The Concept of Liberty - Essay Example

The Concept of Liberty The clssicl liberl, libertrin, nd principl commonsense conception of interpersonl liberty is of people not hving constrints imposed upon them by other people. Such liberty is here formulted s people not hving subjective cost initited nd imposed on them (tht is, without their consent) by other people. Or, for short, liberty is the bsence of imposed cost. In the event of mutul clsh of imposed costs, observing liberty entils minimizing imposed costs. These two formule re defended s cpturing the conception clerly, consistently, comprehensively, nd non-morlly. They re used to derive property implictions nd to solve philosophicl problems ssocited with this conception of liberty. In the following pper I would like to discuss the concept of liberty s it is presented by severl reserches. First I will define the generl concept of liberty s it is viewed by the generl socil community, then I will discuss the views of severl uthors s for the liberty concept. Finlly I Will mke the conclusions nd summrize the reserched pper. 'Liberty', in its most generl sense, signifies the bsence of some sort of constrint on something. The topic here is interpersonl liberty: the bsence of initited constrints on people by other people; or, more precisely, people intercting voluntrily without constrining, interfering with, or imposing upon ech other - except to prevent or redress initited constrining, interfering, or imposing. s 'imposing' seems the most generl of these terms, I shll stick with tht s long s it withstnds criticism. Positively inititing n imposition on nother is to be contrsted here with merely withholding ssistnce, or with defense or redress (so not just nything tht nyone else might do could be described s 'imposing'). This sense of 'liberty' is supposed to be the opposite of subjection nd oppression: it is individul sovereignty. It is bout the voluntry interction of persons rther thn selfish individulism, s its detrctors sometimes misrepresent it. This is the liberty of libertrinism, clssicl liberlism, nd much - though not ll - common sense. s fr s I cn tell, no one hs hitherto provided n dequte ccount of liberty in this sense. This filure is prticulrly striking nd ironic mong those clling themselves 'libertrins'. I shll ttempt cler, or t lest clerer, wy of expressing this ide tht is cpble of deling with vrious problems. number of reserches nd politicins in different wys interpret the concept of liberty. I will tke look t severl of them so tht them in my further reserch. Isih Berlin presents two concepts of liberty through which he plces the freedom of judgment in reltionship to them, nd lys out some dvntges of liberty bsed on judgment over the other two concepts. One wy of tking Berlin's distinction is to mke it debte over the importnce of politicl prticiption. Berlin himself llows for number of other wys to put the distinction, but describes the centrl issue dividing the two concepts s follows: Liberty in [the negtive] sense is principlly concerned with the re of control, not with its source. Just s democrcy my, in fct, deprive the individul citizen of gret mny liberties which he might hve in some other form of society, so it is perfectly conceivble tht liberl-minded despot would llow his subjects lrge mesure of personl freedom. Self-government my, on the whole, provide better gurntee of the preservtion of civil liberties thn other rgimes, nd hs been defended s such by libertrins. But there is no necessry connexion between individul liberty nd democrtic rule. The nswer to the question "Who governs me" is logiclly distinct from the question "How fr does government interfere with me" It is in this difference tht the gret contrst between the two concepts of negtive nd positive liberty, in the end, consists (Berlin, 2002). Mny hve red Berlin s n updted version of Benjmin Constnt, who put mtters similrly. Constnt distinguished between the liberty of the ncients nd the liberty of the moderns, sying tht "n Englishmn, Frenchmn, nd citizen of the United Sttes" understnds liberty to be the right of everyone "to express their opinion, choose profession nd prctise it, to dispose of property, to come nd go without permission, to ssocite with other individuls, to profess the religion which they prefer, or even simply to occupy their dys or hours in wy which is most comptible with their