A Critique of Globalisation Theories - Essay Example

RUNNING HEAD: GLOBALISATION AND NATIONAL BORDERS A Critique of Globalisation Theories According to Inda and Rosaldo (2002 as cited in Cunningham, 2004) globalisation can be defined as “to the intensification of global interconnectedness, suggesting a world full of movement and mixture, contact and linkages, and persistent cultural interaction and exchange. It speaks, in other words, to the complex mobilities and interconnections that characterize the globe today” (p. 329). According to the United Nations’ International Migration Report in 2002, only 3% of the world’s population are living in a country where they were not born. This equates to almost 175 million people; yet between 1990 and 2000 there was a 14% increased in the number of migrants globally. Of this figure 9% are refugees and 60% of them live are found in developing nations. (UN Population, 2002). Despite the more fluid borders and increased globalisation being felt worldwide these figures demonstrate that this mobility is reserved for the few, not the majority, at least with respect to relocation to more prosperous nations. Klein (2002: p. xxii) in support of this notion added “most of globalization’s fenced-out people simply move: from countryside to city, from country to country. And that’s when they come face to face with distinctly unvirtual fences, made of chain link and razor wire, reinforced with concrete and guarded with machine guns.” In effect, increased globalisation has encouraged the open economy and free movement of trade while maintaining a closed door policy to the globalisation of human capital across national borders in the western industrialized nations. Instead, globalisation is viewed in a one way fashion. Increased industrialization of developing and third world countries were technologically advanced nations can benefit from the cheaper labour pool, the natural resources of the host country and the desperation of the host countries for an infusion of capital without the reciprocal movement of human capital movement to the west. Klein (2002: pp. 73-74) continues in this vein stating “the seventy to eighty-five million migrant workers world wide are more than the unseen side effect of ‘free trade.’ Once displaced they also enter the free market…as commodities, selling the only thing they have left: their labour.” Hannicles (2005) reminds us that even with the seemingly extensive migration in recent years, migration is a widely engrained, accepted practice throughout history. The level of migration is merely representative of the increased globalisation due to economical and technological advances brought on by modernisation. “Stimulated by decolonization, modernization, demographic imbalances, and global economic inequalities, international migrant movement has reached unprecedented levels and continues to accelerate” (Hannicles, 2005: p. 156). Fass (2005: p. 938) reminds us, likewise; “The mass movement of populations, whether associated with war or with economic change (and since these are frequently related, to both), is hardly new.” Since the dawn of time man has migrated. Geographic boundaries are merely societal imposed features of culture to produce an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ phenomenon which have existed since our earliest recorded accounts. As an example Fass (2005) points to our more recent past when during the 17th and 18th century, a period when empires collided and brought large portions of the Americas, Africa, and Asia into the European force field. So expansive was that world, that one historian, David Hancock, has described its innovative and wealthy beneficiaries as Citizens of the World. These collisions created the strong currents that led to an immense migration within the Americas, in Africa, and across the Atlantic and Indian Oceans (p. 938) These same routes of migration are still in evidence today. It is neither new nor unique. What has brought the migration to the forefront in recent, perhaps, is the volume of migration brought about by the increased fluidity resultant from the tremendous growth in globalisation, a result of increased technology. Verlinden (2005), however, acknowledges that although historically migration is not a new phenomenon, only in the recent past has asylum seeking reached problematic levels. According to Verlinden (2005: p. 1): (Forced) migration is now identified as deeply problematic, because it is feared that it will bring the fundamentals of our society under pressure. Part of the explanation for this deep concern is to be found in the actual development of globalisation, which has provoked new migration flows and resulted in a kind of globalisation of asylum seeking. Globalisation has, in effect, created a means for international asylum seeking across multiple national borders in far greater frequency than ever before experienced. Whether for political, social, economic, personal reasons, persecution or health and safety issues more and more people are trying to cross these international borders and seek asylum in one form or another. Velinden (2005) contends that this massive movement is unprecedented in history and the responsibility of states to balance morality and self preservation becomes increasingly difficult. In short, those nations to whom the asylum seekers flock have a responsibility or obligation in the moral sense. The problem is found in defining what the morality is and where the limits are placed or