Nuclear Non-Proliferation - Essay Example

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION The prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and more specifically of nuclear weapons has long seen a key driver of United States foreign policy. However, various non-proliferation initiatives have only met with mixed success, as is evidently from the nuclear stand-off in the Korean Peninsula and the Iran nuclear imbroglio, not to mention Pakistan's clandestine proliferation network spearheaded by AQ Khan. In the world of real-politic, nation-states will continue to jockey for superiority over one another to attain a semblance of balance of power, " a theory of state behavior [that] explains and predicts how states respond to threats posed by a potentially dominant, revisionist and aggressive state", (Fry et al, 3). Many theories exist on the 'why' and 'how' of nuclear proliferation such as 'classical realism' and 'neo-realism' but what is generally accepted is that the locus is external in nature. As per Fry, "If a state bids for hegemony, other states willform an alliance to contain and deter the expansion-revisionist states" (Fry 3). This is based on the assumption that states seek to, "maximize their power in order to survive in a competitive international system," (Ogilvie-White 44). Hence, nations who see a perceived threat to their national interests or in extreme cases to their very existence (as in the caser of Israel) seek to acquire a nuclear deterrent since "security represents the intimate challenge to a states survival (Ogilvie-White, 45). This theoretical debate is best exemplified by the arguments propounded by Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz in their book 'The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, A Debate' (New York: WW Norton and Company, 1995). This scholarly debate has two basic schools, one that views states as unitary, rational entities and the other which feels that proliferation occurs as an outcome of organizational interests. Both views have their merits and limitations as will be expanded upon. However, it is quite apparent that given existing geo-political realities, more and more states will seek to acquire nuclear weapon capabilities as a safeguard against nuclear blackmail. The first school of thought, led by Kenneth Waltz are the proliferation 'optimists' in that they feel that nuclear proliferation is not necessarily a negative outcome, and that contrary to popular belief, it may even have contributed to world peace. According to this theory of 'rational deterrence', "once more than one state has acquired a second-strike capability, war between the nuclear armed states is unlikely to occur, due to the fact that mutual destruction is almost assured" (Waltz 1990, 734). Waltz argues that near parity in nuclear weapon capability leads to a reduced probability of armed conflict on account of the prohibitive costs of waging war; unacceptable levels of mutual destruction; and lesser chances of miscalculation by the political leadership, since the ramifications such miscalculation would be catastrophic. This theory certainly gains some credibility when one considers that there has been no all-out war between two nuclear powers. However, Waltz qualifies this optimism by laying down certain pre-conditions that have to exist for stable deterrence. These are firstly, that "there should be no preventive war while a state is developing its nuclear capability; secondly, "both states must develop a sufficient second-strike force to retaliate if attacked first; and thirdly, "the nuclear arsenals must not be prone to unauthorized or accidental use" (Sagan and Waltz, 51). This position seems quite reasonable since nuclear wars are more likely in conditions of asymmetry, even though the asymmetry might be in terms of conventional military capability. It also reinforces the rationale of states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons capability in order to maintain the balance of power through nuclear deterrence. This would be particularly true of states which see themselves surrounded by inimical neighbors, as in the case of Israel, or feel threatened by a larger neighbor or adversary with a domino effect, (Pakistan by India, India by China and so on). There is however, yet another reason which does not quite fit in with the above hypothesis, which is of states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons for the sake of national prestige and / or due to compulsion of domestic politics. India's peaceful nuclear explosion of 1974 would fall in this category in the light of India's diminishing strategic relevance and prevailing domestic unrest at that point of time. This also prompted Pakistan to begin its own nuclear programme, with clandestine support from China, leading to the present state of nuclear deterrence between the two South Asian countries. However, the rational deterrence theory does not explain why South Africa chose to go nuclear in the first place, when it had no strategic imperatives to do so in the absence of any threat. Rather, South Africa's decision to roll-back its nuclear weapon program seems to be the most rational decision of all, and can only be explained as a function of its overarching national security strategy. But does nuclear parity guarantee stability - if stability is to be understood as the absence of armed conflict This may not necessarily be the case. Proxy War in Vietnam and Angola during the Cold War are examples of two nuclear powers engaged in hostilities below an undefined threshold. The same is the case of the conflict between India and Pakistan in 1999 in the Kargil region of the disputed state of Jammu & Kashmir. It has been argued that Pakistan embarked on this military misadventure because, and not in spite of its nuclear capability, to the extent of threatening to play the nuclear card, in order to preclude Indian attacks across the International Border and into the Pakistani heartland. Such conflicts illustrate the theory of the 'stability - instability' paradox generated by nuclear deterrence which states that, "to the extent that the military balance is stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower levels of violence" (Jervis, 31). Moreover while waltz argues that nuclear parity helps keeps conflicts limited, the opposing view in that under extreme circumstance, nuclear escalation may be the only viable option to, "[maintain] national honor, harm and weaken those who represent abhorred values[believing] that the other will retreat rather than pay the price for victory" (Jervis, 135). The other school of thought is the one proposed by Scott Sagan which views the effects of nuclear proliferation in a more pessimistic manner, and is the most critical of Waltz and the theory of 'rational deterrence'. As per Sagan, nuclear weapons by their very characteristics are destabilizing in nature and do not in any manner contribute to peace and stability. Sagan challenges the very foundation on which Waltz bases his theory, namely, that states are unitary and national