What could the Germans have done to save the Stalingrad Campaign - Essay Example

What could the Germans have done to save the Stalingrad Campaign? The Stalingrad Campaign was fought for the control of Stalingrad, a major in Southwestern Soviet Russia, between July 1942 and February 1943. After initial heavy bombing by the German forces, the fighting became bogged down in street-to-street and house-to-house fighting, and eventually the German armies were encircled and cut off inside the city, and forced to defeat by the Soviets. At several stages in the course of these events, decisions were made and actions were taken which harmed the German cause.

It is possible that, had a different course, been adopted, the Germans would have succeeded at Stalingrad. By September 1942, when the fighting moved into the centre of the city, the German began moving large units of heavy artillery into the city itself. While the Germans came to control up to 90% of the city at some points in the conflict, they crucially never dislodged the Soviet forces from the west bank of the Volga river. It was from this bulkhead that, as the tide turned against the German armies, the Soviets were able to build up their forces and prepare for a counter-offensive.

It is true that in mid-October, orders were given for the scaling up of the Luftwaffe bombardment of the Soviet west bank. However, they were unable to destroy the forces stationed there, and by November, German air forces had been depleted to such an extent that a systematic assault of the Soviet position there was impossible. Therefore, had the focus been moved to confronting the Russian forces across the Volga River sooner, when German forces were stronger and Russian forces weaker, the battle may have had a different outcome.

As with everywhere along the eastern front, German forces proved unprepared for the brutal conditions of the Russian winter. The logistical errors were striking, including flying a plane full of summer uniforms into freezing conditions at Stalingrad towards the end of the winter. This inability to fight in the extreme cold meant that many German units were redeployed along the southern parts of the front during the coldest months, and it was at this point that the Russians launched their counter-offensive.

The German forces suffered from chronic supply problems which, had they been alleviated, would have allowed for much more effective fighting. A final, desperate attempt to supply the cut-off army by air failed due to a lack of airfields, planes and supplies, as well as being hampered by the poor weather conditions and tough resistance offered by the Russians. Basic supply issues, such as a lack of fuel for the advancing German armies, should have been rectified, and would have made for a swifter and more effective German assault.

Instead, Paulus had to keep halting on the approach to Stalingrad, and had thus lost the element of surprise. While the main German army fought within the city, the units guarding its flanks and retreat were spread incredibly thinly, and the German commanders failed to bring in reinforcements while the Russian forces were still weak. This made it relatively easy later on for the Russian armies to cut off Paulus’ army within Stalingrad. Finally, orders given directly from Hitler were frequently badly-advised.

He placed huge prestige on capturing the city bearing the Soviet leader’s name, and foolishly order his army to capture it whatever the cost, and on no account retreat or surrender. Had he permitted a retreat when a corridor was still open to do so, many troops might have been saved for future fighting. It would have been better to take the advice of General Zeitner and order a tactical withdrawal to the Don bend, from where a united German front could have been put together. Even when the German army was completely encircled with no hope of winning the battle, Hitler refused to authorize a breakout, by then the only realistic option.

By the time a breakout was authorized, the German troops were too weak to attempt it. Partly because of Hitler’s poor decisions, Paulus was never able to take the initiative, but was instead always reacting to events. As Murray and Millett put it, ‘In every respect Stalingrad was a catastrophic defeat for the Germans – one that turned the balance in the east in favour of the Soviets’1. References W. Murray and A.R. Millett, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, Mass.

: Belknap Press, 2000) Stalingrad. spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk. Accessed 20/01/2011.