inclintions or whims." For the ncients, by contrst, liberty consisted in jointly crrying out the ffirs of stte: "in exercising collectively, but directly, severl prts of the complete sovereignty; in deliberting, in the public squre, over wr nd pece, in voting lws, in pronouncing judgments; in exmining the ccounts, the cts, the stewrdship of the mgistrtes." Constnt's comprison is subtle nd complex-representtive, if not prticiptory, democrcy turns out to be prt even of the liberty of the moderns-but he puts into shrp contrst liberty tht mkes individuls "sovereign in public ffirs" but "slve[s] in privte reltions" with one tht mkes them "independent in privte life" but publicly cipher. From this contrst, debtes over the importnce of politicl prticiption to freedom tke their cue. liberl stte, on the first notion of liberty, need not be democrtic, nd the undemocrtic structure of privte corportions does not in ny wy diminish the freedom of the workers they employ. ccording to the second notion of liberty, both the stte nd the workplce should be democrtic. Note tht there need be little difference over policy between upholders of the negtive nd upholders of the positive view. s Constnt's concession to representtive democrcy revels, nd s Berlin explicitly points out, upholders of negtive liberty cn gree tht democrcy is n excellent, even necessry, wy to protect noninterference with individul c tivities. Democrcy serves s check to tyrnny nd corruption; it provides n incentive encourging those in power to protect the liberties of the people over whom they rule. Of course it does not lwys do this. When populce is religiously bised, strict rule by the mjority my oppress minorities. When populce does not understnd or is indifferent to the condition of poverty, rule by the mjority my obstruct options giving the poor wy out of their condition. The first kind of cse explins why we in meric declre n bsolute individul right to religious expression, nd put the power to enforce tht right in the undemocrtic Supreme Court. The second kind of cse explins how progressive voices in the nineteenth century could give the interest of workers themselves s reson to oppose extending the frnchise. Whether democrcy will enhnce or detrct from liberty in ny given cse is n empiricl question. But it is probbly sfe to ssume tht in most cses, where elections re open, speech is free, nd some medium of speech conveys the issues firly well to the voters, democrcy will protect liberty. Indeed, these instrumentl resons for democrcy re sufficient to underwrite strong cse for democrcy in the workplce: insofr s workplce monitors nd imposes discipline on lrge section of its workers' lives, it cn constitute s significnt thret to liberty s the government, nd the best sfegurd ginst tht thret, in mny cses, will be democrtic ccountbility. But if one who holds the negtive view of liberty cn be socil democrt s esily s libertrin, then policy commitments will not mrk the distinction between holders of the negtive nd holders of the positive view. Wht is t stke between negtive nd positive views of liberty is whether democrcy forms n intrinsic prt of freedom. Supporters of positive liberty believe, s Quentin Skinner puts it, tht we need to estblish one prticulr form of politicl ssocition-therefter devoting ourselves to serving nd sustining it-if we wish to relise our own ntures nd hence our fullest liberty. Our freedom depends on our pursuing our most distinctively humn purposes, nd since humn beings re most distinctively socil nd politicl in chrcter, the pursuit of such purposes requires tht we hve role in the politicl structures tht govern us. ccording to the rgument most fvored by contemporry defenders of positive liberty, democrcy enhnces our freedom () by giving us more control over our options thn we would otherwise hve nd (b) by fostering in us excellences proper to life in community with others, without which our individul cpcities for ction will be thin simulcr of wht fully free, fully humn ction requires. These two points re of very different merits. The first is seriously confused, I think, while the second is quite true-but provides only wek cse for the importnce of democrtic citizenship. By moving from self-rule s politicl prticiption to self-rule s the individul's rule over herself, we point the wy to wht is clled the third concept of liberty. For rule over oneself is