Consciousness and Free Will - Essay Example

Your Full Your Teacher’s April 28, Consciousness and Free Will Consciousness is something that has befuddled both scientists and philosophers alike for centuries. The very definition of consciousness has been subject to intense debate for the same reason, which makes it quite obvious how hard it is to have a discussion on a topic as complex as consciousness and the nature of it. This paper shall, however, attempt to approach this problem in an objective manner, within the limitations. In the case given, Levi’s brain fMRI revealed his brain to be positronic, composed of circuits, microchips, etc., rather than grey matter. However, Levi clearly is able to perceive pain as he suffers from headaches. He also suspects his recent improvement in math, which he attributes to the possible transmogrification of brain to a positronic one. This raises the question whether Levi is, first of all, conscious and whether he is a person. Before addressing the question, three major philosophies of mind should be analyzed – Behaviorism, Identity-theory, and Functionalism. Behaviorism is the theory of mind that postulates that mental state is identifiable with the physical state. For example, the statement “John is happy”, for a behaviorist, is identifiable with his observable physical state – elevated heart rate, a smiling face, and so on.However, this is highly flawed – given that different stimuli could prompt different behavior and vice versa. Different people may like or hate the same movie (different behavior), or one could get elated by watching a movie or a play, or even a puppy (different stimuli). Identity theory, on the other hand, identifies the mental state with natural substance i.e. brain or neuronal tissue. So in essence, one’s mind is their neurology, or to be precise their neural activity. However, this is not without problems. Mental states are not identifiable with brain states. Saying, for instance, “My Cgroup fibers are firing” is not equivalent to saying “I feel pain”. This makes the Identity theory suspect as well. The third theory, which is perhaps the most popular of the three, is Functionalism. Functionalism, while concedes that brain states are responsible for mental states, differs with identity theory in that they are identifiable with the neural activity. To coin a loose analogy, the mind is the software that is emergent from the hardware that is the brain. Functionalist approach is neutral to both materialism and dualism, despite being highly favored by materialists themselves. Adopting a functionalist approach to the problem in hand, the fact that Levi’s brain is made of microchips and circuits or organic brain matter is not relevant to whether or not he is conscious. Even with his distinct physical makeup, Levi is conscious as he has the same functional relationship as otherwise ‘normal’ human being would have, as mental states are constituted by their functional roles. Now an objection that could be raised is about the perception of pain, which is a quale. Qualia is a term that used to describe individual instances of subjective experiences. Levi has experienced headaches, which is what prompted him to consult the doctor in the first place, and this has to be accounted for from a functionalist point of view. There are two ways to approach this problem. First is the Dennettian approach to qualia, where he posits that the very traditional definition of qualia is problematic. According to Dennett, the traditional definition of qualia, on close introspection, turns out to be either obsolete as it cannot be used in the situation in question, or the very way it is defined renders the questions qualia itself poses unanswerable. The qualia, or the sense of the ‘subjective experience’, which forms our reality, are illusory. So we do not see the qualia in the objective world, but rather our qualia itself lets us see the objective world. There is another perspective that addresses the qualia chestnut within a functionalist framework. The functionalist inability to describe qualia can be attributed to the sheer complexity that an experience entails. When we feel pain, for instance – we do not merely receive the ‘information’ of pain, but also the information that we have noticed that we are in pain. And if we are to further the chain, we also receive the information that we received the information of pain, and so on. To add to that, the very experience might trigger a series of subtle subconscious emotions, memories and so on - lots and lots of them. Now the more important and tricky part is concluding if Levi is a person. The concept of personhood is such a complex and tricky area, which makes one even wonder if it would be possible to come up with a coherent theory of personhood. However that maybe, to complicate the issues further, we have two ideas of personhood that are intertwined with each other, but are still distinct. One is moral personhood and the other metaphysical. Moral personhood is the idea that considers people as moral agents, whose behavior can be evaluated in the light of ethics as morally right or wrong. Metaphysical personhood, on the other hand, uses personhood as a category encompassing beings that fulfill certain criteria. There is no consensus on what these are, but broadly speaking, according to this conception of personhood, a thing is a person if it is a conscious, intelligent, feeling agent. To elucidate the distinction, we still largely seem to treat the clinically insane as metaphysical persons, but not moral persons with moral agency. However, being a metaphysical person seems to be a pre-requisite for being a moral person. Keeping these in mind, we shall consider Daniel Dennett’s approach to personhood. Let us see his six criteria for personhood, which shall be briefly explained and see if Levi fits them: 1. Rationality: An agent, simply put, could be considered rational if he is able to do the cost-benefit analysis accordingly. This entails that the entity tends to choose the most effective means to the end. Levi seems to fit this criterion – he goes into the doctor complaining headaches by himself. 2. Intentional predicates: The term Intention here, refers to the mental state, e.g., feeling, imagination etc., which we would typically attribute to something. For e.g., the fear is always fear ofsomething rather than something that occurs in isolation. In this case, Levi felt an (unusual) pain in his head, so he seems to check this box as well. 3. Adopted stance: Here, the personhood is contingent upon the attitude or personal stance taken towards it. This is, at least in part, a determinant of moral personhood, rather than purely a metaphysical one. Here, Levi was treated as a ‘human’ by doctors, and was given medicines for pain management. 4. Reciprocity: The object in question, according to Dennett, must be able to reciprocate some way – or rather to simplify, should be able to treat others as persons. This is more of an aspect that exclusively applies to the moral personhood (a person could still exist as a metaphysical person without fulfilling this criteria – for eg. psychopaths) rather than metaphysical one, and we have insufficient data to conclude either way. 5. Verbal communication: There are more intricacies to this criterion (for eg. deaf and mute are not capable of verbal communication) – but this is something that excuses animals as active moral agents. But either way, in this case, Levi fits this criterion as well. 6. Consciousness: The person in question should be distinct from other beings by being conscious in a special way, which, according to Dennett, is identified as ‘self-consciousness. This is central to both moral and metaphysical personhood. Levi seems to be self-conscious, he felt pain, he consulted the doctors and more importantly, speculates (regardless of whether there is an actual correlation) that his improved math results might be due to the change in his brain. It is important to note that, these are normative ideals for ‘personhood’, and as much as each of them might be necessary, someone can only aspire to fit the approximations. There are no strict lines to be drawn that are not arbitrary. Now using Dennett’s concept of personhood as a reasonable rule of the thumb instead, we can see that Levi clearly fits most of the criteria, save the fourth – but even in that case he does not contradict the criteria. Whether Levi is a moral person might be, hence, still subject to debate, however he clearly fits the criteria for metaphysical personhood. The functionalist approach is not without flaws. But no other approach, when it comes to theory of mind, is, and we have addressed the major concerns regarding qualia and what constitutes personhood from a functionalist perspective. So in conclusion, the mere fact that Levi has a positronic brain does not matter in the functionalist approach, which as he seems to exhibit the same functional relationships that other humans do, and hence he ought to be conscious. The question regarding his personhood needs much more contemplation – however, despite the ambiguity regarding his moral personhood and agency, he still appears to be to be, at least, a metaphysical person. Works Cited Dennett, Daniel Clement. Quining qualia.S.l.: Oxford University Press, 1988. Print. Dennett, Daniel Clement. "Conditions of Personhood." The Identities of persons. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. . Print. Levin, Janet. "Functionalism." Stanford University. Stanford University, 24 Aug. 2004. Web. 28 Apr. 2014. Read More