Challenger Space Shuttle Disaster - Essay Example

Analysis of the Challenger Space Shuttle Disaster. The American Space industry has had an interesting history. It has been market by great achievements and also failures and disasters .To begin with examining some of the disasters that have occurred in the past .It is interesting to note that that 18 astronauts and cosmonauts have died to date .Their deaths can be attributed to space flights in one way or another. An example is the Apollo 1 launch pad fire. NASA acknowledges astronauts who have died while on duty at the space Mirror Memorial in Florida. The first America disaster was that of the challenger .The shuttle was destroyed just after liftoff (73 seconds to be exact).Investigation revealed that a seal was faulty. The O- ring seal let gases emanating from the so rocket booster. These gases lay on the propellant tank which is outside and also the booster strut. This took place in January 28 1986. The remains of the shuttle fell into the Atlantic Ocean just off Florida’s cost. The compartment where the crew was together with fragment of the space shuttle was only recovered after a long search of the ocean was conducted. When exactly the crew passed away is unknown but it is believed that a number survived when the space craft initially broke up. The only problem for those who survived was the fact that the shuttle lacked a means of escape .It is for this reason that they were captive in the space shuttle as it impacted with the ocean surface .This was too violent for any of them to survive. The shuttle space program was halted for 32 months due to the disaster. The Rogers commission was formed by the then president Ronald Regan. The commission laid blame on NASA’S decision making system and and its organizational culture for the disaster. NASA was aware that the design of the Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters (SBRs) by Morton Thiokol had a lethal defect in the O-rings .This hadn’t been addressed since 1977.They also failed to head to warnings from engineers concerning the launch in the prevailing low temperature that fateful morning. These technical concerns weren’t shared with the superiors. It is interesting to note the vehicle never received certification to run in the low temperatures of that morning The O- ring together with other key components hadn’t been tested to ensure that they would operate in the launch conditions of that morning. The launch had many viewers since it had Christa McAuliffe .She was to be the first teacher, female, in space .So hyped was the launch that just an hour after the Disaster 85% of Americans had gotten wind of the news .It is worth noting that the challengers disaster was a reference point when it comes to issues of engineering safety and ethics in the work place. The concerns about the O-Ring A look at the space Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters Design (SRBS) will help us understand where the flaw lay. To begin with this unit makes part of the vehicle for space transportation system. It is made up of six sections connected in 3 factory and field joints. Factory joints had an insulation made up of asbestos-silica .This was applied at the joints to cover them. The field joints were assembled at the Kennedy space centre in the building used for vehicle Assembly .The field joints relied on two O-rings made of rubber .There was a primary one and a secondary one which acted as a backup. After the disaster, field joints adopted a 3 O-ring system. All the SRB joint seals were to contain high pressure gasses resultant from the combustion of the solid propellant that lay within. All the propellant is supposed to emanate from the nozzle at the end of the rocket. At the time of the shuttle design, a Mc Donnell Douglass report highlighted the record of solid rockets when it came to safety .It was safe to abort in most failure types. There was one though in which aborting would have been dangerous. Hot gasses would burn through the forced casing. If the burn through was to take place next the liquid hydrogen/oxygen tank, aborting a launch would be hard. This was to be an accurate foreshadow of the challengers disaster .As we have stated, Morton Thiokol was responsible making and maintaining the SRBs of the shuttle (Heiberger, Richard and Holland,529).The O-ring joints as had been designed were to be tighter due to ignition generated forces. A 1977 test disapproved this. The test revealed that pressurized water, used to recreate how combustion takes place in the booster, bent the metallic parts away from each other .A gap was created. Gases could leak through this. The phenomenon is joint rotation. This caused the air pressure to drop momentarily. This paved way for the combustion gasses to damage the O-ring When the erosion was wide spread ,a path through which flame could pass arises .The joint would then burst. The booster and the whole shuttle would not survive this. The Marshall Space Flight Centre engineers made those responsible for the Solid Rocket Booster project aware of this .They suggested Thiokol’s field joint was flawed. Joint rotation, one engineer suggested, made the secondary O-ring ineffective. Hardy the project