Turkey's Foreign Policy on Arab Spring - Essay Example

Turkey's Foreign Policy on Arab Spring Introduction Turkey has had an ever-changing foreign policy which has hurt it in some ways in this spring’s uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, as well as hurt it in its relations with the West. While Turkey, with its secular democracy, booming economy and modernity, makes it a natural ally for the West, and, in fact, this was the case for a number of years, in recent years the opposite has been true. Specifically, Turkey’s foreign policy has not been anchored by the axis formed by Western countries, as the Western countries, by and large, are seeking to isolate countries that Turkey has befriended and supports. These countries include Syria, Libya and Iran. This has caused consternation to the West, who had hoped that Turkey would be an ally and would be able to help the West put pressure on these authoritarian Arab countries. In the meantime, Turkey has caused more problems for pro-Israeli countries, such as the United States, as the country has turned against Israel because of Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians and an incident where Israel killed a number of Palestinians who were a part of a humanitarian convoy. This is all a part of the Turkish pragmatic foreign policy, as it has realized that it needs to appease its neighbors in order to have security within its borders, as well as have free and open trade with the region, therefore it has embraced the Arab world. However, this caused problems for Turkey when the Arab uprising began. This is because Turkey, in its policy of zero problems with neighbors, embraced dictators. One of these dictators was Qadaffi, so the Libyan uprising put the country into a difficult position. Moreover, the embrace of other dictators in other countries, such as Syria and Iran, signaled to the Western world and the rebels in these countries that Turkey is not entirely on the side of the democratizers. That said, Turkey still stands as a beacon to the Arab world, and a model for the Arab Spring countries to emulate, so Turkey is in the unique position of becoming the model for democratizing countries, while aggrandizing power in the Western world because of its potential for being the bridge between authoritative countries and democracy. The Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy Turkey’s foreign policy has evolved considerably over the years. According to Onis (2010), Turkey currently has an active foreign policy approach, and this approach has been the hallmark of the AKP government era. This approach has had continuity between the first and second terms of office, as Abdullah Gul and Ahmet Davutoglu has played a key role in Turkey’s foreign policy initiatives. This active foreign policy precedes the AKP government administration, however, as it was a part of the Turkish regime since the post-Cold War era in the 1990s (Onis, 2010, p. 3). The AKP era’s central focus on foreign policy is that they use their power softly, and strive to improve relations with its neighbors (using the motto “zero problems with neighbors”). Pursuing a more ambitious role in regional and global power is another benchmark for the AKP government, as well as the desire to Europeanize. Nevertheless, the Middle East and the Arab world was also a focal point of the Turkish foreign policy initiatives under the AKP (Onis, 2010, p. 4). That said, Onis (2010) also states that the second term of office has been marked by foreign policy differences from the first phase, and the most glaring of these difference is that Turkey has weakened commitment to the European Union (EU). This has been shown in the fact that Turkey has acted independently of its Western Allies with regard to the international and regional conflicts (Onis, 2010, p. 4). This is in contradiction to long-standing foreign policy stances which have aligned Turkey with the West since 1946, when Turkey allied itself to the West in the Cold War, which led to Turkey sending troops to Korea and joining NATO. According to Cagaptay (2009), 1946 was the beginning of the Turkish alliance with the West, and led to Turkey closely cooperating with the United States and Europe (Cagaptay, 2009, p. 1). This all led to what Onis & Yilmaz (2009) dubbed “the Golden Age of Europeanization of Turkey,” between 2002 and 2005, with its emphasis upon economic and democratization reforms (Onix & Yilmaz, 2009). Keyman (2009) states that Turkey’s best interest is served by aligning itself with the European Union, and following the EU’s lead in foreign policy matters – letting the EU be Turkey’s foreign policy anchor, so to speak. Keyman states that this is in Turkey’s best interest, because of its modernity