Time Travel and Self-Consistency - Implications for Determinism and the Human Condition by King - Book Report/Review Example

King, D., 1999: 'Time Travel and Self-Consistency: Implications for Determinism and the Human Condition' Ratio, 12: 271-278. In time travel and self-consistency: implications for determinism and the human condition, King(1999) seeks to analyze Carlini et al observations that for space times in which closed time-like curves (subsequently referred to as ‘CTCs’) are possible, ‘past and future are no longer “globally” distinct’ (Carlini et al., p. 3). He seeks to show that the possibility of travel into the past has some rather unexpected implications for the human condition – particularly with regard to the determinism/free-will debate (King, 1999). He starts by looking at Carlini et al’s starting point where they poised the question of whether the principle of self-consistency is really fundamental, or whether it can, in fact, be derived from some other law. (King, 1999) The problem is that they do not give a definition of self consistency. The authors use the principle of minimum action to derive the only self-consistent trajectories. In regards to philosophy, if one was to go by carlini et al then actions are determined and free will may never occur. He begins his philosophical discussion by considering a cause effect relationship. Should a person throw a stone at a window, the window will break. He compares human action to a nuclear decay where nuclear decay will occur and this occurrence is determined simply because it has happened and therefore occupies a fixed, unchangeable position in the time-stream, but is uncaused, because no physical mechanism in our time-stream was responsible for that particular event of decay. (King, 1999) therefore if this decay was on a filmstrip, the cause will not be evident but all that will be evident is that the decay occurred. In this regard, every human action is fixed on a film strip of time. Thus events would be determinate but uncaused. According to King (1999) we are then destined to experience the same events over and over. Vihvelin, K., 1996: 'What Time Travelers Cannot Do' Philosophical Studies, 81: 315-30. In What Time travelers cannot do, Vihvelin (1996) begins by looking at the objection to time travel where it is said to be metaphysically impossible. She goes on to give evidence of this argument by saying that if a person was to go back in time to kill herself, it would not be possible as something will always happen to stop herself from killing her baby self. The fact that the time traveler is alive and can travel through time makes it impossible for her to kill her baby self. Therefore time travel is not possible. The counter argument to this is that this person cannot kill her self because there is a pre determined date on which that person will die. This is the fatalist view who believes that if it is true that something will happen on a set date, such as a person dying, then it is metaphysically necessary for that event to occur at that specific time. Therefore killing oneself before that time is impossible. According to Vihvelin (1996) this view was a mistake because a person may not be able to do something due to some preset factors, not because it is fate. She goes on to introduce a new argument of time travel where she looks at the ordinary meaning of can. It is logically possible for a person to do something for example it is logical for me to lift a 500kg bag but I cannot do so. The ordinary meaning of can is that when a person says he/she can do something, he or she has the ability and opportunity to perform that action. More precisely, we mean that she has the ability to do an act of the relevant kind and that nothing prevents her from exercising this ability. (Vihvelin, 1996) with this in mind a person would likewise not be able to carry out an action if she lacked the ability. For example I cannot walk on water because I would fail each time I tried. Therefore if one was to go back in time to kill her baby self, and fail at each attempt then it is not possible for this person to kill her baby self. No matter how many times she tried, she would always fail. She then goes on to evaluate counterfactuals in relation to time travel. Theories of counterfactuals agree that the closest antecedent worlds are those antecedent-worlds which are most similar, in the relevant respects, to our own (Vihvelin, 1996). For example when considering if one can walk on water, one would have to consider factors that are similar to that person’s world such as similar laws of gravity, and mass among others. Therefore in a similar world where a person travels back in time to kill her baby self, it would then be impossible for her to kill her baby self because she would always fail due to several reasons such as the gun failing. A person can kill another baby but not her baby self. In other worlds where there are other laws then maybe it would be possible for a person to kill their baby self but in worlds with the same laws as ours it would be impossible. When discussing about what time travelers can do, Vihvelin (1996) argues that a time traveler is a temporally extended person with one stage in the future and a later stage in the past. Even if a person’s life is divided into four dimensions comprising of four stages, the adult stage would not be able to kill the baby stage of him/her self because she/he would always fail. Because the fact that this person grew to become an adult means that killing their baby self would not be possible. Had they died as a baby, they would not have grown to be adults to travel back in time and attempt to kill themselves. Therefore time travel is possible and there are things that time travelers can do but they cannot kill themselves when they are babies. For example if a time traveler attempted to kill baby Osama, he would have read about the things that Osama had done as an adult. None of this would have happened had Osama not lived to be an adult. Therefore any attempts to kill him as a baby would fail. All this would happen if the conditions of the world of the time traveler are closest to the real world. In another world, the time traveler would succeed at killing baby Osama but this world would be false or a hallucination. In conclusion time travel is possible and people are free to do as they please, but attempts at killing themselves would always lead to failure. Sider, T., 2002: 'Time Travel, Coincidences and Counterfactuals' Philosophical Studies, 110: 115-38. In Time