manager failed to forward memos to this effect to Thiokol. In 1980 the field joints were given a clean bill of health. It was not long afterwards that evidence of serious erosion came to light .This was during the second Columbia mission. The Marshall centre went against regulation and failed to report this .They only kept it in the channels they heard for reporting with Thiokol. There was no effort to have the shuttle grounded so that the flaw could be addressed. Five years later efforts were made to redesign the joint .The idea was to add an additional 76 mm of steel to the tang. This tang was to hold the inner side of the joint inhibiting it from rotating. The redesign took place while the shuttle fleet was still operational. So casual was the defect considered that Thiokol persuaded NASA to consider the problem solved and the issue closed. On the launch date, there were various hurdles. Initially it was the bad weather that at Transoceanic Abort Landing .Then the exterior access hatch delayed the launch by a day .One of the indicators that verify the hatch is securely locked failed. Also a stripped bolt hindered the closure of the orbiters hatch. When these were sorted crosswinds at the landing facility went beyond the allowable limits. The winds didn’t die down within the launch window hence the launch was aborted. The weather forecast on the fateful date was close to -1 degrees centigrade. This was the minimum temperature under which a launch was executable. The engineers at Thiokol raised concerns about this low temperature the day before the launch. They had sessions with NASA managers who were from the Kennedy and the Marshall Centers .The fear was what effect the low temperatures would have on the rubber O –ring sealing the SRBs .Roger Boisjoly recommended that the launch be postpone. The argument was the absence of data on if the joint would close properly when colder than 12 degrees centigrade. The SRBs O- rings were classified as a Criticality component 1.This meant there wasn’t a back up in the event the primary and secondary rings failed. The crew would have no chance of survival if such was to occur. We at this point can get to see that there was a series of factor at play. Let us take a broader look at the shuttle disaster. Impact of the shuttle disaster on society. The challenger’s mission was to launch the second satellite for data tracking and relaying. It also was to set in orbit the Spartan Halleys’ to be used to observe comets. We also find that the shuttle was to send the first teacher in space. This was to be a milestone especially to the teaching fraternity. The human element. The final cause of the disaster was the failure of the SRB O- ring. The human aspect is to this is the fact that a resolution was made to launch the shuttle .The basis of this decision was faulty support information made worse by this information being poorly managed .The human element can further be traced to ; Demand on the space shuttle: NASA wanted to sell to the American population the idea of reusable transportation system for space .This it began in the late 1960’s.The successful Apollo mission contribute to the space shuttle getting approval as a method of operating in space. The .operational goals of the shuttle weren’t clear. This contributed to it lacking strong political and economical support. The shuttle was packaged as a quick pay off project. To gain more support, it was offered for military use to increase security and for industries as an avenue for new business opportunity. These means used to make it have economical, political and social support resulted in the decisions concerning its engineering and management being very subjective. Subjective to meet organizational, political and economical factors as opposed to a specific mission and vision. After the moon, Congress anticipated that the space program would be financially stable .In the periods running up to the disaster funds were scarce .There were conflicts and management followed short cuts to cut on costs. The decision support system There was no formal decision support system. The decision to launch the challenger best illustrates the shot cut mood that prevailed and lack of funds to further test the faulty joints .NASA decisions were made by default. The organization boundaries were open to political manipulation. NASA employees were de motivated since they couldn’t participate in management. As complacency crept in, the client and keeping with the schedule got more priority than safety. Situational analysis Here we look at how NASA worked with developer of its shuttles. We have seen how the engineers at Thiokol raised their concerns and. how pressure from various quarters pushed them to give the rocket a clean bill of health. This system failed since it wasn’t allowed to work independently. Had it had autonomy the disaster could have been averted. The shuttle disaster has contributed widely to the improvement not only in the shuttle designs but also in other fields to improve on safety. Citations Used Heiberger, Richard M, and Burt Holland. Statistical Analysis and Data Display: An Intermediate Course with Examples in S-Plus, R, and Sas. New York, NY: Springer, 2004. Print Read More