and democracy. Keyman further states that Turkey should demand full citizenship to the EU if it can link its proactive foreign policy with democratic reform and sustainable economic development (Keyman, 2009, p. 41). The Turkish alliance with the West led Turkey to seek out a democratic alliance with Israel, which, as another democratic state, was an attractive partner to Turkey. Moreover, these two countries shared similar foreign policy concerns, notably that Syria was supporting Palestinian and Kurdistan Worker’s Party, therefore both countries had an issue with Syria, as Syria was supporting groups that were in opposition to Israel in its support of Palestinian organizations, and in opposition to Turkey, in its support of Kurdistan organizations (Cagaptay, 2009, p. 1). Turkey’s pro-Western stance has changed, according to Cagaptay, in Turkey’s support, under the AKP, for Islam, and its show of solidarity with Islamic anti-Western regimes (Qatar and Sudan). At the same time, it has shown opposition to secular, pro-Western Muslim governments, such as Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia (Cagaptay, 2009, p. 1). While the AKP did not make fundamental changes to its foreign policy in its first term in 2002, under its second term in 2007, the AKP became emboldened by its re-election, so it was able to take a more pro-Islam, anti-Western stance (Inbar, 2010, p. 2). This anti-Western stance, in which Turkey is supporting Islam, and turning its back on its Western allies and partners in different foreign policy stances is shown by its changing relationship with Israel. Inbar (2010) states that Turkey now has chilled relationships with Israel (Inbar, 2010, p. 2). This was shown most starkly in the Mavi Marmara incident. This involved a Turkish convoy which was offering humanitarian aid to Palestine, and this convoy was refused entry by Israel, whose special forces intercepted it in international waters. Some activists on board the ship fought back against the Israeli commandoes, and this resistance led to eight Turks and one Turkish-American killed, with more then 20 passengers and 10 commandos injured. This act, despite the fact that Israel claimed that it was an act in self-defense, led to international condemnation of Israel, as well as a rebuke from the United Nations (Migdalovitz, 2010, p. 2). Other incidents which have shown the rift between Turkey and the West, especially Israel, include an incident in January 2009, the Davos incident, when the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan critiqued Israel’s actions towards Palestine, and stormed off during the World Economic Forum. This was considered to be the first time that Turkey has shown support for Palestine at the expense of Israel, thus jeopardizing its economic, diplomatic and security relations with Israel. It also showed Turkey as taking less of a hand-off approach to conflicts in the region, and more of an active approach of favoring one side over another. The Davos incident proved to be just the beginning of Turkey’s activism in the region, as Turkey had increasingly become more vocal about Israel’s treatment of Palestine. Turkey also showed its new foreign policy stance of activism when it attempted to broker a dispute between Iran and the West regarding Iran’s nuclear program, as it pushed for an agreement (Onis, 2010, p. 6). The AKP party has also shown that it is willing to turn away from the West and its secularist policies by showing support for Islamic policies within its own borders. For instance, Abramowitz & Barkey (2009) cite a policy that AKP has supported, which is the right for women to wear headscarves in universities, which is currently prohibited. This support for headscarves in public, which are looked upon by secularists with worry and disdain, is seen as proof that the AKP may use its political influence to endorse religious practices. It has also led to a fight with the Constitutional Court, which, in 2008, attempted to have the party banned for challenging the secular constitution. Although the AKP won this particular fight, there are rumors constantly circulating that there will be another court challenge in the near future which might finish the party off in Turkey (Abramowitz & Barkey, 2009, p. 120). Turkey has continued its turn away from the West and the European Union in its foreign policy stances regarding other neighbors. For instance, Turkey has engaged in close political and economic cooperation with Damascus, and they have established official relations with the Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq. They have also reconciled with Armenia, made peace with Syria and have improved its relations with Iraq to the point that the Turkish head of state, for the