Evaluation of the Evil-god Hypothesis - Essay Example

Evaluation of the Evil-god Hypothesis Evaluation of the Evil-god Hypothesis In his article, Stephen Law first reminds his readers about the major claim that is in the classical of monotheism. This claim, as he observes, asserts that there is a creator, who is omniscient, omnipotent, and supremely benevolent. This, therefore, creates the background of the good-god hypothesis. Normally, the people who have the belief in this hypothesis, while insisting that perhaps it is a position of faith, however, consider it reasonable. Having the belief of God’s existence, as they maintain, does not resemble having the belief that fairies or Santa are in existence. He observes that the belief is much more reasonable than just that. Stephen Law then makes the observation that there exist two problems of the evil. He observes that there are the logical problems that are founded on inconsistency that exists between the thought that asserts that there is a maximally good god who is omniscient and omnipotent in existence and the claim that evil exists. Further, he gives the meaning of evil as including both morally blameworthy actions and suffering. The argument then continues as follows (Shenk, 2013). Explicitly, the second argument is true which, therefore, implies that the first argument is untrue. In this argument, Stephen Law tries to argue that if the omnipresent, maximally good, and omniscient god exists, then the evil, which causes suffering and blameworthy actions, should not be in existence. But since the evil is existent, this nullifies the presence of the good god. In addition, he notes that the version of this argument does not consider the relevance of the amount of evil, since it only needs to ascertain that there is some evil, regardless of how little it is. Rowe makes his observation by asserting that’ “The argument is valid; therefore, if we have rational grounds for accepting its premises, to that extent we have rational grounds for accepting atheism.” Maybe, evil’s logical problem does not present a big challenge to theism, as Stephen Law makes an observation. To overcome this problem, there is the need to prove that the all-knowing, maximally good, and all-powerful god may permit some evil for the purpose of a greater good (Stenger, 2014). The second problem, which is the evidential problem, is founded on the assumption that the second argument is incompatible with the first argument logically, but on the assumption that the second argument avails good evidence against the first argument. In this perspective, the amount of evil at this point becomes relevant. Stephen Law further argues that though it can be reasonable to acknowledge that there might be a valid reason why God allows some evil, there can be any valid reason as to why it is for quite so much. The problem can hence be sharpened by observing that God will most probably not allow the existence of any gratuitous suffering. There must, therefore, be a very valid reason for each last ounce of evil. However, considering the philosophy of religion and the belief in the hypothesis of good god, the argument by Stephen Law seems to be invalid. His argument is based on the fact that if there could be a maximally good god in existence, a supreme creator who is ever omniscient and omnipresent, the human beings should not be suffering (Rosenthal, 2009). He argues that it is the evil that brings sufferings and blameworthy actions. Regarding the faith taught in the religious books and religious places, these sufferings are perceived to be temptations to test whether a believer is really dedicated to serving the one and only good God. These religious books and places teach their believers that the sufferings are mostly brought by God and also give the evidence that the same good God let his only son Jesus suffer and later get crucified. This is viewed to the mercy of God to His people. Therefore, both arguments still hold some truth that there is a maximally goo God in existence and also evil exists. If it were not for the evil, God would not get the means to test whether the people are ready to serve Him and, therefore, the blameworthy actions and the sufferings remind the believers that there is a supreme being who can save them from all that (Evans, 2014). Stephen Law later asserts that many people air out the argument that the absolute quantity of evil that is in existence avails the readers with empirical evidence that is overwhelming that the god of classical theism does not exist, regardless of the fact that there is a very little reason that should give the proof. He further asserts that the theists who still hold onto the belief that God exists and they don’t have the proof are reasonably mistaken. Apart from being a question that can be answered through reasons, the assertion that the god of classic monotheism is in existence seems to be directly empirically falsified. In the attempt to justify his evil-god hypothesis, Stephen Law makes the assumption that there is a creator of the universe. He also proceeds to make another assumption that this being is omniscient and omnipresent. Again, he tries to suppose that the creator is not maximally good but rather consider that he is maximally evil, and His depravity is limitless (Adams, 1990). He tries to imagine the creator to have cruelty