Interview on President Nixons Visit to China in 1972 - Essay Example

Interview on President Nixon’s Visit to China in 1972 The Presidency of Richard Nixon consists of numerous events that had immense historical significance. Some of these include the ending of the War in Vietnam, landing a human being on the moon and returning him to earth, and his visit to the previously diplomatically isolated Communist Republic of China (Ragone & Velshi 12). The latter is probably the most important, especially taking to mind that this was the first visit by an American president to China, as well as the fact that, as a Communist country, China was a US enemy by default. As a result, not only was the visit unexpected, it also became a metaphor for countries around the world, including the US. The US had to react to this visit because Nixon’s stance against Communism was not a secret, while China was, not only a Communist country, but practiced an extreme form of communism no different from Stalinism. Moreover, Americans were perplexed at President Nixon’s decision, as his anti-Communist rhetoric had gotten him elected in 1952 as Vice President (Ragone & Velshi 13). With this background in mind, this interview will seek to uncover the machinations behind the visit and its consequences. Q. Welcome and thank you for accepting to participate in this interview. In two sentences, can you talk about the visit to China in 1972? A. As president of the United States, Richard Nixon travelled to the Communist People’s Republic of China in 1972. There he met both the Central Committee of the Communist Party’s Chairman Mao Zedong and the premier of the PRC Zhou En-Lai. The two governments agreed on the Chinese Communiqué during the visit, which was one of the most important agreements between the two countries in improving relations following years of mistrust and hostility (Ragone & Velshi 33). Q. Were relations between the two countries were that bad? A. Well, you have to realize that the two countries had been estranged diplomatically since the 1940s and the Chinese Communist Revolution. Following Chairman Mao Zedong’s victory for the Communists in 1949 and the establishment of the PRC on the mainland of China, officials and soldiers of the vanquished Republic of China moved to Taiwan. Relationships soured totally when the US chose to recognize the ROC over the PRC as China’s legitimate government, leading to a complete break in diplomatic relations (Ragone & Velshi 34). Q. The fact that the US refused to recognize the communist Government, despite it being the larger country, must have been hard for the Chinese to take. What changed? A. You see, despite the obvious lack of diplomatic channels, there were all indications by the late 60s that the PRC and the US were considering rapprochement. The escalation of the Vietnam War with the Soviet-backed Viet Cong and the US-backed KMT led officials in the US government to improve relations with China. This was important in the new US strategy to decrease conflict, isolate North Vietnam diplomatically, undermine Communist alliances, and increase leverage over the USSR (Ragone & Velshi 34). Q. But, still, the process of setting up this meeting must have been difficult. How did it all come together? A. True, mistrust between the US and the PRC was a huge barrier. Henry Kissinger was first sent to China to break the ice in 1971. In fact, he had to go there twice to convince the Chinese officials that the US was willing to reconsider normal relations with china (Ragone & Velshi 34). The US also moved advocate for China’s representation in the UN with an added sweetener of representation in the UN Security Council. Q. That must have been the move that clinched the deal. A. For sure, Mao Zedong’s main aim for China had always been for the country to take up its rightful position in world affairs. Q. Can you talk about the trip? A. Sure, it was almost awkward to begin with, as the reception at the airport was the lowest key reception for an American president anywhere as far as I can remember. The Shanghai Communiqué was actually issued towards the end of the trip, and most of what happened in the meetings is classified. The PRC, in this communiqué, still held onto their demands that Taiwan was China. The United States, possibly as a way of appeasement, assented to the “One China” policy, while also noting the importance of a peaceful resolution and its decision to withdraw remaining US troops from the island (Ragone & Velshi 35). Q. Chairman Mao must have insisted on the US being clearer on the Taiwan issue than that, surely… A. Of course, Zhou En-Lai and Chairman Mao made it clear that relations would never be normalized as long as the US continued diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Q. What was the US’ reaction to this and was the Carter normalization milestone of 1979 a result of these negotiations? A. United States’ officials stated that Taiwan’s independence would not receive support from the Presidency, a principle that was to form a critical basis for the 1979 establishment of formal and full diplomatic missions in both countries (Hay 43). Q. Given the strained relations between China and its neighbors, who were also US allies, there must have been some negative reactions towards this rapprochement, right? A. Without a doubt, the visit sent shock waves that reverberated in the Far East, which was still in a volatile state after the Japanese aggression of WWII, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Smaller nations were insecure about this meeting for sure. Indeed, both allies and enemies of the US felt sold out by the meeting. Whereas the North Vietnamese felt betrayed by Communist China, the Philippines also felt insecure and re-introduced the army draft (Hay 44). There was a feeling among South-Eastern Asia nations that the US and PRC were playing a game of chess, while the rest would have to redefine their political standing and status. Q. What about Taiwan and Japan, their reactions must have been interesting… A. Generally, the trend immediately after the shockwaves were over, and so was policy and alliance realignments. Most nations in the region sought to approach China, as the US seemed to indicate that China was a major player. On the other hand, Taiwan felt increasingly isolated, while relations with Japan became increasingly complex (Hay 44). While the friction between the US and Japan was well known, this visit was almost a betrayal for the Japanese people. Q. Keeping the Japanese and Chinese happy must have required major diplomatic efforts. What was your experience? A. This was essentially the most intriguing part of the visit. While the US was seeking the help of Japan in the UN to promote Taiwan’s inclusion, Kissinger was in Beijing preparing for the visit (Hay 46). Some three weeks, prior to the announcement, of the trip, the US assured Japan that a Communist Chinese Republic would not be recognized. For the Japanese, the visit and was an acknowledgement of the PRC as China’s de facto rulers. Q. Now, seeing as the short-term repercussions was mixed at best; have the longer-term consequences vindicated rapprochement with China? A. This visit practically set the stage for China’s entry into international politics as a major player, especially by instigating a momentum for the PRC’s recognition at the UN and in the UN Security Council. As more countries allied to the US set about establishing diplomatic ties with the PRC, China was on the path of increasing openness to the west and acceptance as a major world player (Hay 47). Q. It must also have had an effect on the ongoing Cold War, right? A. Most certainly and I am certain this was the point at which the Cold War begun to lose its polarizing effect. The separation of the world in blocs became increasingly unclear. In addition, this meeting was the precursor to meetings between the USSR and the US in the 80s as the USSR sought to manage the fallout with China (Tudda 29). Q. What about its impact with regards to international politics? A. Immediately on returning from China, the President told Congressional leaders that if the PRC and the US failed to find a way to talk, they were set for a major collision in the future (Tudda 31). I would go as far as to say that the only reason that there has been no military confrontation despite major differences between the two is a result of diplomatic channels established by the Nixon visit. Q. Finally, the relationship between China and the US seems to be headed backward with the cyber-spying scandal. Do you think the 1972 visit gives the two countries hope that they will resolve this issue? A. “What ifs” and hypotheses are precarious when discussing history. Whether the visit prevented armed conflict or whether such an outcome is still possible are all valid questions, which can only be answered by opinions and analyses. Works Cited Hay, Jeff. Richard M. Nixon. San Diego, Calif: Greenhaven Press, 2011. Print. Ragone, Nick. & Velshi, Ali. Presidential Leadership: 15 Decisions That Changed the Nation. Amherst, N.Y: Prometheus Books, 2011. Print. Tudda, Chris. A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China, 1969-1972. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2012. Print. Read More