first time ever, visited Baghdad in 2009. Iran and Russia have also improved their ties with Turkey. In return, Turkey’s improved relations with Iran and Syria have deteriorated further its relationship with Israel, and has caused further alarm in the West, who see all of these overtures and negotiations to be further signs that Turkey has turned away from the West (Linden et al., 2012, p. 3). Turkey’s relationship with Syria, Iran, Hamas and Sudan have also put the country at odds with the United States, which has sought to isolate these countries – Iran because of its nuclear weapon threat, Hamas because it considered to be a terrorist group, and Sudan because of its genocide in Darfur. Because of this, the United States has criticized Turkey reaching out to the leaders of these countries, and Turkey’s overtures are seen as further signs that Turkey has turned its back on the West (Migdalovitz, 2008, p. CRS-3). This foreign policy stance not only contradicts Turkey’s long-standing alliance with the West, but it also brings clarity to its policy regarding zero problems with its neighbors. According to Svet (2006), this policy of zero problems is one which Turkey sought peaceful coexistence with its neighbors, ostensibly accomplishing this by a policy of non-intervention. Turkey sought to accomplish this by mediating disputes between neighbors and friends, while not really getting involved in picking a side. Their philosophy about this policy was that they did not want their neighbors to harm their friends, nor their friends harm their neighbors, so they sought to balance goodwill in the region. Svet (2006) states that this philosophy and stance was borne not out of Turkey’s inherent need to see peace in the world, but out of pragmatism – any instability caused by friends attacking neighbors or vice versa would cause instability to Turkey herself and might incite Kurdish sentiment. Therefore, this stance of peaceful mediation was seen as vital to Turkey’s internal interests (Svet, 2006, p. 75). Despite some criticism recently, Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu states that the policy continues to be a success (Turkey’s Davutoglu Says Zero Problems Foreign Policy Successful). This policy also benefited Turkey economically, as it improved Turkish relations with Syria and Georgia, which led to improved trading between these countries (Davutoglu, 2008, p. 80). Kirisci (2009) also sees the policy as beneficial to Turkish economics and trading policies, citing Davutoglu’s contention that countries who are seeking to become more export driven and less import driven would do well to seek diplomacy for the sake of economic interests. Since the Middle East has oil, a commodity that Turkey does not possess, making peace and having zero problems with neighbors benefits Turkey immensely. Further, Kirisci (2009) states that Davutoglu’s idea that interdependence between the countries in the region is important because of conflict resolution and peace building, as well as the fact that economic interdependence provides markets for Turkish exports and businesses, is further proof that the Turkish policy of zero problems with neighbors is economically driven, even if the main focus in crafting this policy was security (Kirisci, 2009, p. 42). The shifting foreign policy stances, particularly the current stance of zero problems may be attributed to the vision of Turkey’s foreign minister, Ahmet Davutogu. Prior to Davutogu, according to Aras (2009), Turkey saw foreign policies as an extension of domestic considerations, and, when Turkey had issues within her borders, the country looked outwards to foreign enemies and blamed them for Turkey’s domestic problems. This changed under Davutogu, according to Aras, as Davutogu sought to make the negative images of Turkey’s neighbors in the Middle East, a thing of the past, effectively untethering Turkey’s foreign policy from domestic considerations (Aras, 2009, p. 4). While commentators and leaders in the West do see Turkey’s embrace of its neighbors, and its shift from secularism to support of Islam as worrisome and proof that Turkey has shifted its axis from European to Islamic, Davutogu himself rejects this notion. Aras (2009) first states that Davutogu’s embrace of certain policies is part of a long-term strategy or process, and the critics who believe otherwise are simply judging Turkey’s policies by short-term standards (Aras, 2009). Davutogu himself is in accord with this, stating that Turkey is not re-orienting its foreign policy, as its top priority remains accession to the European Union. Davutogu states that the EU is Turkey’s largest trading partner, and that Turkey and the EU have a record of cooperating with one another with regards to security