Energy Power as a Soft Weapon in Resurgent Russia's Foreign Policy - Coursework Example

 Energy Power as a Soft Weapon in Resurgent Russia’s Foreign Policy Introduction By the second half of twentieth century itself, the control over energy was a key factor which shaped the international politics. There have shifts in the balance of power based solely on a particular countries availability of energy resources. Russia which was considered as a lost power following the demise of Soviet Union comes now back to the centre stage of the new world order using its vast energy resources. The new oil wealth is more effective for realising the foreign policy goals of the resurgent Russia. Qualitatively speaking, Russia no more is a defunct military super power but a rising energy super power. Undeniably, Russia has inherited much of the former Soviet Union’s hard power including a powerful nuclear arsenal and a sophisticated army. It is in a position to capitalise the ever-increasing instability in the Middle East and the consequent dramatic rise in the oil price. Russia as an Indispensable Power for Global Energy Security The interests of Russian energy sector and the foreign policy goals of the Russian states are not only interrelated but also closely intertwined. To a great extent, the energy sector in Russia acts as the global carriers of Russian state’s immensely self assertive foreign policy. On the other hand, the international expansion of Russia’s premier energy enterprises is enormously assisted by the potentials of the Russian state. Oil companies such as Gazprom and LUKoil have strengthened their markets word wide and secured sensitive energy ventures. Their influence goes cut through the strategically important places in Europe. Even the United States has come to rely much upon the Russian energy resources. Moreover, Europe’s energy security is considerably depended up on the energy resources of Russia. Hill (2004) makes it clear that “on the surface, given prevailing concerns about energy security and increasing demand in the rising economies of Asia on Russia’s eastern borders, Russia’s future prospects in energy seem extremely promising” ( Hill, 2004, p.29). Thanks to the increases in oil production since 1999, Russia is now the world’s major non-OPEC, and non-Middle East and Persian Gulf, oil supplier. As Peter Davies, BP’s chief economist, pointed out in his June 2004 presentation of BP’s annual Statistical Review of World Energy, thanks to its fast growth in oil production, between 1998-2003, “Russia alone supplied 46 per cent of world oil consumption growth … and exceeded Chinese consumption growth by 23 per cent … Russia has the resource base and the potential to increase oil and gas production and exports further – to supply a significant proportion of the world’s rising demands ... Russia can – and will – supply an important part of the growing energy needs of Asia”. Resurgent Russia’s Energy Highhandedness and the Doctrine of Self-assertive Foreign Policy There are ample of Russian products which are conquering the global market. Russian popular culture is also gaining momentum across the globe. Its film industry has become one of the leading in the world. The rise in the energy production has led to greater employment creation in both private and public spheres. Russia at present is attracting millions of workers from its neighbouring countries. It is literally absorbing the surplus labour from Eurasia. From 1998 onwards, the booming oil prices have helped Russia to retain its traditional spheres of influence and explore new power blocs. Importantly, oil production too has increased substantially since the end of cold war as new markets such as India and China are being strengthened. It is the availability of vast energy resources that forms the basis of Russia’s resurgence. The efficient and strategic use of energy resources and deals which have long term geo-political implications has substantially helped Russia to regain its old international status as a super power. Most importantly, the oil wealth enabled the Kremlin authorities to assert their full control over the country and thereby ensures national security and stability. The fact is that Russia has become a super power based on its new soft power potential vis-à-vis conventional military power for the first time in history. The core change in the Russian foreign policy is that it no more pursues the Soviet era approach of deploying military power for securing dominance outside its own boundaries. “Instead, Moscow has moved in the direction of first building up and now starting to utilise its economic resources to encourage neighbouring states to associate more closely with its regional policies. At the same time, Russia’s growing economy, the persistence of the Russian language as a regional lingua franca – the language of commerce, employment, and education – for many of the states of the former Soviet Union, a range of new Russian consumer products, and a burgeoning popular culture spread through satellite TV, a growing film industry, rock music, Russian popular novels, and the revival of the crowning achievements of the Russian artistic tradition have all made Russia a more attractive state for regional populations than it was in the 1990s. Over the last several years, Russia has become a migration magnet for Eurasia” ( Hill, 2004, pp.2-3). Gazprom, the giant gas monopoly, which alone is a concrete metaphor of Russia’s newly acquired soft power. While addressing the nation on 2004 may, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin unquestionably asserted that emphasising more the modernisation of military is the aim of allocating substantially more budget share to military spending which in turn tries to create “ a transparent military economy’ wherein strict mechanisms of accountability are introduced as a “necessary condition for reform”. The big difference is that Russia at present is using the energy highhandedness for ensuring its foreign policy objectives instead of military highhandedness. Uncharacteristically, Russia is extending its influence to the neighbouring regions such as Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia by deploying the commercial arm through the big companies like Gasprom or UES. In addition, Russia is investing heavily in the energy sectors of the neighbouring countries such as Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Moldova which go beyond billions of U.S dollars. The rate of the expansion of Russian business beyond its borders is truly unprecedented. By the end of the first decade of the new millennium, the soft power status of underwent tremendous transformations. It is so clear by now that “Russia’s ability to use soft power resources at all, however, stands in stark contrast with the situation a decade ago. In the 1990s, beset by the upheavals resulting from attempts to liberalise and reform its economy, Moscow lost the capacity to continue financial subsidies to the other states of the former Soviet Union and thus to maintain its economic attraction” ( Hill, 2004, p.6). Therefore, Russia is in a position to aggressively self assert itself through its reinvigorated foreign policy based predominately on its newly found energy soft power. It is not to say that Russia’s foreign policy has no connections with its heavy military arsenal but on the contrary to the old Soviet times, the foreign policy of the resurgent Russia is not solely depended upon the hard power. It is the biggest advantage of Russia that it has influential numbers of Russian speakers in the neighbouring countries which means that they could act as “a ‘fifth column’ for the reassertion of Moscow’s influence over its neighbours’ domestic and foreign policies” ( Hill, 2004, p.7). Moreover, one of the key targets of Russia’s use of energy as a foreign policy weapon is to prevent the pro-Western states such as Baltic States, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Georgia from going closer to the West and bring them back to the traditional Russian sphere of influence. Apparently, Russia has many times cut the vital energy supplies to Ukraine in order to alter its foreign policy favouring the United States or Europe. Despite differences in culture, language, and geography, the rulers of Russia and Venezuela are increasingly rejecting civil society and narrowing political space in their respective countries. They drive out foreign investors and erode market mechanisms. Both governments have mounted sustained attacks on the rule of law in an effort to exert control over energy resources, excessively strengthen the state, and expand geopolitical clout. Putin and Chávez are promoting an alternative vision to that of the U.S. and the West and are comfortable with the progress they are making toward this end. Russia and Venezuela, together with Iran, are among the trend-setters in the democratic roll-back taking place since the late 1990s, especially in petro-states. The rise of oil prices has accelerated this process and helped precipitate the rise of statism and the decline in democratic governance, while energy revenues provide the means to buy off political opponents and the media, build up internal security forces, and insulate regimes from any domestic and international criticism. At this juncture, it is necessary to examine the foreign policy roots of Russian federation as it was freed itself from the Soviet Empire. As the succeeding regime in Moscow was not capable enough to formulate an independent foreign policy due to lack of professionalism and nationalist spirit, foreign economic influences were more or less present in almost all the significant foreign policy decisions. The foreign policy of Yeltsin period was infamous for its sheer non-existence. Hill (2004) points out that Yeltsin’s foreign policy was termed as “freewheeling and chaotic” by a number of influential commentators such as Nina Petrova. On the contrast, Lo (2003) argues that the freelancing by vested interests had been sorted out and therefore, President Putin and his administration were completely in charge of the state of foreign policy affairs. It also enhanced the process of securing Russian interests abroad through the export of Russian petroleum products and other commodities and services. However, Lo (2003) notes that such imperial ambitions of Russia considerably reviving the imperial spirit of the Soviet Union in new forms. Concretely speaking, Russia’s foreign policy goals are primarily focused upon the politics of the Commonwealth of Independent States. In 2004, Putin has repeatedly emphasised the vitality of protecting the commonwealth and evolving a new foreign policy doctrine in order to primarily secure its interests in relations to the CIS member Countries. Hill (2004) is of the opinion that “Putin’s emphasis on soft power and economic integration in his July 2004 speech suggests a real departure from Russia’s more traditional heavy-handed and military force-oriented approach to its relations with the CIS. But, Russian hard power is still present and still deployable. Saber rattling tendencies persist, and the real danger remains that ‘restorationists’ in the military and security services, as well as in the Russian parliament will try to reassert themselves in foreign policy” ( Hill, 2004, p.21). Conclusion Russia’s foreign policy assertiveness, funded by revenues from natural resources, makes many believe that a new energy empire is on the rise. The country today is ruled by post-Soviet security and military elites that have internalized the jingoistic values of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. These elites view the outside world almost exclusively through the lens of economic and military might. They also use foreign policy as a tool to buttress domestic support and to foster a perception that Russia is surrounded by enemies at a time when its democratic legitimacy is deteriorating. Despite its projected might, the Kremlin is not capable of dealing with some of Russia’s critical demographic, social, economic, and political vulnerabilities. These flaws may well challenge the current sense of stability in Russia, especially after the 2007–2008 election cycles or if the economy deteriorates. References Hill, F. (2004). Energy Empire: Oil, Gas and Russia’s Revival. London: The Foreign Policy Centre. Lo, B. (2003). Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House Papers. Peter Davies, Energy in Focus: 2004 BP Statistical Review of World Energy’, presentation, Washington, DC, June 17, 2004. Vladimir Putin, ‘Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation’, May 26, 2004, at www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2004/05/26/1309_type70029_71650.shtml. Read More