Hospers' Meaning and Free Will - Essay Example

Hospers’ Meaning and Free Will -- A Critical Essay John Hospers does believe in free will but the point is, in his treatment of the analysis of what constitutes a free act, he claims that it is subject to unconscious motivation and is less powerful influence on a person who loses control or under a neurotic conflict. According to him, acting based on free will is conscious yet such event is directed by unseen wires hidden within human unconsciousness at depth which guides the main course of hatred or desire to do something that may set the person free. By this argument as well, Hospers states that one cannot be held responsible for an action resulting from a decision governed by the unconscious drive no matter how deliberately done in the process. Though a person sees and is aware of what he actually does, there emerges a series of rationalizations in attempt to explain this while one is absent in the realization that as he acts in conscious effort or free will, it is the unconscious or the inner clockwork that takes control. Similarly, Hospers maintains the proposition that because this is so, it is the act that must be accountable and not the man to answer for his state of being since his conscious approach serves only as a vehicle to deliver the ends brought about by the unconscious motivation. Within the latter, Hospers assumes that the key to its impact relies upon the shared functions of the ‘id’ by which the wants are acknowledged, the ‘superego’ that typically contradicts the ‘id’, and the unconscious ego which through compromise, keeps these two in proper balance. In support of his position, the professor opens the subject by designating freedom in certain contexts where it may come to mind a full comprehension in relation to the nature of an act. He argues that ambiguity exists in claiming that a voluntary act is free. Hospers does not completely abolish the possibility of being inclined to the thought that all voluntary acts are free or conversely, that free acts are voluntary, he clarifies however that this is limited in scope due to subjective human preference which distinguishes acts that are voluntary from those that are not even if both could be initiated by freedom. As such, Hospers gives fair view of compulsion behind a voluntary deed which logically suggests that if one is only compelled to do something then obviously, this is contrary to freedom or a sign of such idea as we know it. Similarly, Hospers exemplifies a concept by Schlick to develop a basis for this assumption where the latter necessitates that the free act is the uncompelled act. He even holds that the notion of free will is merely an inexcusable confusion between compulsion and universal causality. Schlick then recognizes the significance of putting distinction between an act rendered of necessity by causal uniformity which is free and that which is done of necessity through compulsion which is not. It turns out freedom and compulsion lie in separate dimensions. Where there is compulsion, man is not free and likewise, if man is not suppressed by external factors in obtaining his natural desires then freedom leads his attitude in meeting his wanted ends. Schlick may have regarded this brief clarification as accurate enough to cease any further examination of the matter yet Hospers expresses that it is somewhat unsatisfactory in view of the supposedly adequate meaning given to the term ‘free’ considering a number of factors such as cultural diversity and social experiences which affect an individual’s perception of freedom. Another perspective introduced by Stebbing states that ‘one must never call acts free, but only the doers of the acts’ then Hospers notes that this also amounts to an interpretation signifying that because freedom in this case depends on the actor to whom the description of ‘free’ is applied, it would follow that not all actions can be freely carried out by the human being on a ground which is close to G.E. Moore’s philosophy stating that ‘we are free to do an act if we can do it if we want to, that which we can do if we want to is what we are free to do. Specific examples in reality are further enumerated in the substance of the investigation with which Hospers hopes for his readers to confidently grasp after which he appears comfortable to reaffirm that the will of a man is not itself free to rule over inevitable circumstances and in reality, the flux of events would eventually command this will to blend and get along, losing its power or essential task of identifying a person with a degree of uniqueness compared to the other. At this point, Hospers begins discussing the role of the unconscious motivation as a principal silent worker that determines human behavior yet even if not or very rarely known to a moralist or an above average person beyond the confines of psychoanalysis, it enslaves or utilizes conscious free will which humans have frequently taken faith in their endeavour to choose. In other words, free will is run by the capacity of unconscious impulses which enable people to employ conscious exertion with reasons that are but derived unconsciously. To some extent, when Hospers concretizes the foundation of his theory on meaning and free will with particular case studies, I understand how he manages to scrutinize with his philosophy under a specified rather than a generalized concern to prevent any misleading attempt with broadness. However, there occur points which he might have either taken for granted or forgotten to regard as pertinent. I think he is missing consideration of a person’s ability to introspect or look into oneself meditatively and recount personal reactions to a situation which could have been illogical yet escapes his notice at the time. An individual in this scenario may seem to exhibit anxiety at rationalizing with the truth due to unready mood but there have undeniably been real-life cases of repentance or asking for someone’s forgiveness having done an unfavorable act confessing that one is aware of his unconsciousness the time it is taking place. So even amidst psychological struggle, evidences show how conditioning can potentially divert or transform one’s way of thinking which consequently affects his paradigm or the manner of perceiving the meaning of things which would facilitate later actions. In one of the instances presented by Hospers in reference to a university student who is apparently prominent and looked up to in almost every aspect, I could figure that this student has unconsciously imposed upon his friends, assuming that part of such unconscious doing feels conscious about his knowledge of the trust earned by these friends. He could have shown the unpleasant portion of his nature he supposes only people close to him will ever accept with profound understanding. Of course, this is not to bypass or discredit the reasoning offered by the psychoanalytical scheme with which Hospers generates his thesis but unless he takes to account elements besides those stored in the realms of the unconscious, the argument may be found lacking in vital pieces when confronted with a similar case in which the person with neurosis becomes cured and exhibits a new pattern of behavior, getting accustomed to an environment totally different than that of the past. If Hospers would insist still on the power of unconscious motivation ever at work this stage, he may do so except he ought not to exclude that spontaneity of events on new grounds abound with fresh insights due to which the former unconscious task may be altered significantly. With conscious effort by experience, I have personally been able to overcome unconscious motivation by observing how often people in my circle respond with unusual resentment toward an action not originally meaning to offend. Since it has happened several times, I believe my consciousness becomes voluntarily encouraged to assess my inner self so that I am made to contemplate by intense recollection so I can troubleshoot and draw from the invisible network, manning my conscious abilities. This way apart from Hospers’ principle, I gradually unlearn the unconscious habit. Learning to unlearn what used to be done has proven difficult I must admit but this is no excuse to justifying that it is right for me to remove my responsibility for the consequences of my acts whether free or not. Read More