concerns. Further, Davutogu states that the path of Turkey is the same path as that of the EU, and that Turkey’s goals of establishing peace and security in the Middle East; bolstering democracy and peaceful resolution of conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia; contributing enhance energy supplies and security to Europe; and strengthening security and stability in Afghanistan and South Asia are the same goals as the EU. As Turkey has sought to broker peace between its neighbors and friends, Davutogu states that, far from turning its back on the West, its work should be complementary to the EU (Davutogu, 2010, p. 14). Thus, Turkey has evolved from a foreign policy stance which was decidedly pro-Western, as Turkey previously allied with the West, which would mean condemnation of many of Turkey’s neighbors, into a policy where Turkey seeks to make peace with its neighbors. This shows the pragmatism of Turkish policy under Davutogu. Davutogu realized that the countries surrounding Turkey are vital for Turkey’s economic realities and its security interests. Brokering peace with them means that Turkey’s own internal borders are more secure, and it opens up trade, which is an economic benefit for Turkey. Therefore, it seems that the zero policy initiative is one of realism, in which Turkey realizes the value that its neighbors have for its own country, and the devastation that would occur within Turkey’s borders if these neighbors were attacked by Turkey’s friends, or vice versa. Namely, instability in the region would mean instability to Turkey, which could also mean that its Kurds will be emboldened, and this would cause internal security problems for Turkey. At the same time, Turkey is seeking to show the West that its embrace of rogue nations, which are set to be isolated by Western nations such as the United States, such as Syria, Iran and Libya, are not in contravention to Western policies, but, rather, are complementary to these policies. Turkey states that it is only trying to make peace in the region, which would benefit everybody, even the countries in the West. All the while, it still states that it hopes to attain EU citizenship. While this policy worked for Turkey in the short run, it has caused problems for it when the Arab Spring began. Below is an analysis of why this is, as well as an analysis of how Turkey can turn things around and become the role model for the region, which is trying to democratize itself. Turkey and the Arab Spring Turkey’s rather pragmatic embrace of its neighbors, regardless of whether said neighbors, like Syria, Iran and Libya, are guilty of egregious human rights abuses has led to problems when the Arab Spring hit this spring. As stated above, Turkish foreign policy has been increasingly orientated towards Middle Eastern countries, such as Syria, and this has led ostensibly to better security for Turkey, as well as opening trade and foreign investments. It has also, according to Souaiaia (2011), allowed Turkey to place more pressure upon the EU for full citizenship, has allowed Syria, Iran and Turkey to coordinate their responses to Kurdish rebellions, and has given Turkey “the political and moral capital to pursue a more aggressive role in world affairs” (Souaiaia, 2011, p. 1). In other words, Turkey’s new embrace of its Arab neighbors inured many advantages to Turkey. That said, Souaiaia (2011) states that these key embraces might have backfired for Turkey in the advent of the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring began when Tunisians toppled its 23 year old authoritarian regime, then, days later, the Egyptian youth ousted Mabarak. Although the Egyptian incident was an easy one for Turkey, in that Turkey did not have decent relationships with Egypt to begin with, therefore Turkey was able to advise Mabarak to step down, Turkey was more tested when it came time for the Libyan rebellion. As Turkey had economic ties with Qaddafi, they were not enthusiastic about Qaddafi being deposed, and refused to assist with NATO efforts to stop Qaddafi’s onslaught of civilians in Benghazi and other towns which rebelled against Qaddafi’s rule (Souaiaia, 2011, p. 2). This NATO position was necessitated by Qaddafi’s aggression against civilians, and the NATO resolution passed in this wake was that countries may take necessary measures to end violence against civilians. According to Ozpek (2011), while Turkey did join the operation, Prime Minister Erdogan attempted to steer the debate away from democratization of Libya, and also away from the aim of redistributing Libya’s resources and wealth (Ozpek, 2011, p. 3). In short, Turkey has found it more difficult to maintain its policy of zero conflict with its neighbors in light of the Arab