Relationship between China and the US - Case Study Example

China and the United s in the twenty-first century: Rivals or Partners' When does a foe become a friend' Can a relationship between two powerful nations historically surrounded with deep mistrust be transformed into friendship' Can two nations profoundly divided by an irreconcilable ideology, wherein victory of one means death of the other, simply put everything away and suddenly be allies' Can China, its government and its people, which pride has been deeply wounded by an arrogant nation forgive and forget' Can the United States, which since World War II has proclaimed itself the police of the world, and which since after the Cold War against communist Russia is left the world's single super power, not feel threatened by a big nation trying to rise to its greatness and supremacy' Can friendly, conciliatory words stand against blatant conflicting actions' These are questions enfolding the US-China relationship in the 21st century. Answers to these questions will tell whether China and the United States in the 21st century are rivals or partners. And whatever the answer to these would surely rock the world. Decades of Mistrust between Two Powerful Nations The relationship of the People's Republic of China (PRC) - to differentiate it from Imperial China to the China transformed by Mao Tse-Tung in 1949 - and the United States started bitterly, brought about by two diametrically opposed ideologies that each espouses: the United States, being the indefatigable monument of imperialism, and China, being the staunch ally of communist Russia. The world then was equatorially divided between imperialism in the west and communism in the east. And no one ever conceived that this demarcation would ever be radically altered. During this period (1949-1970) both nations regarded each other as intransigent enemies. The United States refused to acknowledge the PRC and denied China of its legitimacy being a nation by totally isolating it from the diplomatic community: it excluded China from the United Nations; it banned any trading with China; it fanned anti-communism and supported separatist movement within China (as what it did with USSR after the cold war) to divide the strong China; and it rallied South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Southeast Asia and South Vietnam into a 'crescent-shaped alignment against communism', immediately communist China (Han-Yin Chang, 2000, p.62); that any ally having any diplomatic relations with China warrants the wrath of the powerful US. The U.S. depicted China to the world as repressive, fascistic, dictatorial, denying individual freedom that any one living in a democratic country, like America, enjoys. China on the other hand, side by side with Russia, was a front liner in the united front against US imperialism, all-out supporting national movements that decry U.S. colonialism. It was instrumental in the liberation of North Korea and North Vietnam. China portrayed the U.S. to the Chinese people and to the U.S. colonies, especially in Southeast Asia, that Uncle Sam - a derogatory depiction of the U.S. mocking it as an arrogant self-declared semi-god out to exploit nation's wealth and resources in the guise of benevolence - is nothing but a despotic aggressor, that would like to impose its hegemony over the peoples of the world. It perceived, and made all in its realm perceive, too, any U.S. action as an act of calculated subjugation and total exploitation. This marked anti-American sentiment lingers on among Chinese people until today. Such was the very hostile relationship of these two powerful nations that no peaceful gesture could lessen the tension, instead, if there was any, could have been interpreted as a mere ploy to thwart the other; that peaceful co-existence was unacceptable, because only one should rule the world. Each one representing the two contrasting ideologies, offered itself as the best social system to rule the world, both promising prosperity and humanization of society. Who could ever think that this would change' No one ever did, not even in any of these two powerful nations' remotest thinking. But it did! Changing Interests Define US-China Relationship In 1956-1957, China's relationship with Russia begun to sour (Floyd, 1964, p.32). The former comrades in arm slowly became "comrades in harm (Brown, 2007, p.67)." The once friendly relation turned into antagonism. After border disputes in the early 1969 (Lieberthal, 1984 as cited in Han-Yin Chang, 2000, p. 62), China never felt safe again with Russia. Finding a possible ally with a strong nation, which had been harboring intense resentment against Russia, China changed alignment. By 1972, the inconceivable happened. Under the leadership of US President Nixon, China became the strategic partner of its once deadliest rival, the US - a partnership that was aimed to bring down communist Russia and they did win. By 1991, Russian communism fell down, with its nations fallen apart. China's alignment with the US had been beneficial to both. China was brought back what were denied of it. It was suddenly recognized as a legitimate state, portrayed as a new economy deserved to be aided to enable