Legitimacy and the International Nuclear Order - Essay Example

Legitimacy and the International Nuclear order Introduction: The period subsequent to World War II is referred to as the period of the Cold War between the two super powers – United States and USSR. Conflicts during this period mainly centered upon the underlying race between both nations to amass an impressive and potentially devastating array of nuclear arsenal, with world politics being characterized by the division of the countries of the world into democratic and Communist blocs. In the competition to win over as many nations as possible to their own ideology and tilt the balance of world power in their favor, both nations engaged in a deadly race to gain a technological advantage over the other. In the aftermath of World War II and the mass scale destruction that it had wreaked, the United Nations was founded as a world body to prevent the outward outbreak of another war on such a global scale. However, the development of nuclear weapons has caused more problems than it has solved, since it has resulted in a proliferation of nuclear weapons, with other countries also pressing for their right to develop and test nuclear weapons for their own protection. In so far as the question of actually using these weapons is concerned, the threat looms huge and the risks are frightening, however they have not so far been used, despite the fact that they have been developed at tremendous expense and hardship to the taxpayers in those countries. In the wake of the Cold War, the new international world order that developed was founded upon the deterrent factor of nuclear weapons – a nuclear order. However, in view of the dangers posed and the question of whether the huge expenses are justified, there has been an increasing move to downsize production and testing of such weapons. With the break up of the Soviet Union and its move to adopt democracy, the nuclear order of the post World War II era which divided the world primarily into two blocs is being questioned. The legitimacy of maintaining such weapons when the need for such umbrellas of protection has disappeared is now being questioned. New, alternative strategies are being developed in the interest of world security – such as arms control and the nuclear non proliferation treaty. Therefore, in an examination of the development of nuclear warfare and the subsequent global scenario, the question of legitimacy is vital in examining the issues pertaining to the new world order where the use of nuclear warfare and its role has become a debatable issue. The post World War II scenario: Kaysen et al (1991) have discussed the development of nuclear weapons as a symbol of the Cold war. When the first hydrogen bomb was tested in July 1945, President Truman said, “From now on, man moves into a new era of destructive power….the war of the future would be one in which man could extinguish millions of lives in one blow….” After the IInd World War, the United States demobilized its forces, but this was not the case with Russia. As a result, the United States began to develop and rely on nuclear weapons in order to counteract the perceived threat to Western European countries and democratic countries from the Soviet Communist bloc, especially since the Russian army had not demobilized after the IIrd World War. When U.S. air bases on the periphery of the Soviet Union were built up with backing provided by weapons with nuclear capability, a corresponding build up began on the Soviet side and this led to the cold war, where Soviet “secrecy and successful Soviet bluffs about the size and capability of their forces” and the American-Soviet race to sustain technological superiority worked as factors in keeping sustaining the nuclear arms race (Kaysan, 1991:97). John (1996) has described the post World War II scenario as being characterized by two major aspects. The first was is a corroboration of Keysan’s views on deterioration of relations between the United States and America, which was fuelled by the balance of power between the two States. The other was the conflict generated by the differences in ideology between the democratic order of the United States and Western Europe, which was the result of economic and political turmoil during the war, consequently mandating openness in political systems and the Communist ideology of the Soviet and eastern states. This conflict was spelt out by President Truman in his speech of March 12, 1947, in which he articulated the American perception of Soviet attempts to dominate the world with its Communist ideology and the need for the people and countries of the world to choose between two alternate ways of life (John 1996). Due to the disastrous consequences of the World War II, the United Nations was born, which was intended to be a world body geared towards the purpose of maintaining world peace. However, the extent to which it has achieved its role has been repeatedly questioned, since it was accused as being merely a tool of the United States during the Gulf War and the imposition of sanctions on Iraq. For example, Mueller et al (1994) have questioned its effectiveness in implementation of the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty and have stated that review conferences on the NPT have degenerated into diplomatic disputes between the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament.. The Cold War: The cold war is characterized by the nuclear weapons build up that occurred on both sides – democratic states headed by the United States and the Communist bloc, headed by the USSR. In response to the threat of nuclear attack that was perceived, each country has steadily built up nuclear capability and added to the arms stockpile, thereby posing a potent threat to the world. The world segregated into two divisions – the democratic bloc or the Communist bloc, with the two lead nations offering nuclear umbrella of protection through nuclear weapons, ready to be deployed for the protection of the nations that were their allies. Britain developed nuclear weapons to remain on par with its ally – the United States, while France and China developed nuclear weapons early on as a measure of their independence and their reluctance to come under the umbrella of one or the other superpower. Nuclear weapons function as an effective deterrent against war, especially in the period following the World war II and its massive destruction. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 brought the two superpowers to the brink of nuclear war and served to highlight the dangers that could have resulted if a nuclear battle ground had erupted, this disastrous occurrence being prevented through the timely intervention of President Kennedy and the midnight compromise worked out on October 28th (Ryukichi, 1998). As a result, the nuclear missiles of the two superpowers were withdrawn from Cuba and Turkey. However, while threats and counter threats have been traded back and forth and each nation has added to its stockpile, the danger associated with such weapons has repeatedly generated controversy in the world. Proliferation in nuclear weapons: As Tkacik(1996) mentions, such nuclear weaponry buildup by the two superpowers in the cold war – United States and USSR – also resulted in smaller states also contesting their right to develop and maintain nuclear weapons in order to ensure their own protection and deter potential attacks. The steady build up in nuclear weapons by each of the two superpowers was justified on the basis of the danger of attack by the other and the need therefore, to maintain the competitive edge in attack capacity. However, this in effect legitimized the proliferation in nuclear weapons all over the world, which in turn resulted in a questioning of the legitimacy of development of nuclear arsenal at all. The potential dangers posed to the world community through accidental use of weapons from nuclear stockpiles was so alarming that it led to the resultant reduction in arms, which went side by side with the development of the glasnost policy in USSR and its progressive transformation to a democracy. The legitimacy of nuclear weapons and the umbrella protection offered by the two super powers was also questioned by the world community in the wake of the many wars and world turmoil which could not be prevented despite the clear superiority of the United States as a nuclear power. The Korean war, the Vietnam War, the Gulf war – all of these erupted without deployment of nuclear weapons that had been devised at such tremendous cost and expense. As pointed out by Bundy (1988:231), the United States did not deploy nuclear weapons either in the Korean or Vietnam wars despite the fact that these Asian nations did not possess nuclear capability at that time, because political leaders shrank from the sue of these weapons, seeing the enormous political liabilities that could be brought about as a result. The 1960s to 1980s were characterized by a continual build up of nuclear weapons, pushing up defense budgets of both super power countries and resulting in a huge budget definite for the United States. Yet the weapons were never deployed because the potential danger they could unleash was simply too horrifying and the political ramifications and consequences of such actions were events that no political leader wished to face. Therefore the very existence of the nuclear arsenal began to become questionable, since it could not be deployed in precisely the kind of conflict situations which it was supposed to prevent. Most importantly, when the significant world threat that was posed through Communism was lifted with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the question that arises is – how legitimate is the nuclear order? The post glasnost scenario has been characterized by an era where the dangers of nuclear weapons are being highlighted and measures being taken to reduce production and use. The end of the cold war and subsequent scenario: The Partial test ban Treaty, signed in 1963 spelt one step in the move towards reduction in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, however this did not include underground testing (Ryukichi, 1998). Since smaller nations that were developing nuclear arsenal were also likely to engage in test explosions, the world community came together to frame a comprehensive test ban treaty in the interest of protecting the world from potential dangers of nuclear exposure, and this was finally signed by most nations in 1996. The dangers as posed above, including several other incidents, raised the question of legitimacy of development and use of nuclear weapons, however the process of weapons reduction has been slow and painful, with nations –especially United States and the Soviet states remaining in competition to improve