should be placed, if any. According to his findings, Hannicles (2005) purports there are two main theories involved with the interstate migration of human capital: the Gap Hypothesis and the Convergence Hypothesis. In the former theory, the Gap Hypothesis, there is a wide chasm between the ‘publicly’ avowed stance by the state on immigration and the reality of acceptance of the immigrant population. In short, the state’s official stance on migration is not reflected in their actual treatment of the migrant. In the Convergence Hypothesis, the publicly held views regarding immigration are now, more than ever, on a state by state basis, aligning with the official stance of the government on the issue of immigration. This is best evidenced in more stable western countries where populations are aging and the birth rate is at a far lower rate than emerging or third world states. These factors in conjunction with an increasing skill level by the resident population require the infusion of cheap, unskilled labour to fill the void. When this is understood and accepted by the political structure of the state and the populous migration is widely accepted. However, when the public still retains its aversion to the migration of labour inside its geographic boundaries there is a political ‘battle’ over immigration policies within the state. According to Hannicles (2005: p. 157): Essentially, the new immigrants are wanted but not welcome, which accounts for the ambivalence and inconsistency of governmental approaches to immigration. Restrictive policies mostly target non-white immigrants, while favouring highly skilled professionals. So, although most receiving countries claim to be liberal democracies, immigrants face cultural rejection, social stigma, racial discrimination, and human rights abuses. The complex nature of immigration polices and the balancing of citizen’s wants and desires with the economic and labour needs of business, industry and the state will ensure, particularly for the wealthy developed nations which are the primary goal of many immigrants, this socio-political debate will continue to be one of the most controversial issues of this century. The problem lies in the fact that according to “state migration control efforts still follow a national logic, while many of the forces driving migration follow a transnational logic.” With increased mobility brought on by globalisation more and more people view themselves as transnational, owing allegiance to not one state, but see themselves as member of multiple states. The force to open borders brought on by globalisation only further demonstrates individual state’s inability to ‘think’ beyond borders and arrive at migration policies based on this new fluidity (Levitt and Glick- Schiller, 2004; Vertovec, 2004). According to Dauvergne (2004) “As globalising forces challenge and transform sovereignty, so too is the place of migration law in the nation altered. The response to this challenge among prosperous and powerful nations is to imprint even more strongly than before a sense of self - of identity and of essential ‘nation-ness’ - onto the text of their migration laws” (p. 588). Stratham (2003) contends that although asylum seeking was constructed as a more humanitarian institution in theory, it has, in effect, become the primary method of immigration. Freeman (1995, 1998) takes this theory a step forward by asserting that even contrary to public sentiment and public debate by politicians regarding immigration, business and industry actively seek out the cheap import of labour enabling immigration to occur. Regardless of the public outcry from those competing for jobs with these newly arriving immigrants, the organised lobbying by industry has led to the more open door policy of politicians albeit in contrast to their publicly avowed closed door policies. In effect, Freeman’s position is that regardless of the official political position on immigration, western society in general, in contrast to the citizens of the state, allows a more open door policy on immigration due to the financial incentives and gains by industry who benefit economically from the cheaper labour source. Contemporary migration laws spell out who counts as family and who does not, and who is considered valuable in an economic sense. Humanitarian admissions confirm the nation itself as good and generous – part of the immigration rule rather than an exception” (Dauvergne, 2004: p. 589). Skilling’s (2005) view offers a somewhat different perspective on the same issue. With increased globalisation and mobility, the need for geographic boundaries and their application in a highly globalised environment is questioned. Geographic boundaries are merely a political representation of a state’s identity and therefore, their power base. With more fluid movement in and out of geographic boundaries the sovereignty of individual states becomes, according to Skilling (2005) minimised and reduced. Therefore, immigration laws and policies are the state’s attempt to maintain control and exhibit their power and authority over their geographic boundaries. According to Skilling (2005: p. 98): Control over immigration is a central component of state sovereignty; moreover, immigration policy is intimately connected to questions of national interests, values and identity. It is a site of contestation where a nation’s interests (security and prosperity) and values (openness, tolerance and respect for international human rights laws) may come