Politics of the Contemporary Middle East - Essay Example

? Politics of the Contemporary Middle East (07.03.12) Introduction Amongst the most important elements relative to international relations in the Middle East region following the Gulf War of 1991 was the peace process between the Arabs and Israel that was sponsored by America. The two main parties in the Arab Israeli conflict were Israel and Palestine. This paper traces the development of the conflict and of peace negotiations between the PLO and Israel and attempts to find the reasons why the Oslo Peace Process of the 1990s failed to deliver the promise of a just and lasting peace between Israel and the PLO. The main developments of the peace process were the Oslo Peace Accord, its implementation, the summit at Camp David and the re-escalation of violence. It is evident that the Oslo Peace Process was slated to fail from the beginning because under Likud’s leadership, Israel went back on its words relative to implementing its own obligations emanating from the deal. Upon reading the details of the accord it becomes clear that the Oslo Declarations of Principles never represented a strong foundation for peace between Israel and the PLO. It is widely believed that this happened because preferential treatment was given to Israel in the treaty. The US is said to have avoided playing an effective and impartial role in brokering the peace agreements. The Soviet Union was an ally of the Palestinians but it was a declining power during the period. The enormous support provided to Israel by the US makes it clearly evident that there was an imbalance of power that served as an obstacle in making the treaty and agreements successful (Quandt, 2005). Theoretical interpretation This paper examines the issue in the light of the theoretical perspectives relative to politics in the Middle East. The theories that appear to provide an understanding and to explain the events of the conflict are neo-realism, modernization theory and post colonialism theory. However, the reasons behind the Oslo failure are best explained by the neorealist theory. The main theoretical assumptions of neorealism are the following: The international political systems are defined through power relations The main actors are sovereign states The main objective of these states is to optimize security by maximizing their own military, diplomatic and economic capabilities Peace and order is achieved after states are able to achieve balance of power by effecting deterrence and stable alliances The presence of a dominating state can lead to stability if that state is hegemonic in terms of identifying its self interests with the interests of the larger region or global system The modernization theory originated through the concept of functionalist sociology. It holds that all societies developed from traditional to modern conditions, in terms of transforming from simplistic, narrow and theocratic circumstances to complicated, public and secular forms of organization. It is known that societies undergo different stages of socio economic transformation whereby some manage to modernize faster in view of their interactions and association with modern societies of the west. The theory is applicable to the Middle East region in the context of some states being in a transitional stage towards modernism. The Postcolonial criticism approach is recent in having its origin in cultural studies. In fact it grew from analysis of the Middle East region as carried out by Edward Said (1978) through his influential work Orientalism, which related to the ways in which a distorted image was created about the Arabs by Europeans in justifying their colonial occupation in the region. This theory holds that politics in the Middle East Region was first characterized by struggle for power control by colonists, then by the super powers during the Cold War and subsequent to 1989, by the US alone. The arguments are based on the belief that nations in the Middle East are dependent or client states that act as agents of Western hegemony or national liberation groups striving to reduce colonial dependence (Kedourie, 1992). According to Hourani (2005), amongst the three theoretical frameworks, the neorealist theory explains more aptly the circumstances in the Middle East in terms of regional chaos, volatility and insecurity. From a neorealist perspective, changes in the balance of power allowed both sides a strong sense of authority in the negotiations whereby ways could be developed to manage the conflict better in order to change the status quo. In spite of both Israel and the PLO being open for conflict resolution, a large number of gaps existed in terms of conceiving a permanent settlement. A critical flaw was the decision of mutual recognition that masked the problem of finding a permanent solution. As per the neorealist theory, the major issue is not about recognizing each other but about finding ways in which the two sides will translate meaning of the agreement into practical solutions in keeping with mutual interests. It is largely believed that assumptions of the neo-realist theory are relevant to the Middle East because the region is characterized with weaknesses in the Arab states. These circumstances do not make the region prone to security and stability. Such circumstances allow the empowerment of non state actors and they eventually grab excessive power. Examples of such actors are terrorist organizations that have been threatening peace and order in the region. Ideological considerations such as Islamic fundamentalism and socialism are known to create violent attitudes towards America’s involvement in the region, thus weakening its impact on stabilization efforts (Hinnebusch, 2003). Details of the Oslo Accord The Intifada was a massive youth uprising that occurred in Palestine in 1987 to protest against Israel’s occupation of Gaza and the West Bank, which reopened the issues in the global agenda relative to Palestine. Global public opinion was in favor of the Palestinians after Israel ordered its forces to impose severe physical injuries on Palestinian youth that were taking part in the Intifada. The Intifada movement continued even as the Gulf War and the Cold War ended. In view of the prevailing tensions, the US arranged a multilateral peace conference in Madrid in October 1991in which Palestinians, Israel, USSR, Syria and Jordan participated (Said, 1995). This was the first time that Israel and its neighboring Arab states collected together to talk in trying to find solutions to the issues. Subsequently, meetings and negotiations continued at London in December, 1992, whereby a secret agreement was reached amongst the PLO and Israel that further led to a cordial environment and a concept agreement