the quality of nuclear arsenal. Paul et al (1998) have examined the declining importance of nuclear arsenal in the new strategic environment that emerged at the end of the Cold War between USA and USSR. They question the legitimacy of existence of these weapons and the credibility and guarantees associated with nuclear deterrence and offer the view that nuclear weapons are here to stay, however nuclear deterrence is likely to be moderated and refined through other arms control strategies such as nuclear arms reduction and the reorganization of conventional warfare strategies in ensuring global security. In view of the declining importance of nuclear weapons, interdependence and coalitions between various nations are likely to be the new order of international security, leading to nuclear free zones and defense coalitions to provide collective security. Such collective security measures are likely to be more effective in deterring wars in small areas where security threats are low, as opposed to nuclear warfare which is more effective in strategic global deterrence. As opposed to nuclear weapons however, the authors have also stated that the new emerging threats to international security such as weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological weapons are hard to control and pose logistical problems for use over large areas. Deterrence: The premise of deterrence against the use of nuclear weapons works by posing the threat of destruction of an unimaginable scale that will occur through the use of such weapons. By presenting a scenario where there is a high risk of disastrous consequences that could potentially arise if a country were to use a nuclear weapon, there is sufficient degree of danger perceived by opposing nations to back down and refrain from generating any conflict that could provoke the use of nuclear weapons. The phenomenon of deterrence may be examined from two different approaches. The first poses the scenario of total and complete disaster, resulting from a first strike so devastating and lethal that it is better left uninitiated. However, since countries using nuclear weapons have now developed formidable powers of second strike to retaliate to such attacks with counter offensives equally as devastating as the former, the second approach examines nuclear deterrence from the perspective of limited use of a nuclear weapon to an extent sufficient to demonstrate the potentially devastating effects. The first theory of deterrence is referred to as the brinkmanship crisis, which relies upon the skilful manipulation by one country of the perceived risk that could occur through a nuclear crisis that goes out of control. This approach has been examined by several researchers and it operates through one country posing such a threat and risk of unlimited crossfire using nuclear weapons that its adversarial country backs down because it perceives the level of risk as manipulated by the former country to be too high and therefore does not wish to make any moves that could precipitate such a crisis. (Powell 1985; Kahn 1965). This is also referred to a strategic nuclear deterrence because it is based upon information flows about nuclear capability. As examined by Nalebuff (1986) and also by Powell(1987), the success of this strategy depends upon the adversarial country possessing incomplete information about the nuclear capability of its opponent. Even in instances where the degree of information garnered by the adversarial country may be adequate or accurate, nevertheless the result of possession of such information about first strike and second strike capabilities results in the acquisition of knowledge about potential threats and risks to the world that could arise if an attack is provoked, such as annihilation of life on the planet. Therefore, this theory holds that each country that possesses nuclear weapons tries to inflate the impression about its nuclear capabilities so that potential dangers function as a restraining factor against conflicts. Schelling (1960) also examines the importance of the information aspect and its relevance to this theory, where each country tries to up its own capability to the perceived or ill informed levels that the adversarial country apparently possesses. He characterizes the risk levels as “threats that leave something to chance”; thereby highlighting the fact that such manipulated information that is circulated about nuclear capability may not always be credible. This factor becomes even more relevant in the next theory of deterrence examined below. The second theory of deterrence is that of limited retaliation. According to this approach, one country successfully inflicts a limited amount of punishment upon its adversarial country in order to make the threat of future, harsher punishment credible enough that the adversarial country backs down and loses its motivation to continue the situation generating the conflict (Powell 1985; Davis 1976). This theory becomes relevant where second strike capability possessed by countries makes the threat of a massive retaliation an effective deterrent to a first strike. Kauffmann (1956) has pointed out how the United States resorted to the threat of nuclear attack as a means to protect all its strategic interests throughout the world, both the important and the peripheral ones and he has questioned the credibility of information underlying the belief in such a