quintessentilly the exercise of judgment or phronesis, the mking of choices guided by judgment. But to see the exercise of this qulity s constituting concept of liberty t ll, we need to recst Berlin's distinction so tht it does not turn on politicl prticiption. Berlin's own presenttion very much llows for tht. philosophiclly deep wy of tking his distinction, nd one tht enbles us to situte Kntin judgment in the middle of it, is to see it s division between two understndings of humn nture. Suppose one begins the cse for positive liberty from within the notion of negtive liberty. Freedom from restrictions, one sys, is impossible without some freedom to combt the internl s well s externl obstcles to my ction. The notion of n internl obstcle-n obstcle to me tht is lso within me-then requires some notion of the self s divided, s split between, stndrdly, set of merely given desires nd some controlling gency over those desires. The rguments for this view mke more philosophicl sense thn the rguments tht self-government requires politicl prticiption, lthough they cn led to rther more dngerous politicl conclusions. nd the liberty of judgment I derive from Knt nd Smith cn be clerly seen s n lterntive to the two trditionl concepts of liberty if we put the issue in these terms. Berlin defines negtive liberty s freedom from obstructions or inter ferences. This leves open the question: obstructions to wht The bsence of interference with wht spect of myself constitutes freedom To which most ccounts of negtive liberty, including Berlin's own, reply: "obstructions to my desires" (Berlin, 2002). I m free when I cn ct to stisfy my desires, unfree when such ction is thwrted. "The negtive conception of liberty in its clssicl form," sys Berlin, is the notion tht "ll coercion is, in so fr s it frustrtes humn desires, bd s such, lthough it my hve to be pplied to prevent other, greter evils." (Berlin, 2002). Plesure, the stisfction of desire, is the centrl term in this conception, for which reson Hobbes nd Benthm re its stndrd founders. Constnt writes tht the "im of the moderns is the enjoyment of security in privte plesures; nd they cll liberty the gurntees fforded by institutions to those plesures". This does indeed seem to be the dominnt modern view. mong economists, the notion tht liberty protects privte plesures is tken s lmost tutologous. nd the prominent politicl philosopher Joel Feinberg begins n introductory text to his subject with the clim: Becuse of the intimte tie between constrints nd desires, it is nturl to think of the bridgment of freedom s necessrily productive of frustrtion. When we re constrined in the most obvious cses, our wnts re denied their stisfction (Berlin, 2005). Sometimes this linkge of liberty to desire is qulified to cknowledge tht some of us, nd ll of us on some occsions, feel coerced by our desires. Negtive liberty for psychotic or drug ddict my depend precisely on obstructing some desires, if only so tht others cn be more redily stisfied. When this ccount is extended to cover people other thn the md nd the ddicted, the relevnt desires to be constrined re picked out by ppels to qulittive differences mong desires (J. S. Mill) or to higher-order desires nd their reltionship to our lower-order desires (Hrry Frnkfurt). Even when so qulified, negtive liberty remins essentilly defined by mens of the stisfction of desires. Mill's higher plesures still fulfill desires, while Frnkfurt's cse for heeding our second-order desires depends on demnd, within our first-order desires, for fuller or more coherent stisfction thn the first-order desires themselves cn chieve. nother resercher, Dworkin, viewed the concept of liberty in its connection with equlity trying to mrk the re of lw with the principle of utonomy nd equl respect. In liberl politicl theory, it seems to be the pproprite cndidte. Protecting individul liberty is by definition centrl concern for ny liberl polity, but the reson liberls insist on polity tht protects life, liberty, property, nd the pursuit of hppiness is tht liberl politicl theory vlorizes the powers of utonomous gency nd scribes the cpcity for such utonomous gency, in equl mesure, to ll mture, helthy humn beings. Implementing tht vlue requires the most extensive possible protections for the development, mintennce, nd exercise of the cpcity for utonomous gency consistent with equl protection for