Critiques of Ned Blocks Distinction of the Two Types of Consciousness - Essay Example

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHENOMENAL COUSNCOUSNESS AND ACCESS CONSCIOUSNESS Institute: CATHOLIC OF EASTEARN AFRICA Summary The paper looks in details Ned Block’s views on the differences between P-consciousness and A-consciousness. The paper analyzes these views and offers a critical view of the Block’s conception of the differences between the two. The Relationship between Phenomenal Consciousness and Access Consciousness One of the most troublesome facets of attempting to define and explain phenomenal consciousness (p-consciousness is the fact that it is actually not possible to give an exact definition of what consciousness is. This is due to the fact that a good definition of a particular term should necessarily not include the term itself within the definition that is seeks to provide. Breaching this rule amounts to the fallacy of begging the principle, petitio principi. However, it is almost impossible to define consciousness in any other way, without falling back to the same term - consciousness, in explaining what consciousness entails. But even after giving a rather imprecise definition of consciousness, we still remain with the trouble of differentiating between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. This paper, therefore, analyses and critiques Ned Block’s distinction of these two types of consciousness. But, before the analysis and the critique, it is necessary to look at and consider the details what consciousness actually is according to Ned Block’s chapter, ‘concept of consciousness’ in David Chamber’s book, Philosophy of Mind: Classic and contemporary Readings. Many scholars are agreed that phenomenal consciousness (p- consciousness) can simply be defined as experience. In John Searle’s chapter, he summarizes the classic conception of consciousness. Searle states, “consciousness is a subjective state of awareness that begins when one wakes up in the morning and continues throughout until one falls into a dreamless sleep, coma or dies…’’ (Block 2002 p.206). In the same vein Searle continues, “One is said to be in a p-consciousness state if the properties of the state of consciousness are experiential.” (Block 2002 p.206). The experiential properties of consciousness include: sensations (to include the five human senses) as well as thoughts, wants and emotions. This means that we have p-conscious state when we see, hear, smell taste and/or have experiences as diverse as pain and desire. The difference in p-consciousness arises with respect to difference in intentional content. This is proven by Block’s following statement, “What is it like to hear a sound as coming from the left differs with what it is to listen to sound from the right? P-consciousness properties are distinct from any cognitive intentional or functional properties.” (Block 2002 p.206). Similarly, Francis Crick and Christof Koch (famous neurophysiologists) came up with a theory explaining how a consciousness of any state is formed as a result of nervous tissue irritation. According to them, “a synchronized 35-75 hertz neural oscillation in sensory areas of cortex is at the heart of phenomenal consciousness. Different areas of visual cortex are sensitive to color, shape and so on” (Block 2002 p.207). T.X. Huxley shares the same view on what constitutes the p-consciousness. He says, “How it is that anything as remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as uncountable as the appearance of Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp…that is why you do not see redness and blueness without seeing them as belonging with particular shapes and motions. Representations of colors, shapes and motions of a single object are meant to oscillate in phase with each other but this should not occur with representation.” (Block 2002 p.207) In this way, the author makes not of the inherently odd and tenuous nature of what defines consciousness and thought within the formal constructs of human language. The true and literal definition of such will likely never be found or if it is will likely never be fully agreed upon due to the fact that seeking to bend words to legitimize such an abstract concept is likely an exercise in futility. On the other hand, a-consciousness plays a deep role in our ordinary actions with regards to how we think and what sensory information relates to our brain. As human beings, we do have another type of consciousness different from the p-consciousness; this type of consciousness is cognitive and intentional, as opposed to the sensational p-consciousness. A- consciousness therefore is unique to human beings, unlike the p-consciousness that human beings share with animals. Neil Block recognizes one of the main differences between p-consciousness and a-consciousness to be that while, p-consciousness is occurring, a-consciousness is dispositional. This distinction seems plausible, given the sensational nature of p-consciousness and the intentional nature of a-consciousness. Block and Fodor have recognized the “disposition