Philosophy and the Structure of Scientific Revolutions - Essay Example

Philosophy Science and Value Values interact with science in three main ways. To begin with, there are values that are epistemic which guide scientific research. The second way is that the enterprise of science which is connected to a particular culture and their norms and values are bound to be represented by individuals coming from the culture whether it is intentional or not. The third way through which science is connected to values is that values come from science both as an end-product and as a procedure and is bound to spread through the society or culture (Proctor, 1991). However, sometimes, some scientific discoveries may pose a challenge to the values that are common in the society. The popular misconception that science is value free is to a vast extent misleading. As much as science is meant to be objective, values are not expected to make the scientists have uneasy relativism. Science incorporates an enormous amount of epistemic values which in turn involves cultural values in practice. Values dictate how individuals regulate information that is likely to be biased and thus produces knowledge that is reliable. Wherever there is a wide range of values, there is bound to be more knowledge. It is, therefore, important to ensure that there is a communal justification and must have a background on principles that are universally accepted. Science has a basis in values since scientists cannot practice fraud, pseudoscience or errors. Science must uphold and value testability, reliability, accuracy, simplicity of concepts, precision, heuristic power and generality (Popper, 2005). Scientists have values, and this can be evidenced by the fact that there are professional bodies that award those who have made significant discoveries in the field. An example of such an award is the Nobel peace prize. Science as an action in itself promotes values in improving knowledge in the material world. In some cases such as research in space science, dissection of sub-atomic matter or even obtaining a better understanding of AIDS is likely is not cheap, and thus the issue of funds come into play. Scientists have to been responsible for the funds that are availed to them and hence need to have values and principles. Other issues in the field of science that require values include the methods through which scientists evaluate claims. These are known as epistemic values and are concerned with ensuring that the observations, confirmations of predictions made for each experiment, statistical analysis, and interventive experiments are carried out in a science laboratory. The values are contingent in that they are derived from previous experience in research (Proctor, 1991). For instance, most people will not put much value on the results of a drug trial that does not use the double blind experimental design. However, in the past, this issue was not of primary concern for issues such as the biases by both the patient and the doctor were put into consideration. In the present day, these issues are now controlled. The preferences at this point have to be acknowledged and are important in teaching science in the present day. Honesty is science is as important as it is in other fields. Researchers and scientists are required to present accurate and detailed reports of any experiments that they have done in a precise manner. If the values are altered to satisfy a particular need or are biased towards a particular direction, or even withhold any necessary information, then it cannot be said to be science. Since science also includes animals, ethics requires that they are handled properly despite being subjects of research (Popper, 2005). As such, science cannot be excluded from social values. For instance, the Nazi scientists examined on hypothermia using human beings. Although their tests passed the other tests of science such as reliability and dependability, it eroded human values and is considered unethical. Science Science seeks to understand the universe in its natural form and how it was formed with the various elements through its physical features. The process is carried out through observation, experimentation and even calculations using observable characteristics if the features (Klemke E D, 1998). Demarcation, on the other hand, is the problem of finding out which criteria should be used to differentiate science from mathematics, metaphysics, and logic. Sometimes, it is very hard to distinguish science from the other subjects hence the need for classification. There are different criteria for demarcation. For instance, there is the criterion by Popper, which suggests falsification. Kuhn, on the other hand, uses the solving of skills as the major criteria for science. Lakato advocates for the need to use research programs that are not present in non-science. Most of the methods advocated for by the various researchers only use one criterion. However, there is the need for developing other methods of ensuring complete demarcation of science. According to modern philosophers, it is impossible to demarcate science using only one criterion hence the need for a multi-criteria approach. One such philosopher is Paul Thagard. He claimed that Popper and Lakatos only used the inner structure of thoughts demarcating science and Kuhn only considered the historical events prior to the phenomena. Thagard claimed that the approaches were insufficient. In order to accurately evaluate a scientific phenomenon, there is the need to consider the logics, history, and the thoughts of the community. He combines the methods formulated by Popper and Kuhn to come up with broader criteria. Lastly, the community has to agree to the theory by giving value by measuring success through comparison of data of alternative theories. Another philosopher by the name Kitcher suggests that a theory can qualify as science if it can be independently tested, if the scientific processes are unified wholes and if they are fertile meaning that they are open to further research. This means that any theory that does not have any potential for change or progress, and then it cannot be said to be science. Gerhard Vollmer on the other and advocates for both internal and external consistency. Internal consistency demands that the theory should not contradict itself and neither should it include any circularity. External consistency means that it should be compatible with whatever is already known by other people. The proposed theory should also have extra features such as testability, reproducibility, and fecundity. Robert Merton also believes in a multi-criterion approach. He believed that both social sciences and natural sciences had the same base (Merton, 1973). He believed that there were four spirits that include organized skepticism, communism, universalism and lack of interest differentiate social sciences from natural sciences. Universalism dictates that claims should be established beforehand and not depend on the opinions of the scientist. Communism states that the discoveries should be those that are acceptable to the entire community. Disinterestedness implies that there should be some form of control in the way that the scientists think to avoid personal inclinations. Organized skepticism suggests that the theory should be questioned properly and deeply. It is clear that observation only as a way of demarcating science is not sufficient. There are many ways of separating science as has been proven by the various philosophers. The issue of demarcation is important to scholars as it is to scientists. Science contains some explanations that are supported by data. While science concentrates on observable facts, pseudoscience does not focus on the said facts. Therefore, testability is one of the major criteria for demarcating science (Klemke E D, 1998). Testability means that the information can be easily verified by the public. Indicators of science include openness to change, having the capacity to solve problems, fertility of the proposed knowledge, any publications on the theory should consist of critiques as well, and it should not contain any internal contradictions and should be able to integrate into existing networks without distorting any of them. Science, the scientific method and scientific theories Scientific