Arendt's and Nietzsche's Views - Essay Example

Moral Relativism Question One Nietzsche is a moral relativist since he does not condone absolute morality that he considers as slave morality. He considers morality as matters of judging good and bad a good and evil without expressly stating which the best is or which is correct (Nietzsche 21) . He considers master morality as covering good and bad where slave morality covers good and evil. Nietzsche is opposed to the philosophies of Plato and Kant in terms of morality. He rejects the idea of Jesus that the weak shall inherit the earth where he states that the only things the weak inherit are leftovers from the strong (Nietzsche 22). However, it can be argued that he is not a complete moral relativism if all moralities are equal since he does not believe that other things are better in terms of being right than others where the morality he advocates for is not seen in the current Christian moral values. Master morality is born out that life by noble people where there is no absolute code but a variety of modalities that need to be realized. In the book, Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche views religion as the source of harm in the society and to individuals (Nietzsche 47) Nietzsche can be described as a moral relativism in the descriptive sense since he believed that there was real substance to religious, political, moral, and cultural values. He believed that they lacked the validity and had no binding obligations in individuals (Nietzsche 33). He viewed others as nihilists like him where others could not. He considered that the transcendental value of God had no meaning in the modern culture and could be considered as dead in the society by individuals. Nietzsche believed that traditional moral values especially from Christianity were harmful to human beings where he argues that lack of absolute values does not show that there is the absence of such values (Nietzsche 41). He, however, gives a fair hearing to different values from different perspectives where he sees such values as true and appropriate even when they may not be.Nietzsche studied moral relativism extensively that is why many people argue out that he is a moral relativist (Nietzsche 37). He believed that people have to assess the value of values since they determine a person’s goals and oneself. He viewed that people who deemed well were the powerful nobles that had the chance to be educated, and they considered themselves better compared to others especially those below their rank (Nietzsche 34). It can be said that Nietzsche was a moral relativistic since he does not believe in objectivity or a universal morality. He rejects the edifice of morality in understanding the human nature of life. He can be said to be a philosopher of the good not of the right (Nietzsche 33). He is not a moralist but an ethicist where he considers whether might makes right, as he sees no right. It can be said that he does not have a morality. His arguments are self-overcoming where he insists that people should overcome their weaknesses to be able to please their life .He argues that people should make decisions that beautify their lives (Nietzsche 34) Therefore, with all this analysis, he would look like a moral relativist but everyone looks like one.He thinks that slave morality rules the daily five of individuals in the society where slaves made their actions, but this describes descriptively the moral theory individuals people are committed to. His stance on morality is complicated therefore; it is hard to regard him as a moral relativist or not (Nietzsche 67). Nietzsche rejects the notion of soft values that comes from willpower that is of Christianity. These notions include charity, compassion, brotherly love, and turning the other cheek (Nietzsche 36). This according to him hinders creativity and much potential. He is considered as such since he was of the view that supermen need to create their hard values. This showed that he was consistent in atheism where there were no universal moral values without God (Nietzsche 68). Hannah Arendt stated that existence of things as radical evil where intellectuals fail to allow self-determination to exist as a force (Arendt 134). This shows that ordinary men can be forced to do terrible actions. In response to problems of politics, she did not dwell on objective defense in emphasizing the ability to make responsible political judgments. Arendt did not decree moral relativism since she worried of insistence on the idea of singular truth that would mean what for democracy. She argues out that there is no absolute truth that she accounts hostile to plurality and democracy (Arendt 135). Arendt confronts the inadequacy of traditional moral truths that are used to judge what people can be able to do and how individuals in the society can differentiate the good from evil and wrong from right (Arendt 137). She states that totalitarianism exists pernicious evil that is free from the political ideology that it is limitless in its execution especially when the accused or perpetrator is not remorseful and can easily forget his actions when committed (Arendt 139). Arendt cannot be described as a moral relativism because her analysis of judgment is seen as a critique of the function of moral relativism and culture that strips people the right to judge others in matters of ethics and truth. She views the worship in the postmodern society of secular pluralism is problematic when it comes to cultural elites than the individuals collectively (Arendt 136). She distinguishes personal responsibility from political responsibility that condemns those who claim personal guilt in political problems falsely, which allow the guilty to walk free (Arendt 140). She argues out that every government assumes political responsibility for all its deeds of the past and such guilt is to be dealt with. She views events of the 21st century, as having an effect where she argues out that obedience is not a political virtue. This means that what a person decides from their power is not related to how they judge other peoples actions (Arendt 138). Question Two The difference between Arendt and Nietzsche’s view of political conception is the purpose of attributes to matters of forgetfulness and memory. Arendt writings on issues of politics are filled with references to matters of the value of memory of politics where Nietzsche writings praise the virtue of forgetfulness. Arendt emphasizes on the advantage of memory on the issue of politics that is derived from the concept of totalitarianism (Arendt 135). This means it cannot be forgotten and remains with us. The survival of the memory of totalitarianism is important for her since she views the future as depending on it on matters of politics. On the other hand, Nietzsche views that the future of politics is based on the level of memory and forgetfulness. This, however, does not mean that totalitarianism should be forgotten, but it means that it should be used to preserve the memory of past issues