factor between p-consciousness and a-consciousness as the basis for criticism of both functionalism and behaviorism.” (Block 2002 p.208) According to functionalism, the level of abstraction by the mind is one that determines the multiple realizations that occur as a result of the inputs the brain receives. For many philosophers, realization does not matter. Conversely, the biological perspective is contrary to this point of view and states that realization matters. Hence even in biology there is a division between a-consciousness and p-consciousness. A-consciousness and p-consciousness interact when perceptual information is processed. P-consciousness can sense the figure on the ground; however, if/when the figure on the group changes positions the phenomena appears differently. Similarly, this phenomena does not affect a-consciousness in any way. Likewise, an example of a-consciousness is guessing by a blind person. Although the person does not know what actually he/she is guessing looks like. Here we find that a-consciousness mirrors that of p-consciousness. Some of the differences between a-consciousness and p-consciousness are that p-conscious content is phenomenal while a-conscious content is representational. A-conscious content can play a role in reasoning because only representational content is useful in reasoning. Block in this chapter conceives p-conscious content as the totality of experiential properties. The author finds the content of an experience to be both p-conscious and a-conscious where the experience has both the phenomenal properties and representational properties. Another difference is that a-conscious is functional notion while p-conscious is not a functional notion. The a-conscious content is system related. It involves informational relations among modules. On the other hand, the content of p-conscious is what takes place in the p-conscious module. Likewise, an example of p-type consciousness would be having headache as headache pain must be distinctly felt. On the other hand, a-consciousness is not accessible at some other points in time. The author derides the idea that sense is not a sense of consciousness, and that a-consciousness is not a sense of consciousness. He argues that as much as a-conscious is dependent on the core notion of p-consciousness – so also are the two mutually defensible forms of consciousness. In the same way, a blind person who guesses that an X exists and not an O in the blind field can be thought to have no p-consciousness of the existence of X. Of course, the blind man has no X representing a-conscious. Therefore, the author concludes that due to the fact that the information or lack of information influences his guess, it does not appear as a reasoning premise. This way the patient is said to be unconscious of the phenomenal reality. When the blind person has a notion of existence of X but cannot tell the font of the letter X, then the perceptual content of having an X in his visual field is a-conscious and not p-conscious since he cannot realize the linkage. Such is one case of a-consciousness without p-consciousness. A case of p-consciousness without a-consciousness is a case where one is engaged in an intense conversation and then suddenly realizes that there has been a drill digging up the street. (Block 2002 p.210) Although the person has been aware of the noise all along, he was consciously aware of it only in the afternoon. This implies that before noon the person was with p-conscious only. (Block 2002 p.210) It certainly seems possible that the neural bases of p-consciousness system and a-consciousness system are distinct but, that is in fact not the case due to the fact that the two are so inextricably linked within the broader definition of human consciousness. This means, there are possibilities, at least conceptual, for one to get damaged while the other remain unaffected…each of the two brain hemisphere might have separate ratios, proportions or levels of p/a-conscious. Some of these sub systems might also be a-consciousness, but other systems might lack enough machinery for reporting or reasoning. (Block 2002 p. 210) It is in monitoring consciousness that one appreciates the overall breadth of experience that it gives. Such a study is inherently important to understanding both the inner workings and constructs of psychology and the mind as well as seeking to ascertain a more complete and firm view of human relationships and interactions that take place on a daily basis. Although “consciousness” is an extremely difficult concept to define, the fact of the matter is that in seeking to understanding the nuances of how levels of consciousness interrelate to our understanding of human thought, experience, and actualization, oftentimes the definition itself becomes of secondary importance whereas the overall process and key inputs and knowledge gained is of primary importance to the reader/researcher. Reference Block, N 1995, On a confusion about a function of consciousness, Behavioral And Brain Sciences, 18, 2, pp. 227-287, PsycINFO, EBSCOhost, viewed 6 November 2012. Read More