it to positively participate and contribute in the global market. Paradoxically, under US maneuvering - the cunning mastermind of China's former exclusion - China had secured its seat in the United Nations and was even given a permanent status in the UN's five-seat Security Council. Moreover, China's "one-China" policy had been respected, with the US deferring its financial aid to the Dalai Lama, who was bidding for the independence of Tibet and taking out its nuclear weapon from Taiwan, which was asserting its nationhood independent of China. For its part, China reciprocated U.S. by fully mutually working with it, in checking the increasing magnitude of Russia's influence over Cambodia and Afghanistan; by reforming its economy to semi-capitalism, opening its market to global economy; and by dropping all its anti-U.S. imperialism slogans and campaigns within and outside its territory. (Han-Yin Chang, 2000, p. 62) Observably though, the relationship built by each others needs was transformed only into diplomatic, economic and security alliance. Until today, China remains reluctant to fully integrate in the world free market. With its unprecedented growth since it embraced some aspects of capitalism, its relation to the world market remains unclear. (Naughton, 1998, p.148) To this, the U.S., feeling uncomfortable, perceives the necessity of China's integration into international bodies, like the WTO, for it to be reticently contained. (Noland, 1998, p.139) China and U.S. might have enjoyed a sense of honeymoon relationship yet underneath rests the undeniable hidden feeling of distrust for each other. This would be sensed greater upon Russia's destruction. The year 1991 saw the end of cold war between Russia and the U.S. This removed the single basis of China and U.S. alliance. No more communist challenge to the U.S. hegemony and so does China's strategic significance. But 'China Threat' lingers in the White House, and in the Pentagon. With a territory a little bit bigger than that of the U.S. and a colossal population incomparable with any nation's; with an armed military larger than any country has today, although backward could capably be modernized; with a nuclear weapons arsenal third largest in the world, with an economy that could surmount that of U.S. economy (Eikenberry, 1995, p.82-103) - today, China ranks fourth largest economy in the world (Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 2006) - the U.S. does not take any chances, despite China's vehement denial that it seeks to be the supreme power in Asia-Pacific making this part of the globe operate within China's socio-eco-political orbit. (Xinbu, 2000, p.479) But looking back at history on the repositioning of allegiances as great powers rise and fall, it is almost certainly that China, an awakened formerly sleeping giant, would fill in the void in power created by Russia's fall. (Pan, 2004, p.305) This perception is further strengthened by China's consistent record of claiming lands in India, Russia, Tajiskitan, North Korea, and Vietnam, and claiming islands involving Japan, the Koreas, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei (Kim, 1992, p.248), aside from its nationhood struggle against Tibet and Taiwan. All possibilities, even how much these are rationalized pointing to a friendlier possibility, still more strongly point to China threat. If the U.S. has every reason to feel insecure and be cautious, China on the other hand has every reason to be hurt, as it feels being intentionally embarrassed by the U.S. in front of the world, given the successive blatant actions that the U.S. consistently denied as intentional - the NATO bombing of the Belgrade Chinese embassy in May 1999; the collision of an American EP-3 surveillance plane with a Chinese fighter plane in April 2002; the U.S. arms deal with Taiwan; the move by U.S. to deny China of hosting the 2000 Olympics; the effort of the U.S. to intervene in the domestic problems of China regarding human rights to the point of making observance of human rights a prerequisite for China's entry into WTO's Most Favored Nation; the inspection of the U.S. of the Chinese ship Yinhe accused of carrying chemical weapons despite Chinese intense objection (1994); the findings by the Cox Committee - a US congress appointed committee -- regarding Chinese nuclear espionage; etc. (Ying Ma, 2002, p.43) The evolution of U.S.-China relationship is dictated by their constantly changing needs, as defined by the changing political contexts which can be divided into three major periods: the cold war (1949-1970), the sino-soviet falling-out (1970-1990), and the post cold war (1991-present). During the Cold War, China is treated by the U.S. as how it treated Russia: China is an enemy to be contained. When China split from communist Russia, China was incorporated by the U.S. into its overall security organization against Russia: China became an ally. And now in the post-Cold War era, three major factors keep on shaking U.S.