Ernst Machs Introductory Remarks: Anti-Metaphysical - Essay Example

College Ernst Mach’s Introductory remarks: Anti-metaphysical It is without any much doubt that Ernst Mach has gained reputation as one of the most influential thinkers during the period extending to 1900 within the intellectual discourse in Vienna. Not only was his work influential within the philosophical context, but also greatly affected other disciplines including psychology, sociology, economics, politics, literature and also arts (Carus 17). His most famous publication, The analysis of Sensation and the Relation of the Physical to the Psychical published in the year 1886 and whose popularity can be explained by the four new editions available within only a span of six years which attests to the fact that Mach’s influence was mainly effective between 1900 and 1910. Introductory Remarks: Antimetaphysical (Antimetaphysische Vorbemerkungen) forms the beginning of the Analysis of Sensation. What is the meaning of being anti-metaphysical for Mach? Mach’s meaning of being anti-metaphysical is anchored on two arguments. The first argument basically concerns the classic subject/object dichotomy in which Mach strictly rejects Kantian ‘things in themselves’ which holds for both bodies outside of us and also the first person. Mach argues that all that is given to us by immediate experience is an implication of a bundle of qualities like sound, smell and spaces. Consequently, whatever he refers to as elements or sensations and the elements appear in all different kinds of combination. This he says apply not only to our inner experiences, but also the experiences of both our body and the objects outside of us (Mach 21). This basically implies that whatever is relevant to scientific research is just their functional connexion to each other, however, their ontological statues is neutral according to Mach. Other aspects like object or body refers to nothing but different bundles of perception which look more stable compared to others thus making us to think they may be referring to some Cartesian substance. However, I must agree that the Ego looks a bit permanent in a manner that is absolute just like all the other objects like our body. It is therefore more likely that the existing dichotomy between appearance and reality may vanish. From the ontological perspective, it is worth mentioning that all the bundles are of the same nature. Regarding a particular combination of elements either as psychic or physical to this end now looks no more of a question about their statues of existence, but more about the particular perspective that is involved in different experiments. I believe we can have a better understanding of this when viewed from the perspective of being interested in the dependency of a particular colour from the luminous source, in which we take it as a physical object. However, putting our focus on it as regards to the retina, will make us view it from the psychological point of view. Mach’s bundle theory of perception on the other hand argues that ‘I’, with respect to the first person does not refer to some mental substance just like implied in its meaning. This is informed by the fact that just like in the case of our inner experience, it is almost impossible to come across anything like Cartesian Ego; hence the notion of the ‘I’ according to Mach is nothing but a logical outcome of his analysis of sensation within a sensualistic positivistic tradition of empiricism. This is a clear indication that Mach himself did not take this philosophical internal consequence of his bundle theory as a kind comment on the different individual crises just around the turn of the century. What is the basis for Mach’s own philosophy? An intuit analysis of Mach’s published papers portrays a clear picture of an ingenious experimentalist who was keen and an original critic of the empirical foundations of science and a person who was singularly alert as regards the value of exploring questions in the areas in which physics, physiology and psychology overlap (Carus 14). It is worth appreciating the fact that Mach’s interest in physics was naturally born as a result of insatiable and tender curiosity as regards the world of his immediate environment. Training could also be attributed to his philosophy as Mach was a physicist by training and never wanted to be known professionally as anything else apart from physicist. It is noted that at the tender age of 25 during 1863, Mach realized that his scientific curiosity could only be natured, but also promoted best if he were to become a serious student of history of scientific ideas and practice, which explains why next to Mach’s dedication to scientific investigation history was his lifelong interest. It is thus evident that the initial stimulus for his involvement in the history of science was a practical one that was intimately related to his quest to find sound pedagogical techniques in the teaching of science (Carus 26). Hofmannsthal’s diaries also show the immediate influence of Mach. Various remarks either explicitly or implicitly remind the reader of Mach’s philosophy, which we can attribute to the fact that Hofmannsthal joined Mach’s lectures in summer 1897 and was therefore quite familiar with his work. A clear example would be when Hofmannsthal writers about the perishability of the ‘I’ in his diaries. Generally, we can conclude that amongst the contemporary thinkers, Mach distinguishes himself by his independence and the exactness of these thoughts and generally an absolute absence of pretension which with all his prominence as regards the history of science makes him pretty nigh as one of the most respectable people in the world. The fact that Mach does not rely on others, but goes his own way makes him original. Despite having been influence by other great thinkers in both philosophy and physics, he distinguishes himself by not becoming a disciple of any one of them which we can say is evident in his distinction between theory and fact, his observation of modus operandi of science itself which is evident in his economy of thought. It is being this economical that leads into simplification which is an implication of a system of monism hence making Mach one of the leading monists who came up with theories in tentative and empirical as opposed to dogmatic and metaphysical. Mach’s practice of philosophy with regard to idealism and materialism To begin with, it is worth noting that any individual who is least acquainted with philosophical literature need to understand that rarely can a contemporary professor of either philosophy or theology be found who is not directly or indirectly engaged in refuting materialism. Most if not all revolutionists are engaged in refuting materialism while pretending though an in-depth would reveal that they are pretending as they end up refuting the materialist Plekhanov as opposed to the materialist Engel or the materialist Feuerbach though most disturbingly they would be refuting materialism from the standpoint of the recent and modern positivism and natural science amongst many others. To this regard, it is worth appreciating the fact that Mach has gained popularity as being the most popular representative of empirio-criticism today and is universally acknowledge in philosophical literature. The concept of eclecticism is majorly marked in Mach’s latest philosophical work , Knowledge and Error, 2nd edition, 1906, where Mach declares that there is no difficulty in constructing each and every element of sensation in which context he refers to out of psychical elements, and then in the same book postulates that about dependencies outside the boundary which in this context refers to spatial boundary of our body since there are physics in the broadest sense. He further goes ahead to construct physical elements from psychical elements and letter turns out that the physical elements actually lie beyond the boundary of psychical elements which do indeed lie within the body. This basically implies that Mach does indeed forget his own theory as regards treating various problems of physics. Consequently, the physicist’s body end up being a reflection of not only bodies, but also liquid, and gases existing outside us and which makes them independent of us which thus turns out to be not only approximate, but also refers to this simplification arbitrary wrong. Therefore, it is evident that Mach’s own theory is actually subjective to idealism and in instances requiring objectivity he inserts into his arguments the premises of the contrary implying the materialist, or the theory of knowledge. Thus, we are justified to term Mach’s philosophical as a mixture of naïve realism and absolute illusionism. Mach’s arguments qualify to be naïve realism implying that the materialist theory of knowledge is unconsciously and instinctively taken over from the other scientists. Works Cited Carus, Paul. The Surd of Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Question Are There Things-in Themselves? Chicago: The Open court publishing company, 1903. Print. Mach, Ernst. The Analysis of Sensations: And the Relation of Physical to the Psychical. New York: Dover, 1959. Print. Read More