into conflict. In this process, questions may be raised as to how a nation’s interests and values are formed and confirmed. In examining the issue from another stance Skilling (2005) points out that instead of being contra-indicative of the state’s survival, globalisation and the resulting migration and movement of people becomes, not a threat to state sovereignty; rather a manifestation of it. In truth, the reality of globalisation lies somewhere in the middle; individual states are neither powerless in their ability to control immigration, nor do they command total control over migration of human capital. Too many other entities including industry, multinational corporations’ financial interests and citizens play important roles in decision making. The question becomes not the actual immigration of human capital but a state’s desire to control the variables of which human capital to admit. Highly skilled immigrants with specific training and expertise are fiercely sought. However, other immigrants with general or little skills are viewed as potential sources of further burden to the state. Therefore, according to Kelsey (1999: p. 121) the actual nature of globalisation can best be described as “goods, capital and ideas – but only selected people – move freely around the world.” This view is further enhanced by Moses (2005) who found that “to the extent that labour, as a class, is comparatively less mobile than capital, its political influence is limited by its inability to threaten exit. Labour’s resistance to globalization may be derived from the fact that the benefits of free mobility have not been extended to most workers” (p. 55). In theory, Moses (2005) contends that although most states view globalisation as positive and necessarily for increased profitability and growth, economically viable states want to append the definition of globalisation to omit human capital as part of the free flow across geographic borders. Conradson and Latham (2005) offer a somewhat different approach to the rationale and reasoning behind the increased immigration and migration patterns brought about through increased globalisation. According to their theory, Conradson and Latham (2005) contend that economics is not the sole feature which defines migration, nor is it necessarily the most important to the migrant. It is merely a reason or rationale most frequently put forth in both the literature and by states and entities wishing to either stem the influx of migrants or explain the process. for an increasingly diverse mix of people, a period spent living abroad /whether to study, to develop a career, as part of traveling, or as an experimentation with the possibility of emigrating permanently is becoming a normal and almost taken-for-granted part of the lifecycle. Such mobility emerges from a complex set of personal motivations, amongst which financial considerations are not necessarily primary (Conrad and Latham, 2005: p. 288). What they have detected is that contrary to the popular notion of a dual system of migration: the poor, unskilled labour seeking a ‘better’ life in a traditionally accepted more affluent western advanced country and the ‘elite’ migrants, those with affluence and highly desired skills and expertise which have traditionally experienced an ‘open door’ migration pattern, there is the lesser known and lesser researched ‘middle class’ migrant who is neither desperate and seeks asylum in a particular country not possesses ‘elite’ status but merely sees migration as a normal part of their development, either personally or professionally. In defense of their position they offer the example of the multitude of middle class young people who have gravitated to cities such as London to work. They are relatively well educated and were drawn to the city not necessarily for financial gain but because of what the city offers them in terms of personal growth and experience. An additional factor in the ‘middle class’ migrants is the fact that long term many have not desire nor aspiration to make their residence permanent. They are merely on a personal development journey. Unique, this form of migration is not tied to familial relationships as much as to friendship bonds. Many of these ‘middle class’ migrants plan and share the migration experiences with friends from home, often moving and living together within their host environ – keeping their cultural ties intact even though they may be thousands of kilometers away from home. Boswell, et al. (2005) offer that there are two main positions with regard to migration: The Rationalist and the Non-Rationalist. With the former anti-immigration sentiment is based on the perception that disagreement with allowing immigration arises from the perception that the lack of skill and non-productivity of these immigrants will place an inordinate burden on the state. Non-rationalist’s views acknowledge that their may be increased burden on the state due to the influx of low or non-skilled immigrants but their anti-migration philosophy is not based on this rationale. Rather their fears are based on such things as the demise of national identity, cultural patterns and increased security risks. Figure 1 below displays the divergence of these two theories. Figure 1: Rationalist versus Non-Rationalist Views on Immigration1 In truth, reality lays somewhere in the middle. According to Boswell et al. (2005) the contention is that although there are economic considerations with regard to immigration they are often