was arrived at between the two sides in August 1993. This was the result of further secret talks that were carried out amongst leaders of the two sides. Fourteen sessions of secret meetings were held during a period of eight months. At a highly publicized ceremonial meeting that was held on 13th September 1993 in Washington, the PLO leader Yasser Arafat and Prime Minister Rabin of Israel signed the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government as applicable to the people of Palestine (Amin, 1989). The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government basically pertained to being a program of negotiations that were to be carried out under a tight schedule. It provided that Israel would withdraw from Gaza in four months. Internal security would be maintained by Palestinian forces while Israel retained the complete responsibility of foreign affairs and external security. Israel would transfer authority to Palestinian authorities in areas of tourism, direct taxation, social welfare, health and education and Palestine was to hold elections within nine months to elect a Palestinian Council that would be responsible for all government functions other than foreign affairs and defense. Both parties would start negotiation within two years to determine the eventual status of regions so that a permanent settlement will be effected within five years (Shlaim, 2005). Therefore, the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government promised that a process would be initiated whereby Israel’s control over about two million Palestinians would be eventually ended in Gaza and the West Bank. It is evident that in spite of the ambiguities and limitations of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government represented a major initiative in achieving a solution of the centuries old dispute between Israel and Palestine (Halliday, 2005). However, the outline of the permanent settlement was not made specific in the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government, and was left open to further discussions amongst the two sides in the second stage. The agreement did not mention crucial issues relative to the status of Jerusalem, the fate of Jewish people settled in Gaza and the West Bank, borders of the Palestinian state and the return of the 1948 refugees. It is now evident that these issues were not addressed because it was not possible to arrive at a negotiated settlement on them. Both Israel and the PLO had taken calculated risks in view of the dependence on the ways in which the attempt towards self government in Palestine would take shape. The Israeli Prime Minister Rabin was against giving independence to Palestine and instead wanted to create a Palestinian-Jordan confederation. On the other hand, Arafat remained dedicated in focusing on independence for the Palestinians. The Oslo accord comprised of two parts; the first comprising of mutual understanding through a letter that was signed on a plain paper between Prime Minister Rabin of Israel and Yasser Arafat, the Chairman of the PLO. Secondly, Arafat confirmed that the PLO was committed in recognizing the right of Israeli citizens to live peacefully and accepting the UN Security Council resolutions whereby Palestinians would not involve in terrorism and violence. In view of these commitments by Arafat, Prime Minister Rabin confirmed recognizing the PLO as the representative of Palestinians and of commencing talks with the PLO in achieving lasting peace in the region (Milton-Edwards, 2006). The Oslo accord appeared to be a historic settlement because both parties to the conflict appeared to be reconciled. There appeared to be a solution in sight through mutual recognition of each others’ rights. Israel expressed its recognition of the Palestinian people and of their political rights. The historic settlement was based on a notable sense of compromise whereby the concept of partitioning Palestine was accepted. Both Israel and Palestine were open to accepting the territorial compromises in return for a solution to the long drawn and embittered conflict. In having agreed to the concept of partition, both sides had abandoned their dogmatic disputes in terms of who owned Palestine. Instead, they started focusing on finding practical solutions for sharing the crowded areas falling between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. Both parties agreed to part with territories they had previously considered as being their right to control and as a crucial part of their national identities. They decided to make this a noteworthy agreement because both accepted they were not capable of imposing their own perspectives on the opposite side (Amin, 1982). Failure of Oslo Accord from a neorealist perspective From a neorealist perspective, changes in the balance of power allowed both sides a strong sense of authority in the negotiations whereby ways could be developed to manage the conflict better in order to change the status quo. In spite of both Israel and the PLO being open for conflict resolution, a large number of gaps existed in terms of conceiving a permanent settlement. A critical flaw was the decision of mutual recognition that masked the problem of finding a permanent solution. As per the neorealist theory, the major issue is not about recognizing each other but of the ways in which the two sides will translate meaning of the agreement into practical solutions in keeping with mutual interests. The issue of mutual recognition actually proved to be destructively ambiguous because it created huge gaps relative to the conceptualization of both sides about the practical meaning of mutual recognition. This sense of destructive ambiguity led to enhanced perceptions about threats to the main objectives of both parties, which created a vicious circle relative to extreme sense of insecurity on both sides, instead of mutual trust (Kepel, 1994). Although both sides recognized each other politically, the Palestinians did not accept Zionism as the official national movement and Israel refused to make formal commitments about Palestinians having the entitlement to statehood ((Schoenbaum, 1993). Most people in Israel supported the peace initiatives not because of Palestinian rights but because of security issues relative to protecting the identity of Israel and the Jewish democratic status. This made many citizens in Israel to become least concerned about the fear that developed amongst Palestinians about being recognized as a viable state. The Palestinians continued viewing Zionism as a colonial concept, which implied for them that peace was related to submission and not to justice. Israelis were overwhelmingly opposed to a right of return for Palestinian refugees because making compromise in