Travel, Coincidences and Counterfactuals, Sider (2002) begins by looking on whether it would be possible for a time traveler to go back in time and kill a victim. A person would not be able to kill her earlier self because it would contradict with the fact that this person lived long enough to be an adult. Therefore according to this view, time travel would not be possible because as much as the time traveler has the ability to kill, she would also lack the ability to kill herself. This argument only views the impossibility of auto infanticide, but time travel is possible. Moreover, though time travelers do not kill their earlier selves, they typically have the ability to do so. (Sider, 2002) Sider (2002) looks at the reasons why we should bother with time travel. The most straightforward reason to care is that today’s physics community cares. Whether the actual laws of nature permit time travel is a live debate in contemporary physics journals (Earman, 1995). Time travel is connected with important issues in the philosophy of persistence (Sider, 2002). He also argued that the possibility of time travel undermines “three-dimensionalism”, the view that objects persist over time by being “wholly present” or “enduring”, rather than by “perduring”,i.e., persisting by means of temporal parts. Sider (2002) goes on to look at the theory of coincidences. If we agree that a time travel would fail at killing her earlier self, and many time travelers would travel back in time with the aim of killing their earlier selves yet fail, this would bring about a string of coincidences. Every time the time traveler would go back in time to kill his/her earlier self he/she would fail. When looking at the counterfactuals of coincidence, the idea that a person traveling in time would fail at killing their earlier self there would create a long string of string of coincidence which he refers to as “would-counterfactuals of coincidence”. These types of coincidences would never be true. (Sider, 2002) this is because coincidences are not things that would happen but might happen therefore making time travel impossible. He looks at Vihvelin (1996) argument against time travel where she says that if a person has the ability to do something then it is likely that the person would do that action and at least succeed. But if this person repeatedly performs an action and fails then every time this person attempted to perform the said action she/he would fail. Therefore attempts at auto infanticide would lead to failure. This then undermines the freedom of the time traveler. He then goes on to look at another argument where a number of assassins failing at killing themselves is not coincidence; rather there is a force or mechanism that is preventing the killings. Therefore the assassins would be shackled to this force and would not be free (Sider, 2002). He turns back to Vihvelin (1996) and is of the view that if something is said to be true such as the time traveler’s failure at killing themselves then it does not undermine the time traveler’s freedom. This because it does not undermine the freedom of the time traveler who does not attempt to kill his/her earlier self, nor does it undermine those who fail. In conclusion if the coincidences that time travelers would encounter i.e. failing do not undermine their freedom. Conclusion In regards to free will and freedom the three literatures there are different view brought forward. King (1999) argues that the failures of the time travelers attempts at auto infanticide is like a film strip where is set that at some point of the film strip the time traveler will fail. If we look at this in terms of free will, this would mean that human beings are not free to decide their actions. Human action is determined and can be compared to events that are set on a film strip, where at a particular point in time, an event is set to occur. Therefore on the film strip the time traveler lives to adult hood, and attempts to kill her former self would lead to failure. Sider (2002) argues that the coincidences would not impede a person’s freedom because they are unremarkable. Coincidences happen therefore the fact that a group of time travelers going back in time to kill their former selves would fail is not a remarkable coincidence. This is something that would happen. Now this then means that time travel is not possible because coincidences are things that might happen and not things that would happen. These coincidences would not impede the ability of the time traveler to kill, because if the time traveler was to attempt killing another person they would succeed. Therefore coincidences do not impede the time traveler’s freedom. The time traveler would still have the free will to decide who to kill, whether herself or another person. Vihvelin (1996) on the other hand is of the view that if the time traveler’s past is closest to the conditions of the time traveler’s present world then the time traveler would always fail at attempts to kill herself. This does not hinder the time traveler’s freedom because something is said to be true if the conclusion is always the same. Therefore the numerous attempts at auto infanticide would lead to failure therefore this would always be true. Although she does point out that a person has to make an attempt at a certain action in order for it to be true. Therefore time travelers can perform various actions and if they succeed on all attempts it holds true. They neither lack the ability nor opportunity. In my opinion the time traveler does not exercise free will if all the attempts at killing himself will fail. This is because it is already determined that this person will live to be an adult therefore if it is true that the person can not kill his earlier self then he does not exercise free will. Free will would enable the person to perform the action. On the other hand the person does exercise free will because the person’s ability to kill is not hindered, although the result will always be failure. The person has the freedom to kill or not kill himself even if the result is failure. The fact that the result will always be failure is what is determined. Works Cited King, D., (1999) Time Travel and Self-Consistency: Implications for Determinism and the Human Condition' Ratio, 12: 271-278. USA: Wiley Blackwell Vihvelin, K., (1996), What Time Travelers Cannot Do Philosophical Studies, 81: 315-30. New York: Cambridge University Press. Sider, T., (2002) Time Travel, Coincidences and Counterfactuals Philosophical Studies, 110: 115-38. New York: Springer Read More