that will be relevant to the future. This strategies proposed by the two deal with issue of how to preserve the past for purposes of the future which are reflected in the promise differently (Nietzsche 33). Arendt brings back the promise in the issue of contemporary political philosophy where she introduces the promise and forgiveness to be used as remedies for irreversibility and unpredictability of human action processes (Arendt 139). In matters of uncertainty, the promise serves as security for continuity and durability of human relationships and in return stabilizes human affairs in the world that protects it is from unfeasible consequences of human action. Arendt views the promise as a mechanism of control based on policy that comes from the will to coexist in action and speech. This creates a bilateral commitment that binds individuals for a purpose that is agreed together, Such control over the future is possible and is seen as a form of memory where for Arendt the promise faculty is essential that has power to bring people at the beginning where they had agreed on the promise (Arendt 134). It acts as a reminder that bonds the individuals together and links them to the past. It is applied in articulation as opposed to action. Promise controls the future into the past that therefore reverses time where people are born into a secured past as opposed to uncertain future. Arendt praises human capacity to create and make promises and dispose of the future as it seems individuals’ sovereignty (Arendt 58). She is viewed as anti- sovereign conceptions in a matter of politics. Sovereignty must be rejected since it is the will power over people and others that create dominance and inspiration. Such sovereignty signifies where it has bound and kept by agreed purpose where contracts and promises are free. The idea Arendt takes from Nietzsche. Nietzsche viewed the promise that bound individuals together in groups as the memory of the will. Arendt views Nietzsche that he had unequaled clarity where there were a connection promises and human sovereignty that led to unique insights in human pride and conscience. However, for Arendt they are unrelated and are overlooked by scholars (Arendt,54). Promise for Arendt of the sovereign individual in Nietzsche shows the will power of an isolated individual and not of the mass population. The sovereignty that deals with privileged in making promises in Nietzsche is not inherently anti-political and free. She argues that come from the will power of isolated individuals where Nietzsche sovereign individual becomes paradigmatic of lack of freedom due to the devaluation of the political issues (Arendt 34). In the Genealogy of Morals, he argues whether the task in breeding an animal that can make promises does not constitute real problems for human beings. He views it as a paradoxical since it needs the human animal in reversal to its animal nature (Nietzsche 59). He argues that the human being is a forgetful animal and associates it robust health that is a solitary way of life. He argues that the human animal cannot maintain its forgetfulness due to inferiority as compared with others. Humans are social in order to survive and hence form groups. This transformation was capable due to the memory of the will. On matters of forgetfulness on the human animal that coincides with political and social life (Nietzsche 56). Nietzsche views the memory of will responds to the need of life where its political institution is needed for accomplishments and preservation of human animal life. The memory of will appreciates the force of forgetfulness (Nietzsche 61). It solves the issue bringing forth an animal that makes promises and provides a solution on how societies can be kept together and how solitary animals can willingly be made to contribute to the welfare of the society. However, it fails in dealing with the forgetfulness and memory of will does not become entitled to making promises (Nietzsche 38). The memory of will has the risk of producing irresponsible animals that are dangerous where their promises are untrustworthy. According to Nietzsche, the question remains in bringing forth the memory and promises regardless of its forgetfulness as part of the form of life in social and political realm (Nietzsche 23). This memory of will is known for its cruelty and violence; Arendt praises its sovereignty, and greatness that keeps the promise despite Nietzsche view of horror. Arendt does not focus on the cruelty and violence in processing the memory of will (Arendt 32). Arendt identification of the memory of will with the sovereign individual is problematic because it ignores Nietzsche rejection of the memory of will that is cruel and has violence and the conception of the promise that critic the memory of will. This seeks to overcome political violence and domination in promoting individual responsibility and freedom (Arendt 54). Arendt writing fails to differentiate the memory of will as recourses for dominance and promise as a way to responsibility and freedom for the sovereign individual. Promise of the sovereign individual for Nietzsche is important since it shows the commitment of the self and is anti-political and cultivates free relationships. Arendt confuses Nietzsche concept of the will to power with individuals will (Arendt 57). Her reading of Nietzsche interprets the identification of a promise of the sovereign individual for social and political in the form of egoism and solitude. He supports such issues due to the chance it provides human animal to join in relation to others without grounds of fear or force or revenge and resentments. In the Genealogy of Morals, he reflects that making of the memory of will is coincided with breeding of an animal that is civilized and social and can be reliable and predictable. The violence that characterizes memory of will is inseparable as it is directed to animalist in animal forgetfulness (Nietzsche 39). Arendt senses that the memory of will humanizes the animal that is characterized by forgetfulness where the distinctions become crucial. Arendt believes that separation of human from animal life protects plurality and freedom, and Nietzsche states that such separation threatens plurality and freedom of action (Arendt 59). Conclusion Both Arendt and Nietzsche portray valid points where the memory of will and promise of the sovereign individual can preserve totalitarianism. Arendt asserts that the democratic polity must preserve and protect the survival of the memory by forms that are instituted. Nietzsche shows that the promise of the sovereign individual questions institutions allows the institutions in the present form to be questioned in light of memory of the issues of totalitarianism. References Top of Form Nietzsche, Friedrich W, and Michael A. Scarpitti. On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic. , 2013. Print. Top of Form Arendt, Hannah, and Jerome Kohn. Responsibility and Judgment. New York: Schocken Books, 2003. Internet resource. Bottom of Form Bottom of Form Read More