this regard would imply that Israel’s status as a Jewish nation was secondary to the Palestinian rights in terms of choosing their eventual place of residence. This created beliefs amongst Israeli people that the long term objective of the PLO was to remove Israel demographically (Owen, 2004). Majority of Israeli people were against permitting refugees into Israel and they felt that the right of return could become a severe threat to their most cherished political value of Israel existing as a Jewish state in demographic terms. The failure of arriving at a framework for a permanent status agreement (FAPS) during the intervening period adversely affected further negotiations in ways that led to erosion of trust. The interim period was created to provide time for the liberalized processes to make the circumstances ripe for conflict resolution. But as there was no permanent status agreement, the intervening period created a lot of mistrust on both sides. There was lack of specific solutions to issues pertaining to permanent status that further encouraged rejectionists and opponents in both Israel and Palestine. Such circumstances created complexities for leaders on both sides to take consistent action in building support and trust for the ensuing processes such as cracking down on terrorist facilities and affecting a settlement freeze. Attempts to arrive at compromise relative to the main and symbolic issues before strong signs of ripeness appeared amongst the general population, led opponents to exploit the violent perspectives of such symbols and mobilized people to engage in violence. Although the elites have the power and ability to control conflicts, the eventual reality is what people come to recognize in their name. It was perhaps due to this perception that there was initiation and incitement of violence following Prime Minister Sharon’s Temple Mount visit. It was not without reason that the Palestinian people had termed the violence that commenced in September 2000 as the second Intifada. Therefore, from a neorealist perspective, the creation of mistrust was not because of failures pertaining to faulty implementation in terms of mistakes made by the two sides, but because of the functioning of the inherent problematical character of common recognition. The process relative to the Oslo accord was faulty from the beginning because the realistic meanings of mutual acknowledgment as perceived by the two sides proved to be extensively distanced, despite the fact that the differences could be bridged through sensible implementation. In fact, the gaps amongst the two sides relative to the important issues of permanent status created the maximum distrust in the intervening period (Lewis, 2004). The US is held partly responsible for the collapse of the Oslo peace process because it is argued that it did not act impartially. Rather, it synchronized its position with Israel by permitting it to assume leadership in fixing the time table for discussions. The US has been criticized for remaining inconsiderate towards the interests of Palestinians by asking them to accept proposals made by Israel during the Camp David talks. Additionally, it is also apparent that America’s cultural bias in favor of Israel and the US elections of 2000 disallowed the US from sufficiently pressurizing Israel in achieving a breakthrough before the outbreak of violence in September, 2000. Analysts have argued that successful outcomes would have been achieved if the US had acted differently. The US and its Arab partners were alienated because of Arafat’s open support of Saddam Hussein during the 1991 Gulf War, which considerably weakened the Palestinians’ financial and diplomatic position. Conclusion A possible answer to why the Oslo accord broke down is that it was destined to fail from the beginning in view of its innate flaws, particularly because it did not deal with the central issues of the conflict between the two sides. The narratives relating to the signing and the failure of the Oslo accord clearly suggest that the main reason of failure was the back tracking by Israel. In having resorted to violence, Palestinians created mistrust that further put a stop to the political process of implementing the terms of the accord. The basic reason for the loss of trust and the decline in the speed was Israel’s policy of increasing settlements along the West Bank. Such policies prevented the creation of a feasible Palestinian state that led to further escalation in violence. It has been argued that America was not forceful in enforcing a solution, primarily because of its special relationships with Israel in terms of domestic politics and cultural bias. From a neorealist perspective, the US did not enforce peace because it has a special interest in preserving stability in keeping with pro American power balance in the Middle East. The US could continue with the prevailing minor conflicts as long as they did not intensify into a full-fledged regional war. It is clearly suggestive from the failure of the Oslo accord that in the Middle East, there is immense significance of external interventions for resolving the prevailing conflicts. Rather than try to make attempts in arriving at comprehensive agreements, a viable option is to focus on achieving the practical solution through methods of conflict management, which can be adopted in reconstructing the primary circumstances for resolving future conflicts. This would also serve the purpose of keeping options open for adopting methods of conflict resolution. As per the neorealist theory, as discussed in this paper, this would mean that physical and political separation between Palestinians and Israel will have to be made the base for partition and a concrete solution. This is possible even if no formal agreement is made. From the neorealist perception, the solution in terms of peace can be achieved only through marginalization of the perceived advantages of violence and doing away with extremist and anti partition approaches. References Amin, Samir. 1989. Eurocentrism, London: Zed. Amin, Samir. 1982. The Arab Economy Today, London: Zed Books. Halliday, Fred. 2005. The Middle East in International Relations – Power, Politics and Ideology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch.1. Hinnebusch, Raymond. 2003. The International Politics of the Middle East, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Hourani, Albert. 2005. A History of the Arab Peoples, London: Faber and Faber. Kedourie, Elie. 1992. Politics in the Middle East, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kepel, Gilles. 1994. The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World, Cambridge: Polity Press. Lewis, Bernard. 2004. 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