The Differences between Natural and Artificial Virtues - Essay Example

The Differences between Natural and Artificial Virtues In order to comprehend why individuals behave in particular ways in different situations, there is need to analyze the critical variations between natural and artificial virtues, with a core emphasis on the manner in which these virtues influence individual action. According to David Hume, a natural virtue entails a disposition, which individuals both naturally possess and naturally approve of. On the other hand, an artificial virtue is a disposition for which none of the above assertions hold true (Hume, 1978). Thus, it is clear that natural virtues are those that naturally elicit a spectator’s approval while artificial virtues do not evoke such approval. When looked at from another perspective, it seems that the spectator’s approval for artificial virtues is similar to that of natural virtues. For instance, even though justice may be an artificial virtue, its sense of morality on the spectator’s side, remains to be natural. Indeed, justice is naturally attended with a strong with a formidable sentiment of morals, and these can only proceed from individuals’ sympathy with the interests of the society. It is noteworthy that artificial virtues are more dependent on social structures and include allegiance, justice, chastity, and modesty, fidelity to promises, and the duties of sovereign states to respect treaties, observe set boundaries, and subjects themselves to the laws governing the nations. Even though these virtues seem to apply equally to all concerned parties, they may vary from one society to the other (Adams, 2009). On the other hand, natural virtues originate from nature and tend to be universal. These virtues include gratitude, generosity, charity, fidelity, equity, clemency, temperance, prudence, courage, ambition, modesty, pride, good sense, wit, and humor. Other virtues that may be categorized in this domain include industry, frugality, patience, cleanliness, decorum, and articulateness. It is significant to understand that some of these virtues may be voluntary such as pride while some are involuntary, like good sense. The natural virtues can be described as those virtues that individuals have within a natural environment, in the absence of the edifices of the society that surround them. Indeed, natural virtues are the values that individuals would still harbor in an environment that is free from any social structure such as judicial system, government, or monarchs. Thus, these virtues are the values such as having mercy, showing benevolence to children, loving one’s life, and caring for others as a way of ensuring the posterity of the human race as a distinct species. Most importantly, these virtues encompass the values that people have independently from the societal expectations of prudent human behavior (Hacker-Wright, 2007). From the above explanation of natural virtues, a referential definition helps in identifying what David Hume would refer to as a natural virtue. In other words, a natural virtue is just but a virtuous character trait that would conceivably apply to an individual without the need to initiate the incentives and deterrents that are introduced by the rules that govern a civilized state or society. Thus, the natural virtues are more refined and entail the completed forms of the human sentiments that would be anticipated to be found in individuals who belong to no specific society, but cooperate only within their small familial groups (Harris, 2013). When one takes the example of bodily appetites such as thirst and hunger, and mental passions such as attachment to offspring, resentment, and love of life, it is clear that these elements arise from simple instincts. The first group arises from bodily sources while the second one arises from a mental source. As postulated by David Hume, the bodily appetites encapsulate the impressions at the level of sensation, and at the level of passions, or reflections. On the other hand, the mental passions only entail the impressions of passions, or reflections (Hume, 1978). This is to say that the instinctive character traits of natural virtues precipitate the instinctive mental passions, which then motivate the necessary action. When one considers the artificial virtues, it becomes apparent that these virtues are the character traits, which bring about a spectator’s moral approval, yet, they are not natural virtues. Given that they are not instinctive in nature, these virtues can only be regarded as being mere intentions. In this regard, intentions involve thinking in terms of forethought and design (Skorupski, 2010). Furthermore, intentions are ideas of reason more than they are ideas of perceptions or sensations. In fact, Hume makes a point that ideas of reason can elicit a passion by informing individuals of the existence of something, which is an object of passion. Hume goes on to clarify that for the artificial virtues, individuals’ initial instinctive interests are often augmented by a new artifice. For instance, the private education of parents and public instructions by state officials serve to give people a sense of duty and honor in the strict regulation of their actions. Largely, the artificial virtues hold out the expectation of pleasure because individuals are trained to expect it. According to Hume, individual justice may at time conflict with what a sense of benevolence would motivate individuals to do (Hume, 1978). In fact, Hume harbors the belief that judgments about rightness and virtue are dependent on an individual’s capacity for sympathy rather than on any form of reason or some distinct moral sense. This means that being virtuous is dependent on the feelings of such as sympathy and benevolence rather than on reason. The motives such as curiosity, benevolence, and prudence can be regarded as natural in the twofold sense that they exist away from social conventions (Hume, 1978). Furthermore, these motives do not require any explicit critical thinking in order for them to be issued in the action. When one looks at the virtue of justice from this perspective, it seems that the virtue of justice is not natural, and would rather be regarded as artificial. This is because the virtue is dependent on human artifices and conventions for purposes of its existence, and because the primary motive to justice is a sense of duty. According to John Rawls, individual justice is a theoretical derivative from social justice in the sense that a just individual is often understood as someone who has a regulative of effective desire for compliance with the principles of justice (Drydyk, 2012). This assertion appears to resemble the Kantian perception of justice and makes justice an artificial virtue as postulated by Hume. Concerning the individual virtue of justice, Hume argues that it is easier for an individual to bear not having something than to bear having something taken away from them. The understanding of this sentiment gives someone who is benevolent or cares about the welfare of others some reason to discourage the act of taking things from people without their due permission (for example through stealing). However, it is imperative to note the fact that stealing when opposed to the act of allowing a theft to take place, is a positive commission. In this case, natural virtues approach to individual justice would definitely be helped along. This is if the distinction between omission and commission, or between allowing and doing, could be captured in natural or non-artificial sentimentalist terms (Baillie, 2006). From the above explication, it is clear that natural virtues are the instinctive durable motives that are found within a moral agent. For the natural virtues, the perceptions of the spectator towards some durable qualities within the agent elicits the sympathetic ideas of reflection, which then directly stimulate , within the spectator, passions of love or hate, as well as the associated feelings of approbation. In conclusion, it is noteworthy that the most basic cognitive differential point between the natural and artificial virtues lies in the fact that artificial virtues are ideas of design and forethought while natural virtues are neither impressions nor ideas, but instinctive character traits. Furthermore, it is clear that both natural and artificial virtues vary in the manner in which they produce actions. In this regard, natural virtues immediately elicit passions, which then motivate willful action. On the other hand, artificial virtues, as fanciful or rational intentions, hold out an artificially instilled sense of pain or pleasure, which evokes passion, and the passion, in turn, motivate willful action. It is noteworthy that a differentiation between natural and artificial virtues is necessary for its role in directing the attention of the audience on several key elements that underlie the theories of motivation. For instance, the distinction between the two types of virtues helps in understanding the role of pain and pleasure in both the spectator and the agent as a motivator. Furthermore, it helps in understanding the role of empirical observation when to come to the identification of the categories to which durable motives can be classified as natural virtues. This is because such motives appear in a similar manner in all cultures and al all stages of life. References Adams, R. 2009. A Theory of Virtue, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Baillie, J. 2006. Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Hume on Morality. London: Routledge. Drydyk, J., 2012. A capability approach to justice as a virtue. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 15 (1): 23–38. Hacker-Wright, J. 2007. Moral Status in Virtue Ethics: Philosophy. The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, 82(321): 449–473. Harris, J. 2013. The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century. New York: Oxford University Press. Hume, D. 1978. A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Skorupski, J. 2010. The Routledge Companion to Ethics. London: Routledge. Read More