ll. Restrictions on liberty --restrictions on the wys in which individuls exercise their utonomy--will lwys require justifiction, but restrictions which compromise the cpcity for utonomous ctivity itself (s opposed to its mere exercise in prticulr cse) will require the strongest possible justifiction. This distinction often gets lost in politicl debtes bout liberty, especilly when libertrinism is conceived of s vriety of liberl politicl theory. Libertrins who conceive of liberty s intrinsiclly vluble, nd thus conceive of the protection of liberty s fundmentl morl principle, re not liberls. Perhps, rther, it is best to sy tht they re t one end of continuum which includes liberls for whom the fundmentl morl principle is the protection of utonomy. For those liberls, the protection of liberty is n instrumentl principle, dopted s wy of implementing commitment to the development, mintennce, nd exercise of gency powers in everyone. Such liberls will ccept restrictions on liberty tht re necessry to develop or preserve gency powers; tht is, the bsic liberl rgument for pternlistic intervention. Such liberls will be reltively untroubled by restrictions on liberty tht leve "s much nd s good" (Dworkin, 1999) for the gents involved--tht is, stisfy generl version of the Locken Proviso--or tht re the inevitble by-product of utonomous choices by the gents themselves nd do no hrm to others. The fct tht Professor Dworkin writes skepticl essy bout utonomy nd the enforcement of morls, though it limits my liberty in some sense, does not limit it in morlly or politiclly significnt sense. Hyek's understnding of liberty is inseprble from the ccount he gives of the nture of morlity, nd few spects of his work re so often misunderstood s the conception he develops of morlity. He hs been chrcterized s morl reltivist, n exponent of evolutionry ethics nd, less implusibly but nonetheless incorrectly, s rule-utilitrin. In the first plce, morl life for Hyek is itself mnifesttion of spontneous order. Like lnguge nd lw, morlity emerged undesigned from the life of men with one nother: it is so much bound up with humn life, indeed, s to be prtly constitutive of it. The mxims of morlity in no wy presuppose n uthority, humn or divine, from which they emnte, nd they ntedte the institutions of the stte. But, secondly, the detiled content of the morl conventions which spring up unplnned in society is not immutble or invrint. Morl conventions chnge, often slowly nd lmost imperceptibly, in ccordnce with the needs nd circumstnces of the men who subscribe to them. Morl conventions must (on Hyek's ccount of them) be seen s prt of the evolving socil order itself. Now t this point it is likely tht chrge of ethicl reltivism or evolutionism will t once be levelled ginst Hyek, but there is little substnce to such criticisms. He hs gone out of his wy to distinguish his stndpoint from ny sort of evolutionry ethics. s he put it in his Constitution of Liberty: It is fct which we must recognize tht even wht we regrd s good or beutiful is chngeble-if not in ny recognizble mnner tht would entitle us to tke reltivistic position, then in the sense tht in mny respects we do not know wht will pper s good or beutiful to nother genertion It is not only in his knowledge, but lso in his ims nd vlues, tht mn is the creture of his civiliztion; in the lst resort, it is the relevnce of these individul wishes to the perpetution of the group or the species tht will determine whether they persist or chnge. It is, of course, mistke to believe tht we cn drw conclusions bout wht our vlues ought to be simply becuse we relize tht they re product of evolution. But we cnnot resonbly doubt tht these vlues re creted nd ltered by the sme evolutionry forces tht hve produced our intelligence (Hyek, 1996). Hyek's rgument here, then, is mnifestly not tht we cn invoke the trend of socil evolution s stndrd for the resolution of morl dilemms, but rther tht we re bound to recognize in our current morl conventions the outcome of long evolutionry process. Hyek does not, then, subscribe to ny sort of ethicl reltivism or evolutionism, but it is not ltogether cler from these sttements if he thinks humnity's chnging morl conventions hve in fct ny invrint core or constnt content. In order to consider this lst question, nd to ttin better generl understnding of Hyek's conception of morlity, we need to look t his debts to Dvid