policy Approach (FPA) to help explain the complex arena of the European Union’s Foreign Policy. To adapt FPA to the European Union, an original and unique political organization, poses no insuperable problems. The difficulty is to apply an FPA approach to “European Foreign Policy”. In my view the concept of “European Foreign Policy” is the problem. For some analysts EFP is synonymous with EU’s Common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP) which should be differentiated from the European Community external competences (the traditional trade policy and the new development policy complementary to those of the Member States). Recently Hill (2002: 2-3) employs the term “European Foreign Policy” to the ensemble of the international activities of the European Union alone, not only CFSP activities but also including outputs from the other two EU’s pillars, considered as a “mass of activity” which cannot be pretended to be in itself coherent. Others find the former definition to restrictive and consider that EFP takes three forms: member states Foreign Policy, Community external relations and Union’s CFSP. In this context EFP is understood as a system of external relations or a Foreign Policy system where these three strands can be differentiated for analytical purpose. Although these perspectives stress that a key research task for the analyst is to establish the extent to which these forms have become interwoven over time, the fact is that this notion of EFP emphasizes the distinct sets of activity more than their interaction. These definitions of EFP tend to ignore that CFSP provides the necessary political dimension to the Union’s external action, that is to say, provides the political dimension which complements Community action. Moreover they fail to recognize the fact that in spite of its limitations and deficiencies the Treaty on European Union has allowed the formulation and implementation of a Common Foreign Policy which is more than the sum of member state’s foreign policies. The Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe is a clear example of the later. It showed for the first time a common Foreign Policy strategy, combining Community and CFSP measures. Another example is, the EU has also a CFP towards the Mediterranean and the Middle East, Russia, Ukraine, the Western Balkans. This is not to say that it is, or should be, a single foreign policy of a federal type but to recognize that the Union is an original and unique political organization where the CFP coexists within national foreign policies, which should be coherent nor contradictory with the later. The concept of “common” foreign policy invokes the existence of interests in common. The Treaty on European Union makes a clear differentiation between areas of common interest and matters of general interest on which the Member States will inform and consult one another within the Council (Art.16). The common interest doesn’t emerge automatically. It is the result of a process of overcoming narrow national interests for the shake of a shared common interest. The common interest also arises from the existence of common values which the Union wants to promote and defended in the international scene. EU’s Foreign policy has as its first objective to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union. The common values shared by the Member States are laid down in Article 6.1 of the Common provisions which confirms their attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. Furthermore, respect for human rights is one of the main prerequisites for membership of the European Union and a basic principle informing all its activities. This general objective is specifically stressed in the development cooperation policy which should contribute to it (Article 177.2). On this basis, the protection and promotion of human rights has become the mainstay of the EU common foreign policy. The difficulty of finding an explanatory framework of the Common Foreign Policy stems mainly from the unsuitability of the concepts and categories employed. The question is not to apply to the European Union state categories or to pretend to recognize in the Union features characteristics of a state Foreign Policy but a better understanding of the context of the Union’s action. Also if we understand Foreign Policy as the way a political community, usually but not always a state, projects itself in the international scene. Then, the question is to observe if the Union, a political system where a policy-making cycle can be identified, has the capability to develop a common Foreign Policy, namely to formulate Foreign Policy objectives and the instruments to implement them. Common Foreign Policy (CFP) is the way the European Union projects itself towards the external word as a response to external challenges and according to common interests and common values. CFP is thus the result of a decision making process which through a single institutional framework, allows the formulation and implementation of Foreign Policy strategies using Community, CFSP and third pillar instruments. Even since the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union we see how it has steadily expanded its scope (it has a progressive character) there are still geographic areas where the Member States don’t share the same geopolitical interests neither they have the same compromises and responsibilities (Africa in general with the exception of South Africa is the best example). It can also be claimed that is common although not fully consistent. However absolute and full consistency, in terms of both activities and institutions, is hardly an attainable goal. Besides which national Foreign Policy can claim to be fully consistent? As Dassù and Missiroli (2002: 1) acknowledge this is so inside the member states, and it is all the more so in the EU level. The strength of the Union’s common Foreign Policy lies in its structural character. Since the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) we have witnessed the development of global, long-term strategies towards the EU’s priority geographic areas. Above their specific