over inflated concerns which tend to mask the true reasons for citizens’ desire for a more closed border approach to migration. According to their research, Boswell et al. (2005) contend that the aging population in conjunction with an increasing demand for qualified and extremely qualified workers will ensure that an increase in migration is necessary to maintain the economic standing globally of industrialised states. They use the current health care worker crisis in the UK as an example of shortages in certain workforce sectors that will only increase without an easing of the immigration regulations. These labour gaps are caused by either aggregate shortages where there simply is not enough labour available to fill vacancies or secondly, an inequality between labour vacancies and skill or mobility of the resident labour force. Boswell, et al. (2005) examined the print media in the UK to ascertain the level of public debate regarding immigration, labour shortages and asylum seekers. Overall, during the period of their analysis they found that, in general, “political debate focuses on controlling non-economically productive immigration, especially asylum” (p. 21). For a six week period prior to the 2001 election, 15 April through 7 June 2001) and prior to the EU expansion in 2004 (23 April through 1 May 2004), they examined 6 dailies with wide circulation to examine the nature and extent of public discourse regarding migration issues. Their findings indicated two things. Firstly, the media uses the terms asylum and immigration interchangeably, albeit incorrectly. Secondly, the primary topics of discussion focus on immigration and asylum seekers rather than labour migration. Figure 2 below displays the instances of mention of these various topics during the periods noted above. Figure 2: British Printed Media Extent of Immigration Coverage2 As seen in the above figure during the seven week periods covered 579 times the combined topics were addressed via the press. Although the majority of references were neutral in tone as seen in Figure 2 above when there was a biased reference it was most frequently 20% of the time as opposed to .01% of the time a negative reference as opposed to a positive one. Surprisingly, the authors noted that only one of the articles during the time of the analysis drew a comparison between native UK citizens and unemployment with immigration. When evaluating an opinion poll conducted by MORI prior to the general election in 2001, as seen in Figure 3 below, 49% of the British population polled strongly feel that the UK is a ‘soft touch’ when it comes to immigration issues and 25% agree for a total agreement of 74% of the population. In the same line, a total of 53% feel there are too many immigrants living in the UK now. However, only 18% of the public to some degree will admit they would not want an asylum seeker to live in their neighborhood, and 44% of Brits feel there are enough asylum seekers currently housed within the UK. Figure 3: British Public Opinion regarding Immigration Issues3 A similar study conducted by the EU in 2000 regarding public opinion on immigration found that surprisingly, as shown in Figure 4 below, that the UK had a higher percentage of citizens than both Germany and the EU in general who believe that immigration has had a negative impact on education, has created more abuse of the welfare system and believe that immigrants receive preferential treatment. Conversely, the UK as a whole feels that immigration is less responsible for unemployment and an increase of crime than does the rest of the EU. Figure 4: British, German and EU views of Immigration4 What these polls and surveys seem to indicate in total is that the UK citizens seem to view immigration and asylum seekers as more of a threat to the way of life in Britain and as a burden on the state rather than the cause of employment loss and economic conditions in general. In contrast there appears to be little concern for the migration of highly skilled human capital into the state which supports the notion that the belief is such a migration will not increase the welfare system within the country. In summation it appears that regardless of the circumstance for the migration, as long as the migrant is capable of offering immediate benefit to the state the public welcomes them whilst wishing to keep the border locked tightly to those migrants who regardless of their need appear unable to be self sustaining members of British society immediately upon entry into the country. Although there has been much rhetoric about the erosion of the state due to increased mobility caused by globalisation, much of the debate centres on self serving principles and long standing beliefs held by the elite few. Migration with globalisation is inevitable. One can not exist without the other. As Wagner (2005) stated instead of concern about geographic borders devised by men to protect their self-interest, we, as one world, need to concern ourselves with recreating the concept of citizenship, not of nations by transnational citizenship that does not limit the worth of human capital at a man made boundary, but rather transcends national boundaries to ensure we meet our moral and ethical obligations to all, not just those with whom we chose. Globalisation has not eroded our borders, our own misconceptions of what defines borders has led too many to that conclusion. References BEAUDIN, M. and BREAU, S., 2001. 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