that has no bounds and there does not exist any other god or gods but only this ‘Supreme Being’ that is wicked. He then refers this hypothesis as the evil-god hypothesis. He tries to figure out whether the evil-god hypothesis makes sense. He says that, in most of the simplest versions of the popular arguments that justify that God exists are unable to avail any clue regarding the moral character of our creator. In that case, the arguments tend to offer their support to the good-god hypothesis. This, therefore, implies that these arguments do not very much if any possibility, offer any support to the evil-god hypothesis. In his hypothesis, Stephen Law tries to consider the problem of good. He questions whether there is any evidence of the problem of good that can act as indisputable evidence to challenge the evil-god hypothesis. The problem arises in attempting to give an explanation as to why a supremely evil god who is omnipotent and omniscient would permit so immense good into his creation. For instance, he questions why would an evil god give some people so much wealth, health and happiness, decorate the world with natural beauty that would give pleasure to human beings, permit people to help one another hence reducing the suffering and increase the degree of the things that do not make him happy like love, give people children to love who love them back unconditionally, and equips human beings with young bodies that are beautiful and healthy (Cole, 2006). Concerning this argument again, he makes the conclusion that if it could be true that a supremely evil being would be going to introduce conscious beings in his creation, it would subject them to torture and make them do things that are evil. He also would not allow rainbows, laughter, and laugh and neither will he allow his creation to exercise the kind of courageous and selfless acts that are helpful in reducing the suffering and pain of others. Stephen Law, therefore, agrees that the world has much evil though there is a great deal of good. The conclusion that Law makes concerning the evil god who does much good to his creation is not substantial because the characteristics he tries to imagine the god are impossible. From the beginning, he defined evil as the one who brings about suffering and blameworthy actions but he is now contradicting himself and trying to imagine of an evil god who is omnipresent, omniscient but maximally evil. The good things that he observes given by the evil god, if taken under careful scrutiny, all come with a price but the maximally good supreme god does not make the human beings pay any price. Also, the wealth and health that is given by the maximally evil supreme being is not always genuine because it seems to be overemphasized and exaggerated (Martinez, 2013). As I have made my observation in the previous years, the wealth that is left behind by people who acquired it through the maximally evil god after their death has not been beneficial to the next of kin. This is where the maximally evil god takes the position to expose his creation to a great deal of suffering, unlike the maximally good god who ensures that during the times of trials and temptations he strengthens his creation. Considering this fact, the argument by Stephen Law about the evil-god hypothesis seems to be invalid. In the attempt to justify his position, he poses the question, ‘What of the asymmetry between the free-will and reverse free-will theodicies?’. Stein makes an attempt to defend the thesis that asserts that for each theodicy, there exist an exact parallel by making the argument that, in fact, free will is not an intrinsic good. Stephen, however, tries to make the assumption that free will is an intrinsic good, for the purpose of argument. He also poses another question to emphasize on his hypothesis that, ‘But does it require that we put aside my symmetry thesis , the thesis that if we load the good-god and evil-god scales in the correct way, with all the evidence that is available and other concerns that are pertinent to the reasonableness nature of a belief, that the two scales settle in roughly similar positions?’. He gives his three reasons as to why he doesn’t believe so. The first reason is that the asymmetry that exists between the two theodicies may be neutralized very well by another. He makes the observation that for people to possess the full variety of free choices between evil and good, God, whether evil or good, must expose his creation to suffering, pain and death not simply as possibilities but as realities (Evans, 2014). References Shenk, R. A. (2013). The wonder of the cross: The God who uses evil and suffering to destroy evil and suffering. Martinez, B. C. (June 01, 2013). Is Evil Good for Religion? The Link between Supernatural Evil and Religious Commitment. Review of Religious Research: the Official Journal of the Religious Research Association, 55, 2, 319-338. Stenger, V. J. (2014). The new atheism: Taking a stand for science and reason. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. Evans, D. (2014). Atheism. London; Hodder & Stoughton Cole, P. (2006). The myth of evil. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Adams, M. M. C., & Adams, R. M. (1990). The Problem of evil. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rosenthal, B. (2009). Atheism. Detroit, MI: Greenhaven Press. Read More