Hume, whose influence upon Hyek's morl nd politicl philosophy is ubiquitous nd profound. In Hyek's conception of it, individul liberty is creture of the lw nd does not exist outside ny civil society. He goes further thn this, nd proceeds to dvnce one of the most severely criticized clims of his philosophy, when he rgues tht the rule of lw, properly understood nd consistently pplied, is bound to protect individul liberty. nother resercher Dvid Miller developed his understnding of liberty through the rgument of rejecting cosmopolitnism nd estblishing liberl ntionlist. The cosmopolitns Miller trgets re centrlly concerned with how to pproximte the idel of democrcy in our world better thn we currently do. significnt prt of their project involves willingness to contemplte lterntive forms of governnce, citizenship, nd sovereignty which, they rgue, re more democrtic. In this connection, the new cosmopolitns do, periodiclly, dvocte more cosmopolitn forms of citizenship in their efforts to promote greter globl consciousness which better reflects our complex interdependence nd to fcilitte chnges necessry to chieve more uthentic democrcy. The newest of the new rguments Miller presses ginst the cosmopolitns centers crucilly round the notion of citizenship. Miller rgues tht the prctice of (republicn) citizenship is immensely vluble representing the best wy in which people cn live together nd shpe the future of their community in wys tht promote the common good. Certin preconditions (such s certin mount of solidrity, mutul trust, nd loylty) re necessry if citizens re to ct responsibly in public decision-mking bout the common good, nd common ntionlity promotes these. Miller is deeply skepticl tht trnsntionl decision-mking mechnisms could foster the necessry solidrity. He rgues tht without common ntionlity there is no reson to expect tht people prticipting in world governnce would ct responsibly. Inventing forms of citizenship will not help solve the pressing problems of interntionl justice, in his view. The principle of ntionlity tht Miller defends consists of three clims: "tht ntionl identity is defensible source of personl identity, tht ntions re ethicl communities tht impose reciprocl obligtions on members which re not owed to outsiders, nd tht ntions hve good clim to be self-determining." (Miller, 2000). While defending ntionlism, he lso recognizes importnt obligtions to nonmembers of one's ntion, including three core requirements he believes re binding on ll politicl communities: "n obligtion to respect nd sfegurd bsic humn rights everywhere, n obligtion not to exploit other communities nd individuls, nd n obligtion to help crete the conditions under which ll ntions hve the chnce to chieve their own regimes of justice internlly." (Gry, 1983). So, on the fce of it t lest, it ppers tht Miller does concede sme of the very issues of concern to cosmopolitns, but there re still key differences, s I discuss shortly. Miller believes, "globl justice sets certin lim its on wht ntion-sttes cn decide to do, but still leves them with wide rnge of options." In prticulr, he wnts to llow spce for "institutionl schemes tht re designed to deliver benefits exclusively to those who fll within the sme boundries s ourselves," s welfre progrmmes (such s pension schemes nd unemployment benefits) typiclly do. Ntionlism cretes the necessry solidrity for such schemes to work, hence its undenible morl importnce, ccording to Miller. Miller offers two min rguments ginst the cosmopolitns, one I cll "The Welfre Stte rgument" nd the other I cll "The Citizenship rgument." Bibliogrphy: 1. Berlin, Isih. Freedom nd its Betryl: Six Enemies of Humn Liberty, recorded 1952; ed. Henry Hrdy, 2002 2. Dnto, rthur C. ' Constructing n Epistemology of Humn Rights: Pseudo Problem ' In Pul nd Miller 1984 3. Dvid Miller, Citizenship nd Ntionl Identity (Cmbridge: Polity, 2000). 4. Gmble, Hyek. The Iron Cge of Liberty, Cmbridge: Polity Press, 1996. 5. Gerld Dworkin, Devlin Ws Right: Lw nd the Enforcement of Morlity, 40 WM. & MRY L. REV. 927, 931 (1999). 6. Gry, John. 1983. Mill On Liberty: Defence. London: Routledge. 7. Rz, Joseph. "Incommensurbility nd gency." Incommensurbility, Incomprbility, nd Prcticl Reson. Ed. Ruth Chng (Cmbridge: Hrvrd University Press, 1997 ), pp. 110-113. 8. Rothbrd, Murry N. 1979. Left nd Right: The Prospects for Liberty. Sn Frncisco: Cto Institute. Read More