threat, even as he acknowledges that it was effective in helping the United States remain invulnerable to attack. As opposed to the brinkmanship theory in which states are able to exert deterrent power on their adversaries by manipulating the risk of an unlimited nuclear exchange, limited retaliation works through the actual infliction of damage using less powerful weapons, as a sample of much more destructive results that could follow. This functions as a bargaining chip where the potential threat and risk becomes the basis for deterrence in nuclear conflict. While states may resort to counter force and develop weapons capable of striking back, nevertheless with the inadequate supply of information and the punitive nature of limited punishment that is inflicted, the ultimate result is that attack and counter attacks become less and less likely as a crisis continues. Ball (1984) has examined the options used in the nuclear strategy of the United States and he points out that there has been a greater emphasis placed on the use of weapons that inflict limited punishment while developing counter capability to destroy or seriously interfere with an adversary’s military capability. Arms control agreements: A natural corollary of nuclear deterrence is the arms control theory, wherein the goals sought to be achieved through deterrence in the prevention of use of nuclear weapons is sought to be achieved through a reduction in the production and proliferation of nuclear weapons instead. In the power battles raging between nations, the international nuclear order appears set on an escalating track; while the developed, nuclear armed nations such as US, USSR, France, Britain and China are initiating arms reduction measures, there are rogue states such as Lybia, Iran, Syria and North Korea that resist global disarmament measures, while India and Pakistan have each openly declared themselves nuclear states in order to protect themselves from perceived threats from the other. (Ryukichi, 1998) The relevance and legitimacy of proliferation in nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence has been questioned in recent times, where in view of the risks and threats posed by potential nuclear deployment, there has been a spate of arms control agreements. Cowen Carp (1993:122) contends that nuclear deterrence can no longer remain the “principal feature of international security.” On the other hand, experts like Halperin (1963) are strong advocates of a consistent role for deterrence in international security, because no other means is as effective in functioning as a deterrent to destruction. Tkacik (1996) has mentioned several instances where deterrence has functioned effectively in maintaining security such as for example, in retaining western democracy in Berlin, keeping the Soviets out of the Middle East in 1973 and through preventing escalation of conflicts between Communist bloc countries and democracies during the era of the cold war. He also points out that the concept of extended deterrence exercised by the United States in the protection it extends to its diplomatic allies is being questioned for its utility in the new era where the Cold war has ended and Russia has adopted a more peaceful posture. However, in relation to the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans in Europe and similar conflicts, he states that nuclear deterrence is unlikely to be as effective as it was during the low intensity Cold War, since such conflicts as those occurring in Europe are ethically rooted and nuclear deterrence would only encourage these small states to try and strengthen their nuclear capability. Tkacik also puts forth arguments both in favor of and against arms control. Those who are in favor of arms control contend that the leaders of nations should take steps to come to agreements on limiting arms in the interest of world security; however those who oppose arms control argue that while threats exist, the deterrence posed by the weapons should not be eschewed. The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty: Despite the fact that the US and USSR were fierce competitive rivals in the nuclear arms race, both these nations recognized the need for nuclear arms controls in view of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially among rogue states and individual terrorists and the need to reduce and ultimately eliminate production and testing of these weapons. In 1968, the Eighteen nations Disarmament Commission produced the first draft of the Nuclear non proliferation treaty, which sought to ban the manufacture, possession and use of nuclear devices, excluding only those nations that had possessed or tested nuclear weapons before January 1, 1967 (Ryukichi, 1998). Many nations, especially India and Brazil, have contested membership in this Treaty, protesting their right to protect themselves through the development of nuclear weapons, especially in view of the inequity in excluding the nations that had progressed early in the arms race. By the year 1995, there were 162 signatories to the NPT in 1995 (Nolan, 1994) Mueller et al (1994) have examined in detail, the development of the Nuclear Non Proliferation treaty, including its twelve key documents and its record of implementation. They have pointed out that nuclear non proliferation as such is unlikely to succeed unless it is also accompanied by effective steps towards disarmament. Another