realism is notion that the world exists independently of what people think about it. There have been questions regarding the unobservable characteristics that science has. Scientific realists believe that valid claims can be made from the unobservable features that the world has. Scientific realism has two main positions where the first is that there is a group of particular claims that identify a scientific theory (Bunge, 2006). The second position is that science has commitments that will come up with theories that are almost similar to ideal theory. This is referred to as semantic commitment of scientific realism. The Metaphysical commitment of scientific realism is concerned with whether the different factors can be discussed objectively without any prior bias to any side. Epistemological commitment deals with the real reasons to grant a theory audience or to believe an enormous part of the said theory. Metaphysical realism is concerned with the existence of the world independent of what the mind thinks or believes. This notion can best be explained by contrasting it with arguments against it. One example is that it is in doubt by any position is the traditional healing of idealism that implies that there is no external world and thus does not exist in the mind. However, as much as this type of idealism is important in historical science, it remains in the background in modern philosophy of science (Bunge, 2006). There are more arguments against the mind-independence stem which means that people would deny their world of experience indicating that they would be accepting, though indirectly that the world does not exist independent of their minds. The argument here is that the world is researched by the sciences on its own. It is in its way dependent on the thoughts brought about by scientific research, and there is a connection in human convention and scientific taxonomy. Metaphysical realism has some major shortcomings. One such problem is the issue of explaining how sentences and words can explain the world as it is if the ideal theory is false. The second problem is explaining how human beings can come up with statements that cannot be recognized as true given that the human language improves ass person is exposed to different situations. The third problem would be to explain how the understanding that human beings have can be manifested or displayed (Samir, 2002). According to realists, science progresses over time and, therefore, this makes it easier to give accurate predictions about phenomena successfully. It is for this very reason that gives more value to the unobservable aspects of realism. Abductive reasoning is mostly used in scientific reasoning. Abductive reasoning states that inferring is the best explanation. Scientific theories have successfully predicted and explained various phenomena thus can be said to produce a correct description of the world. An argument against realism is the pessimistic induction that claims that many of the theories that had been used in the past are no longer acceptable to the modern day. They claim that the history of science has many theories that made sense in the past but the terms cannot be genuinely referred to such as the effluvial theory of static electricity which has been replaced by other theories. The older theories have been replaced by the newer theories thus depicting the nature of science that it is progressive (Bunge, 2006). Critiques may argue that it is impossible for realist scientists to explain the rapid changes that occur during revolutions. All in all the realist theory remains the best explanation and philosophy. Theories try to explain the world as it is as opposed to antirealists who believe that the theories give empirical adequacies to various phenomena. Theories aim at the truth rather than providing empirical explanations as suggested by anti-realists. The scientific process The scientific revolution is the transition from what has always been known for some new beliefs based on new practices. The developments that were made in the fields of mathematics, physics and chemistry shaped the human views of issues. According to Kuhn, there are various stages in the history of science. First there is the pre-paradigm period, which is followed by normal science, the time of crisis, the revolution and the post-revolution period. The pre-paradigm period is marked by starting the work from the beginning without any background knowledge. At this point, the science is just about data collection, and there is no real guiding principle about how things should be done. The normal period is where science consists of problem-solving and identifying matches in the various facts and predictions that exist (Kuhn, 1996). Scientists at this point do not work to either refute or find any loopholes with the theory but rather assume that it is correct and further build upon it. The assumption is likely to lead to a period of crisis due to anomalies associated with the theories. The time of crisis is where the results that were expected do not tally with the formation that had been used for hence the need for new theories and structures. The period of crisis then forces the scientists to a period of revolution where they need to come up with new theories to verify their experiments and collecting new data. The revolution is marked by a change in the paradigm and beliefs that are considered to be more appropriate and believable. However, the new paradigm is unlikely to change the data completely but will work to accommodate the old model as well. The two different paradigms are likely to have different sets of explanations for the same data hence making the first model look simpler to those who propose it and the second paradigm seem easier to those who agree with it (Kuhn, 1996). The post-revolution period is marked by most of the scientists accepting the new paradigm as it is and using them in any new experiments that they may have. Kuhn also believed in a notion known as incommensurability where he proposes that there is no universal language that can be used across all the different theories. There is also no common observation as it is theory-laden, and every scientist is likely to have different views of the same phenomena. There is also no standard criteria for choosing which theory is best applied for any particular situation hence the need for scientists to use what is best for them (Kuhn, 1996). The most radical view that Kuhn has is that there is no neutral world. This means that scientists who believe in different theories are likely to see the world in very different ways hence lack of a common world in the scientific field. Paradigm changes are not typically seen as revolutions but rather additions to what already exists in the scientific world. The history or the past of the field is usually documented alongside the new paradigm and, for this reason, a revolution mostly seems invisible. Constant literature about the history of science makes the revolutions seem real. The research documents events as they happened and is continuously written and rewritten to accommodate any upcoming views of modern scientists. The books discuss the various theories in detail with the negatives and the positives leaving the reader to decide which side to follow alone. However, sometimes, the textbooks may have some very conflicting information regarding Science leaving even the scientists themselves confused as to what they should or should not follow. Still, more than anything else in the world, there is nothing else that documents science as it is other than the textbooks. References Bunge, M. (2006). Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Klemke E D, H. R. (1998). Introductory Readings in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Prometheus Books. Kuhn, T. (1996). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Merton, R. (1973). The Normative Structure of Science". In The Sociology of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Popper, K. R. (2005). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London-New-York: Routledge Classics. Proctor, R. (1991). Value-Free Science?: Purity and Power in Modern Knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Samir, O. (2002). Philosophy of science: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Read More