-China relations: security, trade and human rights. Yet, both knew that in order to maintain regional stability in Asia-Pacific, both have to work together despite their great differences. China now becomes an ally to be cautiously watched. The Paradox of US-China Relationship in the 21st Century Two powerful nations keenly observing each other, taking every precaution that one may not disrupt the balance of power - the single unifying factor that when moved will most likely cause the conflict that both have been trying to prevent for decades now. Such relationship is very fragile since both are aggressive and historically both mind frames is that of a supreme ruler, although each one acts it out differently depending on its position in the current balance of power, which in the long run could be radically altered. China in its alliance with the U.S. is well-aware that it has to accept that for now the U.S. remains the super power; that for now no one can challenge it, including China. That for China to proceed with its quest for greatness, it has to inevitably compromise with issues not strategic to its cause. A concrete example to this was its bid to host the 2008 Olympics. When Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian visited U.S. and met with overseas Taiwanese, US Congress members and New York Mayor Rudy Guliani, China did not express its indignation against the U.S. for the cordial reception it accorded to Bian, which is unlikely of China. China's low profile could be understood in its caution to offend American public opinion and the US representatives for it to have a better chance of winning its bid. (The Taipei Times, 2001, p.8) But China can be hard line if its political principles are challenged. When U.S. President Bill Clinton required China to improve the human rights situation of its country - this is in reaction to the Massacre in Tiananmen Square in 1989 - for it to be granted the most-favored-nation in the WTO, China did not succumb to Clinton's pressure. In the end Clinton ceded and granted China the MFN status - the human rights precondition removed. When the U.S. entered into arms deal with Taiwan, China boldly criticized U.S. and demanded for a full explanation. Lots of questionable acts done by U.S. since 1989 did raise the ire of China and China had been very assertive with its sovereignty, dignity, and pride. These are issues most sensitive to China - domestic matters, international pride, and security, which since 1989 has been constantly pricked by the U.S. Now, China is evolving as a great economy. Even in its relatively slow growth, economists predict that undoubtedly China will become a giant economy. It is also backed with a strong armed forces and armaments ready for any domestic violence and any aggression. Its people may be criticizing it for its human rights violations, but the growing nationalism in China, enable the Chinese people to accept that these are inevitable part of a growing nation. In fact their comparison is human rights or food, to which the latter is chosen. Thus the campaign to tarnish the beautifying image of China with its human rights records does not hold so much water even among the Americanized Chinese. (Ying Ma, 2002, p. 43) What matters to most Chinese people now is the great name being etched by China in the 21st century, especially after the magnificent Beijing 2008 Olympics. The U.S. on the other hand is increasingly becoming cautious of growing China especially so that anti-American sentiment is being fanned by varied extremist groups. U.S. arrogance is slowly getting its toll. In fact, on September 11, the most inconceivable of a super power happened. Since then, no one ever felt safe again in America. To this, the Chinese people expressed sympathy for the loss of American lives, but impressed that the World Trade bombing is a painful lesson for America who has always thought that their lives is more valuable than others. Propaganda wise, the U.S. cannot efficiently penetrate China, because of its own image problem, and the high nationalism among the Chinese people. The U.S. remains suspicious of China but maintains its cordial relation with it, because in the face of its many created enemies, the U.S. doesn't need additional one, more so as big as China. What the U.S. is trying to do, to check China's threat is to pressure it on domestic democratic reforms specifically human rights - this is not because U.S. truly advocates human rights, but this issue is the most popular issue that could pave in liberal ideas inside China. The U.S. needs more than China does to democratize China, because not unless China is democratized, its socio-political system can hardly be influenced. Without this, China can hardly be penetrated, which is causing further alarm to U.S. The architect of China's integration to world market is no other than the U.S., not because U.S. wanted China to grow, but instead it wanted to take advantage of China. But dismayingly, China until now did not yet fully open up its economy - maybe it has no intention to do so. It still maintains some levels of protectionism, which again contradicts U.S. design. With the world territorially divided among world powers, the battleground now is transferred in the world market, that's why the U.S. is cajoling China from the very start to enter into international bodies that is to make China entrapped by unequal world trade relations, especially so