Spring. This is because, when it refused to help NATO in its efforts to quell Qaddafi’s push back against the rebel civilians, once the new Libyan rulers came into power, Turkey found that its relations with Libya had soured. Likewise, when it called upon Mabarak to step down, its relations with Saudi Arabia and some Gulf States who supported Mabarak, became strained (Souaiaia, 2011, p. 2). Ozpek (2011) states that Turkey had these problems because the Arab Spring essentially exposed Turkish foreign policy. This is because Turkey’s foreign policy was that its success was contingent upon sustaining intergovernmental relationships with authoritarian regimes. Turkey’s involvement with $15 billion of Libyan projects is just one example of this (Ozpek, 2011, p. 3). This perspective is echoed by Tocci (2011). Tocci states that Turkey’s problem with the Arab Spring was that it revealed that Turkey’s zero problems policy was inherent upon the Prime Minister of Turkey cozying up to dictators, such as Qaddafi and Syria’s President Assad. It also has revealed that the Turkish activism in the Middle East has been driven by the fact that nobody else in the region has been attempting to mediate conflict, and that Turkey, in its pro-mediation stance, has simply stepped in to fill the void. Therefore, Turkey’s efforts to mediate conflict in the region seem less the product of initative, then the product of context, according to Tocci. This has inflated its status as mediator of the region and broker of an Arab-Israeli peace (Tocci, 2011, p. 4). Peterson (2011) states that, actually, although Turkey was caught rather flat-footed by its cozying to dictators prior to the Arab Spring, it has used the Arab Spring as a way to reverse policy and get on board with more Western initiatives regarding the region. An example of this is the fact that it has reversed years of foot-dragging and, this September, has accepted the United States anti-missile radar unit on their soil, which is a part of the NATO missile shield aimed at thwarting Iranian ballistic missiles (Peterson, 2011, p. 2). This was seen as a strong rebuke to Iran, at a time when the Turkish-Iranian relations were improving. Turkey’s actions in joining in with the West in the wake of the Arab Spring has left Iran “fuming” according to Peterson, because “the recent actions of the Turks have now effectively killed any Iranian hopes that Ankara will join the so-called rejectionist camp made up of Iran, Syria, Hama and Hezbollah aimed at confronting the West, instead showing that Turkey’s basic security interests are anchored to the West” (Peterson, 2011, p. 2). Nevertheless, there is no denying that Turkey still has an image problem with many in the West, and although Turkey’s image in the West has been tarnished by its cozy relationships with dictators and its increasing acceptance of Islam, it has long been held up as a model for the Middle East, and a hopeful symbol for the countries involved in the Arab Spring and any future rebellions that might occur in the region. In the 2000s, Presidents Bush and Obama have stated that Turkey is a “model, example or source of inspiration for the entire Muslim Middle East. In 2009, a survey conducted by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) revealed that “61% of respondents in Arab countries considered Turkey to be a model for the Arab world” (Tocci, 2011, p. 4). Ozhan (2011) states that the individuals who were pushing for a democratic model are looking enthusiastically at Turkey as a model, asking Prime Minister Erdogan to “fill the political vacuum after the Arab revolutions” (Ozhan, 2011, p. 2). The reason why Turkey is such a role model for the potential democracies in the Middle East is because of its “secular democracy, booming economy and growing international clout” (A Flawed Example). Moreover, Turkey, in the wake of the Arab Spring, is vying to the become the dominant power in the Middle East (Isom, 2011). That said, Tocci states that the countries involved in the Arab Spring may or may not follow Turkey’s lead. Tocci states that Tunisia may move towards democracy, in which case Turkey may serve as a model for that country. However, Egypt seems to be heading towards another authoritarian regime. Meanwhile, Morocco has been more timid, so it may move towards another form of government, but not in the same way that the Arab Spring countries have, and other countries, namely Libya, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain, have futures up for grabs (Tocci, 2011, p. 4). While Tocci states that different countries involved in uprisings are going in different directions, while other countries have not yet involved themselves in uprising, therefore their futures are uncertain, Tocci