objectives, they all serve the TEU general objectives of preserving peace and strengthening international security, the development of international trade and to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms rights. These objectives are pursued by three main instruments: political dialogue, the promotion of free trade and the support of regional co-operation/integration. These are instruments with a long-term stabilization perspective. In this regard CFP shows the benefices of a Foreign Policy developed by other means than the military thus reinforcing the civilian power image of the Union. But the record of last years also evidences EU’s inability to develop an effective and consistent Foreign Policy in response to conflict situations. The EU has lacked the ability to project its capacity in order to implement its Foreign Policy objectives (complex and lengthy procedures of Foreign Policy formulation and decision-making, the unanimity requirement constrains policy-makers to the search of the lowest common, inter-pillar friction, lack of military forc).The best example are the western Balkans. Although former Yugoslavia was identified as a possible area of common interest and the Union’s common values were at stake, the EU didn’t take the resolute action that was needed. Early diplomatic and mediation efforts by the EC to stem conflict failed, largely because there was no political will. It could be argued that there was no Union at the time. Neither was there any underlying policy, neither a structure of appropriate mechanisms that might have enabled the Union to contribute to effective international crisis management. When the EU is able to develop a common strategy and spite of the fact that Yugoslavia becomes the top priority of the CFSP it is already to late. Although it worked actively to search for a peaceful solution to the conflict it failed again to provide protection to the civilian population. It is not until the Kosovo crisis explodes that the Union manifests in the end a willingness to act. The European Council’s decision to develop civilian and military capabilities for international conflict prevention and crisis management (including new decision-making bodies and modes of participation and cooperation with international partners) shows the new attitude of the Union. The Union has a comparative advantage in the field of conflict prevention. Conflict prevention requires a comprehensive and multidimensional approach which combines emergency aid with measures to protect human rights and rehabilitation measures with long term strategies that address the underlying causes taking humanitarian needs in consideration. In this context, the add-value of the European Union is twofold: on the one hand it disposes of a whole range of instruments from diplomatic activity, external assistance, humanitarian aid to human rights policy, trade policy, social and environment policies etc. which can be better targeted towards conflict prevention through an integrated and long term approach and, on the other hand it could guarantee a relief-rehabilitation-development continuum during the different phases. Moreover is the only organization with the structure, mandate, decision making and financial-funding needed. By the way there is not at world level, an organ comparable to the Commission of the European Union with the financial resources, experience and field presence. It is still early to know if the EU will be able to meet the challenge of crisis management. EU’s civilian crisis management capacity is an ongoing process in which important issues of co-ordination among the different civilian elements of a mission, between European Community and EU instruments, between EU’s civilian and military crisis management instruments and between EU and Member States actions still need to be address. It will also take some time before the results of the process of reform of external aid undertaking by the Commission and the performance of the new Rapid Reaction Mechanism can be fully assessed. The experience of the Union’s policy in the Balkans made amply clear that is the dose of political will, more than the perfection of instruments and procedures, what determines success in Foreign Policy. (If it is measured that Foreign Policy in relation with the ability to project resources in order to implement Foreign Policy objectives, success would be the effective meeting of the stated objectives). Still, appropriate decision-making processes and structures may not supplement the existence of a common interest but they can surely contribute to create it. Appropriate instruments also contribute to success. In fact first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo, in the absence of an EU’s credible military force its diplomacy lacked effectiveness. Moreover in both occasions the inexistence of a common coercive instrument obliged the Union to depend on the United Sates implication, therefore on NATO. Eventually the Kosovo crisis served both as a catalyst and as a wake-up call for the European Union to accept its international responsibilities. The development of a military crisis management capability should give the Union autonomy and independence to act. The take-over of the mission in Macedonia and Bosnia would be a test. This is not the end of the European Union as a civilian power but rather the strengthening of the European Union’s identity and it’s role in the international system. European aversion to the exercise of military power is not the “understandable” consequence of Europe’s military weakness (Kagan: 2002, 6) but the consequence of a genuine dislike of military power and of its utility in international relations. EU value of soft-power tools and its appeal to international law and multilateralism is not, again, the product of disparity of power with the United States. It is the result of a truly belief in that with its traditional instruments such as trade, aid and diplomacy it tackles not only the symptoms but also the root causes of conflict. Europe’s strength lies in its civilian power. 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