actors that always have the best interests of the state in mind. As per Sagan, " government leaders intend to behave rationally, but are influenced by powerful domestic organizations whose decisions often conflicts with the decisions taken by political leaders" (Sagan & Waltz, 49-53). Organizational imperatives and constraints can sometimes acquire a life of their own which tend to undermine, and subsume, willingly or unwillingly the larger national interest. This aspect though, is not exclusive to nuclear proliferation alone, as history is full of examples of Generals presenting a fait-accompli to their political leadership and thus encouraging a favored course of action. Thus Sagan seeks to explain the trend towards nuclear proliferation as a function of organizational theory, in support of which, Sagan cities the example of South Africa. South Africa had a fledging nuclear weapon capability to be used as a bargaining chip. However, the discovery by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) of delivery systems indicated that the nuclear weapon program had transgressed to the next level, contrary to national interests. In this instance according to Sagan, the South African firm Armscor, "took matters into their own hands due to organizational pressures and incentives to produce advanced weapons system" (Sagan &Waltz, 251-262). Even in the case of India's peaceful nuclear explosion of 1994 cited earlier, Raja Ramanna suggests that the test was carried out, '"as a result of an ad-hoc decision taken by an elite group [including members of the Atomic Energy Commission of India] who were aware that the timing was not ideal, but took the decision to go ahead anyway, because it was too late to turn back for practical reasons". In both instances, these decisions were not the national level decisions of a mature political leaders or the government (organization) as a whole, but of individuals with vested interests. This Organizational Theory approach though has its own limitations. Ogilvie-White feels that it does not fully explain the phenomenon of proliferation, as firstly, "in focusing on structural explanations of behavior, it loses sight of the role that individuals have played in influencing decision making" (Ogilvie-White, 51). In the case of India for example, successive Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission were alternatively either totally opposed or totally for nuclear weapons, thus overlooking the role of played by individuals and their personal beliefs. Secondly, the Organizational Theory model cannot predict which organization is likely to prevail in the decision making matrix. Once again focusing on the Indian experience, the Indian Military had no say in the decision 'to go nuclear'. Thirdly, by concentrating on organizations rather that the people who staff these organizations, " [it] overlooks the point that individuals and organizations, can and do, learn as a result of new information that challenges past assumptions and beliefs" (Ogilvie-White, 51). Sagan thus tends to overlook the role of individual decision makers, whose personal beliefs are shaped by their up bringing and experiences, wherein the responses of two different leaders exposed to a similar set of events might be quite contrary. Similarly, leaders react differently to the same inputs depending upon national interest. This is particularly so in the case of proliferation where "[leaders] continue to justify their nuclear arsenals on the grounds of national deterrence theory, but are prepared to accept the arguments of experts who doubt the logic of deterrence, when dealing with nuclear threshold states and nuclear aspirants" (Ogilvie-White, 53). A glaring example of this double-standard is exemplified in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, manifest in the policy of the Nuclear Weapon States who are against any form of horizontal proliferation, even as they continue to refine their own arsenals, in the name of deterrence. The proliferation debate thus centers on differing world views, with both sides conceding that the other school of thought has some merit and would prevail under ideal conditions. For e.g., the Sagan school admits that if states did indeed behave rationally then proliferation could perhaps contribute to stability. On the other hand, the Waltz school admits that if organizations overstep their charter, then proliferation could lead to a nuclear conflagration. Whatever be the case, there appears to be a shift in US policy on non-proliferation that is most evident in the Indo-US Joint statement of 18 Jul 05 which, "reversed more than a quarter-century of US declaratory policy, [and] suggests that the national security team of George W. Bush regards nuclear proliferation to be both inevitable and not necessarily a bad thing" (Potter, 343). This new policy, which is more in keeping with the optimistic views on nuclear nonproliferation initiatives, is as per Potter, premised on the following (Potter, 345-346). Nuclear proliferation is inevitable; at best it can be managed, not prevented. There are good proliferators and bad proliferations. Multilateral mechanisms to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons are ineffectual. Regional security and economic considerations trump those of global nonproliferation. The latest shift in United States policy as regards nuclear nonproliferation not only seems to favour the theory as proposed by Waltz, but once again underscores the old-age adage that in internal relations there as no permanent friends or permanent enemies, only permanent interests. Hence the United States now seeks to manage nuclear proliferation in ways that are not against the global interests of the United States, and to that end, " [it] is not opposed to the possession of nuclear weapons by some states, including those outside the NPT" (Potter, 345). The debate between Sagan and Waltz being of an academic nature therefore, fails to take into account while formulating their theories, the compulsions of geo-politics or of the fact that in an era of globalization, geo-economics takes precedence over such issues like human rights or nonproliferation. Bibliography Fry, Michael Graham; Goldstein, Erik; and Langhorne, Richard (Eds), Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy, Continuum, London, 2005. Jervis, Robert, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, Ithica, NY: Cornwall University Press, 1984. Ogilvie-White, Tanya, Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate, The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1996). Potter, William C, India and the New Look of US Non Proliferation Policy, Nonproliferation Review, Vol 12, No 2, July 2005. Ramanna, Raja, My Years of Pilgrimage: An Autobiography, Viking, New Delhi, 1991. Sagan, Scott D. & Waltz, Kenneth N, 'The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, A Debate' (New York: WW Norton and Company, 1995). Waltz, Kenneth N, 1990, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities", American Political Science Review (Fall 1990). Read More