that U.S. dominates these international bodies. Although China generally cooperates with the U.S. in ensuring regional stability, the U.S. remains cautious of China especially regarding China's military preparedness and its relation with U.S. enemies, that from time to time it demonstrates its power advantage both to test the limit of China - up to what extent it could be bullied, and to impress to China that the U.S. force is far superior than China's. This line of U.S. thinking is very visible in the NATO's Bombing of the Belgrade embassy, the US-Taiwan arms deal, the inspection of the Chinese ship Yinhe accused of carrying chemical weapons, and the EP-3 surveillance plane. When China furiously reacted, the U.S. immediately provides reconciliatory explanations and gestures. The heated argument on how should U.S. treat and relate with China continues. Different views are expressed. Each camp belying the other, yet thinking the same to one another: U.S. thinks that China is just taking its time to consolidate its economic power and military strength to capably depose the U.S.; on the other hand, China thinks that the U.S. is trying to limit its growth to an extent that it could not capably unseat the U.S. To the U.S. China is a potential enemy, and to China, the U.S. is a bully that should be disciplined. But despite this, the best option for both is to remain an ally. China-U.S. in the 21st Century: Not Enemies, not Friends but Rivaling Allies China's ambiguous attitude to the world market, despite its entry into international bodies, implies that its acceptance of capitalism is selective and that it has no intention to fully open up its market because it sees it detrimental to China's on going reconstruction. What it does instead is making the most out of the opportunities it sees in its incorporation to the capitalist world, aware of its dangers and conscious of China's direction. Also, China strongly disapproves U.S's. egotistical display of power not only over its enemies but also to its allies. This revives the Chinese's buried anti-American sentiment, and in one way or another further deepened and strengthened Chinese nationalism and defense of its government that never flinch against U.S. display of abuse and terror against China. But most importantly, even how many million times it may deny, nobody seems to believe that it has no imperial interest over Asia-Pacific, given its military capability, combine with its distaste with U.S. arrogance. What is clear to the world today, especially after the Beijing 2008 Olympic, that China is magnificent - the once sleeping giant is now awakened, fully aware of its strength and rich resources that it can never permit itself to be a lame duck. Being a super power for half a century, it would just be normal for the U.S. to feel threatened because in the first place, something most sought after is in its hands. The insecurity of the U.S. with China is not China's doing. China only touched the vulnerabilities of the U.S. which it covers up with its bullying. In psychology, the bullies are usually the insecure; the calm ones are usually the secured. But the more the U.S. bully states and nations, the more it losses its leadership of the world which it doesn't want to relinquish. U.S. policy clearly implies that it does not want China's ascendance, that a mere indication of it will be thwarted. The frequent bane in the economy of the U.S. weakens the moral authority of its government over its domestic issues which would surely affect its global leadership and lessens the ascendancy of its free-market ideology. In fact, it is in this light too that it wanted China's economy grow but checked, because free-market should not fail China - this is a matter of ideological correctness, which was the root cause of China and U.S. animosity to each other. Although each sees each other as an enemy or potential enemy, both clearly understand that each one needs each other. The U.S. has lots of enemies - extreme enemies - and it has no intention to add a new one much more something as big as China. It needs China to preserve its hegemony. China knew that it takes a long time to re-establish its power and it needs U.S. to realize this. Thus U.S. and China are not friends - they have so much hatred to each other, neither enemies - they work together; they are instead rivaling allies, working together cautiously watching their back from each other. References Brown, C. (2007). Comrades in Harm: Book Review. The Mail on Sunday. 6th May, p. 67.' Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. (2006). U.S.-China Relations. Fact Sheet. Washington D.C. 18th April. [Online] http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/64715.htm' Eikenberry, K. W. (1995). Does China Threaten Asia-Pacific Regional Stability' Parameters. Spring 1995, pp. 82-103' Floyd, D. (1964). 'The Beginning of the Trouble, 1956-57'. in Floyd, D. (author) Mao against Khrushchev: A Short History of the Sino-Soviet Conflict. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 32-47.' Han-Yin Chang, J. (2000). China-US Relations: The Past as Looking Glass. American Studies International. 38 (2), 62.' 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