problem that is posed is that of the non aligned nations who did not side with either USA or USSR during the Cold War, as pointed out by these authors, the forum of the United Nations is effectively used by these nations to harass the world’s most powerful nation – the United States – in a forum where this can be done without incurring due risk. These nations are pressing for complete disarmament, however the United States sees its nuclear stockpile as vital to its national interests, in order to protect itself and its allies from unexpected attacks from unpredictable elements such as terrorists, who are unlike the Soviet Union (Nolan, 1994). As a result, it is committed towards denuclearization, but is progressing slowly towards that end. On the other hand, the developing nations and non aligned nations who have not invested so heavily in nuclear stockpiling or do not stand to lose so heavily if attacked by unscrupulous enemies or through an accident, view the nuclear non proliferation differently. In the race for development and to enjoy some power and clout, nations such as India, Pakistan, Libya, North Korea, etc are insistent upon protecting their own security interests and condemning the United States for its unilateral actions in world politics, especially in the recent Iraq war. Moreover, since the five nations that first developed nuclear weapons have been exempted from the requirements of complete disarmament and non proliferation as spelt out in the treaties, there is the question of inequity in the positions expected of different nations. The developing nations view this measure as an unfair retention of power by the Big Five while other nations are forced to stop producing and testing nuclear weapons. The danger from nuclear weapons is now no longer restricted to the US and USSR but could originate from several small countries or individual terrorists. In the conflict between protection from threat and the dangers of proliferation, the position of the United States and the other four nations is being contested as one that imparts undue favor to these countries as a result of which reaching world accord on the nuclear order has been thorny at best. Conclusions: On the basis of the above, it may therefore be concluded that the question of legitimacy of development and use of nuclear weapons has been an issue, both during the Cold war and in the subsequent periods. This has also become an issue where the NPT is concerned, where the legitimacy of the Big Five to retain their powers of production and use of these weapons is being contested by other nations. The United States in particular, is not being forced into disarmament but arguing for retention of its stockpile to protect its security interests, which other nations are also using as a basis to contest the NPT on the grounds that it eschews their rights to protect themselves. With the dissolution of the USSR, the USA has emerged as the only world superpower and therefore the legitimacy of its possession of nuclear weapons is being hotly contested. When combined with its unilateral actions, this has placed the USA in a position of untenable power in the world, without the balancing element that was provided by the USSR and is the basis for the opposition offered by many of the non aligned nations and their demand for complete disarmament of the US stockpile of nuclear weapons. References: * Ball, Desmond, 1984. “U.S. strategic forces: How would they be used?” IN “Strategy and Nuclear deterrence: An international Security reader.” (Steven Miller edn) Princeton: Princeton University Press. * Bundy, McGeorge, 1988 “Danger and Survival” New York: Random House * Cowen Karp, Regina, 1993. "Section II" IN “Nuclear Deterrence: Problems and Perspectives in the 1990s” New York: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research: 122. * Halperin, Morton H, 1963. “Limited war in the nuclear age.” New York: John Wiley. * John, Ikenberry G, 1996. “The myth of cold war chaos” Foreign Affairs , 75(3): 79-92 * Kahn, Herman, 1965. “On escalation: metaphors and scenarios.” New York: Praeger. * Kaufmann, William W, 1965. :The requirements of Deterrence” IN “Military Policy and National Security” (William W Kaufmann, edn) Princeton: Princeton University Press. * Kaysen, Carl, McNamara, Robert S and Rathjens, George W, 1991. “Nuclear weapons after the cold war.” Foreign Affairs, 70(4): 95 -111. * Mueller, Harald, Fischer, David and Kotter, Wolfgang, 1994. “Learning from the past – nuclear non proliferation and global order.” New York: Oxford University Press * Nalebuff, Barry, 1986. “Brinkmanship and nuclear deterrence: The neutrality of escalation.” Conflict Management and Peace Science, 9:19-30 * Nolan, Janne E, 1994. “The U.S. nuclear arsenal – its past, its future.” The Brookings review, 12(2): 30-34 * Powell, Robert, 1985. “The Theoretical foundations of strategic nuclear deterrence.” Political Science Quarterly, 100: 75-96 * Powell, Robert, 1987. “Crisis bargaining, escalation and MAD.” American Political Science review, 81: 717-35 * Ryukichi, Imai, 1998. “Renewed effort to limit nuclear weapons.” Japan Quarterly, 45(4): 23-29 * Schelling, Thomas, C, 1960. “The strategy of conflict.” Cambridge: Harvard University Press. * Tkacik, Michael Patrick, 1996. “Nuclear deterrence, arms control and multipolarity: An argument for incremental policy change.” Armed Forces and Society, 22(3): 357-378 Read More