states that the status quo of stable authoritarian rule in the Middle East is shaken, at least for now. Tocci also states that Turkey may serve as a model for different countries, at least aspects of the Turkish structures may do so. One option, according to Tocci, is that countries may modernize but not democratize. In this scenario, countries may emulate Turkey’s successful economic reforms, as well as its banking, regulatory and social reforms, while not building a democratic society. In a second scenario, countries may look to Turkey as a model of how to secularize one’s country and constitution. Third, countries may look to Turkey as a model of civil-military relations. Fourth, countries may imitate Turkey’s power in the Western world, as Turkey has successfully been able to stand up for its neighbors to powerful Western countries such as the United States. This kind of clout is envied by many countries in the Middle East, and is something that they, too, would like to attain. According to Tocci, the countries involved in the Arab Spring may adopt one or more of the above aspects of Turkey’s regime for their own (Tocci, 2011, p. 5). Escobar (2011) provides another perspective of Turkey’s role in the Arab Spring. Essentially, Escobar states that Turkey could be invaluable in promoting the interests of Palestine in the West. This is because of Turkey’s recent policy stance of supporting Palestine over Israel, and the Turkish promotion of Palestinian state recognition. Because Turkey is the core of the Arab Spring, in that it serves as a model of democracy for the fledgling countries who want democratic reforms, Turkey could well have more clout to the West. Therefore, its support of Palestine, according to Escobar, may not fall of deaf ears, as the West is interested in keeping Turkey as an ally when dealing with the countries involved in the Arab Spring (Escobar, 2011, p. 1). Turkey’s clout with the West may only be enhanced by the fact that it has been at the center of the attempts to broker peace in the region, as well as the fact that it has made overtures that it might yet join its Western partners in helping to rebuild the countries involved in the Arab Spring, as it has made overtures towards helping the West once again. Thus, its support of Palestine might actually help that country achieve statehood, and this, according to Escobar, would be a definite plus. Turkey has also benefited from the Arab Spring, in that they have experienced a boom in tourism, because the uprising has shifted tourism to Turkey from countries that previously were popular for tourism, such as Egypt (Turkish Tourism Buoyed by Arab Spring). Another reason for this is because the Arab world perceives Turkey as being strongly supportive of the Arab Spring uprisings, and this is a reason why the country has become more popular with tourists (Jones, 2011, p. 1). However, even as Turkey’s tourism sector has been booming because of the influx of tourists who have been deterred from touring Egypt, they have suffered a loss of tourism from Israel. The Arab Spring has deterred Israelites from visiting Turkey, as Turkey has suffered a loss of 27% of its tourists in 2010, compared to last year’s numbers. The reason for this was because of the anti-Israel protests which have occurred in the wake of the Israeli commando raid on a Turkish aid vessel, killing nine people. Moreover, the Israeli government has warned its citizens not to visit Turkey. Ironically, while Turkey’s Israel policies have deterred the Israelis from visiting Turkey, Turkey’s Israel policies have encouraged other Arabs to visit Turkey. This is because Turkey’s Israel policies have endeared Turkey to the rest of the Arab world, so they are encouraged to visit Turkey for this reason. Another reason is because Turkey has exported its soap opera to the Arab world, and this has encouraged the Arabs to see the Turkish palaces, ancient sites of Instanbul and the other sites that the soap opera features (Turkish Tourism Buoyed by Arab Spring). Conclusion It is likely that normalization and stabilization of the region will take a couple of years. Turkey in these years of transformation desires to become a moral leader and a source of inspiration for Arab Spring and Middle East countries. In fact, AK part was preparing the leadership since they have been in power. Economic, cultural and other social relations were developed with the countries in the region during this time. Increased tourism, Turkish TV series broad in Arab television, visa free travel, being familiar with Turkish secularism and democracy formed the basis for the Arab revolution. The only problem with this process was long lasting dictator regimes. 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